Opinion
A165428
07-25-2023
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JERMAINE BROOKS, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
(Alameda County Super. Ct. No. 143257)
MARGULIES, J.
Defendant Jermaine Brooks appeals from an order denying his motion for a Franklin/Cook hearing under Penal Code section 1203.01. Defendant contends his statutory ineligibility for a youth offender parole (YOP) hearing under section 3051, subdivision (h), violates his rights to equal protection and constitutes cruel or unusual punishment because mandatory life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) is disproportionate when imposed on young offenders. Additionally, defendant contends the imposition of LWOP violates constitutional protections against cruel or unusual punishment under the California Racial Justice Act of 2020 (§ 745) because it is disproportionately imposed on minorities. We affirm the order.
People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 (Franklin); In re Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439 (Cook). In these two cases, the California Supreme Court established the procedural mechanisms for youth offender parole hearings. Specifically, the court held youth offender parole hearings require preserving a "record of mitigating evidence tied to [the defendant's] youth," and a sentenced prisoner may seek an evidence preservation hearing through a motion under the authority of section 1203.01. (Franklin, at p. 269; Cook, at p. 452.) We refer to this process as a Franklin/Cook hearing.
All statutory references are to the Penal Code.
I.
BACKGROUND
Defendant was charged with first degree felony murder for fatally shooting a convenience store security guard when he was 21 years old. The information also alleged felony-murder special circumstance allegations (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A)) and personal gun use allegations (§ 12022.53. subd. (b)).
At trial, a jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder. The jury also found true the special circumstance allegations that the killing occurred while defendant was engaged in the attempted commission of a robbery and that defendant personally used a firearm to carry out the commission of the crime. It found not true that defendant had personally and intentionally discharged a firearm. Defendant was sentenced to LWOP plus 10 years for the gun use enhancement.
Seventeen years later, defendant filed a motion seeking a Franklin/Cook hearing to present and preserve evidence for an eventual YOP hearing. In his motion, defendant acknowledged he was statutorily ineligible for a YOP hearing but argued this exclusion was unconstitutional.
The trial court denied the motion. It reasoned defendant was not entitled to a Franklin/Cook hearing because he was ineligible for a YOP hearing. The court explained section 3051, subdivision (h) excluded from YOP hearings" 'cases in which an individual is sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole for a controlling offense that was committed after the person had attained 18 years of age,'" and defendant was 21 at the time of the offense. The court also rejected defendant's other arguments as meritless. Defendant timely appealed.
II.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, defendant asserts the trial court erred by denying his motion for a Franklin/Cook hearing. Specifically, he argues his statutory exclusion from YOP hearings violates the right to equal protection and the ban on cruel or unusual punishment. In response, the Attorney General opposes defendant's position and further argues defendant's claims must be brought via a petition for writ of habeas corpus.
A. Section 3051
The United States Supreme Court issued a series of opinions addressing constitutional limits on juvenile sentencing. (See Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551, 568 (Roper) [holding the 8th Amend. prohibits sentencing juveniles under 18 to death]; Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48, 74 (Graham) [holding the 8th Amend. prohibits LWOP sentences for juvenile offenders convicted of nonhomicide offenses]; Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460, 465 (Miller) [holding mandatory LWOP sentences for juvenile offenders violate the 8th Amend. and sentencers must take into account a juvenile's age and other mitigating factors]; accord, People v. Caballero (2012) 55 Cal.4th 262, 268 (Caballero) [holding de facto LWOP sentences for juvenile nonhomicide offenders violate the 8th Amend.].) In doing so, the Supreme Court noted juvenile offenders are different from adult offenders for the purposes of sentencing because (1) scientific and sociological studies confirm persons under 18 lack maturity, which leads to impetuous and ill-considered actions; (2) juveniles are more vulnerable to negative influences; and (3) juveniles are not as well formed as adults and exhibit a heightened capacity for change. (Roper, at pp. 569-570.)
In response, the Legislature enacted section 3051 "explicitly to bring juvenile sentencing into conformity with Graham, Miller, and Caballero." (People v. Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 277.) The Legislature's stated purpose was" 'to establish a parole eligibility mechanism that provides a person serving a sentence for crimes that he or she committed as a juvenile the opportunity to obtain release when he or she has shown that he or she has been rehabilitated and gained maturity.'" (Ibid.) The statute requires the Board of Parole Hearings to conduct a YOP hearing to review the parole suitability of eligible offenders during their 15th, 20th, or 25th year of incarceration. (§ 3051, subd. (b).) Originally, the statute limited eligibility to juvenile offenders. The Legislature later amended the statute to apply to most offenders who committed crimes before the age of 23, and then again to extend YOP hearings to most offenders who committed crimes before the age of 26. When passing the amendments, the Legislature cited to neuroscientific advances showing the brain development involved in decisionmaking and impulse control continues into a person's 20's. (People v. Sands (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 193, 198 (Sands).) However, section 3051, subdivision (h) explicitly excludes young offenders sentenced to LWOP from being eligible for YOP hearings.
Young offenders are persons who were convicted for crimes committed between the ages of 18 and 25.
B. Appealability
As an initial matter, the Attorney General contends defendant's claims are nonjusticiable on appeal and must instead be brought in a habeas corpus petition. The Attorney General reasons "[a] constitutional challenge to the exclusion of persons sentenced to LWOP from section 3051" constitutes a collateral attack on a final judgment and cannot be raised through a postjudgment motion for a Franklin/Cook hearing.
In Sands, our colleagues in Division Five rejected a similar argument regarding the appealability of a motion for a Franklin/Cook hearing. In that case, the defendant, Phillip Sands, was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole for special circumstances murder committed when he was 24 years old. (Sands, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 197.) Sands then sought to develop a record of mitigating circumstances pursuant to Franklin. As defendant does here, Sands acknowledged his statutory ineligibility for a YOP hearing but argued the statutory exclusion violated his rights to equal protection. (Sands, at p. 197.) The Attorney General conceded a motion for a Franklin/Cook hearing was an appealable order, but argued Sands was required to file a habeas corpus petition to resolve the constitutional issue. (Sands, at p. 199.)
The appellate court disagreed. First, the court reasoned because "Cook and section 1203.01 create a substantial right for offenders to obtain a Franklin record development hearing," an order denying such a hearing affects a defendant's substantial rights and is therefore appealable under section 1237, subdivision (b). (Sands, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 200.) Second, the court reasoned an offender who is statutorily eligible under section 3051 is not materially distinguishable from someone who is statutorily excluded but contests their eligibility on constitutional grounds. (Sands, at p. 202.) It explained the Supreme Court's reasoning in Cook, which involved an offender who was statutorily eligible under section 3051, extended to Sands even though he was statutorily ineligible because "[a]ny offender [who] brings a Cook motion must establish his [or her] entitlement to a [YOP] hearing . . ., which is how Sands raised the equal protection issue." (Sands, at p. 202.) The court concluded Sands, like the Cook defendant, was "not seeking release or challenging the validity of the underlying judgment" by seeking a record preservation hearing, making a habeas corpus petition unnecessary. (Sands, at p. 202.)
The Attorney General assails Sands as ignoring the legal distinction between a limited postjudgment proceeding-which does not disturb the underlying judgment-and a constitutional challenge to section 3051 that directly attacks the underlying final LWOP judgment. However, the distinction the Attorney General draws incorrectly characterizes the claim at issue. In Sands, as is the case here, defendant's equal protection challenge was raised to establish eligibility for a YOP hearing, as required in connection with a motion seeking a Franklin/Cook hearing. (Sands, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 202.)
Claiming eligibility for a YOP hearing is distinguishable from claiming the underlying judgment-LWOP for special circumstance murder committed at 21-is unconstitutional. Only the latter vacates a final judgment. Thus, defendant's appeal of the trial court's order denying his motion for a Franklin/Cook hearing, including his argument that the statutory exclusion of youthful offenders sentenced to LWOP under section 3051 is unconstitutional, does not advance a collateral attack on his sentence.
This conclusion is further supported by our Supreme Court's interpretation of section 3051. In Franklin, the California Supreme Court interpreted section 3051 to function alongside an offender's existing sentence without modifying it. (Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 269, 278.) It noted "[t]he Legislature did not envision that the original sentences of eligible youth offenders would be vacated and that new sentences would be imposed," evident from the fact an otherwise eligible inmate remains bound by the original sentence without a YOP hearing if the inmate commits an additional crime with malice aforethought after turning 26. (Ibid.) Rather, section 3051 changes the way the "original sentence operates by capping the number of years that he or she may be imprisoned before becoming eligible for release on parole." (Franklin, at p. 278.) Thus, in Franklin, the defendant's "two consecutive sentences of 25 years to life remain[ed] valid, even though the statute has made him eligible for parole during his 25th year of incarceration." (Id. at p. 269.)
Under this reasoning, defendant's equal protection argument and his argument that the trial court's order constitutes cruel or unusual punishment when applied to young offenders do not challenge the validity of his LWOP sentence. Rather, they attempt to prove defendant is constitutionally eligible for a YOP hearing despite his statutory exclusion. This is not a collateral attack on a final judgment because, even if successful, granting a YOP hearing does not result in a change of sentence under the Supreme Court's interpretation of section 3051. (Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 278.) If successful, the defendant receives a YOP hearing, but the original sentence is not vacated. (Id. at pp. 278-279.) For the foregoing reasons, these claims do not need to be raised by writ of habeas corpus and are not procedurally barred from consideration on appeal.
We reach a different conclusion regarding defendant's Eighth Amendment claim under the California Racial Justice Act of 2020, as discussed in part II.D.2., post.
C. Equal Protection
Turning to the substance of defendant's claims, he first contends section 3051 violates equal protection by excluding young offenders sentenced to LWOP from eligibility for YOP hearings. We review this claim de novo. (Samples v. Brown (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 787, 799.)
Both the federal and California Constitutions guarantee that no person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws. (U.S. Const., 14th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 7.) This means "persons similarly situated regarding the legitimate purpose of the law should receive like treatment." (People v. Morales (2016) 63 Cal.4th 399, 408.) When "a statute involves neither a suspect class nor a fundamental right, it need only meet minimum equal protection standards, and survive 'rational basis review.'" (People v. Turnage (2012) 55 Cal.4th 62, 74 (Turnage).)" 'The first prerequisite to a meritorious claim under the equal protection clause is a showing that the state has adopted a classification that affects two or more similarly situated groups in an unequal manner.'" (Cooley v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 228, 253.)" 'The next step of an equal protection analysis asks whether the disparate treatment of two similarly situated groups is justified by a constitutionally sufficient state interest.'" (People v. Hardin (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 273, 283, review granted Jan. 11, 2023, S277487 (Hardin).)
Defendant contends (1) young offenders sentenced to LWOP are similarly situated to young offenders sentenced to life eligible sentences, and (2) section 3051's differentiation between young offenders serving LWOP and those who are not cannot be rationally justified and thus violates constitutional guarantees to equal protection before the law.
1. Similarly Situated
The first issue under the equal protection analysis is whether" 'the state has adopted a classification that affects two or more similarly situated groups in an unequal manner.'" (Cooley v. Superior Court, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 253.) This question asks "not whether persons are similarly situated for all purposes, but 'whether they are similarly situated for purposes of the law challenged.'" (Ibid.) Here, section 3051, subdivision (h) differentiates between young offenders sentenced to LWOP and young offenders sentenced to life eligible terms, with the former explicitly excluded from YOP hearing eligibility.
In evaluating this distinction, Courts of Appeal are split on whether young offenders serving LWOP sentences are similarly situated to young offenders serving non-LWOP sentences for the purposes of section 3051. (Compare Hardin, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at pp. 287-288 [concluding both groups are similarly situated] and People v. Acosta (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 769, 779 (Acosta) [noting both groups "are similarly situated for the purpose of evaluating whether they have outgrown the youthful impulses that led to the commission of their offenses"] with People v. Jackson (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 189, 199 (Jackson) [holding LWOP and non-LWOP serving offenders are not similarly situated because only the former committed special circumstance murder] and In re Williams (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 427, 435 (Williams) [holding persons convicted of different crimes are not similarly situated for equal protection purposes and can be punished differently].)
We need not resolve this issue because defendant fails to satisfy the second step of the equal protection analysis. Accordingly, we assume without deciding that offenders serving an LWOP sentence and who were between 18 and 26 years old at the time of their offense are similarly situated with offenders who are serving a parole eligible sentence and who were between 18 and 26 years old at the time of their offense.
2. Rational Basis Analysis
Next, defendant must demonstrate there is no rational relationship between the disparate treatment of young offenders and a legitimate governmental purpose. (See Turnage, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 74.) "Equal protection analysis does not entitle the judiciary to second-guess the wisdom, fairness, or logic of the law." (Ibid.) "Nor must the underlying rationale be empirically substantiated." (Id. at p. 75.) This standard "sets a high bar before a law is deemed to lack even the minimal rationality necessary for it to survive constitutional scrutiny." (People v. Chatman (2018) 4 Cal.5th 277, 289.)
Addressing a similar issue, our colleagues in Sands rejected an argument that section 3051's exclusion of offenders sentenced to LWOP is unconstitutional under equal protection. (Sands, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 204.) The court concluded "[t]he Legislature may rationally treat offenders in this group less harshly because it deems their underlying crimes, such as first degree murder, less grave than special circumstances murder." (Ibid.) "It is well settled that the Legislature has broad latitude to define crimes, separate them into degrees, and assign them different punishments based on its view of the crimes' comparative gravity and on policy objectives like deterrence, retribution and incapacitation." (Id. at p. 205, citing People v. Rhodes (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1374, 1384-1387.) "By denying any possibility of parole to special circumstance murderers, the Legislature presumably hopes to deter others from committing similar offenses in the future. It is in no way irrational, or even contradictory, that the Legislature allows parole for other youthful offenders who, in its view, committed less heinous homicides." (Sands, at p. 205.)
Various other appellate courts have reached a similar conclusion and held there is a rational basis for differential treatment between LWOP and non-LWOP serving young offenders. (See, e.g., Williams, supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 436; Jackson, supra, 61 Cal.App.5th at p. 200; People v. Ngo (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 116, 124, review granted May 17, 2023, S279458 (Ngo); Acosta, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th at p. 780.)
In contrast, defendant solely relies on Hardin, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th 273, to argue no rational basis exists for distinguishing between young offenders sentenced to LWOP and other young offenders for purposes of section 3051. In Hardin, the Second Appellate District disagreed with the equal protection analysis in Sands, Williams, Jackson, and Acosta. Specifically, the Hardin court focused its rational basis analysis on the Legislature's goal of applying Miller youth-related mitigating factors to young offenders up to 26 years old. It concluded "for that purpose there is no plausible basis for distinguishing between same-age offenders based solely on the crime they committed." (Hardin, at p. 288.) Hardin continued: "The potential for growth and rehabilitation is no greater for the 19-year-old offender who committed a robbery one day and an unrelated premeditated murder the next, for example, than for the 19-year-old offender who killed his or her victim during the robbery, a homicide offense that does not necessarily require proof of actual malice." (Ibid.) Hardin also critiqued courts finding a rational basis in relative culpability. It noted, "The crime of a 20-year-old offender who shot and killed his [or her] victim while attempting to commit robbery and was sentenced to life without parole [citation] cannot rationally be considered more severe than those of a 20 year old who shot and killed his [or her] victim one day, committed a robbery the next, and was sentenced to an indeterminate term of 50 years to life." (Id. at p. 289.)
In Miller, the Supreme Court found mandatory LWOP for juveniles violates the Eighth Amendment because it prevents a sentencer from considering the mitigating factors of youth, including "chronological age and its hallmark features-among them, immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences." (Miller, supra, 567 U.S. at p. 477.) It also emphasized a juvenile's susceptibility to negative influences and heightened capacity for change. (Id. at pp. 476, 479.).
The Fourth District Court of Appeal recently responded to Hardin's rational basis analysis in Ngo, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th 116. Ngo explained the" 'similarly situated'" inquiry is limited to an analysis of whether persons are similarly situated for the purposes of the law challenged. (Id. at p. 125.) "By contrast, the 'rational basis' inquiry is not limited to the purposes of the challenged law. [Citation.] The Hardin court, however, looked at the rational basis for the distinction strictly in terms of 'the goal of section 3051.'" (Ibid.) Moreover, while Hardin identified a hypothetical where a special circumstance murder would not necessarily be perceived as more culpable than nonspecial circumstance murder," 'any plausible reason for distinguishing between [two classes] need not exist in every scenario in which the statutes might apply.'" (Ngo, at p. 126; accord, Sands, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at pp. 204-205 ["The Legislature's distinction is not irrational simply because some offenders sentenced to life without the possibility of parole are arguably less culpable than some offenders receiving lesser sentences."].)
We agree with the analyses in Sands and Ngo. The Legislature could rationally distinguish between young offenders sentenced to LWOP and other young offenders based on the severity of the crime committed. Special circumstance murder mandates the harshest sentences available in California: LWOP or the death penalty. (§ 190.2, subd. (a).) "A person guilty of murder with special circumstances is the worst of the worst. This is the most heinous crime known to our Penal Code, and one of the few crimes subject to the death penalty in California." (Ngo, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 123.) "The Legislature rationally judged [special circumstance murder] to be more severe and more deserving of lifetime punishment than nonspecial circumstance first degree murder." (Williams, supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 436.)
For similar reasons, we reject Hardin's argument that the distinction between special circumstance murder and nonspecial circumstance murder is illusory because the "expansion of the factors qualifying as special circumstances . . . meant special circumstance allegations could have been charged in 95 percent of all first degree murder convictions." (Hardin, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 290, fn. omitted.) First, the fact that special circumstances could be charged in most murder cases does not mean the prosecution would have secured convictions for special circumstances in most murder cases. Second, the issue of how prosecutors choose to charge special circumstances is distinct from whether the Legislature had a rational basis for assigning a certain level of culpability for persons convicted of special circumstance murder.
We recognize many jurists on the Court of Appeal have called on the Legislature to revisit the exclusions under section 3051 in light of the statute's purpose. Like them, however, we conclude the current distinction established by the Legislature in section 3051 does not violate equal protection principles.
D. Cruel or Unusual Punishment
Next, defendant contends denying a YOP hearing to an offender who, like him, was sentenced to LWOP for committing special circumstance murder when he was 21, violates the state constitutional ban on cruel or unusual punishment. In support of this argument, defendant claims mandatory LWOP is disproportionate for young offenders and the Miller sentencing process should apply instead. Additionally, defendant argues LWOP constitutes cruel or unusual punishment under the California Racial Justice Act of 2020 (§ 745; CRJA).
1. Application of Miller to Young Offenders
Defendant argues an LWOP sentence is cruel or unusual when imposed for special circumstance murder committed when defendant was 21 years old.
Federal and California law both place constitutional limits on sentencing. The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits "cruel and unusual punishments." Likewise, article I, section 17 of the California Constitution prohibits the infliction of "[c]ruel or unusual punishment." "Although articulated slightly differently, both standards prohibit punishment that is 'grossly disproportionate' to the crime or the individual culpability of the defendant. [Citations.] Under both standards, the court examines the nature of the offense and the defendant, the punishment for more serious offenses within the jurisdiction, and the punishment for similar offenses in other jurisdictions." (People v. Mendez (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 47, 64.)
Defendant argues the Supreme Court's reasoning in Miller, supra, 567 U.S. at page 479, which found mandatory LWOP sentences for juveniles unconstitutional due to their diminished culpability and heightened capacity for change, should be extended to young offenders. In Miller, the Supreme Court held mandatory LWOP for juveniles violated the Eighth Amendment. (Miller, at p. 479.) There, the court consolidated two cases. Each involved a defendant who had committed murder at age 14, were found guilty, and sentenced to LWOP. (Id. at p. 465.) The court reasoned its former decisions in Roper, supra, 543 U.S. at page 578 (holding the 8th Amend. bars capital punishment for children) and Graham, supra, 560 U.S. at page 82 (holding an LWOP sentence for a juvenile convicted of a nonhomicide offense violates the 8th Amend.) establish "children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing" and less deserving of the most severe punishments due to their diminished culpability and greater prospects for rehabilitation. (Miller, at pp. 470-471.) The court cited both to common sense and social science. (Id. at p. 471.) It concluded a sentencer must consider the mitigating factors of youth, including "chronological age and its hallmark features-among them, immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences." (Id. at p. 477.) The court also emphasized a juvenile's susceptibility to negative influences and heightened capacity for change as relevant considerations in sentencing. (Id. at pp. 476, 479.)
Defendant argues the neurological characteristics highlighted by Miller that make LWOP unconstitutional for juveniles continue to persist into a person's mid-20's, including recklessness, vulnerability to negative influences, and a heightened capacity for change. However, the court's reasoning in Miller, as well as the precedential cases it rests on, was explicitly confined to juveniles under 18 years of age. The United States Supreme Court noted both a scientific basis for distinguishing between juveniles and offenders 18 and over, as well as emphasizing the need for a bright-line rule reflecting society's understanding on when childhood ends: "Drawing the line at 18 years of age is subject, of course, to the objections always raised against categorical rules....[H]owever, a line must be drawn.... The age of 18 is the point where society draws the line for many purposes between childhood and adulthood. It is, we conclude, the age at which the line for death eligibility ought to rest." (Roper, supra, 543 U.S. at p. 574.)
The California Supreme Court reinforced this bright-line rule for distinguishing juvenile offenders from older offenders for sentencing purposes in People v. Gamache (2010) 48 Cal.4th 374, 405 (Gamache). There, the defendant was convicted of committing numerous crimes when he was 18, including first degree murder with robbery, burglary, and kidnapping special circumstances. (Id. at p. 356.) He was sentenced to death. (Ibid.) The defendant argued the imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed at 18 violates the Eighth Amendment. Our Supreme Court rejected this argument, explaining, "the United States Supreme Court has concluded the federal Constitution draws precisely this line, prohibiting the death penalty for those younger than 18 years of age, but not for those 18 years of age and older." (Gamache, at p. 405.)
Since Gamache, our Supreme Court has continued to apply Roper, holding death sentences imposed on individuals who were 18 or over at the time of their crimes do not violate constitutional protections, even though they may share certain qualities with juveniles. (See, e.g., People v. Powell (2018) 6 Cal.5th 136, 192; People v. Flores (2020) 9 Cal.5th 371, 429; People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1234-1235.) In Flores, for example, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that Roper should be expanded to those aged 18 to 21, because research shows young offenders "suffer from many of the same cognitive and developmental deficiencies as adolescents." (Flores, at p. 429.) It reasoned "the high court in Roper recognized that the' "qualities that distinguish juveniles from adults do not disappear when an individual turns 18,"' but nonetheless held the' "age of 18 is the point where society draws the line for many purposes between childhood and adulthood"' and is' "the age at which the line for death eligibility ought to rest.'" " (Ibid.) The court also noted a nonprecedential case holding the execution of individuals who committed crimes when under the age of 21 and the expansion of section 3051 to provide YOP hearings to individuals 25 and under "do not establish the 'national consensus' necessary to justify a categorical bar on the death penalty for individuals between the ages of 18 and 21 at the time of their offenses." (Flores, at p. 429.)
By holding the most extreme punishment, death, is constitutional for 18 year olds, binding precedent forecloses defendant's Eighth Amendment challenge based on his LWOP sentence for committing murder at age 21. As the Second Appellate District in Williams held, "If the Eighth Amendment does not prohibit a sentence of death for 21 year olds, then most assuredly, it does not prohibit the lesser LWOP sentence." (Williams, supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 439.) Accordingly, the trial court's order denying defendant's motion for a Franklin/Cook hearing does not violate the constitutional bans on cruel or unusual punishment.
Defendant points to 10 examples of laws distinguishing people by age in an attempt to demonstrate consensus that society treats young adults as more vulnerable and more deserving of protection that older adults. These laws include restrictions on persons under 21 from buying alcohol, tobacco, and firearms, as well as other laws pertaining to parental support obligations, loans, and insurance. However, the majority of these laws protect people younger than defendant was at the time of the murder. More significantly, there is no clear allegory between protecting a young adult from purchasing harmful substances or allowing a young adult to remain on their parents' health insurance and how society perceives a young adult's culpability for murder.
2. Constitutionality Under the CRJA
Next, defendant asserts his "[LWOP] sentence is cruel or unusual punishment under the [CRJA] because it is statistically imposed much more frequently on young African Americans and other young people of color." The CRJA provides, "The state shall not seek or obtain a criminal conviction or seek, obtain, or impose a sentence on the basis of race, ethnicity, or national origin." (§ 745, subd. (a).) In support of his argument, defendant cites statistics showing 79 percent of people serving LWOP are people of color, and 38 percent are Black youth under the age of 26. Defendant further asserts special circumstances could be charged in connection with most murders, which grant local district attorneys tremendous discretion without meaningful oversight.
In response, the Attorney General notes defendant has not complied with the requirements for bringing a CRJA claim. (See § 745, subd. (j)(1).) Defendant does not dispute this, instead arguing he is not raising a separate claim under section 745. Rather, defendant asserts his sentence is cruel and unusual under the CRJA because such sentences are more likely to be imposed on people of color.
Unlike defendant's first two arguments, he does not explain how his CRJA claim relates to the denial of his motion for a Franklin/Cook hearing. For comparison, defendant's equal protection argument attempts to establish defendant's eligibility under section 3051 by showing his statutory exclusion is unconstitutional. If successful, this would provide defendant with an avenue, through section 3051, to receive a YOP hearing and further establish his entitlement to a Franklin/Cook hearing. Additionally, defendant's argument for extending Miller to young offenders goes to the heart of the agebased distinctions underpinning the YOP remedy in section 3051. Defendant argues the constitutional developments leading to the passage of section 3051 should be extended to defendant's age group, which would thus entitle him to a YOP hearing and a Franklin/Cook hearing. By contrast, here, defendant argues his sentence is cruel or unusual under the CRJA. But this contention does not demonstrate an entitlement to a YOP hearing. By invoking the CRJA and statistical evidence to argue his LWOP sentence is unconstitutional, defendant attacks the constitutionality of his LWOP sentence, not his exclusion from eligibility under section 3051.
As a collateral attack on his LWOP sentence, defendant's argument under the CRJA is most appropriately raised through a habeas corpus petition, not an appeal from the denial of his motion for a Franklin/Cook hearing. A writ of habeas corpus allows a defendant whose sentence has been affirmed on appeal to collaterally attack the final criminal judgment by "permit[ting] judicial inquiry into a variety of constitutional and jurisdictional issues." (People v. Duvall (1995) 9 Cal.4th 464, 476.) Further, unlike an appeal, a writ of habeas corpus allows a prisoner "to bring before a court evidence from outside the trial or appellate record." (In re Reno (2012) 55 Cal.4th 428, 449-450.) This would better accommodate defendant's argument under the CRJA, which rests on statistical evidence outside the existing record that defendant contends demonstrates LWOP is disproportionally imposed on people of color.
Although an appellate court may exercise discretion to construe an appeal as a petition for writ of habeas corpus in order to decide an issue on its merits, we decline to do so here. A court only exercises such discretion "under unusual circumstances, and . . . where doing so would serve the interests of justice and judicial economy." (Mon Chong Loong Trading Corp. v. Superior Court (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 87, 92.) Defendant has not demonstrated any compelling reasons or unusual circumstances that would warrant the exercise of such discretion here. Accordingly, we decline to consider defendant's constitutional argument under the CRJA.
III.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: HUMES, P. J., BANKE, J.