Opinion
No. C97-3122-PAZ
May 20, 1999.
ORDER
This matter comes before the court pursuant to the defendant's motion seeking partial summary judgment. At issue is whether plaintiff's claim for punitive damages, based on alleged actions which took place after the death that gave rise to the lawsuit, can survive summary judgment.
I. INTRODUCTION
On March 3, 1999, defendant Custom Made Products Company ("Custom Made"), filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the plaintiff's ("the estate") claim for punitive damages. (Doc. No. 30.) Harder filed a resistance to the motion on March 26, 1999, (Doc. No. 36) and a memorandum supporting the resistance on May 14, 1999 (Doc. No. 40). On May 19, 1999, the court held a hearing on the motion. Bradford F. Kollars appeared on behalf of the estate. John C. Gray appeared on behalf of Custom Made.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On June 12, 1997, while operating a truck owned by his employer, Michael Harders ("Harders") was traveling west on Highway 3 near LeMars, Iowa. As Harders approached a set of railroad tracks, another vehicle, owned by Custom Made and driven by one of its employees, Jason Benge ("Benge"), was traveling east on the same road. When the two vehicles passed, a winch from Custom Made's truck came loose and went through Harders' windshield, killing Harders. Benge was unaware that he had lost a winch or that an accident occurred. While Benge determined later that day that he was missing a winch, and learned the next day that a fatal accident involving a winch had occurred near LeMars, he remained unaware of any connection between the two incidents.
The day before the accident, June 11, 1997, Benge was told by Custom Made that he would be discharged on June 14, 1997. Custom Made told Benge that as the result of a previous accident in which Benge was involved, Custom Made's insurer would no longer cover Benge under their liability policy. Custom Made actually terminated Benge's employment on June 13, 1997.
On June 17, 1997, Gary Naeve ("Naeve"), the owner of Custom Made, called Benge and told him that law enforcement officers were seeking to interview Benge regarding the June 12 accident. According to Benge, Naeve told Benge to lie to the officers and tell them that none of his winches were missing when he returned to Custom Made's facility on the night of the accident. Benge's followed Naeve's instructions, but in a statement given to law enforcement officers on June 23, 1997, Benge recanted, stating that under Naeve's instructions he lied in his June 17 statement. Benge then gave a new statement in which he testified that he had lost a winch during his trip on June 12, 1997.
The estate subsequently filed a lawsuit seeking to hold Custom Made liable for negligence in the death of Harders. As a part of its lawsuit, the estate claims that the actions of Naeve and Benge entitles the estate to punitive damages.
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS A. Summary Judgment Standards
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs motions for summary judgment and provides that either party to a lawsuit may move for summary judgment without the need for supporting affidavits. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a) (b). Rule 56 further states that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). "A court considering a motion for summary judgment must view all the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, . . . and give [it] the benefit of all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the facts." Lockhart v. Cedar Rapids Community Sch. Dist., 963 F. Supp. 805, 814 (N.D. Iowa 1997) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986)). A genuine issue of material fact is one with a real basis in the record. Lockhart, 963 F. Supp. at 814 n. 3 (citing Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586-87, 106 S. Ct. at 1355-56).
The party seeking summary judgment must "`inform[ ] the district court of the basis for [its] motion and identifying those portions of the record which show lack of a genuine issue.'" Lockhart, 963 F. Supp. at 814 (quoting Hartnagel v. Norman, 953 F.2d 394, 395 (8th Cir. 1992)); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986). Once the moving party has met its initial burden under Rule 56 of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party "by affidavits or as otherwise provided in [Rule 56], must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Rule 56(e); Lockhart, 963 F. Supp. at 814 (citing Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586, 106 S. Ct. at 1356).
E.g., by "affidavits . . . supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e).
Addressing the quantum of proof necessary to successfully oppose a motion for summary judgment, the United States Supreme Court has stated that the nonmoving party must produce sufficient evidence to permit "`a reasonable jury [to] return a verdict for the nonmoving party.'" Lockhart, 963 F. Supp. at 815 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986)). Furthermore, the Court has held that the trial court must dispose of claims unsupported by fact and determine whether a genuine issue for trial exists, rather than "weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter." Lockhart, 963 F. Supp. at 815 (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S. Ct. at 2510-11; Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24, 106 S. Ct. at 2552-53; and Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586-87, 106 S. Ct. at 1355-56).
Thus, if a defendant shows that no genuine issue for trial exists in this case, and if the plaintiff cannot advance sufficient evidence to refute that showing, then that defendant is entitled to judgment as matter of law and the court must grant summary judgment in the defendant's favor. If, on the other hand, the court "can conclude that a reasonable trier of fact could return a verdict for [the plaintiff], then summary judgment should not be granted," Lockhart, 963 F. Supp. at 815 (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S. Ct. at 2510), and the court must deny the motion for summary judgment.
B. Whether the Estate Can Sustain Its Claim for Punitive Damages
Custom Made argues that even construing the facts in the light most favorable to the estate, Iowa law does not allow an award of punitive damages in this case. In support of this argument, Custom Made cites relevant Iowa case law holding that actual damages must exist before punitive damages can be assessed. See generally Suss v. Schammel, 375 N.W.2d 252, 255 (Iowa 1985). According to Custom Made's position, in order for the estate to be able to claim punitive damages for Benge's and Custom Made's attempt at concealing evidence, the estate would not only have to forward a separate cause of action addressing that conduct, but also show that the conduct actually damaged the estate. Custom Made asserts that because the estate only claims damages from the actions that led to the accident, and not by Benge's and Custom Made's attempt to conceal evidence, no claim for punitive damages can be sustained.
The estate, on the other hand, relies on an Ohio Supreme Court ruling for the proposition that a party does not need a separate cause of action to address and remedy interference with or destruction of evidence. See Moskovitz v. Mt. Sinai Med. Ctr., 635 N.E.2d 331 (Ohio 1994). In Moskovitz, the Ohio Supreme Court found that a survival claim could form the necessary predicate for an award of punitive damages, as long as the acts giving rise to the punitive damages claims were "inextricably intertwined" with the survival claim. Id. at 342-43. The estate concludes that its wrongful death action is the predicate for punitive damages and that the action giving rise to the punitive damages claim are inextricably intertwined with the wrongful death action.
The fundamental step in this case is to ascertain whether Iowa law permits the estate's claim. Under Iowa law, "[o]nly evidence that is relevant to the underlying wrong for which liability is imposed can support an award of punitive damages." Wilson v. IBP, Inc., 558 N.W.2d 132, 142 (Iowa 1996) (citing Burke v. Deere Co., 6 F.3d 497, 511 (8th Cir. 1993)). In the present case, the underlying wrong for which the estate seeks to impose liability is the wrongful death of Harders. It does not support a cause of action seeking liability for an underlying wrong based on a spoliation of evidence theory. Because any actions relating to attempts to hide evidence lack relevance to the estate's wrongful death claim, the actions cannot be used to support a punitive damages claim. Therefore, no genuine issue as to any material fact exists and Custom Made is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of the estate's claim for punitive damages.
In fact, Iowa law precludes a cause of action based upon a theory of negligent spoliation of evidence. See Meyn v. State, No. 97-1007, 1999 WL 250153 (Iowa Apr. 28, 1999).
IT IS SO ORDERED.