Opinion
No. 4-511 / 03-1650
Filed February 24, 2005
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Hancock County, John S. Mackey, Judge.
In this farm lease dispute, Linda Thompson appeals adverse judgment on her petition and James Mattox's counterclaim. AFFIRMED.
Thomas Reavely of Whitfield Eddy, P.L.C., Des Moines, and James Wetterling, Garner, for appellant.
David Siegrist and Brian Jones of Siegrist Jones, P.C., Britt, for appellee.
Considered by Mahan, P.J., and Miller and Vaitheswaran, JJ.
A landlord and tenant appeal a judgment relating to the attempted termination of an oral crop share lease. We affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
James Mattox farmed land owned by his grandmother, Helen Casper. He operated under a 50/50 oral crop share lease. Linda Thompson, Casper's daughter, acted as Casper's fiduciary; she was her attorney-in-fact, conservator, and executor.
Casper died in 2002.
In 2001, Thompson began expressing concerns about Mattox's farming practices. She stated he was unprepared to harvest, his combine was not fit, she had to make arrangements to custom harvest his soybeans, and she paid others to have some of his corn harvested. She also complained of Mattox's application of nitrogen to his fields, late planting, poor communication, poor maintenance of field tile, and poor use of the ridge till system.
Later that year, Thompson served Mattox with a notice of lease termination, for default in performance. See Iowa Code § 562.6 (2001). When Mattox elected to remain on the property, Thompson sued for a judgment declaring the lease null and void. She also sought a temporary injunction "to prevent Defendant from holding over and farming or entering on Plaintiff's land in the 2002 crop year." The district court issued an injunction, subject to the posting of a $25,000 bond.
Meanwhile, Thompson timely served a second notice of lease termination without cause, which became effective on March 1, 2003. Id. § 562.7. She also amended her petition to add a breach of contract claim. Mattox answered and counterclaimed, alleging he "suffered damages for lost profits from farming the farm real estate for the 2002 crop year and future crop years and for the lost opportunity costs." He also claimed he suffered emotional distress as a result of the claimed wrongful removal. Finally, he filed an action on the bond, claiming he was entitled to damages for "wrongful issuance of" the temporary injunction.
Following a bench trial, the district court dismissed Thompson's claims and granted judgment in the amount of $62,054.21 on Mattox's counterclaims. Thompson filed post-trial motions, which the court denied. This appeal and cross-appeal followed.
II. Scope of Review
As a preliminary matter, the parties disagree on the proper scope of review. Thompson argues this matter was tried in equity and our review, therefore, is de novo. Mattox counters that the action was tried at law, requiring us to review for errors only. We agree with Mattox.
Our court has stated, "[w]here the primary right of the plaintiff arises from the nonperformance of a contract, where the remedy is monetary in nature, and where monetary damages are full and certain, remedies are usually provided by actions at law and equity has no jurisdiction." Mosebach v. Blythe, 282 N.W.2d 755, 758 (Iowa Ct.App. 1979). Here, the relief sought at trial was damages. In addition, the district court ruled on evidentiary objections, the hallmark of a law action. Howard v. Schildberg Constr. Co., Inc., 528 N.W.2d 550, 552 (Iowa 1995). It is true that a temporary injunction was issued before trial. It is also true that "[a] request for an injunction invokes the district court's equitable jurisdiction." Iowa Supreme Court Comm'n v. A-1 Assocs., Ltd., 623 N.W.2d 803, 805 (Iowa 2001). However, the district court justified its issuance by noting that "any negative impact [resulting from the issuance of the temporary injunction] can be offset with money damages." For these reasons, we will treat the action as one at law and review claimed deficiencies in the district court's ruling for errors. Iowa R. App. P. 6.4.
III. Merits
Thompson argues (A) her "high duty" as Casper's fiduciary required her to terminate Mattox's lease, (B) she had a right to "control and supervise" Mattox's farming practices, (C) Mattox breached the lease, justifying termination, (D) the court erred in declining to award damages to the Casper estate and in awarding damages to Mattox, and (E) the district court abused its discretion in overruling her motion for a new trial.
A. "High Fiduciary Duty."
At the outset, Mattox asserts Thompson did not raise this argument until her post-trial motion and, accordingly, failed to preserve error. We will bypass this error preservation argument and proceed to the merits. State v. Taylor, 596 N.W.2d 55, 56 (Iowa 1999).
Thompson claims the district court "failed to apply correct law of a fiduciary's duty." She argues that, as a fiduciary, she had a heightened duty to manage the estate, which included termination of the lease. Mattox does not dispute that Thompson owed a fiduciary duty to Casper, but contends "Thompson's status as a fiduciary does not excuse her breach of the oral lease or reduce the damages that can be awarded as a result of her breach." We agree with Mattox. As a fiduciary, Thompson was authorized to breach a contract only for good cause shown and with court approval. Iowa Code § 633.650. Accordingly, her status as a fiduciary did not change the analysis of her breach-of-contract claim.
B. "Control and Supervision."
Thompson argues she had a right to control and supervise Mattox's farming operations. She claims this right arose out of Mattox's implied duty of "good husbandry." See Moser v. Thorp Sales Corp., 312 N.W.2d 881, 906-07 (Iowa 1981) (Reynoldson, C.J. dissenting) (citing Brown Land Co. v. Lehman, 134 Iowa 712, 719, 112 N.W. 185, 188 (1907)).
While a tenant may have a general duty to use proper farming techniques, the authorities cited by Thompson do not give a landlord a concomitant right to "control and supervise" a tenant's farming practices. In Meeker v. Shull, the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed a district court finding that a farm tenant's plowing was excessive and was "a failure to farm in good farm-like manner." 235 Iowa 701, 707-08, 17 N.W.2d 514, 517 (1944). The court premised its decision on a written lease provision that "specifically prohibited defendants from plowing pasture without plaintiffs' consent," rather than on a landlord's general right of control. Similarly, in McElwee v. DeVault, 255 Iowa 30, 35, 120 N.W.2d 451, 452 (1963), the court concluded a farm tenant's omissions, while not flagrant, contravened express provisions of a written lease agreement. No mention was made of a landlord's general right of control.
Thompson and Mattox did not have a written lease agreement creating specific husbandry obligations for the tenant and specific "control and supervision" rights for the landlord. In the absence of such an agreement, Meeker and McElwee are inapposite, as are provisions contained in sample farm leases proffered by Thompson.
C. Breach of Oral Lease.
We turn to the crux of the case: whether Mattox breached an implied duty to farm in a competent manner. We find substantial evidence to support the district court's finding that Mattox did not breach this duty. Mattox stated "[t]here's a lot of right ways to farm." He then countered each of the errors or omissions raised by Thompson.
For example, in response to her complaint that he did not apply nitrogen in crop year 2001, Mattox's witness stated that nitrogen in manure applied in previous years, while not optimal, would have been "available for a number of years." The witness also opined that, due to weather and soil conditions, Mattox's yield likely would not have increased with nitrogen. In his words, "had Mr. Mattox applied nitrogen it'd be money down the rat hole that he'd have lost and his grandmother would have lost."
Similarly, Mattox refuted Thompson's assertion that he did not timely plant his corn and beans. A farm manager testified that "weather probably is without question the largest determining factor in farming as it is also in some other occupations." The weather in 2001 was unusually wet. Based on this fact, the farm manager opined, "[w]hen it's rained excessively in days prior to that time, the soil conditions may not be fit for optimum planting."
Mattox also established that his yields were satisfactory. Despite average soil quality and lower-than-average corn suitability ratings for the parcels he farmed, he established that he was generally able to "attain yields at or above county averages" for a five-year period.
Mattox offered this and other evidence to rebut the litany of alleged farming flaws cited by Thompson. He also established his proficiency as a farmer. He introduced into evidence a copy of a cover article in Wallaces Farmer, which featured his approach to conservation tillage. He additionally elicited testimony from Marvin Engh. Mattox contracted to produce seed for Mr. Engh, who described the seed as "in the top 10, 5 or 10 percent of the quality that we had every year." Like the district court, we also note Mattox was able to survive the farm crisis of the 1980s.
The district court as fact finder was free to accord greater weight to Mattox's evidence than to that offered by Thompson. See Blume v. Auer, 576 N.W.2d 122, 125-26 (Iowa Ct.App. 1997). The court's finding that Mattox did not breach the oral lease agreement was based on a thoughtful consideration of a large record and is supported by substantial evidence. D. Damages.
We would reach the same conclusion were our review de novo.
As Thompson did not show a breach of the lease, she is not entitled to damages.
Turning to her claim that the amount of damages awarded Mattox was excessive, we note that the assessment of damages is within the province of the district court as fact-finder. Hamilton v. Mercantile Bank of Cedar Rapids, 621 N.W.2d 401, 407 (Iowa 2001). Thompson's expert calculated the economic impact of not farming the Casper farm at $26,422. Mattox estimated his total loss at more than $74,415.08. The district court's figure was within this range of evidence. Id. Therefore, we will not overturn it.
Thompson finally takes issue with the court's calculation of interest. She cites no authority for her contention that the calculation was improper. Therefore, we deem the issue waived. Iowa R. App. P. 6.14(1)( c).
E. Motion for New Trial.
Thompson contends the district court should have granted her a new trial. She claims numerous errors, many of which have been addressed in prior sections. One ground not previously addressed is her contention that Mattox failed to produce financial documents from his dissolution trial that allegedly conflicted with his evidence in this trial and with the district court's findings. We are persuaded by Mattox's argument that the income figures contained in the dissolution documents are not inconsistent with the trial evidence, in that those figures did not account for the yet-to-be-sold 2002 crops. We are also persuaded that the dissolution evidence was cumulative. For these reasons, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Thompson's motion for new trial. See McHose v. Physician Clinic Servs., Inc., 548 N.W.2d 158, 162 (Iowa Ct.App. 1996).
IV. Cross-Appeal
In his cross-appeal, Mattox seeks an additional $12,360.87 in damages. We reject this appeal for the same reason we rejected Thompson's challenge to the amount of the damage award. As stated earlier, the district court's calculation was within the purview of the fact-finder and within the range of evidence.
V. Disposition
We have considered all factual challenges and legal arguments raised by the parties, whether or not explicitly addressed in this opinion. We affirm the district court's cogent ruling in its entirety. Costs are taxed to Thompson.