Opinion
Record No. 1910-94-2
Decided: April 4, 1995
FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION
S. Vernon Priddy, III (Mary Louise Kramer; Matthew J. Ide; Sands, Anderson, Marks Miller, on briefs), for appellants.
Daniel E. Lynch (Williams Pierce, on brief), for appellee.
Present: Chief Judge Moon, Judge Elder and Senior Judge Cole
Pursuant to Code Sec. 17-116.010 this opinion is not designated for publication.
The Stenrich Group and its insurer (appellant) appeal from the Workers' Compensation Commission's award of benefits to Claudia H. Jemmott. Appellant contends that the commission erred in determining that (1) Jemmott's carpal tunnel syndrome is a disease within the meaning of "disease" under the Workers' Compensation Act, and (2) her syndrome is an occupational disease as opposed to an ordinary disease of life. The record establishes that Jemmott's carpal tunnel syndrome is a compensable occupational disease, and we affirm the commission's award of benefits.
I.
Jemmott was employed as a copy editor/proofreader. This job involved extensive writing with the use of a pen, and maneuvering copy with her hands on a slanted board. In August 1992, Jemmott began treating with Dr. Bruce Stelmack. Dr. Stelmack diagnosed carpal tunnel syndrome in both wrists caused by the repetitive motions necessitated by her work. Appellant did not contest the argument that claimant had carpal tunnel syndrome. Rather, among other things not pertinent to this appeal, it argued that claimant had not proved that her syndrome was a disease, and that, even if it were a disease, it was not an occupational disease. The commission found in favor of claimant on these issues. The commission found that Dr. Stelmack testified that claimant had a disease. The commission also found that there was "no evidence of substantial exposure to the causative hazards of this disease outside of the employment."
II.
Credible evidence supports the commission's finding that Jemmott's carpal tunnel syndrome is a condition characterized as a "disease." See Merillat Industries, Inc. v. Parks, 246 Va. 429, 436 S.E.2d 600 (1993) (holding that the condition for which compensation is sought as an occupational disease must first qualify as a disease). When asked whether the syndrome is a disease or an injury, Dr. Stelmack responded:
I believe it is a disease process and I think the key word there is process. And the way, the reason I distinguish it from a simple injury is that as was pointed out earlier, is this the same as a cut or a broken bone or something along that line? It's really not. And the reason is one person will get carpal tunnel when the next person won't, and the difference in that situation may not be the activity but the underlying strengths of that person, the size of their carpal tunnel, the size of the median nerve, the healing potential of the nerve, the vascular nature of that individual, whether the person is male or female, whether they're under 40 or over 40. There are a lot of conditions that determine how that disease process will progress, whereas in a simple injury you're cut with a knife whether you're male, female, old, young, you're cut with a knife. So it's a disease in that way, my opinion.
Dr. Stelmack's answer satisfies the definition of disease enunciated in Piedmont Mfg. Co. v. East, 17 Va. App. 499, 503, 438 S.E.2d 769, 772 (1993), and Department of State Police v. Haga, 18 Va. App. 162, 166, 442 S.E.2d 424, 426 (1994).
III.
The commission did not err in treating Jemmott's disease as a compensable occupational disease. In order for a disease to be compensable under Code Sec. 65.2-400, each of the six conditions contained therein must be met. A claimant must meet a more rigorous standard of proof, as set out in Code Sec. 65.2-401, where the claimant's occupational disease may have resulted from substantial exposure outside of the employment. However, where, as here, there is no suggestion in the record that the claimant's condition resulted from exposure outside of her employment, we need not look beyond the four corners of Code Sec. 65.2-400.
On appeal, the commission's findings must be construed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below. Piedmont, 17 Va. App. at 504, 438 S.E.2d at 773 (citing Crisp v. Brown's Tysons Corner Dodge, Inc., 1 Va. App. 503, 504, 330 S.E.2d 916, 916 (1986)). "Whether a disease is causally related to the employment and not causally related to other factors is . . . a finding of fact." Island Creek Coal Co. v. Breeding, 6 Va. App. 1, 12, 365 S.E.2d 782, 788 (1988) (citation omitted). Credible evidence supports the commission's finding. Dr. Stelmack clearly related Jemmott's syndrome to her work. There was no medical evidence to the contrary, and no evidence that Jemmott's disease resulted from substantial exposure outside of her employment.
Affirmed.