Opinion
A163126
11-15-2023
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. LINDA HASKIN-GOLOGORSKY, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
San Mateo County Super. Ct. No. 17SF003374A
CHOU, J.In connection with divorce proceedings in which she appeared pro se, appellant and defendant Linda Haskin-Gologorsky provided the opposing party's attorney with documents pursuant to a mandatory exchange of potential trial exhibits. The opposing attorney, believing at least some of those documents were false or forged, introduced them into evidence in the divorce trial to show appellant's deceit. Appellant lost in the divorce proceedings, and we affirmed the judgment. Based largely on the documents appellant provided to opposing counsel, the San Mateo County District Attorney charged appellant with 36 felonies, ultimately garnering 33 convictions.
Gologorsky v. Gologorsky (Dec. 15, 2017; A150050) 2017 Cal.App.Unpub.Lexis 8552.
In this appeal from her convictions, appellant contends the trial court erred in denying her attorney's motion to withdraw two weeks before the trial and in excluding some of the testimony she had given in her divorce proceedings. We find no reversible error on those grounds. Appellant further contends most of her convictions should be reversed due to matters of statutory interpretation, lack of evidence, or instructional error. In that regard, respondent concedes that the evidence is insufficient to support her convictions on counts 8, 11, 14, 17, 20, 23, and 27 for offering a false or forged instrument in violation of Penal Code section 115, subdivision (a). In addition to these counts, we will reverse appellant's convictions as to counts 7, 10, 13, 19, and 30 for offering false documents into evidence in violation of section 132, on the ground the evidence was insufficient. We will affirm the judgment in all other respects and remand for resentencing.
Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory references are to the Penal Code.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In November 2018, a Felony Information charged appellant with 36 counts: forgery of a driver's license (§ 470a; count 1); making a false sworn statement to a notary public (§ 115.5, subd. (b); counts 2, 33); perjury (§ 118, subd. (a); count 3); attempted grand theft of real property (§§ 487, subd. (a), 664; count 4); second degree commercial burglary (§ 460, subd. (b); counts 5, 36); preparing false documentary evidence (§ 134; counts 6, 9, 12, 15, 18, 21, 25, 29); offering false evidence (§ 132; counts 7, 10, 13, 16, 19, 22, 26, 30); offering a false or forged instrument for filing (§ 115, subd. (a); counts 8, 11, 14, 17, 20, 23, 27, 31, 32, 35), with six of those counts enhanced as a filing pertaining to a single-family residence (§ 115.5, subd. (a)); counterfeiting a seal (§ 472; counts 24 and 28); and possessing a forged driver's license (§ 470b; count 34). The Information further alleged that appellant committed counts 35 and 36 while released from custody (§ 12022.1).
The matter proceeded to a trial by jury. In June 2021, after the trial began, the trial court granted the prosecution's motion to dismiss counts 2 and 33 and to strike the section 115.5, subdivision (a) enhancements as to counts 11, 14, 23, 27, and 31. The trial proceeded on the remaining 34 counts.
A. Prosecution Case
At the time they married in January 1995, appellant and Jonathan Gologorsky lived in appellant's home in Foster City. In October 1997, they purchased a single family home on Halsey Boulevard in Foster City (Halsey home), taking title in both of their names. Appellant had a daughter named Elysha from a previous marriage. Appellant and Gologorsky together had a daughter named Natalie.
In July 2014, appellant told Gologorsky she wanted a divorce. She filed for separation approximately one month later. Gologorsky retained attorney Vivian Kral to represent him in the divorce proceedings, while appellant represented herself.
The divorce proceedings went to trial in October 2016. As relevant here, the issue was ownership of the Halsey home: Gologorsky took the position that the home was purchased during their marriage and was therefore community property, while appellant took the position that it was her separate property.
Appellant appeared at the divorce trial using the name Princess Leia Lucas. As Gologorsky would later disclose during the criminal proceedings, appellant had been saying things he perceived to be delusional. She talked about Princess Leia Lucas, George Lucas, "MK Ultra," remembering false memories, and being involved in CIA mind experiments. Sometime between 2012 and 2014, she talked about how she was learning Photoshop, although Gologorsky never actually saw her use the program. In addition, appellant filed petitions to change her name from Linda Haskin-Gologorsky to Princess Leia Lucas on October 26, 2015, and March 8, 2016 (as well as after the divorce trial in March 2017). But the petitions were denied.
1. Exhibits from the Divorce Proceedings
On October 18, 2016, as part of her pretrial disclosures in the divorce proceeding as required by San Mateo County Superior Court local rules, appellant gave Kral a binder of documents that included purported deeds to the Halsey home. The next day, Kral went to the San Mateo County Recorder's Office to examine the actual documents on file.
During her examination of appellant at the divorce trial, Kral asked appellant questions about several of the documents and moved them into evidence, apparently to show that appellant had created false documents. In the criminal proceedings, the prosecutor moved these documents into evidence as exhibits as well.
At the divorce trial, it was Kral who requested that exhibits 1-5 be marked, although they were marked as petitioner's (appellant's) exhibits. Petitioner's Exhibits 1-7 were admitted into evidence in the criminal proceedings as People's Exhibits 1-7, and Respondent's Exhibit F from the divorce trial was admitted as People's Exhibit 8.
Two of the documents reflected appellant's identity as Princess Leia Lucas. Introduced as People's Exhibit 1 was a birth certificate bearing the names of both Princess Leia Lucas and Linda Haskin. People's Exhibit 5 was a birth certificate for appellant's daughter, Elysha Tenenbaum, listing the mother's name as Linda Haskin and "P Leia" Lucas.
Other exhibits were purported deeds by which appellant obtained title to the Halsey home as her separate property, either before or during the marriage. People's Exhibit 2 was a grant deed dated June 7, 1994, purporting to convey the Halsey home from the Uralli family to Princess Leia Lucas, a single woman; People's Exhibit 7 was the same document but bore a purported seal from the county recorder's office. People's Exhibit 3 was a grant deed dated June 7, 1994, conveying the Halsey home from the Urallis to Linda Haskin, an unmarried woman; People's Exhibit 6 was the same document, bearing a purported recorder's seal. People's Exhibit 8 was a grant deed dated October 23, 1997, conveying the Halsey home from the Bovermans to "Linda Haskin-Gologorsky, a married woman, as separate, not community property."
Additional evidence of the purported ownership of the Halsey home (People's Ex. 4) was contained in a revocable living trust entitled "Princess Leia Lucas Revocable Living Family Trust, an Exemption Trust With Additional Provisions and Disclosure Statements" of July 1994 (Princess Leia Lucas Trust). The document indicated, among many other things, that appellant had purchased the Halsey home before marrying Gologorsky.
2. Appellant's Testimony in the Divorce Proceedings
Portions of appellant's testimony during the divorce trial were read and provided to the jury in her criminal proceedings. In this testimony, appellant asserted that she had two identities, Linda Haskin and Princess Leia Lucas. She claimed that she and Gologorsky were never legally married, and that she was already married when they purportedly wed. She claimed that she purchased the Halsey home in 1994 from the Urallis, and according to county records, purchased it again in 1997 from the Bovermans, although the Bovermans rented the Halsey home from her. Appellant asserted that she had not remembered that she already purchased the property in 1994. When asked about her work, at one point appellant replied that she was in the "special forces." As to the Halsey home, appellant told the court in her divorce trial that" 'I believe the best and fairest distribution in this case would be if I were allowed to keep my home.' "
In response to the admission of the divorce testimony in her criminal proceedings, appellant sought to introduce other portions of that testimony. The trial court denied her request.
3. Other Evidence Against Appellant
In contrast to the documents appellant had provided to Kral, District Attorney Inspector and real estate fraud expert David Wilson obtained certified copies of documents from the county recorder's office, which the prosecutor introduced as exhibits. People's Exhibit 10 was a birth certificate for Linda Haskin. People's Exhibit 11 was a birth certificate for Elysha Tenenbaum listing the mother's name as Linda Haskin. People's Exhibit 12 was a grant deed dated June 7, 1994, conveying the Halsey home from the Urallis to the Bovermans, and People's Exhibit 13 was a grant deed dated October 23, 1997, conveying the Halsey home from the Bovermans to Jonathan Gologorsky and Linda Haskin-Gologorsky, husband and wife, as joint tenants. A clerk from the San Mateo County Clerk-Recorder's Office testified that People's Exhibits 10-13 were true and correct copies of certified records, while People's Exhibits 1-8-the documents appellant had provided to Kral in the divorce proceeding-were not.
The prosecution also introduced People's Exhibits 16 and 20 as documents appellant submitted to the county recorder after the divorce trial. People's Exhibit 16 was a grant deed recorded in December 2016, by which Linda Haskin-Gologorsky placed the Halsey home into the Princess Leia Lucas Trust. Exhibit 20 was a durable power of attorney, recorded in person by appellant in June 2017, by which Linda Haskin-Gologorsky granted power of attorney to Princess Leia Lucas to engage in real property transactions on Haskin-Gologorsky's behalf. Wilson opined that People's Exhibits 16 and 20 were false documents because Princess Leia Lucas was not a real person, noting that appellant's repeated requests to change her name to Princess Leia Lucas had been denied.
Wilson further testified that he met with appellant at the District Attorney's Office on March 23, 2017. Appellant's fanny pack was searched and found to contain two driver's licenses, one in the name of Linda Haskin-Gologorsky and another bearing the name of Princess Leia Lucas. The Princess Leia Lucas driver's license appeared to be fake because it was thinner than an actual driver's license. A subsequent search of DMV records confirmed there was no such license in the system.
Notary Geraldine Blatt testified that she notarized appellant's signature on the Princess Leia Lucas Trust (People's Ex. 4)-which represented that appellant purchased the Halsey home before the marriage-on October 13, 2016 (five days before the document was provided to Kral). On that occasion, appellant provided two driver's licenses as identification, one in the name of Linda Haskin-Gologorsky and the other in the name of Princess Leia Lucas (People's Ex. 21). Blatt thought the Princess Leia driver's license appeared authentic. Blatt also confirmed that she notarized the grant deed transferring the Halsey home from Haskin-Gologorsky to the Princess Leia Lucas Trust (People's Ex. 16) for appellant on December 19, 2016.
A computer seized from appellant's new address was reviewed by District Attorney Inspector and computer forensic expert Matt Broad. He determined that "Linda" was the registered owner of the device and a user profile was initially created in that name. The user profile name was changed to "Princess Leia" in 2016. The computer contained files saved with Adobe Photoshop, indicating it was used to make deeds, birth certificates, driver's licenses, and trust documents between February 2015 and October 2016. Among other things, there was evidence that a "DL" was created in July 2016, a "No Sigs" version of the Princess Leia Family Trust was created on September 16, 2016, and last modified on October 13, 2016 (the date of the notarization), and a trust document was created on October 14, 2016, and last modified on October 21, 2016.
B. Defense Case
Appellant testified that she never filed with the court the documents in the binder she gave Kral, and that it was Kral who moved the documents into evidence. She claimed she created the Princess Leia Lucas driver's license for fun with her friends, not to use as a real license. She denied giving the Princess Leia license to Blatt as identification (to notarize the Princess Leia Lucas Trust); it was in appellant's wallet and Blatt did not see it until after notarizing the document using the Linda Haskin-Gologorsky license. Although Photoshop was on her computer, she claimed she did not know how to use it and the computer was used by her daughters. She acknowledged the Princess Leia birth certificate was fake and she had testified in the divorce trial that she had a birth certificate listing her name as Princess Leia, but she was referring to a Jewish birth certificate, not the one given to Kral. Appellant further testified that she created the Princess Leia Lucas Trust because she understood that a trust could be made in any name. She wanted to keep the Halsey home in the divorce, but she had intended to buy Gologorsky out.
C. Verdict and Sentence
In June 2021, the jury convicted appellant on all tried counts except Count 31. As to that count, the trial court declared a mistrial and granted the prosecutor's motion to dismiss. The court found true the on-bail enhancement alleged in connection with Counts 35 and 36.
The trial court sentenced appellant to eight years in state prison. Appellant timely appealed.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Motion to Withdraw
Appellant contends the trial court violated her Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel by denying her lawyer's motion to withdraw from the criminal case shortly before trial. We find no abuse of discretion.
1. Background
On April 29, 2021, roughly two weeks before trial was to begin, appellant's counsel filed a motion to withdraw on the grounds that appellant had breached their agreement with respect to expenses or fees and had made it unreasonably difficult for counsel to represent her effectively. (See Rules Prof. Conduct, rule 1.16(b)(4), (b)(5).)
As to the expenses and fees, counsel alleged that she had spent all but $200 of the $5,000 advance she received from appellant for investigation. Counsel asserted it was necessary to present a mental health defense to the specific intent charges in the case, but appellant refused to provide money to hire the necessary psychologist because she did not want to pursue a mental health defense. In addition, counsel asserted that the witnesses appellant wanted to subpoena for trial had to be interviewed, but appellant refused to pay for the interviews.
As to the difficulty in representing appellant effectively, counsel alleged that appellant made implied threats of a malpractice lawsuit. On July 20, 2020, counsel received a phone message and e-mail from appellant's brother, "hint[ing] that he would sue me civilly if [she] did not comply with his demands about how to defend his sister's case." On April 2, 2021, counsel's husband received a text message from appellant and her brother on an unlisted number. Appellant emailed counsel on April 15, 2021, warning her to be careful because defense attorneys did not have immunity for mistakes or wrong acts. Finally, counsel claimed that appellant had attempted to file motions in counsel's name.
The prosecutor opposed the motion, arguing that the case was more than four years old, current counsel was appellant's sixth attorney, appellant had withdrawn her time waiver, and trial was set to begin in two weeks on May 14, 2021.
At a hearing on May 7, 2021, the trial court expressed concern that counsel's withdrawal a week before trial would prejudice appellant. Appellant confirmed that she would not waive time and stated that she had "no opinion" whether counsel should be allowed to withdraw. She also confirmed that she did not want to pursue a mental health defense. She believed her initial retainer should have covered the cost of investigating witnesses, but she was willing to pay the additional expense if counsel sent her a bill. She denied contacting defense counsel's husband or being involved in her brother doing so.
The trial court denied the motion to withdraw, finding that the motion was untimely and that appellant would be prejudiced because she declined to waive her speedy trial rights and would not have time to find another attorney. Acknowledging that "communications between [appellant and counsel had] definitely broken down," the court concluded that the situation did not require termination of the representation in light of the resulting prejudice to appellant. Although appellant refused to pay for a mental health examination, she had the right to veto a mental health defense. Although she refused to pay for the investigation of additional witnesses, counsel had the case for over a year and a half and had spent close to $5,000 on the investigation already, and there was no information as to who the new witnesses were, what relevance they had, what kind of investigation was needed, or why interviewing them could not have been included in the original investigation budget. Although contacting counsel's husband was inappropriate, the text was not threatening, and an implied threat to sue counsel for mistakes did not warrant withdrawal. Finally, appellant may have tried to file a motion to dismiss in counsel's name, but she did not actually file it.
On May 13, 2021, counsel filed a supplemental declaration asserting that the breakdown in her relationship with appellant had developed into a conflict of interest. Counsel asserted that a lawsuit filed by appellant and her brother was served on the District Attorney's Office on May 13, 2021. Although the lawsuit was unrelated to the case, appellant's brother had asserted in the papers that he intended to testify at appellant's trial. Counsel did not know what information he had to offer, did not want to contact him directly due to their prior communications, and could not interview him through an investigator because she had no funding for one.
At a hearing on May 28, 2021, the trial court stated, "I do not believe there's a conflict which would require [counsel] to be removed from the case. I do believe that there has been some bad behavior, but I do not think it rises to the level of a conflict." Appellant confirmed that she was not asking to represent herself and that she and counsel had a contract, which included representation at trial.
2. Law
An attorney in a lawsuit may be changed at any time upon consent of the client and attorney or by court order. (Code Civ. Proc., § 284; see Rules Prof. Conduct, rule 1.16.) However, the trial court has discretion to deny a request to withdraw where the withdrawal would work an injustice or cause undue delay. (Mandell v. Superior Court (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 1, 4; see Rules of Prof. Conduct, rule 1.16(d).)
3. Analysis
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to withdraw. The motion was made two weeks before trial and was heard just one week before trial. Appellant had refused to waive time, and there was no other attorney poised to take over or any indication when new counsel could be found. The prosecutor objected to further delay. Appellant did not clearly object to counsel remaining on the case. The ramifications of appellant's refusal to pay for an expert and further investigation paled in comparison to appellant proceeding to trial without counsel as well as without the expert witness and investigation. Counsel's subsequent declaration did not establish a conflict compelling withdrawal.
In denying the motion to withdraw, the trial court stated that appellant had the right to refuse a mental health defense. Appellant argues that the court misread the law. Respondent agrees that the court's view was incorrect in light of People v. Bloom (2022) 12 Cal.5th 1008, 1041 [counsel did not violate Sixth Amendment by presenting mental state defense to first degree murder over defendant's objection]-which was decided after the trial court's decision in this case. But as relevant here, Bloom merely held that counsel may present a mental health defense that the defendant does not want; it did not hold that counsel must be allowed to abandon her client on the eve of trial because the client is unwilling to pay for an expert witness.
Appellant asserts that her counsel sought withdrawal so late in the proceedings due to problems finding a visiting judge to hear the matter, the prosecutor's schedule, appellant's competency evaluations, appellant's brief commitment to Napa State Hospital, her substitution of four previous lawyers, and the pandemic. In addition, she argues it was not until April 2, 2021, that counsel's husband received the text from appellant's brother, April 9 that appellant provided the list of witnesses to subpoena, and April 14-15 that appellant refused to provide funds for investigation and an expert witness. She contends that her counsel's request to withdraw was thus timely under People v. Williams (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 627 (Williams).
Appellant's argument is unpersuasive. The latest events precipitating counsel's request to withdraw occurred by April 15, when appellant refused to pay for proposed expenses. Counsel did not seek to withdraw until two weeks later. And even if appellant's refusal to pay for a mental health expert did not occur until mid-April, her disputes with counsel over a mental health defense arose much earlier. As counsel told appellant at the motion to withdraw hearing, "If I stay on the case, I'll be taking it to trial, but you are not going to agree with the defenses I put forth. We've been arguing about this for a year at this point. You don't agree with the positions I'm going to take at trial." (Italics added.) Furthermore, Williams is inapposite. There, it was the defendant who sought new counsel, with another lawyer waiting in the wings. Here, it was counsel who sought to withdraw on the eve of trial without any substitute attorney, to the defendant's prejudice.
Appellant argues that her refusal to pay for expenses provided good cause for withdrawal. (Citing People v. Prince (1968) 268 Cal.App.2d 398, 406 (Prince).) While it is generally true that a refusal to pay expenses pursuant to the client's contract with her attorney can be a ground for permissive withdrawal (see Rules of Prof. Conduct, rule 1.16(b)(5)), it does not necessarily entitle the attorney to withdraw: the potential prejudice to the client must still be considered. (See Rules of Prof. Conduct, rules 1.16(c), (d).) In that regard, appellant's reliance on Prince is misplaced. In Prince, "the motion was timely made, before the case was set for trial, and there [was] no showing the withdrawal prejudiced the defendant, the prosecution, or the smooth course of administration of justice." (Prince, at p. 406.) Here, the motion was untimely, it was brought just before trial, and there was ample indication of prejudice.
Appellant complains that the trial court put counsel in the difficult position of either interviewing potential witnesses herself, which could lead to counsel becoming a witness if the interviewees changed their story at trial, or foregoing those interviews. At the hearing, however, appellant was open to paying for additional expenses, presumably including the cost of an investigator to interview the witnesses.
Next, noting the trial court's acknowledgement that communications between appellant and counsel had "broken down," appellant contends a complete breakdown in communication precludes effective assistance of counsel, establishes an irreconcilable conflict between attorney and client, and compels relieving counsel. (Citing Stenson v. Lambert (9th Cir. 2007) 504 F.3d 873, 886; Carter v. Davis (9th Cir. 2019) 946 F.3d 489, 508; People v. Smith (2003) 30 Cal.4th 581, 606; People v. Clark (2011) 52 Cal.4th 856, 912.) However, as demonstrated by the cases on which appellant relies, the record does not disclose a complete communication breakdown or an irreconcilable conflict. (Stenson, supra, 504 F.3d at p. 886 [disagreements over strategical or tactical decisions do not rise to a level of a complete breakdown in communication that prevents effective assistance of counsel]; Carter, supra, 946 F.3d at p. 508 [same]; Smith, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 606 [same]; Clark, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 912 [same].) Indeed, appellant never advocated for the court to grant counsel's motion to withdraw, even after counsel filed her supplemental declaration.
In her reply brief, appellant argues that the depth of the breakdown was shown by counsel's claims that appellant lied about the text to counsel's husband and that counsel was unable to get information from appellant. Substantial evidence supports the conclusion that the breakdown was not severe enough to preclude effective assistance of counsel. The cases on which appellant relies involved a defendant's motion for substitute counsel and were far more extreme. (United States v. Adelzo-Gonzalez (9th Cir. 2001) 268 F.3d 772, 779-780; United States v. Moore (9th Cir. 1998) 159 F.3d 1154, 1159-1160.)
Finally, appellant argues that her defense required an expert who could explain that a mentally ill person could manipulate documents with Photoshop and Adobe Acrobat without possessing an intent to defraud. Therefore, she argues, the trial court violated her Sixth Amendment rights by refusing to relieve counsel and forcing appellant to go to trial without a viable defense. The argument is untenable. Appellant never showed there was such an expert, let alone one who was willing and able to testify at the trial. Moreover, there is no indication that appellant would have agreed to pay to retain such an expert, even if counsel were allowed to withdraw. Appellant fails to establish an abuse of discretion.
B. Exclusion of Evidence
Appellant contends the trial court abridged her right to present a defense by excluding testimony she gave at her divorce trial. We disagree.
1. Background
The prosecutor moved in limine to present a redacted transcript of appellant's testimony at her divorce trial. Appellant objected, arguing, among other things, that the redacted material was relevant to her state of mind at the divorce trial, which was relevant to the intent element of the charged crimes, or that the material was admissible under the rule of completeness. The trial court ruled that the redactions were appropriate and that appellant, who planned to testify, could explain how she felt at the divorce trial and move to admit some of the redacted testimony if it proved relevant later in the trial.
After the prosecution rested its case, appellant moved to admit several of the redacted portions of her divorce trial testimony. These included: appellant's statement to the divorce court that" 'prior to recovering from amnesia'" she was known as Linda Haskin or Gologorsky; the divorce court's statement that appellant had filed a witness list, which included a Mr. Turner and George Walton Lucas; appellant's statements to the divorce court that Turner went through abuse training in the MK Ultra program and could confirm appellant's "recovery from amnesia in another identity . . . that is still married to someone else;" appellant's statement that she did not remember in 1997 that she had purchased the disputed property in 1994 due to her dissociative amnesia and excessive trauma; her statement to the court that she needed to maintain her name and identity of Princess Leia Lucas or she would be dependent on Gologorsky or have to find a job at age 62; her statement to the court that she had worked on her brain transmission technologies during her recovery and with other trauma survivors, finding new ways to fix broken brain circuitry with sound and light frequencies; and appellant's apology to the divorce court for laughing, explaining that she laughed when she was nervous and that she had trouble finding documents.
The prosecutor objected, arguing the statements lacked foundation and were hearsay, irrelevant, and improper opinion. Appellant countered that she was not offering the statements for their truth, but as circumstantial evidence of her state of mind during the divorce trial-specifically, that she was experiencing delusions when she was testifying. In addition, the divorce court's comment about Lucas being on appellant's witness list was offered to "impeach" Kral, who testified that she did not remember it.
Appellant also argued that, if the statements were hearsay, the hearsay exception for former testimony applied. She does not make that argument on appeal.
The trial court denied the motion, noting there were issues of trustworthiness and improper opinion and the redacted remarks did not put the admitted material in a different context.
2. Standard of Review
We review the trial court's exclusion of evidence for an abuse of discretion. (People v. Williams (2006) 40 Cal.4th 287, 317; see People v. Zapien (1993) 4 Cal.4th 929, 976 [a ruling correct in law will not be overturned because it was based on incorrect reasoning].)
3. Hearsay
An out of court statement, offered for its truth, is hearsay. (Evid. Code, § 1200.) Appellant argues, however, that the excerpts she sought to introduce were not offered for their truth, but for the non-hearsay purpose of establishing her state of mind at the divorce trial. (See People v. Dalton (2019) 7 Cal.5th 166, 232; Hart v. Keenan Properties, Inc. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 442, 447-448.) As appellant correctly points out, she did not seek to prove that she really had two names, had been diagnosed with amnesia, attended MK Ultra training, or used brain transmission technologies. Instead, she sought to show that she believed she had two identities, was recovering from amnesia, had been through MK Ultra training with Turner, and used brain transmission technologies on herself and other trauma survivors, thus showing she was delusional. (See People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 23 and fn. 9 [describing difference between statements offered as direct proof of state of mind and offered as circumstantial evidence of state of mind], overruled on other grounds in People v. Martinez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 225.)
However, to the extent the excerpts were offered for a non-hearsay purpose, appellant failed to demonstrate they were relevant to her intent when testifying in the divorce case and preparing her false documents. Even if appellant believed she was Princess Leia Lucas and had the experiences she claimed, those beliefs did not preclude her from forming the intent to falsify documents to show others who she was or to show that the Halsey home belonged to her alone.
Furthermore, the court properly concluded that some of the excerpts were not admissible for a non-hearsay purpose. For example, the divorce court's statement that George Lucas was on appellant's witness list would have to first be accepted for its truth-that Lucas was on the list-before it could give rise to an inference about appellant's mental state in believing Lucas was an appropriate witness. Appellant's statement that she laughed when nervous and had trouble finding documents is not circumstantial evidence of her mental state in creating documents. Appellant does not establish in her opening brief any viable exception to the hearsay rule for these statements. Nor were these excerpts relevant. The fact that appellant thought Lucas would be a viable witness, laughed when nervous, had trouble finding documents, or did not recall purchasing the property does not show she lacked the intent to commit perjury or defraud with a forged document.
4. Rule of Completeness
"[W]hen a detached act, declaration, conversation, or writing is given in evidence, any other act, declaration, conversation, or writing which is necessary to make it understood may also be given in evidence." (Evid. Code, § 356; see People v. Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 156.)
The excerpts admitted into evidence by the prosecutor included appellant's statement to the divorce court, "I believe that the best and fairest distribution in this case would be if I were allowed to keep my home." Appellant sought to counter that evidence with her testimony that immediately followed: "But more importantly what I really need is my name and my identity. As the trust and other documents demonstrate and as my foundations demonstrate, I can't accept my funding. I can't go do the work that I wish to do working with trauma survivors. Everything is in the name Princess Leia Lucas. And without that legal name, I would be dependent on Mr. Gologorsky or some other job opportunity which at 62 is going to be more complicated for me." Appellant argues that without this statement, the portion introduced by the prosecutor created the misleading impression that she had a financial desire to obtain full title to the Halsey home, which the prosecutor asserted in closing argument.
We disagree. Although the excluded statement suggested that appellant had a dual motive-or even a primary motive of wanting to use Princess Leia Lucas as her legal name-it did not refute her financial incentive or her statement that she believed the fairest outcome was for her to keep the home. It was within the court's broad discretion to conclude that the redacted statement lacked sufficient bearing on the admitted statement, such that in fairness the redacted portion would also have to be admitted.
5. Harmless Error and Right to Present a Defense
Appellant fails to establish that the exclusion of excerpts of her divorce court testimony was prejudicial: admitting the evidence would not have affected the outcome of the trial, and its exclusion did not violate her Sixth Amendment right to present a defense.
Appellant wanted the statements admitted to support her theory that she was delusional at the time of the divorce trial. But there was ample other evidence in that regard. Gologorsky testified that appellant said things he perceived to be delusional, including statements about false memories and being involved in CIA mind experiments. She went by the name Princess Leia Lucas during the trial. Evidence showed she tried three times to have her name legally changed to Princess Leia Lucas. In the power of attorney admitted as People's Exhibit 20, appellant granted authority to Princess Leia Lucas, confirming (in defense counsel's words) that "she thinks she's Princess Laia Lucas."
People's Exhibit 4-the Princess Leia Lucas Trust (notarized the month of the divorce trial)-provided additional evidence of appellant's delusions. Among other things, it stated: appellant's complete identity included Princess Leia Lucas as well as Linda Haskin; Linda Haskin was providing authority to Princess Leia Lucas because she understood appellant's full history; Princess Leia was taken into the government's experimental program of mind control known as MK Ultra when she was less than two years old; Princess Leia had married George Walton Lucas Jr., the creator of Star Wars and another MK Ultra participant, many times, but their marriage was top secret and known only to the agency; George Lucas gave Princess Leia Lucas a share in the Lucas family trust and wills, because he wanted her to have income in her old age and wanted to apologize for making her into a sex toy with a metal bikini in Star Wars; Princess Leia required protection in the event the public and media learned that the movie character was based on her; Princess Leia spent time in the special forces and was known as General Lucas; MK Ultra created the Linda Haskin and Linda Tenenbaum identities as a cover story or alias; the Princess Leia and Linda Haskin identities both suffered from dissociative amnesia and post-traumatic stress disorder, but their identities would fuse when Linda took control of herself; members of Princess Leia's family sold her eggs to the United States government beginning when she was 10 years old, and those eggs were fertilized by sires including Walt Disney, such that Leia may have 175 children; Princess Leia is a direct descendant of royalty from various countries; Princess Leia is part owner of major scientific discoveries she helped establish, including a plan for distributed data management using the communications infrastructure known as the World Wide Web; Princess Leia studied the effects of sound on the human brain, was trained to project brain transmission frequencies from her own brain to others, and reserved her rights to all such inventions and technology as her separate property; Princess Leia/Linda Haskins was in her alert and aware state of mind if she dotted the i's in her name with stars; when the Linda Haskin identity was "out," she was in a sleep walking or trance state; Princess Leia was concerned about Linda dating Gologorsky and was making the living trust to ensure that Linda, "with her soft heart, and too well trained in Stockholm Syndrome, [did] not become victimized yet again;" James Comey was one of Princess Leia's secret sons; and Carrie Fisher was Princess Leia's cousin.
In light of the foregoing evidence, there is no reasonable probability appellant would have achieved a better outcome if the redacted excerpts had been admitted. (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.)
For similar reasons, the trial court's ruling, even if erroneous, did not deprive appellant of a fair trial or the right to present a defense. (See People v. Fudge (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1075, 1102-1103 [application of evidentiary rules generally does not abridge a defendant's right to present a defense].) There was ample evidence for counsel to cite in support of the defense theory.
C. Convictions
Appellant challenges many of her convictions on various grounds. To the extent she claims legal error, we review the matter de novo. As to the sufficiency of the evidence, we review the record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether the record discloses substantial evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 319; People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578.) We reverse some of her convictions for filing false or forged instruments (§ 115, subd. (a)) and offering false evidence (§ 132) but affirm in all other respects.
1. Burglary
Count 5 charged appellant with second degree burglary for entering the courthouse on the days of her divorce trial with the intent to commit a felony. At trial, the prosecutor told the jury that the requisite felony could be perjury, introducing false evidence, filing a false document, or attempted grand theft. Count 36 charged appellant with second degree burglary for entering the county recorder's office in June 2017 with the intent to commit a felony. The prosecutor argued that appellant's felonious intent was to record a forged instrument (the power of attorney).
Under section 459, burglary includes an entry into a building "with the intent to commit grand or petit larceny or any felony." Notwithstanding the statutory reference to any felony, appellant contends burglary cannot be based on an intent to commit the felonies of perjury, offering false evidence, or offering false instruments because the policy underlying the crime of burglary is to protect a "possessory right in a building." (Citing People v. Davis (1998) 18 Cal.4th 712, 725.) She adds that a litigant has a constitutional right of access to the court (Ryland v. Shapiro (5th Cir. 1983) 708 F.2d 967, 971-972), and perjury is a crime against public justice, not a possessory interest (People v. Barry (1892) 94 Cal. 481).
We are not persuaded. The burglary statute unambiguously criminalizes entry with the intent to commit "any felony." (§ 459, italics added.) Appellant cites no case holding that "any felony" means any felony besides perjury or offering false documents. To the contrary, California law has long held that one who enters a building with the intent to perpetrate larceny or any felony enters without invitation, even if the building is open to the public during regular business hours (e.g., People v. Salemme (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 775, 779-780; People v. Barry, supra, 94 Cal. 481); it is in that sense that entry into a building with the intent to commit a felony-any felony-violates the property owner's possessory rights (see Salemme, at p. 775 [upholding burglary conviction where the defendant entered the victim's home with the intent to sell fraudulent securities]).
In her reply brief, appellant refers us to People v. Davis, supra, 18 Cal.4th at page 719, which held that a defendant did not commit a burglary by depositing a forged check in the chute of a walk-up window. But that was because the defendant did not enter a building for purposes of the burglary statute by merely placing the check in the chute. Here, by contrast, it is undisputed that appellant entered the courthouse and recorder's office.
Appellant also points out, as to Count 36, that the county recorder's office had no right to exclude her from the premises or refuse to record a false power of attorney, because it is not the recorder's duty to determine a document's legal sufficiency. (Citing, e.g., Gov. Code, § 27201, subd. (a)(1)(A).) However, the fact that the recorder must allow a person to record a document does not mean that the person cannot be prosecuted for entering to record a fraudulent one. The burglary convictions shall be affirmed.
2. Filing False or Forged Instruments
Counts 8, 11, 14, 17, 20, 23, and 27, and 35 charged appellant with offering a false or forged instrument in violation of section 115, subdivision (a). Appellant contends the evidence was insufficient to support these convictions. We agree except as to Count 35.
a. Counts 8, 11, 14, 17, 20, 23, 27
Section 115, subdivision (a) provides: "Every person who knowingly procures or offers any false or forged instrument to be filed, registered, or recorded in any public office within this state which instrument, if genuine, might be filed, registered, or recorded under any law of this state or of the United States, is guilty of a felony." (Italics added.)
Counts 8, 11, 14, 17, 20, 23, and 27 charged appellant with offering false or forged instruments (People's Exhibits 1-7) on or about October 25-26, 2016. The prosecutor argued appellant was guilty "in allowing the exhibits to actually be received into evidence either by doing so herself or sitting passively by while it was done using the exhibits that she created and that she caused to be brought into the courtroom." (Italics added.)
Appellant contends she did not violate section 115, subdivision (a) because the documents were offered to the court (by Kral) for admission into evidence, not to be "filed, registered, or recorded" (§ 115, subd. (a)). Moreover, the documents could not "under the law" (§ 115, subd. (a)) be filed, registered, or recorded in a family law court, but would have to be submitted to the recorder's office. Respondent agrees, and we will reverse the convictions.
b. Count 35
Count 35 charged appellant with offering a false or forged instrument based on her filing a power of attorney at the recorder's office on June 5, 2017. The document, signed by Linda Haskin-Gologorsky, granted authority to Princess Leia Lucas to handle real estate transactions on her behalf.
Appellant argues that the power of attorney was neither false nor forged within the meaning of section 115, subdivision (a). She contends a "false" instrument is only one that purports to convey an interest the maker does not own (citing Generes v. Justice Court (1980) 106 Cal.App.3d 678, 682 (Generes)), and appellant's power of attorney purported to convey an interest Haskin-Gologorsky did own. She contends a document is forged when the signature on it is procured by fraud or trickery and the signer is unaware of the document's true nature (citing People v. Miller (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1051, 1060), and Haskin-Gologorsky's signature was not procured by fraud or trickery. Instead, appellant argues, the power of attorney merely gave authority to a fictitious person, which she claims is not outlawed by section 115, subdivision (a).
Appellant further argues that, when she entered the recorder's office and filed the document, she did not have an intent to record a false or forged document and therefore did not commit burglary (Count 36). Substantial evidence supports the conclusion that she did have such an intent; although the evidence was disputed, the jury could reasonably conclude that appellant knew Princess Leia Lucas was not a real person and the power of attorney was thus false and designed to deceive.
Appellant's argument is unpersuasive. The power of attorney was a "false" instrument within the meaning of section 115, subdivision (a), because it purported to grant legal authority to a fictitious person. This is consistent with the purpose of section 115: "to prevent the recordation of spurious documents knowingly offered for record." (Generes, supra, 106 Cal.App.3d at pp. 681-682; see People v. Feinberg (1997) 51 Cal.App.4th 1566, 1579 [" 'The core purpose of section 115 is to protect the integrity and reliability of public records.' "].)
The case on which appellant relies, Generes, supra, 106 Cal.App.3d 678, does not assist her. There, the court of appeal held that a defendant who filed a deed purporting to grant an easement from the defendant to herself over land she did not own was guilty of violating section 115. Even though the deed contained no forged signature, it was a "false instrument" because it could have the effect of defrauding someone who acted upon it as genuine. (Id. at pp. 681-682.) Here, the instrument did not purport to convey an interest the maker did not own, but it was false for a different reason-namely, that Haskin-Gologorsky granted authority to a person who in actuality does not exist. That falsity could defraud others who act on the document as true. (Id. at p. 682 [crime of § 115 is complete when a document has been prepared so that on its face it will have the effect of defrauding one who acts on it as genuine].) The evidence was therefore sufficient for Count 35.
3. Offering False Evidence
Counts 7, 10, 13, 19, and 30 charged appellant with offering false evidence at her divorce trial-namely, People's Exhibit 1 (Princess Leia birth certificate), People's Exhibit 2 (deed conveying the Halsey home to Princess Leia), People's Exhibit 3 (deed conveying the Halsey home to Linda Haskin, an unmarried woman), People's Exhibit 5 (birth certificate listing Princess Leia as mother), and People's Exhibit 8 (deed conveying the Halsey home to appellant as separate property)-in violation of section 132. Section 132 provides that "[e]very person who upon any trial, proceeding, inquiry, or investigation whatever, authorized or permitted by law, offers in evidence, as genuine or true, any book, paper, document, record, or other instrument in writing, knowing the same to have been forged or fraudulently altered or ante-dated, is guilty of felony." (Italics added.) Appellant contends that, although she gave these documents to Gologorsky's attorney during discovery or a pretrial exchange of proposed exhibits, she did not "offer[] [them] in evidence" under section 132 because she neither moved them into evidence nor relied on them in the divorce trial. We agree.
a. Law
The phrase "offers in evidence," for purposes of section 132, does not require proof that the defendant moved the document into evidence. It does require, however, that the defendant affirmatively used the document to support the defendant's case. (People v Bhasin (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 461, 468 [the defendant violated § 132 by providing a false document to his attorney, who had it marked for identification at trial, read it into the record, and used it to cross-examine the victim, even though it was the prosecution that moved the document into evidence]; People v. Gallardo (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 1333, 1344-1349 [substantial evidence of § 132 violation where the defendant "affirmatively used the documents" by holding them up in court, representing they were cancelled checks and other documents proving he owed no money, and later presenting them to the child support services office].)
With this standard in mind, we conclude the evidence was insufficient to support appellant's convictions on Counts 7, 10, 13, 19, and 30.
b. Ex. 1 (Count 7)-Appellant's Purported Birth Certificate
Appellant told the divorce court she had two names, which were on a birth certificate, but she did not refer to the birth certificate in her binder or seek to use it in her direct examination. During her cross-examination, Kral asked appellant whether she expected the court would review the birth certificate, appellant said she presumed so, and Kral had the exhibit marked as an exhibit. When the court later asked appellant if she wanted to move the birth certificate into evidence, appellant replied, "No, sir, it's okay. Don't bother." (Italics added.) Kral then moved it into evidence. The trial court never would have seen the document had it not been for Kral marking it and moving it into evidence; it cannot be said that appellant made affirmative use of it to support her claims.
c. Ex. 2-3 (Counts 10, 13)-Deeds from the Urallis
In her direct testimony, appellant stated that she purchased the Halsey home from the Urallis in 1994, but she was not sure whether she included the deeds in her exhibit binder. On cross-examination, Kral had the deeds marked and asked appellant about their purpose, eliciting that they showed appellant had purchased the Halsey home in 1994 and, in addition, that Exhibit 3 showed she presented two identities to the title company and the title company accepted them. Kral moved both deeds into evidence-obviously to discredit appellant rather than to prove appellant's case-and appellant stated she had no objection. When the court was later inclined to strike the documents because they were not certified, it was Kral who protested, saying they were important because they showed appellant had forged the documents. Meanwhile, instead of relying on Exhibit 2 or 3 to argue her case, appellant proffered what she characterized as certified copies of the two deeds (Exhibits 6 and 7) and relied on them. (Appellant does not challenge, on this ground, her convictions based on Exhibits 6 and 7.) Again, it cannot be said that appellant relied upon Exhibits 2 and 3 to support her claims.
d. Ex. 5 (Count 19)-Tenenbaum Birth Certificate
On cross-examination, Kral asked appellant why the birth certificate for Elysha Tenenbaum (People's Exhibit 5), was in her exhibit binder. Appellant said it showed the mother's name as both Linda Haskin and Leia Lucas. Kral moved the document into evidence, and appellant did not object. Because appellant had not mentioned these documents specifically or asked the court to review them during her direct testimony, there is no evidence she used them to support her claims at trial.
e. Ex. 8 (Count 30)-Bovermans Deed
Respondent's Exhibit F from Kral's binder (People's Exhibit 8) was a purported deed from the Bovermans to Haskin-Gologorsky as her separate property. On cross-examination, Kral had appellant read it into the record. Appellant agreed she gave it to Kral, but denied she was relying on it to show that the Halsey home was her separate property. Nonetheless, Kral moved it into evidence. Appellant did not vouch for the document. To the contrary, she suggested it might be a mistake, because "the certified deeds that I have . . . state[] that I owned the property and I purchased it from the Urallis." When the divorce court asked appellant why there was a deed from the Bovermans, whom appellant said were her tenants, she said she did not know. Thus, there is no evidence appellant relied on this exhibit to support her claims.
f. Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the convictions on Counts 7, 10, 13, 19 and 30 will be reversed.
4. Attempted Grand Theft
Count 4 charged appellant with attempted grand theft of real property in violation of sections 664 and 487, subdivision (a), "[o]n or about and between" October 25 and 26, 2016, in that appellant attempted to take Gologorsky's community property interest in the Halsey home. The prosecutor argued to the jury that appellant tried to persuade Kral, as Gologorsky's agent, to give her the home. Appellant contends the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction because her actions were not intended to persuade Kral or Gologorsky, but the court. We will affirm the conviction.
In arguing what constituted an attempt, the prosecutor told the jury that appellant's "direct, but ineffective step, was trying to convince the Court that the property belonged to her." (Italics added.) However, in accordance with the instructions to the jury, the prosecutor later stated that theft by false pretenses required proof that the defendant deceived a property owner or the owner's agent and identified Kral as the object of the deception.
The parties do not dispute that the cognizable legal theory for Count 4 was attempted theft by false pretenses, with which the jury was instructed at trial. The instruction explained that attempted theft by false pretenses requires proof that the defendant made a false pretense or representation to a property owner or the owner's agent with the intent to persuade the property owner to relinquish the property. (CALCRIM No. 1804; People v. Williams (2013) 57 Cal.4th 776, 787.)
Appellant contends her false documents were aimed only at the trial court, in the sense that she sought to persuade the court to award her the Halsey home as her separate property, and not to the property owner (Gologorsky) or his agent (Kral). (See People v. Sanders (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1414, 1418 [conviction for false pretenses cannot stand without proof of a false representation made to an owner of real property and reliance on the representation].) As respondent argues, however, a jury could reasonably find that appellant also intended to deceive Kral and Gologorsky. By presenting Kral with the documents, albeit in the course of a required pretrial disclosure, it is rational to conclude that appellant hoped to convince Kral that the home was appellant's separate property and persuade Kral not to pursue the issue. Although it was unlikely such a scheme would work, the question is not whether the ploy was going to succeed, but whether Gologorsky intended it to succeed. Substantial evidence supports that conclusion.
5. Forgery of Driver's License (Count 1)
Count 1 charged appellant with a violation of section 470a, which makes it a crime to counterfeit "any driver's license . . . with the intent that such driver's license . . . be used to facilitate the commission of any forgery." (§ 470a.) Forgery includes signing the name of a fictitious person to documents enumerated in the statute (including contracts) with the intent to defraud. (§ 470, subds. (a), (d).)
Substantial evidence supported appellant's conviction on Count 1. Evidence found on appellant's computer indicated that she created the Princess Leia Lucas driver's license in 2016, within weeks or months of her divorce trial. According to Blatt's testimony, appellant presented the Princess Leia Lucas driver's license to her on October 13, 2016, to obtain notarization of her signature as Princess Leia Lucas-a fictitious person-on the Princess Leia Lucas Trust document. On October 18, 2016, appellant presented the trust document-which asserted that appellant obtained the Halsey home before marrying Gologorsky-to Kral. At the divorce trial, appellant vouched for the trust document (People's Ex. 4), stating she would "rely on [it] fully" and describing it as "extremely accurate and helpful." From this evidence, a jury could reasonably conclude that appellant counterfeited the driver's license with the intent to use it to facilitate a forgery (the trust document).
Appellant contends that getting the trust document notarized was aimed at persuading the trial court to award her the home, not at persuading Kral or Gologorsky to give up the property, so creating the license was not for the purpose of committing forgery. But it was reasonable to conclude that appellant made the Princess Leia Lucas driver's license so she could sign the trust document with that fictitious name, which reflects an intent to use the license to facilitate the commission of a forgery, no matter who she intended to later defraud. (§ 470, subd. (a), (d).)
Appellant argues that a court cannot be defrauded because it cannot be deprived of money, property, or a right. Therefore, appellant reasons, since it was the court she was trying to deceive, she did not have an intent to defraud, and therefore she could not have committed forgery, and so she did not intend to commit a forgery. She cites section 8, which states: "Whenever, by any of the provisions of this Code, an intent to defraud is required in order to constitute any offense, it is sufficient if an intent appears to defraud any person, association, or body politic or corporate, whatever." But nothing in section 8 suggests that a party's false representations and documents, which were intended to deceive a court into awarding the party someone else's property, do not reflect an intent to defraud the other party. Whether appellant could have been found guilty on a charge of defrauding the court is not the point. She intended to obtain, by fraud and deceit, Gologorsky's community property share.
Appellant also contends she did not use the Princess Leia driver's license to facilitate a forgery because the text of the trust was so bizarre that no one would believe it. (People v. Franco (2018) 6 Cal.5th 433, 439 [a writing is not a forgery "if 'it is so defective on its face that, as a matter of law, it is not capable of defrauding anyone' "]). Again, appellant's argument misses the mark. Whether or not the trust constituted a forgery, section 470a does not require that the defendant commit forgery, but only that she intended to facilitate the commission of a forgery when she created the license. Appellant fails to demonstrate a lack of substantial evidence.
6. Possession of False Driver's License to Facilitate Forgery
Count 34 alleged that on or about March 23, 2017, appellant violated section 470b, which makes it a crime to "possess [any] driver's license . . . of the type enumerated in Section 470a [e.g., a counterfeit] with the intent that said document be used to facilitate the commission of a forgery."
Substantial evidence supported a conviction under section 470b. Appellant created the Princess Leia driver's license and possessed it on or about March 23, 2017, as charged. The license was a counterfeit. Creating and carrying it on her person was itself evidence of her intent to use it to facilitate a forgery. (See Lewis v. Superior Court (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 379, 388 (Lewis) [fabricating a document with apparent legal efficacy "affords an inference of an intention to 'defraud' "]; People v. Castellanos (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1489, 1493-1494 [defendant's possession of counterfeit resident card supported finding of intent to defraud].) Moreover, she had used it five months earlier to obtain notarization of her signature as the fictitious Princess Leia Lucas on the Princess Leia Lucas Trust document. The evidence was sufficient for a jury to reasonably conclude that, on March 23, 2017, she was carrying the license so she could use it to identify herself as Princess Leia Lucas and commit a forgery as she had before.
7. Counterfeiting the County Recorder's Seal
Counts 24 and 28 charged appellant with forging or counterfeiting the recorder's seal on deeds admitted as People's Exhibits 6 (Urallis to Haskin) and 7 (Urallis to Lucas), in violation of section 472. Section 472 provides, in pertinent part: "Every person who, with intent to defraud another, forges, or counterfeits the seal of this State . . . or any other public seal authorized or recognized by the laws of this State . . . or who falsely makes, forges, or counterfeits any impression purporting to be an impression of any such seal, or who has in his possession any such counterfeited seal or impression thereof, knowing it to be counterfeited, and willfully conceals the same, is guilty of forgery." (Italics added.)
Appellant does not dispute that she forged or counterfeited the seal, but she contends there was insufficient evidence she did so with an intent to "defraud another" (§ 472), because she wanted to make the trial court think the deeds were genuine rather than to secure money, property, or a legal right from someone else. The argument is meritless.
"Making virtually any kind of false document affords an inference that the maker intends to deceive someone." (Lewis, supra, 217 Cal.App.3d at p. 388.) Making a document with apparent legal efficacy affords an inference of an intention to defraud. (Ibid.) If the court accepted the documents as genuine and granted the Halsey home to appellant, she would have secured money, property or a legal right from Gologorsky due to a false representation intended to deceive. If Kral had believed the documents to be genuine and the home was appellant's separate property and removed the issue from the court, Gologorsky's pecuniary, property, and legal rights would have been injured due to a false representation intended to deceive. On this record, there is no reason appellant would have placed a fake recorder's seal on grant deeds she showed to opposing counsel and the court, other than to "defraud another." (§ 472.)
8. Preparing False Documents
Counts 6, 9, 12, 15, 18, 21, 25, and 29 charged appellant with preparing false documentary evidence (People's Exhibits 1-8) in violation of section 134. Section 134 makes it unlawful to prepare "any false or ante-dated book, paper, record, instrument in writing, or other matter or thing, with intent to produce it, or allow it to be produced for any fraudulent or deceitful purpose, as genuine or true, upon any trial, proceeding, or inquiry whatever, authorized by law." (Italics added.)
There being no CALCRIM instruction for section 134, the court instructed the jury using the words of the statute. The instruction read, in pertinent part: "To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that: [¶] 1. The defendant prepared a false or antedated book, paper, record, instrument in writing, or other matter or thing; [¶] 2. The defendant prepared that item with the intent to produce it, or allow it to be produced as genuine or true upon any trial, proceeding, or inquiry authorized by law; AND [¶] 3. The defendant intended to produce the item, or allow it to be produced, for any fraudulent or deceitful purpose." (Italics added.) The instruction further provided, "For purposes of this instruction, fraudulent means tending to deceive another person, a governmental agency, a corporation, a business, an association, or the body politic to cause a loss of money, goods, services, or something else of value, or to cause damage to a legal, financial, or property right." The instruction did not, however, define "deceitful purpose."
Appellant acknowledges that counsel did not object to the instruction but argues we should consider the challenge because the instruction affected her substantial rights. (§ 1259.) Respondent does not claim forfeiture. We proceed to the merits.
Appellant argues that "deceitful" is broader than fraudulent. (Citing People v. Norwoods (1950) 100 Cal.App.2d 281, 288 (Norwoods).) She claims that the omission of a definition of "deceitful" is significant because she did not prepare the false documents for a fraudulent purpose, since she was not trying to defraud the trial court. We review de novo and find no reversible error. (People v. Posey (2004) 32 Cal.4th 193, 218.)
Appellant fails to demonstrate that a definition of "deceitful" was necessary. (People v. Anderson (1966) 64 Cal.2d 633, 639 ["when terms have no technical meaning peculiar to the law, but are commonly understood by those familiar with the English language, instructions as to their meaning are not required"]; see People v. Richie (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 1347, 1360.) The court in Norwoods merely observed that "intent to deceive" used in section 474 was broader than "intent to defraud" in section 470 and was not limited to an act causing financial loss-a proposition immaterial here. (Norwoods, supra, 100 Cal.App.2d at p. 288.) Moreover, appellant does not proffer any legal definition of deceit that would have had any chance of producing a more favorable outcome for her. (See Civ. Code, § 1710.) She fails to establish reversible error.
D. Bail Enhancement
The information alleged that appellant committed Counts 35 (recording a false document) and 36 (burglary of the recorder's office) on June 5, 2017, while on bail for the primary offenses. Appellant argues that the bail enhancements found true in connection with those counts must be stayed because her convictions on those counts must be reversed. (See § 12022.1, subd. (g) ["If the primary offense conviction is reversed on appeal, the enhancement shall be suspended pending retrial of that felony."].) We have already rejected appellant's arguments regarding Counts 35 and 36. Because appellant's convictions on those counts will be affirmed, the associated on-bail enhancements will be affirmed as well.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed as to Counts 7, 8, 10, 11, 13, 14, 17, 19, 20, 23, 27, and 30. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed. The matter is remanded for resentencing consistent with this opinion.
WE CONCUR: SIMONS, Acting P.J. BURNS, J.