Opinion
No. 99 CIV 11503 (RCC).
March 27, 2001.
OPINION
Plaintiffs Carol Thompson, Vetta Clark, Lucile Hamilton, and Joyce Coltrell ("Plaintiffs") were members of the former Local 144 Hotel, Hospital, Nursing Home Allied Services Union ("Local 144"), a labor organization affiliated with the Service Employee International Union, AFL-CIO ("S.E.I.U."). Plaintiffs brought this action against Local 144, S.E.I.U., Andrew Stern, President of the S.E.I.U., New York's Health and Human Service Union 1199/S.E.I.U. ("Local 1199"), and Dennis Rivers, President of Local 1199 ("Defendants") alleging that a referendum on the proposal to merge Local 144 into Local 1199, and the subsequent merger, were unlawful, the trusteeship was unlawful, and the individual defendants breached fiduciary duties owed to Plaintiffs. Defendants have brought a motion for judgment on the pleadings and/or for summary judgment dismissing the first amended complaint. For the reasons stated herein, Defendants' motion is GRANTED and the complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
Federal Jurisdiction
This action is properly in federal court pursuant to Title 28 of the United States Code, Section 1331, 1337 and 1343(a)(3), and Title 29 of the United States Code, Section 185. Venue is proper pursuant to Title 28 of the United States Code, Section 1391(b), because the actions alleged herein arose within the Southern District of New York.
Background
The S.E.I.U. placed Local 144 in trusteeship from August of 1997 until May 31 of 1998. In March of 1998, Local 144 conducted a referendum on a proposal to merge Local 144 into Local 1199, and Local 1199 conducted a referendum on the same proposal. The proposal was approved by the respective memberships, and became effective as of June 1, 1998, at which time Local 144 ceased to exist and both the former Local 144 and Local 1199 were governed by the Constitution of Local 1199. Plaintiffs brought this action alleging violations of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act ("LMRDA"), Title 29 of the United States Code, Sections 101(3)(A), 101(a)(2), 101(a)(1), 411(a)(2), (5), 411(a)(3)(A), 462, 464(a), and 501, the Local 144 Constitution and By-Laws, the S.E.I.U. Constitution, the Local 1199 Constitution and the laws of the State of New York.
The complaint alleges seven causes of action. Plaintiffs' first cause of action alleges that Defendants deprived them of their right to free speech. Plaintiffs' second cause of action alleges that the merger was permeated with fraud and was the result of fraudulent voting practices on the part of Defendants. Plaintiffs's third cause of action alleges that defendant S.E.I.U. and defendant Stern improperly placed Local 144 into trusteeship and that, as a result of such improper trusteeship, they sought to eliminate any opposition to a proposed merger between Local 1199 and defendant Rivera. Plaintiffs' fourth cause of action alleges that Defendants engaged in a scheme to obtain the dues and assets of Local 144, and peremptorily sold Local 144 before the ousted leadership could resume their officer. Plaintiffs' fifth cause of action alleges that defendants Rivera and Stern violated the Constitution and By-Laws of Local 144, and violated the Constitution of Local 1199. Plaintiffs' sixth cause of action alleges that defendant International violated its own Constitution and By-Laws, and the Constitutions and By-Laws of Local 144 and Local 1199, resulting in financial losses to the members of Local 144. Lastly, Plaintiffs' seventh cause of action alleges that the S.E.I.U. manipulated the vote at the March 7, 1998 election and deprived the members of Local 144 of their right under the Local 144 Constitution to a fair and equal vote. Plaintiffs' allege that this action was in violation of the LMRDA.
Plaintiffs seek relief in the form of damages for Defendants' breach of fiduciary duties; a declaration that Defendants violated provisions of the Local 144 Constitution an By-Laws; judgment directing the S.E.I.U. to conduct a second vote for the merger; repayment of dues to compensate for the allegedly illegal increase; an accounting of Local 144 prior to and subsequent to the merger; punitive damages; and costs, disbursements and attorneys' fees.
Standard
A Court applies the same standard to a motion for judgment of the pleadings, pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("Rule 12(c)"), as in a motion to dismiss, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("Rule 12(b)(6)"). Accordingly, a court must "view the pleadings in the light most favorable to, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Davidson v. Flynn, 32 F.3d 27, 29 (2d Cir. 1994). When doing so, a court must determine whether a plaintiff can prove any set of facts which would entitle him or her to relief. Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546, 546 (1964). Although vague and conclusory allegations are insufficient to overcome a motion to dismiss or a motion for judgment on the pleadings, a pro see complaint should be "construed liberally so as to raise the strongest possible arguments suggested in the complaint." Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972).
Discussion
Title I of the LMRDA provides that a union member generally must exhaust all available internal remedies prior to filing a complaint in federal court. 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(4); Herman v. Local Lodge 197, Int'l Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Iron Ship Builders, Blacksmiths, Forgers, Helpers, AFL-CIO, 976 F. Supp. 129, 132 (N. D. N.Y. 1997). The exhaustion requirement is intended to permit the unions to evaluate matters in the first instance, promote internal resolution of conflicts, and avoid unnecessary judicial intervention. See Detroy v. American Guild of Variety Artists, 286 F.2d 75, 79 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 929 (1961); Maddalone v. Local 17 United Brotherhood of Carpenters Joiners of Am., 152 F.3d 178, 186 (2d Cir. 1998); Johnson v. General Motors, 641 F.2d 1075, 1078 (2d Cir. 1981). However, this requirement is not absolute. Id. It is within the discretion of the district court whether the exhaustion requirement must be satisfied. Maddalone, 152 F.3d at 186.
When determining whether to excuse the exhaustion requirement, a court must examine (1) whether union officials are so hostile to the employee that the employee could not hope to obtain a fair hearing on his claim; (2) whether the internal union appeals procedures would be inadequate either to reactivate the employee's grievance or to award the employee the full relief they seeks; and (3) whether exhaustion of internal procedures would unreasonably delay the employees' opportunity to obtain a judicial hearing on the merits of the claims. Maddalone, 152 F.3d at 186 (citation omitted). Defendants have the burden of proving that their procedures are reasonable and not futile. Id.
In the complaint, Plaintiffs state that they have "exhausted all available administrative remedies. Actions have been filed with the National Labor Relations but the Department of Labor Internal Grievance procedure were [sic] also instituted. Therefore, this matter is ripe for adjudication." (Compl. ¶ 10) (emphasis added). However, according to Article XVII, Section 8 of the S.E.I.U. Constitution, union members are required, as a condition of membership, to exhaust all internal union remedies before filing or prosecuting an action in the courts. Here, it is clear that Plaintiffs have not adequately exhausted internal union remedies according to the procedures set forth. Indeed, Plaintiffs conceded this by expressly adopting Defendants' Statement of Material Facts, setting forth that none of the Plaintiffs in this action, nor any former member of Local 144 or any present member of Local 1199, has filed a complaint with the S.E.I.U., with Local 1199, or with any representative thereof, and none of the Plaintiffs and no other person has requested that the S.E.I.U. sue defendants Rivera or Stern for breach of fiduciary duty. Further, no court has granted leave to sue on any of these issues. See Defs.' Statement of Material Facts ¶¶ 4-7.
See Pl.'s Mem. of Law in Opp. at 1 ("For reasons of clarity the Defendants [sic] Statement of Facts, Chronology of Proceedings, and Statement of the Case is incorporated by reference.")
The exhaustion requirement does not deny Plaintiffs' their protections under any of the relevant Statutes, because exhaustion does not deny Plaintiffs' access to the courts; it merely sets forth the procedures that union members must complete before filing in the courts. Furthermore, none of the relevant statutes provide that exhaustion is inappropriate or would prejudice union members. See 29 U.S.C. § 501, 412, 411. The S.E.I.U. Constitution and Bylaws set forth specific procedures for filing charges against local unions, their officers or members, and officers of any affiliated body, and officers of the International Union. See S.E.I.U. Constitution, Declaration of Anna Burger, dated April 24, 2000 ("Burger Declaration"), Ex. A, at 34-38. The S.E.I.U.'s internal remedies require only that a member file specific, written charges with the S.E.I.U.'s Secretary-Treasurer, who is not a defendant in this case. The S.E.I.U.'s internal remedies provides for an initial hearing within ten days of the filing of the grievance. A record must be kept of the hearing and must provide the basis for any decision made. A full review of the Secretary-Treasurer's decision is made by various appellate panels, and an appeal to the International S.E.I.U. is available. The Court holds that this procedure is sufficient and does not deprive union members of a fair hearing.
Further, Plaintiffs have not alleged hostility on the part of Defendants that amounts to more than bald, unsupported accusations. Plaintiffs argue that
It is abundantly clear that the union officials were hostile to the members who opposed deliverance to defendant 1199 and Rivera and that the internal union appeals procedures would be inadequate because numerous complaints to defendant Stern went unanswered . . . .
(Pl.'s Mem of Law in Opp. at 5-6.) The Court holds that the grievance procedures in place are sufficient to remedy any perceived hostility on the part of Defendants or the Unions toward Plaintiffs. If the Court were to hold that exhaustion would be futile because internal remedies would be reviewed by the same organization whose actions were being challenged, and would amount to an exception that swallows the whole.Mitchell, 2000 WL 343892, at *2.
The Court also holds that the S.E.I.U.'s internal remedies are able to afford Plaintiffs the relief that they seek. Specifically, Article XVII, Section 5 of the S.E.I.U. Constitution empowers the trial body to set aside a merger of local unions or dues increases, and to award monetary relief. See S.E.I.U. Constitution, Burger Declaration, Ex. A, at 37, Section 5 ("The trial body, after requisite due process has been afforded, may impose such penalty as it deems appropriate and as the case requires."); Mitchell v. Stern, 2000 WL 343892, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. March 31, 2000) (concluding that such provision provides the relief sought). The Court finds that this provision empowers the trial body to grant Plaintiffs relief with respect to their grievances regarding the merger, voting practices, rights to participate and to free speech with respect to union activities, allegations against individual defendants for violations of the By-Laws and the Constitution of the union, and financial losses.
Lastly, requiring Plaintiffs to follow the procedures set forth in the S.E.I.U. Constitution would not result in unreasonable delay. Those procedures provides for an initial hearing within 10 days of the filing of the grievance. Furthermore, the Court has only entertained a motion to dismiss at this point. See Mitchell, 2000 WL 34892, at *2.
The Court has reviewed the factors relevant to whether a plaintiff should be required to exhaust all internal remedies, and finds that the facts of this case do not warrant departure from the general requirement that a plaintiff exhaust all internal remedies before filing suit in the district court. Furthermore, Defendants have met their burden of demonstrating that the grievance procedures set forth are reasonable, and not futile. See Maddalone, 152 F.3d at 186.
Lastly, with respect to Plaintiffs' allegation that defendants International S.E.I.U. and Stem improperly placed Local 1144 into trusteeship, the Court reiterates that Judge Batts already decided that the trusteeship was valid, therefore, as in Mitchell, the Court declines to address any claims related to the formation of the trusteeship. See Mitchell, 2000 SL 343892, * 1 n. 3.
Conclusion
Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, this action is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE in order to allow Plaintiffs to exhaust their complaint through the union's internal grievance procedure. SO ORDERED.
Furthermore, as in Mitchell, the Court notes that Plaintiffs have brought this action on behalf of themselves and other members of Local 144/S.E.I.U. In order to state a claim under Title I of the LMDRA, Plaintiffs must "do more than argue that all members of Local 144 were affected by defendants alleged violations, Plaintiffs must also show how they were treated differently by defendants compared to the rest of the members of Local 144." Mitchell, 2000 WL 343892, *2 n. 8; citing Members for a Better Union v. Bevona, 152 F.3d 58, 63-65 (2d Cir. 1998).