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Thompson v. Ford

Supreme Court of Ohio
Jul 20, 1955
164 Ohio St. 74 (Ohio 1955)

Summary

finding the specific and detailed statutory standard of care for parking a car at night supplanted the "ordinarily prudent person" standard of care under common law

Summary of this case from Cnty. of Lake v. Purdue Pharma (In re Nat'l Prescription Opiate Litig.)

Opinion

No. 34213

Decided July 20, 1955.

Negligence — Motor vehicles — Vehicle parked within municipality — Legal requirements as to parking complied with — Section 6307-83, General Code — Damage resulting from collision with parked car — Claimed negligence for failure to have lights — Owner absolved from liability, when.

Where the owner of an automobile rightfully parks such vehicle in a municipality in accordance with all legal requirements as to such parking, and where he fully complies with Section 6307-83, General Code (Section 4513.10, Revised Code), with reference to lights on parked vehicles, he is absolved from any liability for damages resulting from the collision of another automobile with his parked one, where the one who suffers the damages makes no claim of negligence except failure to have lights upon such parked automobile.

APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Summit County.

The present cause arose out of an automobile accident.

On March 23, 1951, at about 9:30 p.m., appellee, Ruby Thompson, hereinafter designated plaintiff, was a passenger in an automobile being driven in a northerly direction on South Main Street in the city of Akron, and, when within the block between Dresden and Selden Avenues, two streets which enter South Main Street from the east, the automobile in which plaintiff was riding collided with the left rear of an automobile belonging to appellant, Keith D. Ford, hereinafter designated defendant. At the time of the collision defendant's automobile was unlighted and was parked parallel with and immediately adjacent to the east curb of South Main Street. The collision deflected the course of the car in which plaintiff was riding and it continued to its left side of the street and came into a head-on collision with another car being driven by one Robert M. Schray in a southerly direction on South Main Street.

As a result of the accident, plaintiff was seriously injured, and she instituted an action against both defendant and Schray to recover for the injuries and damages which she suffered.

Schray made a settlement with plaintiff in the sum of $1,400 and was dismissed from the action under a covenant not to sue.

The cause went to trial, and the jury returned a verdict against plaintiff, upon which judgment was rendered.

The Court of Common Pleas granted a motion for a new trial and set aside the judgment.

Thereafter, on December 20, 1952, plaintiff filed an amended petition in which she alleges three specifications of negligence as follows:

"Plaintiff says that the defendant, Keith D. Ford, was guilty of the following negligent acts and ommissions:

"1. He failed and neglected to use ordinary care for the safety of other persons and vehicles upon said street by leaving his said automobile upon said street without displaying any front or rear lights upon the same at said time and place and for a period of five hours under said conditions and circumstances of traffic, weather, darkness, width of streets and the street lighting and driving conditions existing thereon.

"2. He left his said automobile standing for five hours upon said street without any lights showing on said automobile at a time and place and under such conditions and circumstances of darkness, weather, lack of sufficient light, traffic and width of the street when in the exercise of reasonable and ordinary care, he should have had a lighted tail light and a lighted front light upon said automobile to warn drivers of other automobiles.

"3. That he parked his said automobile on said portion of South Main Street at said time in the night season without a red light visible for a distance of 500 feet to the rear and a white light visible a distance of 500 feet to the front of said automobile when there was not sufficient light at said time and place to reveal any person or substantial object within a distance of 500 feet upon said highway and in violation of the aforesaid ordinance of the city of Akron and the traffic laws of the state of Ohio."

The Akron ordinance referred to is to the same tenor and effect as Section 6307-83, General Code.

The portion of South Main Street involved herein is a paved street 40 feet in width between curbs and illuminated by street lights located on the east side thereof at the northeast corner of the intersection with Dresden Avenue and the northeast corner of the intersection with Selden Avenue, which lights are about 295 feet apart.

There was testimony that at about the time of the accident the sky was overcast, that at about 7:00 p.m. a mere trace of rain had fallen, and that at about 11:00 p.m. rain again fell.

The condition of the street and the atmosphere was in some dispute at the trial, but there is ample evidence that the atmosphere was clear and the visibility unimpaired.

There is evidence also that the street lighting was supplemented by the outside lighting of a drive-in restaurant located south of the intersection on the east side of Main Street, to the rear of where defendant's automobile was parked.

Defendant, a working man, was a student at an industrial trades institute located on the east side of South Main Street about 85 feet north of Selden Avenue. At 6:00 p.m. on the day of the accident, defendant had parked his car between Dresden and Selden Avenues, and, so far as the record shows, the parking was made in every way in accordance with all legal requirements. Without turning on any lights of the car, defendant went into the school for the purpose of remaining until 11:00 p.m. when the school session would be finished.

The testimony was in dispute as to the distance within which there was sufficient light to reveal a person or substantial object at the place where defendant's car was parked.

There was testimony on the part of plaintiff that such person or substantial object could not be revealed at a distance of more than 80 or 90 feet from defendant's car, whereas there was a great quantity of testimony to the effect that a person or substantial object could be revealed or was visible at a distance of 800 to 1,200 feet from such car.

At the time of the accident, Section 6307-83, General Code (Section 4513.10, Revised Code), was in full force and effect. It reads as follows:

"Except in case of an emergency, whenever a vehicle is parked or stopped upon a roadway open to traffic or shoulder adjacent thereto, whether attended or unattended during the times mentioned in Section 76 [Section 6307-76, General Code], such vehicle shall be equipped with one or more lamps which shall exhibit a white light on the roadway side visible from a distance of 500 feet to the front of such vehicle, and a red light visible from a distance of 500 feet to the rear. However, no lights need be displayed upon any such vehicle when stopped or parked within a municipality where there is sufficient light to reveal any person or substantial object within a distance of 500 feet upon such highway. Any lighted headlamps upon a parked vehicle shall be depressed or dimmed. This section shall not affect the requirements of Sections 100 and 101 [Sections 6307-100 and 6307-101, General Code] of this act."

The times mentioned in Section 6307-76, General Code (Section 4513.03, Revised Code), are "from one hour after sunset to one hour before sunrise, and at any other time when there is not sufficient natural light to render discernible persons, vehicles and substantial objects on the highway at a distance of 500 feet ahead."

Sections 6307-100 and 6307-101, General Code, refer to disabled vehicles and those carrying explosives.

It is obvious that in the present case the accident occurred during the time between one hour after sunset and one hour before sunrise.

In his charge to the jury, the trial judge declined to charge upon the law with respect to ordinary care and the obligation of defendant to exercise ordinary care, or that the defendant might be guilty of negligence by failure to use ordinary care under the specifications of negligence numbered one and two in the amended petition, but did give to the jury a special charge that, if it found by the greater weight of the evidence that there was sufficient light at the time of the accident to reveal defendant's automobile within a distance of 500 feet upon the highway, then the defendant was guilty of no negligence in parking his automobile without lights and the verdict must be for him.

The jury returned a verdict for defendant, upon which judgment was entered, and a motion for a new trial by plaintiff was overruled.

Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals, that court reversed the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas, upon the sole ground that it erred in refusing to charge upon common-law negligence and had submitted the cause to the jury upon the sole issue whether defendant had violated Section 6307-83, General Code.

The cause is before this court upon the allowance of a motion to certify the record.

Mr. James M. Hinton, for appellee.

Messrs. Knowlton, Wilson Sanderson, for appellant.


The question before us is free of complications.

It was apparently the view of the trial court that because the only specifications of negligence alleged by plaintiff in her amended petition relate to the failure of defendant to have lights upon his parked automobile, and there was no claim as to any other negligence concerning the manner in which or the location where the automobile was parked, the question of liability hinged solely upon whether defendant complied with Section 6307-83, General Code.

It was not only the view of the Court of Appeals that the statute was involved but that it was only cumulative with reference to the common-law obligations of defendant, and that the trial court was in error in declining to charge on the common law with reference to the duties owed by defendant.

It is plain that plaintiff's amended petition raises only the issue of defendant's failure to exhibit lights, and, since it is conceded that there were no lights on defendant's automobile and it was parked within a municipality, if, at the place where it was parked, there was not sufficient light to reveal any person or substantial object within a distance of 500 feet upon the highway, defendant was guilty of negligence per se. In such a case, he could have no advantage from the common-law doctrine basing negligence upon what a fictitious ordinarily prudent person (as the Court of Appeals so appropriately called him) under the same or similar circumstances would or would not have done. So far as defendant is concerned, the common law does not apply. He was either guilty of negligence per se or not, as the facts show whether he obeyed the statute or not.

It is the theory of plaintiff, as well as the Court of Appeals, that, although the preceding statement is true and defendant can not have the advantage of a common-law defense, plaintiff is not deprived of a common-law advantage even though defendant strictly complied with the statute.

There is no question that the legislative branch of the government, unless prohibited by constitutional limitations, may modify or entirely abolish common-law actions and defenses. That was done by the General Assembly when it passed the guest statute. It was done by the Congress of the United States when it passed the comparative negligence statute in relation to railroad employees.

This state and most others have abolished common-law rights and obligations, both by Constitution and statute, in reference to workmens' compensation acts.

These are just a few of the many examples supporting the foregoing proposition. See Leis v. Cleveland Ry. Co., 101 Ohio St. 162, 128 N.E. 73.

There can be no question as to the right of the General Assembly to prescribe a standard of care to the exclusion of any standard under the common law. Has it done so in relation to lights upon an automobile parked within a municipality?

There is no dispute that it has done so with reference to the rights and obligations of the parker of an automobile.

Has it done so with reference to one injured by colliding with such parked automobile?

It is true that under some circumstances a statute, the violation of which would make the violator guilty of negligence per se, still might not relieve him from amenability to common-law duties, even if the statute were not violated. For instance, if a statute should be enacted making it illegal to drive at a speed in excess of so many miles per hour, a violation of that statute would constitute negligence per se, although, if one drove within that limit, he might still be liable for negligent driving under the conditions of traffic in which he found himself. In Ohio, driving faster than certain speeds constitutes prima facie evidence of an unlawful rate of speed, but one driving under such rate could still be guilty of negligence in driving at an unreasonable speed because of the conditions surrounding him at the time of the driving.

But the statute with which we are concerned is of a different character. Here the General Assembly has said that if you park at night you must have a white light visible from a distance of 500 feet to the front and a red light visible from a distance of 500 feet to the rear, but you need display no light upon your vehicle if you park within a municipality where there is sufficient light to reveal any person or substantial object within a distance of 500 feet upon the highway.

It seems to us that the permission or direction of the General Assembly would have a shabby result if the motorist observing it literally and relying upon it in good faith could then be told that he obeyed in full measure the direction contained in the statute but had no right to rely upon the standard of care that statute provided, and can still have a question of his liability for damages submitted to a jury, where the only claim made against him is in reference to the requirements outlined in the statute.

We are convinced that no such situation was intended by the General Assembly when it enacted Section 6307-83, General Code.

We believe that the proper rule of construction of this statute is stated as follows in 3 Sutherland Statutory Construction (3 Ed.), 13, Section 5305:

"But general and comprehensive legislation, prescribing minutely a course of conduct to be pursued, the parties and things affected, and elaborately describing limitations and exceptions, is indicative of a legislative intent that the statute should totally supersede and replace the common law dealing with the subject matter."

Section 6307-83, General Code, constitutes general and comprehensive legislation prescribing minutely a course of conduct as to lights where one parks an automobile in a municipality, and such section elaborately describes the limitations and exceptions as to the requirement of lights, and we are of the opinion that it lays down a statutory standard of care which replaces the precautions enjoined by common law. A violation of the statute makes the violator guilty of negligence per se, without regard to what the fictitious ordinarily prudent person would have or would not have done in the absence of the statute, and the comprehensiveness of the statute absolves one from liability for claimed negligence in failing to display lights, where he has fully complied with it.

From what we have said, it follows inevitably that the judgment of the Court of Appeals must be and it hereby is reversed, and that of the Court of Common Pleas affirmed.

Judgment reversed.

MATTHIAS, HART, ZIMMERMAN, BELL and TAFT, JJ., concur.

WEYGANDT, C.J., dissents.


Summaries of

Thompson v. Ford

Supreme Court of Ohio
Jul 20, 1955
164 Ohio St. 74 (Ohio 1955)

finding the specific and detailed statutory standard of care for parking a car at night supplanted the "ordinarily prudent person" standard of care under common law

Summary of this case from Cnty. of Lake v. Purdue Pharma (In re Nat'l Prescription Opiate Litig.)

finding the specific and detailed statutory standard of care for parking a car at night supplanted the "ordinarily prudent person" standard of care under common law

Summary of this case from Cnty. of Lake v. Purdue Pharma, L.P. (In re Nat'l Prescription Opiate Litig.)

In Thompson, allowing the plaintiff to proceed at common law would have thwarted the express provisions of the statute at hand.

Summary of this case from Cnty. of Lake v. Purdue Pharma (In re Nat'l Prescription Opiate Litig.)

In Thompson, allowing the plaintiff to proceed at common law would have thwarted the express provisions of the statute at hand.

Summary of this case from Cnty. of Lake v. Purdue Pharma, L.P. (In re Nat'l Prescription Opiate Litig.)

using its police powers, the General Assembly "may modify or entirely abolish common-law actions and defenses"

Summary of this case from Stetter v. R.J. Corman Derailment Services

In Thompson v. Ford (1955), 164 Ohio St. 74, 57 O.O. 96, 128 N.E.2d 111, the Supreme Court did not hold, as Coast suggests, that all parking statutes have replaced common-law standards of care.

Summary of this case from Nichols v. Coast Distrib. Sys
Case details for

Thompson v. Ford

Case Details

Full title:THOMPSON, APPELLEE v. FORD, APPELLANT

Court:Supreme Court of Ohio

Date published: Jul 20, 1955

Citations

164 Ohio St. 74 (Ohio 1955)
128 N.E.2d 111

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