Opinion
No. FST CV 03 0194153
September 12, 2005
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
The plaintiff, Albert Thanhauser, filed a three-count complaint against the defendant, Michele M. Smith, the operator of a motor vehicle involved in a collision on March 19, 2001, on Summer Street in Stamford, and also against her parent, Clifford Smith, the owner of that vehicle. The plaintiff claims that he sustained personal injuries as a result of the collision.
In count one of the complaint, the plaintiff alleges both common-law negligence, and the violation of General Statutes § 14-218a pertaining to traveling unreasonably fast and of § 14-241 involving improper turns. In the second count of the complaint, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant operated her vehicle with "deliberate and/or reckless disregard" of the plaintiff, including driving at an excessive rate of speed, violating General Statutes § 14-218a and turning her vehicle in such a manner as to "cut directly into the path of the Plaintiff's vehicle." In this count, the plaintiff seeks "exemplary damages." In the third count of the complaint, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant driver violated the above referred to statute, and that such violation was "a substantial factor" in causing him to suffer physical injuries. The plaintiff seeks in this count multiple damages as authorized by General Statutes § 14-295.
General Statutes § 14-295 provides in relevant part: "In any civil action to recover damages resulting from personal injury . . . the trier of fact may award double or treble damages if the injured party has specifically pleaded that another party has deliberately or with reckless disregard operated a motor vehicle in violation of section 14-218a, 14-219, 14-222, 14-227a, 14-230, 14-234, 14-237, 14-239 or 14-240a, and that such violation was a substantial factor in causing such injury, death or damage to property."
The defendants have filed motion #103 to strike counts two and three of the complaint. As to the second count claiming common-law recklessness, the defendants contend in their motion that the facts as pleaded do not "take the defendant's conduct beyond that alleged to be merely negligent in his First Count." As to the third count claiming statutory damages, the defendants assert that the plaintiff has failed to allege with specificity the requisite elements of common-law recklessness.
"The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest . . . the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint . . . to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003). "It is fundamental that in determining the sufficiency of a [pleading] challenged by a [party's] motion to strike, all well-pleaded facts and those necessarily implied from the allegations are taken as admitted." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Commissioner of Labor v. C.J.M. Services, Inc., 268 Conn. 283,292, 842 A.2d 1124 (2004). "[A motion to strike] does not admit legal conclusions or the truth or accuracy of opinions stated in the pleadings." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Faulkner v. United Technologies Corp., 240 Conn. 576, 588, 693 A.2d 293 (1997). "[The court] take[s] the facts to be those alleged in the complaint . . . and . . . construe[s] the complaint in the manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bhinder v. Sun, Co., 263 Conn. 358, 366, 819 A.2d 822 (2003). "[I]f facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Commissioner of Labor v. C.J.M. Services, Inc., Id., 292.
The second count of the plaintiff's complaint alleges common-law recklessness. "[W]here the allegations of a count of a contested pleading support a cause of action of recklessness, the count sounding in recklessness may well be sufficient to withstand a motion to strike even though the allegations of reckless conduct are also alleged as a basis of negligent conduct in a count sounding in negligence . . . [T]here is no reason why the plaintiff, relying on the same set of facts in negligence counts, cannot set forth in separate counts, causes of action arising out of those same facts alleging recklessness . . . It is frequently urged on [the] Court that the similarity of allegations renders one cause of action (usually, of course, the recklessness one) invalid. But similarity cannot be the sole focus. To so consider would often require a plaintiff to ratchet down the negligence claim in order to render more visible the conceptual space between the counts. Focus must instead primarily rest on the recklessness — sufficiency of that count . . . Rather than follow a mechanistic approach . . . it seems more appropriate . . . to examine instead whether the facts that are alleged could, under any set of facts admissible under the pleadings, support a conclusion of recklessness." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Drennan v. Geist, Superior Court, judicial district of Middletown, Docket No. CV 99 0089114 (January 29, 2002).
To determine whether the plaintiff's complaint states a cause of action sounding in recklessness, we look first to the definitions of willful, wanton and reckless behavior. Recklessness is a state of consciousness with reference to the consequences of one's acts . . . It is more than negligence, more than gross negligence . . . The state of mind amounting to recklessness may be inferred from conduct. But, in order to infer it, there must be something more than a failure to exercise a reasonable degree of watchfulness to avoid danger to others or to take reasonable precautions to avoid injury to them . . . Wanton misconduct is reckless misconduct . . . It is such conduct as indicates a reckless disregard of the just rights or safety of others or of the consequences of the action . . . While we have attempted to draw definitional distinctions between the terms willful, wanton or . . . reckless, in practice the three terms have been treated as meaning the same thing. The result is that willful, wanton, or reckless conduct tends to take on the aspect of highly unreasonable conduct, involving an extreme departure from ordinary care, in a situation where a high degree of danger is apparent . . . It is at least clear . . . that such aggravated negligence must be more than any mere mistake resulting from inexperience, excitement or confusion, and more than mere thoughtlessness or inadvertence, or simply inattention."
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Craig v. Driscoll, 262 Conn. 312, 342-43, 813 A.2d 1003 (2003).
"[A] brief reference to recklessness, contained within a count which otherwise is clearly limited to ordinary negligence is [not] sufficient to raise a claim of reckless and wanton misconduct. Simply using the word `reckless' or `recklessness' is not enough." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Shea v. Denault, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 02 0283059 (January 13, 2004). "Some additional factual allegations are necessary to alter the nature of the conduct complained of from an action for negligence to an action for willful and wanton conduct . . . If the plaintiff merely reiterates the facts from the negligence count and inserts the word `reckless,' a motion to strike is properly granted . . . If, however, the factual allegations in the negligence count are detailed and specific enough to support a claim of recklessness, the motion to strike may be denied." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Walters v. Tanner, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. CV 549835 (November 15, 1999). "To state a claim of recklessness . . . the [plaintiff] must allege facts demonstrating both egregious conduct and the requisite state of mind . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
In the present case, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant driver acted with "deliberate and/or reckless disregard" of the plaintiff by reason of driving at an "excessive" rate of speed, turning her vehicle directly into the path of the plaintiff's vehicle and violating General Statutes § 14-218a. Even construing the facts of the pleadings most favorably to the plaintiff, he has not alleged sufficient facts to assert an extreme departure from ordinary care. Hence, the defendants' motion to strike count two is granted, including the claim for relief pertaining thereto.
The essence of the defendants' motion to strike count three of the complaint is that the allegations in that count merely repeat the allegations in count one which sounds in negligence. The defendants point to the similarity of language used in the counts alleging negligence and recklessness. To obtain enhanced damages under General Statutes § 14-295, it is necessary to allege both that the defendant driver operated his vehicle "deliberately or with reckless disregard" in violating one of the so-called "trigger statutes," including General Statutes §§ 14-218a, and that such violation "was a substantial factor in causing such injury." The plaintiff has used these words in compliance with the statute and hence is entitled to invoke § 14-295 in this case. The motion of the defendants to strike count three is therefore denied.
So Ordered.
William B. Lewis, Judge T.R.