Opinion
Index No. 69042/2018 Motion Sequence No. 1
07-06-2021
THE LEGION OF CHRIST, INCORPORATED, Plaintiff, v. THE TOWN OF MOUNT PLEASANT, CARL FULGENZI, SUPERVISOR OF THE TOWN OF MOUNT PLEASANT, THE ASSESSOR OF THE TOWN OF MOUNT PLEASANT, and THE BOARD OF ASSESSMENT REVIEW OF THE TOWN OF MOUNT PLEASANT, Defendants.
Unpublished Opinion
DECISION AND ORDER
Terry Jane Ruderman Judge
The following papers were considered in connection with defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing plaintiff s complaint against them:
Papers Numbered
Notice of Motion; Affidavit, Exhibits A - C, E - AA;
Affirmation, Exhibits D, BB - FF; Memorandum of Law 1
Affidavit in Opposition, Exhibits 1-16; Memorandum of Law 2
Affirmation in Reply, Exhibits GG - JJ; Memorandum of Law 3
The Action
This civil rights action arises out of numerous disputes between the parties; regarding plaintiffs applications for exemptions from real property taxes. Plaintiff, The Legion of Christ, Incorporated ("Legion" or "plaintiff''), is a religious corporation organized under and existing pursuant to Not-For-Profit Corporation Law § 402. Defendant the Town of Mount Pleasant (Mount Pleasant) is a municipality within the State of New York, and defendant assessor of the Town of Mount Pleasant (the tax assessor) is the individual charged with valuing, assessing, and determining the taxability of all real property therein. Defendant Board of Assessment Review hears complaints arising out of decisions made by the tax assessor, and makes determinations in matters subject to such complaints. Defendant Carl Fulgenzi has been the town supervisor of Mount Pleasant since October 2014.
It is undisputed that on December 12, 1996, Legion purchased real property located on Columbus Avenue in Mount Pleasant from IBM Corporation. At the time, the property was made up of two contiguous tax parcels. The larger parcel is approximately 164.78 acres of wooded, undeveloped property (the undeveloped parcel), and is the primary subject of this lawsuit. Directly north of the undeveloped parcel, the smaller parcel of approximately 97 acres included a 282,000 square foot structure previously used as the IBM International Conference Center, as well as a separate 48,000 square foot office building.
Legion alleges that, nearly every year since 1997, it has filed applications with the Mount Pleasant tax assessor seeking an exemption from paying real property taxes on both parcels based on its religious use of the properties. Plaintiff claims that, with few exceptions, the tax assessor has denied each application and the Board of Assessment Review has upheld those decisions, . resulting in Legion commencing actions pursuant to article 7 of the Real Property Tax Law (RPTL) for each denied application, claiming entitlement to exemptions from taxation and/or unequal assessments.
In 1999, Mount Pleasant separated the office building and the former conference center into two tax parcels (collectively "the northern parcels"). Plaintiff alleges that litigation continued with respect to the three separate tax parcels, and in June 2012, they began settlement negotiations to resolve (1) pending article 7 proceedings claiming unequal assessments on all three parcels for tax years 1998 to 2012, (2) Mount Pleasant's appeal regarding tax-exemption of the undeveloped . parcel for tax years 2002 and 2003, and (3) proper valuations for all three parcels going forward.
According to Legion's verified complaint, the parties ultimately reached a global settlement in which they agreed that Legion was entitled to $2,200,000 in tax refunds, but would pay $215,000 to Mount Pleasant for outstanding taxes, penalties, and interest. Therefore, Legion would receive a net settlement of $1,985,000. The settlement agreement was memorialized in an Order &Judgment signed by Hon. John R. LaCava on November 20, 2012, which incorporated two related documents by reference: a stipulation and a stipulation of payment (the 2012 settlement).
The 2012 settlement encompassed Westchester County index numbers 15524/1997, 15525/1997, 16472/1998, 16473/1998, 16316/1999, 15847/2000, 15848/2000, 15849/2000, 16305/2001, 16306/2001, 16307/2001, 17063/2002, 17075/2002, 17076/2002, 16851/2003, 16852/2003, 16853/2003, 16648/2004, 16649/2004, 16650/2004, 18457/2005, 20651/2006, 20653/2006, 20656/2006, 21205/2007, 21206/2007, 21207/2007, 22862/2008, 22863/2008, 22864/2008, 23942/2009, 23943/2009, 23944/2009, 25992/2010, 25993/2010, 25994/2010, 15235/2011, 15236/2011, and 15237/2011.
Legion alleges that, due to an arithmetic error, Mount Pleasant failed to pay $371,765 of the agreed-upon settlement and refused to make up the shortfall. Legion claims that the parties were unable to resolve the dispute in an April 24, 2014 Court conference, so they filed a motion to enforce the settlement on May 27, 2014. Subsequently, on March 12, 2015, the Court denied Legion's motion to enforce the settlement (Tolbert, J.). The Second Department later affirmed the decision (see generally Matter of Legion of Christ, Inc. v Town of Mount Pleasant, 151 A.D.3d 858 [2d Dept 2017]).
Plaintiff further alleges that, in the interim, the tax assessor had denied Legion's exemption - application for the 2013 tax year but granted the application for 2014, and that on March 28,2014, Legion sold the northern parcels to non-party Efekta Academy, Inc. Following that sale, in a letter dated May 20, 2014, the tax assessor denied Legion's renewal application with respect to the exemption of the undeveloped parcel.
Plaintiff concedes that the renewal application submitted on May 16, 2014 indicated that a change had occurred in its use of the undeveloped property, in that it was no longer used for training and education programs. However, the application also indicated that the property was instead used for outdoor religious and recreational purposes on a regular basis. In the May 20, 2014 letter, the tax assessor noted that the undeveloped parcel was previously exempt as a support parcel for the northern parcels, and because it was being used for education purposes. The letter further explained that the renewal application was denied because the undeveloped parcel was no longer being used for those purposes, noting that the northern parcels had been sold add citing a conversation with Father Jose Felix Ortega, who purportedly stated that Legion personnel had vacated the premises and were instead using locations in Rye and White Plains to carry out Legion's business.
An article 7 proceeding challenging this decision is pending in New York State Supreme Court, Westchester County under index number 68099/2014.
On July 22, 2014, Legion entered into a purchase and sale agreement for the undeveloped parcel, however, since title never closed under this contract, Legion asserts that it continues to own and use the premises. Its applications for exemption were denied again from 2015 through 2018 for the same reasons stated in the May 20, 2014 letter.
An action related to this alleged breach of contract was filed in New York State Supreme Court, Westchester County under index number 53577/2018 and was discontinued with prejudice by a June 29, 2020 stipulation.
Article 7 proceedings challenging these decisions are pending in New York State Supreme Court, Westchester County under index numbers 67924/2015, 64920/2016, 66112/2017, and 65448/2018, respectively.
Plaintiff alleges that each decision to return the property to the tax rolls was made in retaliation for plaintiffs attempt to enforce the 2012 settlement. As purported evidence of such retaliation, plaintiff attached as exhibit B to the verified complaint a June 28, 2018 letter to the editor of the Examiner from defendant town supervisor Carl Fulgenzi, in which Fulgenzi refers to' >: Legion as a "so called religious corporation" which "tries so hard to take from the hard working, people they once referred to as neighbors," and indicates that "[Fulgenzi] advised [the tax] assessor Jim Timmings to put the vacant portion of the property on the tax rolls as soon as [they] were advised that the property was for sale..." Plaintiff maintains that they continue to use the property for outdoor religious purposes.
For its first cause of action, Legion claims, pursuant to 42 USC § 1983, that defendants violated the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution by removing the undeveloped parcel from the "wholly exempt" tax roll and placing it on the "taxable" roll in retaliation for Legion's attempt to enforce the 2012 settlement.
For its second cause of action, Legion claims, pursuant to 42 USC § 1983, that defendants violated the Equal Protection Clause of the United States' Constitution by implementing and enforcing a policy of denying the Legion's applications to the tax assessor for the sole reason that their status as a religious organization deprived Mount PleaSant of tax revenue it had previously received from IBM Corporation, the property's prior owner.
For its third cause of action, Legion claims generally that defendants violated the New York State Constitution and unspecified laws of New York State. For each of the three causes of action, Legion seeks a judgment in the amount of $371,765, plus interest from January 1, 2013 and attorney's fees.
Defendants' Motion
Defendants move for summary judgment dismissing the complaint against them pursuant to CPLR 3212. In support of their motion, defendants submit the affirmation of:Darius P. J Chafizadeh, the Mount Pleasant town attorney, and the affidavit of James J. Timmings, [the Mount Pleasant tax assessor.
Chafizadeh summarizes the history of litigation between the parties. Following an earlier article 7 petition, the Supreme Court and the Appellate Division ruled in favor of Mount Pleasant, holding that the undeveloped parcel was, fully taxable (see generally Matter of Legion of Christ v. Town of Mount Pleasant, 303 A.D.2d 507 [2d Dept 2003]). However, in 2004, the Court of Appeals reversed, and remanded the case to the Appellate Division to determine "whether the development of the property for tax exempt purposes was 'in good faith contemplated'" within the meaning of RPTL 420-a (3) (Matter of Legion of Christ v Town of Mount Pleasant, 1 N.Y.3d 406, 413 [2004]).
On remand, the Second Department found that Legion's proposed improvements to the property were contemplated in good faith, and held that it was entitled to real property tax-exemption for tax years 1997 through 2001 (see generally Matter of Legion of Christ v Town of Mount Pleasant, 10 A.D.3d 609 [2d Dept 2004]).
More recently, on August 19, 2019, Mount Pleasant moved for summary judgment in Legion's article 7 proceedings related to tax years 2014 through 2018 (see nn 2, 4, supra). In a September 22, 2020 decision and order, Hon. Bruce E. Tolbert upheld the tax assessor's and the Board of Assessment Review's determinations that the undeveloped parcel was not exempt from real property taxes for those years (see generally Chafizadeh affirmation, exhibit FF, Matter of Legion of Christ v Town of Mount Pleasant, Sup Ct, Westchester County, Sept. 22, 2020, Tolbert, J., Index Nos. 68099/2014, 67924/2015, 64920/2016, 66112/2017, and 65448/2018).
This decision is the basis for defendants' res judicata and collateral estoppel arguments discussed below.
James J. Timmings indicates in his affidavit in support of the present motion that he has been the Mount Pleasant tax assessor since October of 2001. He explains that the Board of Assessment Review is a body of officers empowered to hear and determine complaints in relation to tax assessments, and that its rulings can be challenged in court by filing a small claims assessment review or an RPTL article 7 proceeding.
Timmings further explains that, when Legion first purchased the properties in 1996, it made representations that it planned to install a Rosary path, Stations of the Cross, grotto of our lady, outdoor chapel, nature trails, gardens, a picnic grove, a challenge course, soccer fields, softball fields, volleyball courts, and a day camp for children. Subsequently, Legion also sought to create a Catholic university on the undeveloped parcel, to be called Westchester University.
Timmings cited correspondence between Legion and Archbishop Edward Cardinal Egan spanning from 2000 to 2008 related to the Westchester University proposal. In a November 22, 2000 letter to Father Peter Hopkins, the Archbishop's office discouraged the plan to build a new Catholic university on the undeveloped parcel. In a January 17, 2003 letter to Archbishop Egan, Father Anthony Bannon, Legion's territorial director, stated "[o]ur lawyers have urged us to present the town a site plan for the University Project we had proposed to you a couple of years ago. This would forestall any further expropriation and exempt us from paying taxes while we continue litigation." Finally, on February 28, 2008, Archbishop Egan wrote to Father Joseph Burtka, Legion's new territorial director, clarifying that the Archdiocese of New York would not grant Legion permission to move forward with Westchester University.
Timmings indicated that Legion eventually abandoned the Westchester University plan, and never made any of the other planned improvements to the undeveloped parcel. According to Timmings, Legion's use of the property was limited to placing Stations of the Cross and a grotto along a preexisting path that covered approximately one acre of the 164-acre property, and the remaining 163 acres remain densely wooded, unmaintained, and unpassable.
With respect to the 2012 settlement, Timmings explained that the parties agreed that Mount Pleasant would pay Legion $320,400 pursuant to the stipulation of payment and $290,300 pursuant to the stipulation, for a combined total of $610,700. Timmings further asserted that Mount Pleasant paid Legion $610,700 by a check made out on November 28, 2012. He also indicated that, following the settlement, he granted Legion's application for real property tax-exemption for all three parcels in 2012 and 2013.
Timmings explained that he then participated in a meeting with former town supervisor Joan Maybury and Father Jose Felix Ortega in Spring of 2014, in which Father Ortega stated that Legion was finished with all operations at the Mount Pleasant facility, and that Legion would be conducting its business from offices in White Plains and residences in Rye.
Timmings also described Legion's May 16, 2014 renewal application, which provided that the undeveloped parcel was previously used primarily by priests residing at or visiting the northern parcels, which had been sold, and that Legion was actively negotiating the sale of the undeveloped parcel. Timmings acknowledges that Legion still claimed that it. planned to use the undeveloped parcel for religious and recreational purposes on a regular basis. Nevertheless, he denied Legion's . renewal application in the May 20, 2014 letter, citing details provided in the May 16 application as well as the meeting with Father Ortega as his justification for doing so. As discussed above, this decision was upheld by the Board of Assessment Review and by Judge Tolbert in his September 22, 2020 decision.
Finally, Timmings asserts that neither defendant Fulgenzi nor any other town supervisor has ever instructed him to take any specific action regarding assessments or exemptions. He further asserts that he made his decision to deny Legion's renewal application before Legion made its motion to enforce the 2012 settlement, and that he was not aware of the dispute until after he made his determination. Moreover, Timmings indicates that he has also denied applications for religious exemptions from other institutions, including Valhalla United Methodist Church in 2006, the Reformed Church of the Tarrytowns in 2008, and the Hawthorne Reformed Church in 2010.
Defendants' Legal Arguments
As an initial matter, defendants argue that the claims against Timmings and the Board of Assessment Review must be dismissed based on qualified and absolute immunity, and that the claims against Fulgenzi must be dismissed because he had no personal involvement in the decisions made against Legion. Defendants also take the position that Legion's claims are barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel based on Judge Tolbert's 2020 decision. Additionally, they contend that all claims brought under 42 USC § 1983 from 2014 and 2015 are barred by the three-year statute of limitations.
Defendants also argue that Legion has not provided evidence of retaliatory conduct, and maintain that the applications for religious exemptions were denied because Legion (1) sold the northern parcels, (2) abandoned its application for Westchester University, (3) moved its activities from Mount Pleasant to White Plains and Rye, (4) was in the process of selling the undeveloped parcel, and (5) never improved the undeveloped parcel.
With respect to the second cause of action brought under the Equal Protection clause, defendants contend that Legion has failed to offer evidence demonstrating that the denials of its applications were motivated by religious discrimination. Defendants further contend that the third cause of action fails because Legion may not pursue a state constitutional tort claim where it has an adequate remedy under federal law.
Plaintiff's Opposition
In opposition, Legion submits the affidavit of P. Daniel Hollis, III, who observes that the May 20, 2014 denial letter states that the undeveloped parcel was previously exempt as a support parcel and under an education exemption, but it fails to reference the religious exemption, which he claims Legion is still entitled to. Additionally, Hollis cites several statements allegedly made on behalf of defendants that were disclosed during discovery in the instant action. In an email dated May 19, 2014, tax assessor Timmings wrote to former town supervisor Joan Maybury, purportedly in relation to Legion's May 16, 2014 renewal application: "Can you believe the nerve of these people!? ... Of course they will be denied so I guess they will file a grievance and cert etc. What [a] miserable group. Just so incredible." Similarly, during his deposition, Timmings testified "I don't think very highly of [Legion] as a group."
Hollis also notes the deposition testimony of former town supervisor Joan Maybury, who stated that it would be improper for the new town supervisor, defendant Carl Fulgenzi, to advise Timmings on applications made to him as tax assessor. Finally, Hollis cites Fulgenzi's testimony that he suggested to Timmings that the undeveloped parcel should be on the tax rolls because he had heard that Legion was no longer using the property.
Plaintiffs Legal Arguments
Plaintiff argues that the instant action is not barred by res judicata or collateral estoppel because the prior article 7 proceedings on which defendants rely do not provide jurisdiction for the Court to award compensatory damages for a violation of constitutional rights. Plaintiff acknowledges that defendants' denials of its applications between 2014 and 2018 were addressed in Judge Tolbert's 2020 decision, however, Legion takes the position that the discriminatory pattern of those denials amounts to a distinct transaction.
Next, Legion argues that its claims are not barred by the statute of limitations. Although plaintiff agrees that a three-year statute of limitations applies here, it contends that the 2014 and 2015 denials may still be considered because they were part of a continuing pattern of unlawful conduct, in which the most recent event occurred within the limitations period.
Legion further contends that defendants violated its due process rights by prejudging their applications to the tax assessor rather than examining the facts of each application. Legion relies on the same arguments for its third cause of action.
On the subject of immunity, Legion argues that Timmings is not protected by qualified immunity because he was aware that his actions were violating Legion's constitutional rights. To support this position, Legion refers to the history of litigation between the parties as well as the same statements cited in the Hollis affidavit. Plaintiff does not submit opposition to defendants' claim of absolute immunity with respect to defendant Board of Assessment Review.
Legion further claims that Fulgenzi was directly involved in the alleged discrimination, citing the Examiner article in which he asserts that he instructed Timmings to deny Legion's 2014 renewal application.
Defendants' Reply
In reply, defendants note that the damages sought herein - $371,765 - is the exact amount that was sought in Legion's motion to enforce the 2012 settlement, which was denied. They also challenge plaintiffs position that res judicata and collateral estoppel do not apply because the alleged conduct amounts to a discriminatory pattern rather than a single transaction, contending, that the full context of the situation was apparent to Judge Tolbert as he analyzed each of the individual transactions together in his 2020 decision. Further, defendants argue that the individual transactions, which were adjudged as valid in Judge Tolbert's 2020 decision, do not become invalid when viewed collectively.
Analysis
Res Judicata
New York has adopted a transactional analysis in deciding res judicata issues. "[O]nce a claim is brought to a final conclusion, all other claims arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions are barred, even if based upon different theories or if seeking a different remedy" (O'Brien v Syracuse, 54 N.Y.2d 353, 357 [1981]). Here, the instant action arises out of the same transactions that were the subject of Judge Tolbert's 2020 decision. However, since the compensatory relief that plaintiff seeks through its 42 USC § 1983 claims was not available in the context of the prior article 7 petitions, an exception applies and this action is not barred by res judicata (see Corvetti v Town of Lake Pleasant, 227 A.D.2d 821, 823 [3d Dept 1996]; Parker v Blauvelt Volunteer Fire Co., 93 N.Y.2d 343, 348-49 [1999]).
The Corvetti Court analyzed facts nearly identical to those at bar here. Corvetti had previously filed several petitions pursuant to RPTL article 7, challenging the tax assessments on two parcels of real property in the town of Lake Pleasant; those petitions were denied. Subsequently, Corvetti filed a plenary action alleging violations of the Federal and State Constitutions pursuant to 42 USC § 1983. The defendants moved to dismiss on a theory of res judicata, but the Supreme Court rejected their arguments on the basis set forth above, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The same result is warranted here.
Statute of Limitations
With respect to the Statute of limitations, the parties are correct that a three-year limitations period applies (see CPLR 214). However, under the continuing violation theory, "a plaintiff may maintain an action on all claims even though some may have occurred outside of the Statute of Limitations period if the subsequent identifiable acts of discrimination occurred within the period of limitations and were related to the time-barred incidents" (see Corvetti, 227 A.D.2d at 824). Defendants only argue that the 2014 and 2015 denials are outside of the statute of limitations. Since both events are clearly related to the subsequent denials in and after 2016 because they involve the same property and identical claims of tax-exemption, the continuing violation theory applies, and no claims are barred by the statute of limitations.
Immunity
Turning to the issue of immunity, the branch of defendants' motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the complaint as against the Board of Assessment Review based on absolute immunity is granted as unopposed (see Arteaga v. State of New York, 72 N.Y.2d 212 [1988]; Corvetti, 146 A.D.3d at 1122).
Defendants also argue that the complaint should be dismissed against the defendant tax assessor based on qualified immunity. Government officials performing discretionary functions are entitled to qualified immunity if "their conduct did not violate any clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known" (Scully v Town of Mamaroneck, 186 A.D.3d 636, 638 [2d Dept 2020]). As discussed further below, no statutory or constitutional rights were violated here. Therefore, the defendant tax assessor is entitled to qualified immunity, and the complaint is dismissed as against him.
Although defendants' memorandum of law only analyzes the qualified immunity issue with respect to defendant tax assessor, defendants assert in a footnote that "all other individual defendants are also entitled to qualified immunity." The only other individual defendant is town supervisor Fulgenzi who, like Timmings, is a government official entitled to qualified immunity (see id.), and, employing the same reasoning, the complaint against him is dismissed as well.
Due Process
With respect to the first cause of action, "[w]hen taxpayers challenge state taxation, a section 1983 due process cause of action is stated upon an allegation of an aggravated pattern of misuse of taxing power (Way v City of Beacon, 96 A.D.3d 829, 831 [2d Dept 2012] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]). Defendants established a prima facie case for summary judgment on Legion's first cause of action, in which the complaint focuses on plaintiff s claim of retaliation, through the Timmings affidavit which, together with his deposition testimony, established that the decision to place the undeveloped parcel on the tax rolls had a legitimate basis and was not made in retaliation of Legion's motion to enforce the 2012 settlement.
In opposition, plaintiff focuses on statements from non-party Maybury, defendant Timmings, and defendant Fulgerizi, which it characterizes as evidence of defendants' intent to punish Legion for its motion to enforce the 2012 settlement. However, none of the statements relate to the 2012 settlement or suggest retaliation for plaintiffs attempt to enforce it. Maybury testified in her deposition that, when she was town supervisor, she was not always neutral toward Legion's applications for tax exemptions. Timmings testified that he did not think very highly of Legion as a group. And Fulgenzi wrote the letter to the editor discussed above, which plaintiff relies on to demonstrate retaliation. Since none of these statements either suggest retaliation for the motion to enforce the 2012 settlement as alleged in plaintiffs first cause of action, or demonstrate an aggravated pattern of misuse of taxing power, plaintiff has failed to raise a triable issue of fact, and the first cause of action must be dismissed on that basis.
Furthermore, since Timmings' justification for his denials of the applications in question was upheld by Judge Tolbert's 2020 decision, Legion is precluded from relitigating the validity and propriety of those denials here. "Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, precludes a party from relitigating in a subsequent action or proceeding an issue clearly raised in a prior action or proceeding and decided against that party ..., whether or not the tribunals or causes of action are the same" (Parker, 93 N.Y.2d at 349). When this defense is raised, "the burden rests upon the' proponent of collateral estoppel to demonstrate the identicality and decisiveness of the issue, while the burden rests upon the opponent to establish the absence of a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior action or proceeding" (id. [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]).
Here, defendants have successfully demonstrated the identicality and decisiveness of the relevant issue. In opposition, plaintiff relies on the same arguments made in opposition to defendants' res judicata argument - that compensatory damages were not available in the article 7 proceedings - which is insufficient to establish the absence of a full and fair opportunity to litigate the propriety of Timmings' denial of plaintiff s applications.
Judge Tolbert's 2020 decision determined that the decisions made by the tax assessor and the Board of Assessment Review between 2014 and 2018 were valid. Since each of those individual decisions was valid, this Court cannot find that together they amounted to an aggravated pattern of misuse of taxing power. To the extent that there may be circumstances in which valid denials of an application could amount to an aggravated misuse of taxing power, plaintiff has failed to present any support for such an assertion in opposition to the motion for summary judgment.
Therefore, in addition to plaintiffs failure to raise a triable issue of fact with respect to its first cause of action, the application of collateral estoppel to Judge Tolbert's 2020 decision also requires the rejection of any claim of an aggravated pattern of misuse of taxing power. The first cause of action must be dismissed on that ground as well.
Equal Protection
As for plaintiffs second cause of action, the parties agree that "a tax classification will only violate constitutional equal protection guarantees if the distinction between the classes is palpably arbitrary or amounts to invidious discrimination" (Way, 96 A.D.3d at 831 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]). Plaintiff concedes that a tax assessment is presumptively valid (see Matter of Jacobowitz v Board of Assessors for Town of Cornwall, 121 A.D.3d 294, 299 [2d Dept 2014]).
Defendants have established a prima facie case for summary judgment for the second cause of action through the Timmings affidavit, which indicates that the denials of Legion's tax exemption applications were not palpably arbitrary and did not amount to invidious discrimination. Timmings explains that the applications were denied because Legion (1) sold the northern parcels, (2) abandoned its application for Westchester University, (3) moved its activities from Mount Pleasant to White Plains and Rye, (4) was in the process of selling the undeveloped parcel, and (5) never improved the undeveloped parcel.
In opposition, plaintiff has failed to rebut the presumption that the tax assessments were valid or raise a triable issue of fact as to whether defendants violated the equal protection clause. Plaintiff relies largely on the same statements discussed above with respect to the first cause of action. Again, these statements do not establish discrimination based on religion. While the statements cited may indicate that Maybury, Timmings, and Fulgenzi have expressed negative views toward Legion, they do not establish that such views stem from religious discrimination. Indeed, the context of their statements make it clear that such opinions stem from the protracted litigation between the parties, rather than from Legion's religious identity. For example, Timmings' email to Maybury refers to the fact that Legion filed its 2014 renewal application after abandoning the Westchester University project, although the project was the basis upon which the Court previously held that Legion was entitled to tax-exempt status. None of the statements relied on by plaintiff establish an abuse of plaintiffs equal protection rights, and plaintiff has not offered sufficient evidence to suggest that such a violation occurred.
Additionally, collateral estoppel applies to the second cause of action as well. As discussed above, Timmings' justifications for denying Legion's applications from 2014 through 2018 were upheld by Judge Tolbert's 2020 decision. Therefore, it has already been determined that such justifications were not palpably arbitrary. Since plaintiff has failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the tax classifications amounted to invidious discrimination, and Judge Tolbert's 2020 decision held that the determinations were not palpably arbitrary, the second cause of action is dismissed as well.
Finally, plaintiffs third cause of action, which alleges violations of the due process and equal protection clauses of the New York State Constitution, is dismissed for the same reasons discussed above.
Based upon the foregoing, it is hereby, ORDERED that defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted; and it is further
ORDERED that plaintiffs complaint is dismissed, and the Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly.
This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.