Opinion
Docket No.: CL15-11602
02-02-2017
MEREDITH THOMAS, Plaintiff, v. ROBERT E. STAMBAUGH, M.D., TIDEWATER EMERGENCY MEDICAL CARE, LTD., JOHN E. DAUGHDRILLE, M.D., and CHESAPEAKE RADIOLOGISTS, LTD., Defendants.
ORDER DENYING PLEA IN BAR TO AMENDED COMPLAINT
Defendant Robert E. Stambaugh, M.D. ("Stambaugh"), filed a Plea in Bar in this personal injury suit, asserting that—as to him—the Amended Complaint filed by Plaintiff Meredith Thomas ("Thomas") is barred by the statute of limitations. Stambaugh provided legal argument in his Plea in Bar, to which Thomas filed a response. The parties presented oral argument at a hearing held on January 19, 2017 (the "Hearing").
Now the Court—considering the arguments advanced in the pleadings and at the Hearing, as well as applicable authorities—rules as follows.
As explained in more detail below, the Court finds that Stambaugh has from the outset been a party to the case at bar and that Stambaugh's assertion that the Amended Complaint does not relate back to a timely filed complaint therefore is moot. The Plea in Bar therefore is OVERRULED.
Stambaugh claims that "Plaintiff's Amended Complaint changed the parties against whom her negligence claims are asserted," ostensibly by alleging negligence against Stambaugh for the first time. (Plea in Bar ¶ 10.) The Amended Complaint—filed on December 2, 2016, apparently in response to Stambaugh's Demurrer, which asserted that Thomas failed to state a claim for negligence—expressly identifies Stambaugh in Paragraph 4 and provides additional detail regarding the negligence allegations against him. Stambaugh asserts that the Amended Complaint was filed after the applicable statute of limitations had run and would relate back to the date of the original complaint only if all four requirements of Section 8.01-6 of the Code of Virginia were satisfied. (Id. ¶¶ 6-7.) Stambaugh further argues that condition (ii) of Section 8.01-6 is not met because Stambaugh had not "received notice of the institution of the action 'within the limitations period prescribed for commencing the action.'" (Id. ¶ 7.)
Of note, despite being in a seemingly identical position and having attended the Hearing, Defendant John E. Daughdrille, M.D., did not join in Stambaugh's Plea in Bar or file his own Plea in Bar.
It is undisputed that had a new party been added to the suit via the Amended Complaint—which was filed after the pertinent statute of limitations had run—Section 8.01-6 would control the issue of relation back. The Court need not determine whether Section 8.01-6's notice requirement has been satisfied, however, because the Amended Complaint did not in fact add Stambaugh as a new party to the suit. Two earlier complaints—the initial Complaint, which was non-suited (May 19, 2015, Order, CL14-3434) (the "Non-Suited Complaint"), and the original Complaint in this reinstituted suit (the "Initial Complaint")—expressly name "Robert E. Stambaugh, M.D." as a defendant and unambiguously allege negligence against him.
Rule 1:4 of the Rules of Supreme Court of Virginia states that a pleading "shall be sufficient if it clearly informs the opposite party of the true nature of the claim or defense." In addition, the Virginia Supreme Court has held that "the party filing a civil action has an obligation to express the nature of the claim being asserted, and the identity of the party against whom it is asserted, in clear and unambiguous language so as to inform both the court and the opposing party of the nature of the claim." Estate of James v. Peyton, 277 Va. 443, 450, 674 S.E.2d 864, 867 (2009). "In determining the adequacy of a pleading to identify a party, we consider the pleading as a whole." Id. The caption of the pleading is included in that consideration. See id.; McCormick v. Romans, 214 Va. 144, 147, 198 S.E.2d 651, 653 (1973) (examining the styling of the case as a factor in overruling a demurrer originally sustained on grounds that the essential party had not been named).
Read as a whole, the Initial Complaint—identical in content to the Non-Suited Complaint with respect to all references to Stambaugh—unambiguously identifies Stambaugh as an individual defendant against whom Thomas alleges negligence. The most obvious identification appears in the case caption, where "Robert E. Stambaugh, M.D." is expressly listed among four defendants. Paragraph 7 of the Initial Complaint alleges that "Plaintiff was seen in the Emergency Room of Chesapeake Regional Medical Center by Dr. Robert E. Stambaugh," and Paragraph 11 asserts that "Plaintiff presented to both of the individual defendant doctors with complaints of an acute onset of pain in her lower back." (Compl. ¶¶ 6, 10 (emphasis added).) Only one other doctor—Dr. John E. Daughdrille—is mentioned in the complaint. Stambaugh therefore must be the other "individual defendant doctor[]."
Beyond explicitly naming Stambaugh as a defendant, the Initial Complaint also alleges against the defendants each element of a properly pleaded negligence claim, as enumerated in McGuire v. Hodges, 273 Va. 199, 205-06, 639 S.E.2d 284, 288 (2007):
(1) Duty of Care - "The Defendants, and all of the corporate defendants, owed a duty to the Plaintiff to provide her that degree of care and skill of a reasonably prudent healthcare provider . . ." (Compl. ¶ 12.);
(2) Breach of Duty - "[T]he Defendants, and the individual employees of the corporate defendants, breached their duties and obligations to the Plaintiff in that . . . they failed to recognize" the cause and seriousness of Plaintiff's distress and to immediately refer Plaintiff for appropriate care (Id. ¶¶ 13-14.);
(3) Injury/Harm - "The Plaintiff has incurred substantial medical bills and lost wages, has suffered great pain, suffering, mental anguish, turmoil and inconvenience . . ." (Id. ¶ 19.); and
(4) Causation - The Plaintiff alleges she has suffered these harms "as a direct result of the negligence of the Defendants and/or their employees." (Id.)
It requires no inference whatsoever to conclude that "the Defendants" charged with negligence include Stambaugh—who is, as stated supra, named in the case caption and referred to in the body of the Complaint as one of two "individual defendant doctors." Stambaugh argues that the multiple references in the Initial Complaint to "the employees of the corporate defendants" are intended to categorize him merely as an employee of one of the Defendants and not as a party, but the Court finds this unpersuasive. Each time "the employees of the corporate defendants" is used in the Initial Complaint, the phrase is listed after both "the Defendants" and the disjunctive "or," starkly emphasizing that some of the defendants are not corporations. The Court simply cannot understand how Stambaugh would not be counted among these non-corporate defendants. Further, the Plaintiff's prayer for relief asks for "judgment and execution against the Defendants, jointly and severally," which is not limited to the corporate defendants and which clearly and unambiguously includes Stambaugh.
Because the Court concludes that the Non-Suited Complaint and the Initial Complaint clearly and unambiguously informed Stambaugh—and the Court—of the claim made against him, the Amended Complaint does not add a party to the suit and therefore need not relate back to the earlier Complaints. Additionally, Stambaugh admits that these earlier Complaints were filed within the applicable statutes of limitation. (See Def.'s Plea in Bar at ¶¶ 17, 23.) For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED that Defendant's Plea in Bar is OVERRULED.
Although Stambaugh implies in his argument that Thomas's filing of the Amended Complaint somehow conceded that her Initial Complaint did not identify Stambaugh or unambiguously express the nature of the claim being asserted against him—as the Amended Complaint apparently was filed in response to Stambaugh's Demurrer, which raised the same issue—the Court does not share Stambaugh's view in that regard. The question before the Court for relation-back purposes is whether the Initial Complaint was sufficiently pleaded against Stambaugh, and the Court finds that it was. --------
The Clerk of Court is directed to forward a copy of this Order to all counsel of record. Endorsements are waived pursuant to Rule 1:13 of the Rules of Supreme Court of Virginia. Any objections to this Order shall be filed within fourteen days.
Enter: 2/2/2017
/s/_________
David W. Lannetti, Judge