Opinion
No. 13-05-026-CV
Memorandum Opinion Delivered and Filed August 25, 2005.
On Appeal from the 107th District Court of Cameron County, Texas.
Before Justices YAÑEZ, CASTILLO and GARZA.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This interlocutory appeal is brought from an order issued by the Cameron County trial court, granting an anti-suit injunction to preclude appellant, Texas Mutual Insurance Company ("Texas Mutual"), from prosecuting a later-filed declaratory judgment action in Travis County, Texas. In issue is the propriety of the anti-suit injunction. We affirm the order of the trial court.
I. Background
The underlying suit was filed in December 2001 in Cameron County, Texas, by Robert S. Howell, D.C., First Rio Valley Medical, P.A. (collectively "Howell"), and several other healthcare providers. Howell named multiple workers' compensation insurance carriers, including Texas Mutual, as defendants. Howell seeks below to certify a class action of healthcare providers located throughout Texas. Howell claims that Texas Mutual and other defendants failed to comply with applicable portions of the Texas Labor Code and accompanying rules by failing to include interest in delinquent payments for services rendered to workers' compensation claimants.
The majority of these defendants have either settled or have been non-suited.
In April 2002, Texas Mutual filed a declaratory judgment action in Travis County, Texas, naming as defendants not only Howell but also additional individuals located in Beaumont, Texas, and the Texas Workers' Compensation Commission ("Commission"). In its Travis County action, Texas Mutual seeks a declaration as to whether interest is due on such payments, under the applicable statute and Commission rules.
Howell's brief states that Texas Mutual is the only remaining defendant in the Cameron County suit that is pursuing a separate case in a separate jurisdiction (Travis County).
On November 18, 2004, Howell filed an application for a temporary restraining order and temporary injunction in the underlying matter to halt the Travis County litigation. Howell alleged the Travis County suit was an attempt by Texas Mutual to circumvent the trial and appellate courts' determinations that venue was proper in Cameron County. The temporary injunction hearing was held December 10, 2004. Howell argued that allowing another action to proceed in another jurisdiction would harm the underlying plaintiffs and hinder the Cameron County court's jurisdiction. Texas Mutual countered that the Travis County action was substantively different and involved different parties, such that it would not divest the Cameron County court of jurisdiction, and that Howell had never requested that the Travis County proceedings be abated.
The parties were involved in earlier Travis County litigation, which was quite contentious. Howell initiated that litigation to determine the validity of a Commission rule requiring health care providers disputing adequacy of payments by a workers' compensation insurance carrier to first exhaust all administrative remedies; Texas Mutual counterclaimed against Howell. See Howell v. TWCC, 143 S.W.3d 416, 426 (Tex.App.-Austin 2004, pet. denied). One result of the suit was a permanent anti-suit injunction entered by the Travis County court to halt Howell's prosecution of multiple suits in Cameron County which were deemed to be vexatious and harassing, and a "disruption of the administrative process for workers' compensation medical cost control." Howell's motion for rehearing in its appeal from the Travis County suit was denied November 12, 2004. Howell filed an application for a temporary restraining order and temporary injunction in the underlying matter on November 18, 2004. Texas Mutual urges that Howell did not seek the temporary restraining order in the underlying matter until after he lost the Travis County appeal.
We note that Texas Mutual did not file the second Travis County suit until after the trial court's rulings against it on the venue issue. The filing was nearly contemporaneous with the adverse rulings from the appellate courts. Texas Mutual argued that venue in the underlying case was mandatory in Travis County because the causes of action related to applicability of state agency rules and because the Commission was a necessary party. The matter was appealed to this Court, and to the Supreme Court by mandamus. Venue was affirmed in Cameron County without comment.
In its brief, Texas Mutual addresses a statement filed in the underlying proceedings by the Commission. In that statement, the Commission supports the jurisdiction of the Travis County court to determine validity or applicability of its agency rules and states that, because the Commission is named as a party in the Travis County action, venue for that matter is mandatory in Travis County. See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 2001.038 (Vernon 2000). The Commission notes it has not been served or made any appearance in the underlying Cameron County suit and makes no comments about the substance of that suit. The statement reflects a filing date of December 10, 2004, 1:25 p.m., the same date as the hearing on the anti-suit injunction, but the document was not admitted in evidence at the hearing. Moreover, it is not dispositive of the issues in this appeal.
The trial court announced at the December 10 hearing that it would grant the injunction, and its order to that effect was entered January 6, 2005, after the parties had the opportunity to confer and provide input as to its form. The trial court's findings include the following:
(1) in this Cameron County action, plaintiffs propose a class action and "seek reimbursement of interest in accordance with Texas Labor Code section 413.019" ( see TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 413.019 (Vernon 1996));
This statute reads:
(a) Interest on an unpaid fee or charge that is consistent with the fee guidelines accrues at the rate provided by Section 401.023 beginning on the 60th day after the date the health care provider submits the bill to an insurance carrier until the date the bill is paid.
(b) Interest on a refund from a health care provider accrues at the rate provided by Section 401.023 beginning on the 60th day after the date the provider receives notice of alleged overpayment from the insurance carrer until the date the refund is paid.
TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 413.019 (Vernon 1996).
(2) "a similar case pending in Beaumont" "has been abated in favor of [the Cameron County case];"
Texas Mutual's petition for declaratory judgment, filed in Travis County, reflects that litigation comparable to that in Cameron County had been filed in Beaumont, Texas, by other plaintiffs. The petition represents that the Beaumont suit was abated pending the outcome of the Cameron County suit, and the trial court's findings so reflect. A copy of the Beaumont petition is not before us, and we are unable to determine how closely the causes of action set forth therein may parallel either the Cameron County or the Travis County litigation.
(3) while this case has been pending, numerous defendant carriers have settled and "numerous non-suits have been filed;"
(4) the case was removed to the United States District Court, and then remanded back to this Court;
(5) plaintiffs have brought causes of action under "multiple theories, including [the declaratory judgment act];"
Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code Ann. § 37.001 et seq. (Vernon 1997).
(6) "multiple motions to transfer venue and pleas to the jurisdiction" have been denied (by both the trial court and appellate courts) in favor of the Cameron County court's jurisdiction, and the court's rulings on joinder have similarly been affirmed;
(7) Texas Mutual's allegations that "Travis County is the mandatory venue" because this case may involve the determination of a Commission rule under Texas Government Code section 2001.038 was "previously rejected by this Court and all reviewing courts" and is incorrect, inasmuch as
Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 2001.038 (Vernon 2000). This provision of the government code provides that (1) any action for validity or applicability of a rule may be determined in an action for declaratory judgment if it is alleged that the rule or its threatened application interferes with or impairs, or threatens to interfere with or impair, a legal right or privilege of the plaintiff; (2) the state agency must be made a party to the action; and (3) the action may be brought only in a Travis County district court. Id.
(a) plaintiffs have not identified a single Commission rule that would impair or threaten their legal right, and
(b) "substantively the same arguments" were previously raised by Texas Mutual and rejected by the trial court, the Thirteenth Court of Appeals, and the Texas Supreme Court;
(8) the declaratory judgment action in Travis County was filed after the venue determination in this matter;
(9) the action for declaratory relief in Travis County seeks declarations pertaining to the total proposed class members, and "poses a threat to [the Cameron County] court's jurisdiction to issue rulings in this case seeking class action status;"
(10) the Cameron County trial court "acquired jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of the dispute prior to and to the exclusion of all other courts;"
(11) "the injunction is necessary to protect public policy" and a determination as to whether interest is "statutorily due [to plaintiffs] when payment for services is issued on or after the 60th day from the date a medical bill is received by the carrier;"
(12) "Tex. Lab. Code § 413.019 is the crux of the proposed class action;"
(13) the threat of multiple litigation, "entanglements between cases," "the potential for inconsistent rulings and interpretations," and inconsistent obligations of the parties "creates an essential need for this matter to be resolved in this Court" and to do otherwise would be a "waste of judicial resources and against public policy;"
(14) to permit a party disagreeing with the rulings of this court to proceed in another County works against the public policy of finality of a court's rulings;
(15) public policy disfavors simultaneous litigation in two courts, which "would most probably work an irreparable miscarriage of justice" because of the need to litigate each issue "separately in two different forums," and the "potential for conflicting rulings on incidental as well as case determinative issues" and, further, requiring "numerous plaintiffs and numerous defendants to have attendant counsel at two simultaneous trial courts and appellate courts with possible differing results would work an irreparable injury;"
(16) "the declaratory judgment sought by Texas Mutual in Travis County seeks attorneys' fees against the purported class representatives for measures that are essentially defensive in [Cameron County]," reflects "an improper trial strategy designed to deter and discourage the proposed class plaintiffs from proceeding forward with the class action, and is an improper use and abuse of the declaratory judgment statute" and "an abuse of the judicial system;"
(17) in order to determine "whether interest payments are due to the plaintiffs or proposed class members, [the Cameron County] court must necessarily determine rights and obligations of the parties under the Texas Labor Code;"
(18) because of the pleadings and evidence, and "the procedural docket in this case," including the "numerous prior appeals," "there exists the existence of very special circumstances and the potential for an irreparable miscarriage of justice to warrant the issuance of an anti-suit injunction;"
(19) "Texas Mutual does not dispute that its declaratory judgment filed in Travis County would interfere with the judgments and decisions of [the Cameron County] court."
The trial court's order enjoined Texas Mutual and Howell from the prosecution of the Travis County case. Texas Mutual was enjoined from seeking a declaration or determination of any issue currently pending in that case or in the Cameron County case involving the proposed class plaintiffs and from "filing or prosecuting any cause of action that involves the interpretation of the Texas Labor Code with respect to issues of payment of interest to health care providers under the Texas Workers' Compensation Act involving the proposed class plaintiffs."
We note that the earlier litigation in Travis County, which resulted in the anti-suit injunction, arose subsequent to legislative changes in the Commission's administrative review practice.
II. Issues on Appeal
Texas Mutual brings three issues on appeal: (1) the trial court abused its discretion in granting the temporary injunction where the applicant tendered no evidence establishing its right thereto; (2) the trial court abused its discretion in finding irreparable harm would occur and that no adequate legal remedy exists absent the injunction; and (3) the trial court abused its discretion in entering the order where the prerequisites for a temporary anti-suit injunction were not satisfied.
III. Standard of Review
Issuance of an anti-suit injunction rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. Gannon v. Payne, 706 S.W.2d 304, 305 (Tex. 1986); London Mkt. Insurers v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 95 S.W.3d 702, 704 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.); Fina Oil Chem. Co. v. Alonso, 941 S.W.2d 287, 290 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1996, no writ) (citing Walling v. Metcalfe, 863 S.W.2d 56, 58 (Tex. 1993)).
"A trial court abuses its discretion when it acts arbitrarily and unreasonably, without reference to guiding rules or principles, or misapplies the law to the established facts of the case." Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241-42 (Tex. 1985). The exercise of discretion is within the sole province of the trial court, and an appellate court may not substitute its discretion for that of the trial judge. Johnson v. Fourth Ct. App., 700 S.W.2d 916, 918 (Tex. 1985); City of San Antonio v. Rankin, 905 S.W.2d 427, 430 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1995, no writ). Rather, an abuse of discretion occurs only when the trial court reaches a decision that is "so arbitrary and unreasonable as to amount to a clear and prejudicial error of law." Johnson, 700 S.W.2d at 917. A court of appeals will affirm the judgment of the trial court if that judgment can be upheld on any reasonable theory supported by the evidence. Ex parte E.E.H., 869 S.W.2d 496, 497-98 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ denied); Harris County Dist. Attorney's Office v. Burns, 825 S.W.2d 198, 200 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied). We consider only the evidence most favorable to the judgment, and if there is some evidence to support the judgment, we will affirm. State v. Knight, 813 S.W.2d 210, 211 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no writ). We draw all legitimate inferences from the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling, and where "some basis" exists on which the trial court could have properly held as it did, there can be no abuse of discretion. See Munson v. Milton, 948 S.W.2d 813, 815 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1997, pet. denied); City of San Antonio, 905 S.W.2d at 430.
IV. Anti-Suit Injunction
The purpose of any temporary injunction is to preserve the status quo of matters that are the subject of pending litigation until a decision on the merits is reached. Walling v. Metcalfe, 863 S.W.2d 56, 57 (Tex. 1993) (en banc). A function of injunctive relief is to restrain motion and to enforce inaction. Boston v. Garrison, 256 S.W.2d 67, 70 (Tex. 1953).
Texas courts have the power, through anti-suit injunctions, to prevent persons from proceeding with litigation filed in other state courts. Golden Rule Ins. Co. v. Harper, 925 S.W.2d 649, 651 (Tex. 1996) (per curiam); Gannon, 706 S.W.2d at 305-06; London Mkt. Insurers, 95 S.W.3d at 706. However, this equitable power is to be exercised sparingly, and only in very special circumstances. Christensen v. Integrity Ins. Co., 719 S.W.2d 161, 163, (Tex. 1986); London Mkt. Insurers, 96 S.W.3d at 706. The party seeking the injunction has the burden to show that a clear equity demands the injunction. Christensen, 719 S.W.2d at 163; Harbor Perfusion, Inc. v. Floyd, 45 S.W.3d 713, 718 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2001, no pet.). The applicant must demonstrate the potential for an irreparable miscarriage of justice in order to obtain the anti-suit injunction. Golden Rule, 925 S.W.2d at 651-52; Am. Int'l Specialty Lines Ins. Co. v. Triton, 52 S.W.3d 337, 341 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2001, pet. dism'd w.o.j.); Forum Ins. Co. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 929 S.W.2d 114, 119 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 1996, writ denied) (stating that clear equity favors all parties seeking completion and finality to dispute in single proceeding without vexation of potentially multiplicitous or harassing litigation).
An anti-suit injunction is appropriate in four instances: (1) to address a threat to the court's jurisdiction; (2) to prevent the evasion of important public policy; (3) to prevent a multiplicity of suits; or (4) to protect a party from vexatious or harassing litigation. Golden Rule, 925 S.W.2d at 651; Gannon, 706 S.W.2d at 307; London Mkt. Insurers, 95 S.W.3d at 705. The circumstances of each situation must be carefully examined to determine whether the injunction is necessary to prevent an irreparable miscarriage of justice. Gannon, 706 S.W.2d at 307.
Here, the findings of fact set forth in the injunction reflect that the court was aware of (1) the issues in both the Cameron County and Travis County actions, (2) the procedural history of the Cameron County case, (3) the existence of prior litigation between the parties, and (3) that the injunction issued principally to protect the trial court's jurisdiction.
V. The Suits in Issue A. The Underlying Claims
Howell's petition below brings a variety of causes of action against Texas Mutual, including violations of the labor code and accompanying Commission orders and rules, with the principal objective of recovering interest on delinquent payments.
Suit is brought under the labor code, section 413.019, as noted above, see Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 413.019 (Vernon 1996), as well as applicable Commission rules. Texas Mutual focuses on interpretation of the rules, including rule 133.304(q), which provides:
All payments of medical bills that an insurance carrier makes on or after the 60th day after the date the insurance carrier originally received the complete medical bill shall include interest calculated in accordance with § 134.803 of this title (relating to Calculating Interest for Late Payment on Medical Bills and Refunds). Interest shall be paid from the 60th day after the date of receipt of the complete medical bill to the date of payment, without order of the Commission.
28 T.A.C. § 133.304(q) (2005). Texas Mutual also claims that interpretation of rule 134.803(a) is required; this rule provides:
Insurance carriers shall pay interest on medical bills paid on or after the 60th day after the insurance carrier originally received the complete medical bill, in accordance with 133.304 of this title (relating to Medical Payments and Denials). Health care providers shall pay interest on insurance carrier requests for refunds paid later than the 60th day after the date the health care provider received the request for refund, in accordance with § 133.304 of this title (relating to Medical Payments and Denials). The rate of interest will be set quarterly and will be calculated on a per annum basis according to the Texas Labor Code, § 401.023.
28 T.A.C. § 134.803(a) (2005).
B. The Travis County Action
Texas Mutual's action for declaratory judgment, filed in Travis County, seeks the following declarations:
(1) no interest is owed if payment was mailed before 60th day after received a complete bill;
(2) when a carrier pays an additional amount following receipt of a request for reconsideration, interest is due only on the "additional amount" paid "only if amount is mailed more than 21 days after request for reconsideration was submitted;"
(3) when a carrier pays an additional amount upon reconsideration, when request therefor doesn't comply with requirements, that no interest need be paid;
(4) a carrier is not required to pay interest under 133.304(q) and 134.803;
(5) under 134.803, prior to 7/15/00, a carrier is not required to pay interest unless a separate bill is submitted for interest;
(6) section 42.15 of the Commission rules does not make 410.208 of the code applicable to payments from a carrier to health care providers, or alternatively section 42.15 of the rules is invalid because it is inconsistent with 410.208 which doesn't apply to these kinds of payments; or alternatively section 42.15 is applicable only if a provider seeks to judicially enforce a TWCC medical review division order or state office of administrative hearings order;
(7) section 42.15 of TWCC rules does not make 416.002 applicable to suit in which provider seeks damages for failure to pay interest due under sections 133.304 and 134.803, or that section 42.15 is invalid because it is inconsistent with Texas labor code section 416.002 which doesn't apply to lawsuits in which providers seek damages for failure to pay interest due under sections 133.304 and 134.803; and
(8) that sections 152.1 through 152.5 of the Commission rules and section 408.221 of the labor code provide no basis for the award of attorneys' fees to a provider seeking damages for failure to pay interest due.
Texas Mutual included in its evidence a draft amended petition which it represented it would file in Travis County if no injunction were entered by the Cameron County trial court. This amended petition was represented as narrowing the issues to be considered by the Travis County court, and requests only five declarations similar to those articulated above. It remained, at all times, a proposal.
The Travis County litigation avoids seeking an interpretation of the applicable statute, labor code section 413.019. TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 413.019 (Vernon 1996). Texas Mutual argues that the Commission is a necessary party to the litigation because it involves the interpretation of Commission rules, and that venue is therefore mandatory in Travis County, Texas, pursuant to government code section 2001.038. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 2001.038 (Vernon 2000).
VI. The Issue of Threat to Jurisdiction A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
In its first issue, Texas Mutual contends that Howell failed to tender any evidence to the trial court to support the temporary anti-suit injunction. In light of the instances in which an anti-suit injunction is appropriate, we interpret Texas Mutual's contention to be that insufficient evidence was before the trial court to enable it to conclude there was a threat to its jurisdiction and, absent the injunction, a potential for an irreparable miscarriage of justice. See Golden Rule, 925 S.W.2d at 651-52; Forum Ins. Co., 929 S.W.2d at 119.
No temporary injunction may issue absent competent evidence in support of its application, and that evidence must be tendered to the trial court at the hearing on the temporary injunction according to the standard rules of evidence. Millwrights Local Union No. 2484 v. Rust Eng'g Co., 433 S.W.2d 683, 686-87 (Tex. 1968) (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 680); Bay Fin. Sav. Bank, FSB v. Brown, 142 S.W.3d 586, 589-90 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2004, no pet.).
Howell attached to its application for temporary restraining order and temporary injunction a copy of the petition in the Travis County declaratory judgment action. Howell also urged the trial court to take judicial notice of the pleadings in the underlying case and in the Travis County case in order to find that the sole reason for the Travis County case was to "wrest jurisdiction" from the Cameron County court. No witness testimony or other documentary evidence was tendered by Howell.
Also attached was evidence that the other two original plaintiffs in that action, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company and Employers Insurance of Wausau, had nonsuited all their claims and were no longer parties to that action.
Texas Mutual tendered the following in evidence at the injunction hearing: (1) the Travis County trial court's docket sheet; (2) the original petition for declaratory judgment filed in Travis County; (3) the original answer of the Commission to the Travis County suit; (4) two motions to transfer venue filed in the Travis County suit by entities not party to this appeal (urging venue was not mandatory in Travis County and was proper in Cameron and Jefferson County, respectively), (4) an order of the bankruptcy court for the Southern District of Texas lifting the automatic stay triggered by the bankruptcy filing of Howell and First Rio Valley Medical, P.A., so that the underlying Cameron County and Travis County actions might proceed, and (5) Texas Mutual's proposed amended petition for the Travis County action.
Included in the clerk's record are numerous documents under the heading "Court records and authorities relevant to Plaintiffs' Motion for Temporary Injunction." These include several documents relating to the Travis County action and were apparently filed by Texas Mutual. These include, among other things, the Commission statement and numerous interlocutory appellate briefs and orders relating to the venue issue in the Cameron County suit.
The bankruptcy court order permits the Travis County and Cameron County actions to go forward to litigate all issues, including any claim involving injunctive relief, except as to any claims for monetary damages against Howell or First Rio Valley Medical, P.A. The exhibit also includes Texas Mutual's motion for relief from the automatic stay.
At the injunction hearing, Texas Mutual urged that the Travis County action involved "interpretation of the [Commission's] rules that determine what counts as a complete bill and what counts as making payment," which would not interfere with the jurisdiction of the Cameron County suit.
We note that the narrow reason articulated to the trial court by Texas Mutual's counsel as the basis for the Travis County suit does not entirely comport with the declarations actually requested in that suit.
The question before the trial court was whether there was a threat to its jurisdiction and, absent an injunction, a potential for an irreparable miscarriage of justice. Viewed under the proper deferential standard and measured against the trial court's findings, we conclude that Howell tendered competent evidence to support its application. See Millwrights, 433 S.W.2d at 686-87.
B. The Court's Findings of Irreparable Harm and that an Anti-Suit Injunction was Proper
In its second issue, Texas Mutual argues the trial court abused its discretion in finding that irreparable harm to Howell would occur, and that no adequate alternative legal remedy existed, absent the injunction. Howell urges that irreparable harm would result from the trial court's loss of jurisdiction, particularly in light of the extensive two years' litigation already undertaken by the parties, and that the Travis County litigation would interfere with the class action proceedings. We conclude that, in the context of an anti-suit injunction, the question is whether the competing suit poses a threat to the court's jurisdiction, such that, absent an anti-suit injunction, the potential existed for irreparable harm and miscarriage of justice.
Texas Mutual's third issue is that the injunction was improper because Howell failed to satisfy the prerequisites for an injunction. In the context of this suit, we interpret this complaint to be that the case does not fit within one of the four narrow identified circumstances for an anti-suit injunction, and that proceedings in Travis County will not threaten the jurisdiction of the Cameron County trial court.
The analysis required under each of Texas Mutual's second and third issues is therefore essentially the same-whether the anti-suit injunction is appropriate and necessary in order to protect the jurisdiction of the Cameron County court and to prevent an irreparable miscarriage of justice. This latter prong necessitates that the injunction be justified by "clear equity" or "compelling circumstances." See Golden Rule, 925 S.W.2d at 651.
See Golden Rule Ins. Co. v. Harper, 925 S.W.2d 649, 651 (Tex. 1996) (per curiam); Gannon v. Payne, 706 S.W.2d 304, 307 (Tex. 1986); London Mkt. Insurers v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 95 S.W.3d 702, 705 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1998, no writ).
C. Challenges to Findings of Fact
In the context of its argument that the prerequisites for an anti-suit injunction were not satisfied, Texas Mutual challenges several of the trial court's findings.
We note that unchallenged findings of fact are binding on the court of appeals "unless the contrary is established as a matter of law, or if there is no evidence to support the finding." Bay Fin. Sav. Bank v. Brown, 142 S.W.3d 586, 590 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2004, no pet.); McGalliard v. Kuhlmann, 722 S.W.2d 694, 696 (Tex. 1986); Reliance Ins. Co. v. Denton Cent. Appraisal Dist., 999 S.W.2d 626, 629 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1999, no pet.).
1. Acquisition of Jurisdiction
Texas Mutual argues there is no basis for the finding that "the Cameron County trial court acquired jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of the dispute prior to and to the exclusion of all other courts." It is undisputed that the Cameron County action was filed first and that it has jurisdiction over all those parties to the exclusion of other courts for the issues raised in that suit. The court in which suit is first filed generally acquires dominant jurisdiction to the exclusion of other courts if venue is proper in the County in which suit was first filed. Wyatt v. Shaw Plumbing Co., 760 S.W.2d 245, 248 (Tex. 1988). The underlying record establishes that the venue matter was addressed and resolved, with venue appropriate in Cameron County.
We find there was sufficient evidence to support this finding, and the trial court did not thereby abuse its discretion.
2. Dispute as to Interference with Jurisdiction
Texas Mutual argues there is no basis for the finding that "Texas Mutual does not dispute that the declaratory judgment action filed in Travis County would interfere with the jurisdiction of the Cameron County court." The hearing record does include argument by counsel that the Travis County declaratory judgment action would not interfere with the Cameron County court's jurisdiction. Howell, by contrast, urges that Texas Mutual would not stipulate that it would not seek to interfere with the Cameron County litigation, if the Travis County litigation were to go forward. Texas Mutual presented argument, but no evidence on this issue. We conclude that Texas Mutual did dispute this finding. Nonetheless, our conclusion on this point is not dispositive to this appeal.
3. Multiplicity of Litigation and Inconsistent Rulings and Interpretations
Texas Mutual argues there is no "multiplicity of suits" given as a basis for the injunction order. There is only one other suit in issue-that in Travis County. The trial court's finding reflects:
Multiple court (if the Travis County litigation was permitted to proceed) litigation involving this proposed class action would likely result in entanglements between the cases pending, the potential for inconsistent rulings and interpretations, inconsistent judgments, and inconsistent obligations of the parties and therefore creates an essential need for this matter to be resolved in this Court. The Court further notes that this case has already resulted in two mandamus appeals to the Thirteenth Court of Appeals and petitions to the Texas Supreme Court (in which Texas Mutual was a party) and would most probably result in additional appeals to the Third Court of Appeals should the Travis County Case proceed. The court finds that for this case to proceed through two trial courts and courts of appeal is necessarily a waste of judicial resources and against public policy.
This finding is not dependent upon evidence of the existence of numerous other suits. Indeed, the injunction did not issue to prevent "vexatious or harassing" litigation. Texas Mutual nevertheless contends that this finding directly conflicts with the conclusion of the supreme court reached in Golden Rule, 925 S.W.2d at 651-52. We find Golden Rule to be distinguishable. Grounds for that injunction included that the enjoined suit was vexatious and brought to harass. Golden Rule had similarly sought first to transfer venue and then proceeded to file a declaratory judgment action in another state-Illinois. Id. at 651. A Texas court's power to enjoin foreign suits, in light of the strong deference to the principle of comity, simply was not properly exercised where only one parallel proceeding existed; the "very special circumstances" mandated did not exist. Id. at 651-62 (citing Gannon, 706 S.W.2d at 307). Comity, as in the deference given to foreign jurisdictions, is not in issue here. Given the arguments raised by Texas Mutual in its efforts to change venue, and the declarations sought in Travis County, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that there existed a likelihood of entanglements between the cases, the potential for inconsistent rulings and interpretations, inconsistent judgments and obligations of the parties, and a potential waste of judicial resources.
4. Public Policy
Texas Mutual challenges several of the trial court's findings that relate to public policy. In addition to addressing the risk of multiple court litigation, the trial court concluded that payment of interest statutorily due to health care providers under labor code section 413.019 "is the crux of the proposed class action," and that filing and prosecuting a declaratory judgment action in a separate trial court "because that party did not agree with the rulings of this court works against the public policy of finality of a court's rulings." See TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 413.019 (Vernon 1996). The trial court determined that it was against public policy to pursue simultaneous litigation in two courts, and that permitting two parallel cases "would most probably work an irreparable miscarriage of justice" and would "potentially result in conflicting rulings . . . on incidental as well as case determinative issues." The trial court's order further reflects that:
[T]he declaratory judgment sought by Texas Mutual in Travis County seeks attorneys' fees against the purported class representatives for measures that are essentially defensive in this case [Cameron County], if any. . . . [It] reflects an improper trial strategy designed to deter and discourage the proposed class plaintiffs . . . and is an improper use and abuse of the declaratory judgment statute . . [and] an abuse of the judicial system.
Class actions do play an important role in our legal system. See Ford Motor Co. v. Sheldon, 22 S.W.3d 444, 452 (Tex. 2000); Gen. Motors Corp. v. Bloyed, 916 S.W.2d 949, 952-53 (Tex. 1996) (recognizing important functions of class action procedure, including that it promotes efficiency, protects defendants from inconsistent verdicts, protects rights of absent class members, allows recovery by small claimants, and provides a mechanism for enforcing laws through private attorney general suits).
The trial court's order further states that the action for "declaratory relief in Travis County . . . poses a threat to this court's jurisdiction to issue rulings in this case seeking class action status," and that "very special circumstances" existed that justified the temporary injunction.
Texas Mutual opposes all these findings. It argues that the trial court's decision and order instituting the anti-suit injunction did not fall under one of the four special instances where such an injunction might be appropriate and, thus, constituted an abuse of discretion.
The trial court reviewed and assessed the pleadings on file in both the Travis County and the Cameron County actions. It considered the evidence before it relating to the history of contentious litigation between the parties. It also took into account the prior interlocutory appeals in the underlying cases and the arguments raised dealing with venue. It considered the arguments of the parties and determined that the focus of the Cameron County litigation involved statutory interpretation of a section of the labor code regarding the payment of interest. It considered the declarations sought in the Travis County suit, in light of the causes of action in the Cameron County court, and determined that recasting the causes of action solely in the context of rules designed to implement that statute (and which in effect restate the same principles articulated in the statute) was nothing more than a direct effort to divest the Cameron County court of jurisdiction.
We note that no party contends that language of either the statute or the rules is ambiguous on its face.
We remain mindful that we review the decision of the trial court for abuse of discretion. Abuse of discretion does not lie where the conclusions reached by the trial court are not arbitrary or unreasonable, without reference to guiding rules or principles, and do not involve a misapplication of the law to the established facts of the case. Downer, 701 S.W.2d at 241-42. Further, we may not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court. See Johnson, 700 S.W.2d at 918. We find abuse of discretion only where the trial court's decision is "so arbitrary and unreasonable as to amount to a clear and prejudicial error of law." Id. at 917.
We are further mindful that Texas courts are vested with the authority to interpret and apply legislative statutes. "The primary rule in statutory interpretation is that a court must look to the intent of the legislature and must construe the statute so as to give effect to that intent." Union Bankers Ins. Co. v. Shelton, 889 S.W.2d 278, 280 (Tex. 1994) (citing Monsanto Co. v. Cornerstones Mun. Util. Dist., 865 S.W.2d 937, 939 (Tex. 1993); Knight v. Int'l Harvester Credit Corp., 627 S.W.2d 382, 384 (Tex. 1982)). When determining legislative intent, the courts may look to the language of the statute, legislative history, the nature and object to be obtained, and the consequences that would follow from alternate constructions. Id. (citing Sharp v. House of Lloyd, Inc., 815 S.W.2d 245, 249 (Tex. 1991) (considering the nature and object of the act and the consequences of alternate constructions)); Irving Fireman's Relief Ret. Fund v. Sears, 803 S.W.2d 747, 750 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1990, no writ) (considering the language of the statute and the legislative history). There is no mandate that all matters involving statutory construction may proceed only in Travis County.
Here, the trial court emphasized that the litigated dispute centered on the interpretation and application of a statute set out in the labor code. Although Texas Mutual emphasizes the need to address Commission rules, the trial court could reasonably conclude that the rules in issue derive directly from an unambiguous statute and address the same substantive concerns.
The trial court did not base its conclusion upon any alleged excess of costs and expenses, or a waste of judicial resources resulting from one parallel suit. See Gannon, 706 S.W.2d at 307-08; Golden Rule, 925 S.W.2d at 651. Rather, it concluded that "very special circumstances" existed based upon the record before it, including (1) the two pending suits and the claims asserted in each, (2) its conclusion that interpretation of the labor code formed the center of the underlying plaintiff class's complaints, (3) the history of the litigation between the parties, including the Cameron County litigation and the multiple intervening appeals, (4) the fact that Texas Mutual had previously attempted to transfer jurisdiction over the matter to the federal court, and (5) the nature of the important public policies furthered by the class action procedure. See Gannon, 70S.W.2d at 307-08; Golden Rule, 925 S.W.2d at 651. We further note the trial court's specific finding that interpretation in the manner proposed by Texas Mutual in the declarations sought in the Travis County action would directly impact the class's ability to recover under the existing statute and rules. We find no abuse of discretion in the conclusion that "very special circumstances" existed and that, in light of the class action proceedings and the length of time the parties had already been engaged in that litigation, the injunction was necessary to prevent an irreparable miscarriage of justice.
5. The Issue of Abatement as an Adequate Remedy at Law
Having found, therefore, that an anti-suit injunction was justified by special circumstances that presented a real threat to the jurisdiction of the Cameron County court, we must still determine whether the injunction is appropriate where no prior request for abatement of the Travis County proceedings was made. Texas Mutual urges that Howell should have pursued a plea in abatement because it constitutes an adequate remedy at law. Texas Mutual relies upon McCurdy v. Gage, 69 S.W.2d 56, 59 (Tex. 1934), which provides that "it is the duty of those engaged in the suit first filed to deal frankly with the court in which the second action is filed and in good faith make a full disclosure to the court with respect to what are the facts and issues involved in the case first filed in the other court." Id. at 59. However, Texas Mutual is also a party engaged in the first filed suit, but does not address any duty it might have to fully disclose issues involved in the Cameron County litigation to the Travis County trial court. We further note that Howell has not appeared in the Travis County litigation. Gage also provides:
The rule is well settled that where two actions involving the same subject-matter are brought in different courts having co-ordinate jurisdiction, the court which first acquires jurisdiction, its power being adequate to administer full justice to the rights of all concerned, should retain such jurisdiction, undisturbed by the interference of any other court, and dispose of the whole controversy.
Id. (citing Cleveland v. Ward, 285 S.W. 1063, 1069 (Tex. 1926); Way v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 29 S.W.2d 1067, 1070-71 (Tex. 1930); Tex. Trunk Ry. Co. v. Lewis, 16 S.W. 647, 648 (Tex 1891). Texas Mutual also cites to Cleveland, 285 S.W. at 1063, for the proposition that the Texas supreme court "requires" that a plea in abatement first be pursued before an injunction may be considered. Cleveland involved a case in which mandamus issued directing the trial court for the first-filed suit to proceed with trial, along with an order vacating the judgment in the second suit. Id. at 1068. Adequate remedy at law was addressed in the context of mandamus. The court did not issue an inflexible rule, but observed that "[t]he controlling question is not, `Has the party a remedy at law?' but `Is that remedy fully commensurate with the necessities and rights of the party under all the circumstances of the particular case?'" Id. at 1068-69. The Cleveland court also stated that "[s]ince jurisdiction attached upon filing the suit in Johnson County, the rule is elementary that it could not be taken away or arrested by the subsequent proceedings in another court." Similarly, in Lancaster v. Lancaster, 291 S.W.2d 303 (Tex. 1956), the supreme court, while noting the preference for abatement of a second suit, also observed that "[m]atters that will constitute a defense of which complainant may avail himself in a suit pending or threatened against him cannot be made the ground of an injunction to restrain proceedings in such suit, unless he is prepared to allege and prove special circumstances . . . showing that he may suffer irreparable injury if he is denied the preventive remedy." Id. at 307 (emphasis added) (citing New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Harrington, 297 S.W. 307, 309 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1927, no writ) ("An injunction will not be granted to a person who has a plain and adequate remedy at law, which is as efficient as the remedy in equity.")). In this case, the trial court assessed the situation before it, including the record and the argument of counsel, and impliedly determined that any alternative remedy was not as "efficient" or as appropriate as the remedy in equity.
We are cognizant that the question before us does not involve a direct action by the Travis County court to wrest jurisdiction from the Cameron County court. However, it does involve an effort by Texas Mutual to bring core, case-determinative issues involved in the class action to a different, later-selected forum. It is also true that the Cameron County court has full jurisdiction to consider the issues before it, including those requiring statutory interpretation. We conclude that sufficient bases existed for the trial court to reach its conclusions as to public policy and to find that the anti-suit injunction was appropriate and necessary in order to preserve its jurisdiction, that "compelling" or "very special circumstances" existed, and that they justified the anti-suit injunction. See Golden Rule, 925 S.W.2d at 651.
We further conclude that the trial court did not act arbitrarily or unreasonably, without reference to guiding rules or principles, or misapply the law to the established facts. Downer, 701 S.W.2d at 241-42. The exercise of discretion is within the sole province of the trial court and we may not substitute our discretion for that of the trial judge. Johnson, 700 S.W.2d at 918; Rankin, 905 S.W.3d at 430. We are to affirm the judgment of the trial court if it can be upheld on any reasonable theory supported by the evidence. Ex parte E.E.H., 869 S.W.2d at 497-98; Burns, 825 S.W.2d at 200.
We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion.
VII. Conclusion
We overrule Texas Mutual's issues on appeal. We affirm the order of the trial court granting the temporary anti-suit injunction.