Summary
holding injured employee who asked his employer for medical assistance, and employer refused, and employee then went to physician of his own choice, employee could recover medical benefits
Summary of this case from Fleming Enterprises, Inc. v. HendersonOpinion
No. 39486.
February 28, 1955.
1. Workmen's compensation — coronary occlusion — causal connection — one for medical experts — triers of fact.
In workmen's compensation proceeding based on claim of employee who suffered chest pains while on job as helper on oil well servicing crew, where subsequent medical examination disclosed that employee had suffered a coronary occlusion, factual issue of causal relationship between heart attack and duties of employee was one for medical experts and triers of facts.
2. Workmen's compensation — coronary occlusion — causal connection established.
In such case, evidence was sufficient to support finding that there was a causal connection between heart attack and employee's duties.
3. Workmen's compensation — refusal of employer to furnish medical benefits — personal physician — medical benefits allowed.
In such case, where employee who suffered chest pains while on job as helper asked employer for medical assistance, and employer refused, and employee then went to physician of his own choice, employee could recover medical benefits. Sec. 6998-08, Code 1942.
Headnotes as approved by Gillespie, J.
APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Adams County; JAMES A. TORREY, Judge.
Richard A. Billups, Jr., Jackson, for appellants.
I. The Circuit Court erred in awarding compensation and medical benefits to the appellee for the reason it was not shown he suffered an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of his employment. Fischer v. Gloster Lbr. Bldg. Supply Co. (Miss.), 57 So.2d 871; Hamilton v. Huebner (Neb.), 19 N.W.2d 552, 163 A.L.R. 1; Ingalls Shipbuilding Corp. v. Howell, 221 Miss. 824, 74 So.2d 863; Le Viness v. Mauer (Fla.), 53 So.2d 113; McNeill v. Thompson (Fla.), 53 So.2d 868; Newton v. Station Industrial Acc. Comm. (Cal.), 267 P. 542, 60 A.L.R. 1279; Ross v. City of Fairmong, 140 Neb. 550, 300 N.W. 574; State ex rel. Hussman Ligonier Co. v. Hugh, 348 Mo. 319, 153 S.W.2d 40; T.H. Mastin Co. v. Mangum, 215 Miss. 454, 61 So.2d 298; United States Fidelity Guaranty Co. v. Wilson, 184 Miss. 823, 185 So. 902.
II. The Circuit Court erred in awarding medical benefits for the reason that the uncontradicted evidence shows that appellee failed to comply with Section 7 of the Workmen's Compensation Act. Ingalls Shipbuilding Corp. v. Byrd, 215 Miss. 234, 60 So.2d 645; Thornton v. Magnolia Textiles, Inc. (Miss.), 55 So.2d 172.
R.L. Netterville, Natchez, for appellee.
I. There is substantial evidence to support the action of the Commission in awarding compensation and medical benefits to the appellee as there was creditable testimony by expert witnesses that appellee suffered an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of his employment. Barry v. Sanders Co., 211 Miss. 656, 52 So.2d 493; Cowart v. Pearl River Tung Co., 218 Miss. 472, 67 So.2d 356; Deemer Lumber Co. v. Hamilton, 211 Miss. 673, 52 So.2d 634; Fischer v. Gloster Lbr. Bldg. Supply Co. (Miss.), 57 So.2d 871; LaDew v. LaBorde, 216 Miss. 598, 63 So.2d 56, 825; Pearson v. Dixie Elec. Power Assn., 219 Miss. 884, 70 So.2d 6; Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Hollingsworth, 221 Miss. 688, 74 So.2d 754; T.H. Mastin Co. v. Mangum, 215 Miss. 454, 61 So.2d 298; Thornton v. Magnolia Textiles, Inc. (Miss.), 55 So.2d 634.
II. The Circuit Court did not err in finding as a matter of fact and law that the complainant complied with Section 7 of the Workmen's Compensation Act. Vol. II, Larson's Workmen's Comp. Law, Sec. 78.41 p. 260.
Appellee was employed February 13, 1953 as a helper on an oil well servicing crew. While on the job, on February 21, 1953, appellee suffered pains in his chest. He had worked eight days during that period, a total of 72 hours, and as much as 13 hours in a day. Subsequent medical tests showed a picture of acute posterior myocardial infarction resulting from coronary occlusion. Appellee had recovered by the time of the hearing before the attorney-referee to the extent he could do light work. Appellee's duties required him to work on wet, slippery ground in rainy weather, and part of his job was lifting and stacking pipes weighing about 100 pounds. The work was attended with considerable strain.
The attorney-referee found that appellee was entitled to compensation and medical benefits, and this finding was affirmed by the commission and the circuit court.
The first contention is that appellee did not suffer accidental injury arising out of and in the course of his employment. The specific inquiry is whether there was sufficient proof for the commission to find that there was causal connection between the heart attack and appellee's duties performed in the course of his employment. Four physicians testified. One testified that the work and strain of appellee's job were probable contributing causes of his heart attack. Two thought there was no relation between appellee's work and the heart attack. The other had no opinion.
(Hn 1) The conflict in the testimony was a typical one which made an issue for the commission as the trier of the facts. In heart attack cases such as this, the factual issue of causal relationship is usually one for the medical experts and the triers of the facts. The award made by the commission was authorized under our decisions. LaDew, et al v. LaBorde, 216 Miss. 598, 63 So.2d 56; Cowart v. Pearl River Tung Co., 67 So.2d 356; Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Hollingsworth, 74 So.2d 754.
Appellants cite two cases decided recently by this Court, Fischer v. Gloster Lumber Building Supply Co., 57 So.2d 871, and Ingalls Shipbuilding Corp., et al v. Howell, 74 So.2d 863. Neither case applies here. In the Fischer case, the two testifying physicians reached opposite conclusions as to causal connection. On this conflicting testimony, the commission found that there was no causal connection. The case was affirmed. In the Ingalls case, three physicians testified. One had no opinion on the question of causal connection. Two were of the opinion that Howell's heart attack had no relation to his work. The award of the commission was reversed for the reason the commission's award was not based on any proof of causal connection.
(Hn 2) We hold that the commission's finding on the issue of causal relationship was based on substantial proof and was not arbitrary.
(Hn 3) Appellants also urge upon this Court that the commission erred in awarding medical benefits to the appellee. Appellee told the operator of the crew of which he was a member that it looked like he would have to go to a doctor, that he did not believe he could make it. The operator replied that it was probably sore muscles. No doctor was furnished. Appellee was gravely ill. The next day, the operator went by appellee's home and found out that he was unable to go to work. A week later, appellee's wife called the office of the manager of the employer, Thornbrough Well Servicing Company, and requested compensation benefits and medical assistance, but nothing was done by the employer and no medical benefits were furnished. Appellee went to his personal physician and then to the charity hospital where he was treated. Under these circumstances, appellee comes within the provisions of Section 7 of the Mississippi Workmen's Compensation Act and was entitled to medical benefits.
Affirmed and remanded.
McGehee, C.J., and Hall, Kyle and Holmes, JJ., concur.