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holding community caretaking function was justified when defendant was traveling twenty miles per hour under the speed limit in the early hours of the morning
Summary of this case from Munoz v. StateOpinion
No. 04-05-00796-CV
Delivered and Filed: June 21, 2006.
Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 2, Bexar County, Texas, Trial Court No. 304103, Honorable H. Paul Canales, Judge Presiding.
Reversed and Rendered.
Sitting: Catherine STONE, Justice, Karen ANGELINI, Justice, Rebecca SIMMONS, Justice.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
The Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS) appeals from the trial court's judgment reversing an administrative order that suspended Jason Christopher Svoboda's driver's license for refusing to provide a breath specimen. We reverse and render.
Factual and Procedural Background
At nearly 2:00 a.m. on March 24, 2005, Bexar County Sheriff's Deputies P. Rodriguez and A. Freveletti observed Svoboda driving 25 mph in a 45 mph zone. Eventually Svoboda brought his vehicle to a complete stop on the roadway's improved shoulder. The officers turned their patrol car around and parked directly behind Svoboda and activated the emergency lights, but not the sirens. The officers testified that they approached Svoboda to determine if he needed any assistance. Upon contact with Svoboda, both deputies observed signs of intoxication. Svoboda was then asked to perform field sobriety tests, which he agreed to do, but failed in his performance. Consequently, the deputies arrested Svoboda and requested a specimen of his breath. Svoboda refused; therefore, DPS suspended his driver's license.
The officers' report stated that this was a "welfare check," meaning they approached Svoboda to see if he needed any assistance. This type of contact has been deemed a reasonable exercise of an officer's community care-taking function and does not violate a defendant's constitutional rights. See Hulit v. State, 982 S.W.2d 431, 438 (Tex.Crim.App. 1998) (allowing the officer to hold the defendant for a welfare check if the officer reasonably believed the person was ill and in need of assistance); Rochester v. State, No. 2-03-519-CR, 2004 WL 1798090, at *1 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth Aug. 12, 2004, no pet.) (mem. op.) (acknowledging that the officer's waking of a man, unconscious in a car, and subsequently asking him to step out of the vehicle for a driver's licence check and several other questions was a valid "welfare check" and did not implicate the defendant's constitutional rights).
Svoboda requested an administrative hearing regarding the suspension. At the hearing, the administrative law judge (ALJ) upheld DPS's suspension of Svoboda's driver's license. Svoboda then appealed the ALJ's decision to the county court at law where he complained that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop or probable cause to arrest him. The trial judge reversed the judgment of the ALJ. On appeal to this court, DPS contends that the county court erred: 1) "by failing to recognize that the initial contact was a consensual encounter or by disregarding the officers'" community caretaker function; and 2) "in reversing the ALJ's finding that DPS had proven the elements of its case."
Standard of Review
A review of an administrative license suspension is conducted under the substantial evidence standard of review. See Mireles v. Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 9 S.W.3d 128, 131 (Tex. 1999). Under this standard, the reviewing court cannot replace the ALJ's judgment with its own. See R.R. Comm'n of Tex. v. Torch Operating Co., 912 S.W.2d 790, 792 (Tex. 1995). If the ALJ's decision is supported by more than a scintilla of evidence, that decision must be upheld. See id. at 792-93. However, a trial court may reverse an ALJ's determination if a substantial right of the appellant has been prejudiced because the ALJ's findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are not reasonably supported by substantial evidence considering the record as a whole. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 2001.174(2)(E) (Vernon Supp. 2006).
The court of appeals reviews the trial court's substantial evidence review de novo. Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Valdez, 956 S.W.2d 767, 769 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1997, no pet.). In determining whether the ALJ's decision was supported by substantial evidence, this court is governed by the following principles: 1) the trial court will hear and consider evidence to determine whether reasonable support for the ALJ's order exists, but the ALJ remains the primary fact finding body, and the question for the trial court is strictly one of law; 2) the trial court may not substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ on controverted issues of fact; 3) if the ALJ heard substantial evidence that would support either an affirmative or negative finding, the trial court must allow the ALJ's order to stand, even if the court would have differed with the result; 4) the trial court may not set aside the ALJ's ruling merely because there was conflicting or disputed testimony; and 5) the trial court is concerned only with the reasonableness of the ALJ's order not its correctness. Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Fecci, 989 S.W.2d 135, 139 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1999, pet. denied).
Analysis
At a license suspension hearing, DPS bears the burden of proving: 1) reasonable suspicion or probable cause existed to stop or arrest the person; 2) probable cause existed to believe that the person was operating a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated; 3) the person was placed under arrest by the officer and subsequently requested to submit to a breath or blood test; and 4) the person refused to submit to the breath or blood specimen. Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 724.042 (Vernon Supp. 2005).
The ALJ made findings of fact as follows: 1) reasonable suspicion existed to conduct a traffic stop; 2) probable cause existed to arrest Svoboda for operating a motor vehicle on a public highway while intoxicated; 3) Svoboda was arrested and subsequently requested to provide a breath specimen; and 4) Svoboda refused to provide a breath specimen. As a result, the ALJ, within his conclusions of law, held that DPS proved its burden to revoke Svoboda's license as required by the Texas Transportation Code. On appeal to the county court, Svoboda argued two issues: 1) DPS lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop; and 2) DPS lacked probable cause to execute an arrest.
Consensual Encounter
In Svoboda's first issue, he claims that DPS lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop. DPS responds that reasonable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop was unnecessary because Svoboda stopped voluntarily. DPS argues that the contact made by the officers equates to a consensual encounter. In the event that this instance is considered a "stop," DPS contends that the officers conducted a valid "welfare check" under the community caretaking function. In either scenario, reasonable suspicion is not required. Corbin v. State, 85 S.W.3d 272, 276 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002) ("But, even without reasonable suspicion or probable cause that an offense has been committed, a police officer may reasonably seize an individual through the exercise of his community caretaking function."); Reno v. State, No. 12-00-00330-CR, 2001 WL 1526806, at * 4 (Tex.App.-Tyler Nov. 28, 2001, pet. ref'd) (mem. op.) (noting that an officer's consensual encounter requires no level of suspicion because the individual is under no obligation to speak with the officer).
Not all interactions between officers and citizens implicate the United States and Texas Constitutions. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n. 16 (1968). Three categories of interaction are recognized between officers and citizens: encounters, investigative detentions, and arrests. State v. Perez, 85 S.W.3d 817, 819 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002). Both an investigative detention and an arrest involve a seizure, and thus implicate the United States and Texas Constitutions and require a certain level of suspicion to justify the seizure. Moore v. State, 55 S.W.3d 652, 655 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2001, no pet.). DPS argues that the interaction between the officers and Svoboda began as an encounter, and therefore, reasonable suspicion or probable cause was not a requisite to the interaction. We agree.
To engage in an encounter with a citizen, an officer does not need to show any particular level of suspicion because the citizen is not under any obligation to continue the interaction with the officer. Reno, 2001 WL 1526806, at *4. An officer may approach a citizen to ask questions, request identification, or even to request consent to search as long as the officers do not convey the message that compliance with their requests is required. Hunter v. State, 955 S.W.2d 102, 104 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997) (citing Florida v. Bostic, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991)).
Here Svoboda stopped his vehicle on the side of a public roadway entirely on his own volition. He was not stopped by DPS, and the officers' report illustrated that they made contact with Svoboda to see if he was in need of assistance. Under the circumstances, reasonable suspicion was unnecessary to make an initial contact with Svoboda.
Community Caretaking Function
DPS further argues that the officers had the capability to stop Svoboda as part of their community caretaking function. The "community caretaking function" was first articulated in Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973), when the United States Supreme Court observed:
Because of the extensive regulation of motor vehicles and traffic, and also because of the frequency with which a vehicle can become disabled or involved in an accident on public highways, the extent of police-citizen contact involving automobiles will be substantially greater than police-citizen contact in a home or office. Some such contacts will occur because the officer may believe the operator has violated a criminal statute, but many more will not be of that nature. Local police officers . . . frequently investigate vehicle accidents in which there is no claim of criminal liability and engage in what, for want of a better term, may be described as community caretaking functions, totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute.
Id. at 441.
In Ortega v. State, 974 S.W.2d 361 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1998, pet. ref'd), this court held that the police officer's traffic stop of the defendant was justified because the officer had "an objectively reasonable basis for having a legitimate apprehension about [the defendant's] welfare. . . ." Id. at 364. There the officer pulled the defendant over for driving 30 mph below the speed limit in the early hours of the morning. Id.
The facts here are almost identical. The officers' radar illustrated that Svoboda was traveling 20 mph under the speed limit in the early hours of the morning. Svoboda even came to a complete stop on the side of the road. The facts support a conclusion that the officers had a reasonable basis for having a legitimate concern for Svoboda's welfare which would justify a "community caretaking function." Id.
Probable Cause
Concerning Svoboda's second issue, that the officers lacked probable cause to arrest Svoboda, we again disagree. Substantial evidence was present throughout the administrative record to support the ALJ's ruling that probable cause existed to arrest Svoboda. The record provides that Svoboda's breath smelled strongly of alcohol, he had bloodshot eyes, his speech was slurred, he admitted to the officer that he consumed six beers before driving, and he failed every field sobriety test he attempted. The record reflects that the ALJ's decision is supported by more than a scintilla of evidence, thus that decision should have been upheld. See Torch Operating Co., 912 S.W.2d at 792-93. "The county court improperly replaced the ALJ's decision with its own." Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Burrer, No. 04-03-00896-CV, 2005 WL 1105181, at *5 (Tex.App.-San Antonio May 11, 2005, no pet.) (mem. op.). Conclusion The county court erred when it conducted its review of the ALJ's order using the wrong standard. After a de novo review of the county court's judgment, it is evident that the administrative record contains substantial evidence to support the ALJ's order; therefore, the county court's judgment is reversed and the ALJ's administrative order is reinstated.