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concluding radar that showed defendant traveling sixty-one miles per hour in a thirty-five-mile-per-hour zone provided "specific, articulable facts" that could reasonably have led the officer to believe the defendant was violating section 545.351
Summary of this case from Gulledge v. StateOpinion
No. 13-04-00597-CV
Memorandum Opinion Delivered and Filed June 22, 2006.
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 1 of Victoria County, Texas.
Before Justices HINOJOSA, RODRIGUEZ, and GARZA.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
After appellee, Courtney Michelle Ricks, refused to provide a breath sample, appellant, the Texas Department of Public Safety ("Department"), suspended her driver's license for a period of two years. Ricks requested a hearing before the State Office of Administrative Hearings ("SOAH"), and an administrative law judge ("ALJ") upheld the suspension. Ricks appealed to the county court at law, and the county court affirmed the suspension. However, on rehearing the county court reversed the suspension, citing insufficient evidence to support the administrative decision. This appeal ensued. In a single issue, the Department contends the county court at law erred in finding that the Department needed to prove Ricks' actual speed by scientific evidence, experts, or otherwise, to show reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop. We reverse and render.
A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On March 17, 2004, Officer Bruno Cavasos stopped Ricks for driving in excess of the speed limit. Officer Cavasos "clocked" Ricks going sixty-one m.p.h. in a thirty-five m.p.h. zone, turned on his overhead emergency lights, and proceeded to follow her. Ricks continued driving, and Officer Cavasos turned on his siren. Ricks continued driving for several blocks before stopping. Officer Cavasos approached Ricks' vehicle and, after observing numerous signs of intoxication, asked Ricks to perform several field sobriety tests. Ricks performed poorly on the tests and was arrested for the offenses of driving while intoxicated and evading arrest. Following her arrest, Officer Cavasos asked Ricks to provide a sample of her breath. Ricks refused, and the Department suspended her driver's license for two years.
1. Administrative Hearing
Ricks requested an administrative hearing in accordance with chapter 524 of the Texas Transportation Code. See TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 524.012(d), 524.031 (Vernon 1999). At the hearing, both the Department and Ricks were represented by counsel. The Department offered the following two items into evidence: (1) the sworn report of Officer Cavasos, which was submitted over Ricks' objection; and (2) Ricks' driving record. Ricks objected to the use of radar to prove reasonable suspicion under Texas Rules of Evidence 702 and 703. See Tex. R. Evid. 702, 703. After the ALJ overruled the objections and admitted the report, Ricks requested a Kelly-Daubert hearing to challenge the conclusions made by Officer Cavasos from the use of his radar unit. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589-90 (1993); see also Kelly v. State, 824 S.W.2d 568, 572 (Tex.Crim.App. 1992). The ALJ overruled Ricks' request and found that the Department had met its burden by proving there was (1) reasonable suspicion to stop her for speeding and (2) probable cause to arrest her for operating a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated. See TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 524.035(a)(1)(A), (2) (Vernon Supp. 2005). The ALJ upheld the Department's suspension of Ricks' driver's license.
2. Appeal to County Court at Law
Ricks appealed the ALJ's decision to the county court at law, contending that Officer Cavasos lacked reasonable suspicion to stop her. Ricks argued that the ALJ abused its discretion by admitting radar evidence to determine if Officer Cavasos had reasonable suspicion to stop her. Specifically, Ricks argued that the Department had failed to show the radar evidence was reliable and relevant under Kelly v. State. See Kelly v. State, 824 S.W.2d 568, 572 (Tex.Crim.App. 1992) (holding generally that, for scientific-theory evidence to be considered reliable, its underlying scientific theory must be valid, technique applying theory must be valid, and technique must have been properly applied on the occasion in question). The county court at law rendered judgment on September 16, 2004, affirming the decision of the SOAH. On rehearing, the county court at law reversed the decision of the SOAH and reinstated Ricks' driver's license.
B. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review to be used by courts in reviewing driver's license suspensions is established by section 2001.174 of the government code. See Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Nordin, 971 S.W.2d 90, 92 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th] 1998, no pet.) (citing Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Mendoza, 956 S.W.2d 808, 810 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th] 1997, no pet.)); see also TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 2001.174 (Vernon 2000). The Texas Transportation Code directs courts reviewing license suspensions to apply the Administrative Procedures Act, otherwise known as chapter 2001 of the government code. See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 524.002 (Vernon 1999).
Section 2001.174 of the government code provides, in relevant part, as follows:
[A] court may not substitute its judgment for the judgment of the state agency on the weight of the evidence on questions committed to agency discretion but:
(1) may affirm the agency decision in whole or in part; and
(2) shall reverse or remand the case for further proceedings if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:
(A) in violation of a constitutional or statutory provision;
(B) in excess of the agency's statutory authority;
(C) made through unlawful procedure;
(D) affected by other error of law;
(E) not reasonably supported by substantial evidence considering the reliable and probative evidence in the record as a whole; or
(F) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.
TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 2001.174 (Vernon 2000).
In evaluating a decision by an administrative court under the substantial evidence standard, a court should not substitute its own judgment for that of the agency. Mireles v. Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 9 S.W.3d 128, 131 (Tex. 1999); Tex. Health Facilities v. Charter Medical-Dallas, Inc., 665 S.W.2d 446, 452 (Tex. 1984). Any quantum of evidence greater than a scintilla is sufficient to affirm a ruling. R.R. Comm'n of Tex. v. Torch Operating Co., 912 S.W.2d 790, 792-93 (Tex. 1995). Moreover, substantial evidence may exist where a preponderance of the evidence militates against the administrative decision. Mireles, 9 S.W.3d at 131; R.R. Comm'n of Tex., 912 S.W.2d at 793. When reviewing the record from the administrative agency, the existence of more than a mere scintilla of evidence turns on the question of the reasonableness of the ALJ's decision, not the correctness of that decision. City of El Paso v. Pub. Util. Comm'n of Tex., 883 S.W.2d 179, 185 (Tex. 1994). The conclusions of the ALJ are presumed valid. Id. Whether the ALJ's decision is supported by more than a mere scintilla of evidence is a question of law. See Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Butler, 110 S.W.3d 673, 675 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th] 2003, no pet.). Thus, we review the trial court's judgment de novo. See Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Struve, 79 S.W.3d 796, 800 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2002, pet. denied).
We review administrative rulings on the admission or exclusion of evidence under an abuse of discretion standard. See Mendoza, 956 S.W.2d at 810. A court abuses its discretion if it acts without reference to any guiding rules and principles or acts arbitrarily and unreasonably. Id. at 810-11. An appellate court must uphold the ALJ's evidentiary ruling if there is any legitimate basis for the ruling, even if it was not previously urged. See State Bar v. Evans, 774 S.W.2d 656, 659 n. 5 (Tex. 1989). To obtain reversal of a judgment based on error in the admission or exclusion of evidence, an appellant must show that the trial court's ruling "probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment." TEX. R. APP. P. 44.1(a). Reversible error does not usually occur in connection with rulings on questions of evidence, unless the appellant can demonstrate that the whole case turns on the particular evidence admitted or excluded. See Atl. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Middleman, 661 S.W.2d 182, 185 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The exclusion of evidence is harmless if the evidence is merely cumulative of other evidence in the record. Reina v. Gen. Accident Fire Life Assurance Corp., 611 S.W.2d 415, 417 (Tex. 1981); see Gee v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 765 S.W.2d 394, 396 (Tex. 1989).
C. APPLICABLE LAW
In a single issue, the Department contends the county court at law erred in finding that the Department needed to prove Ricks' actual speed by scientific evidence, experts, or otherwise, to show reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop.
A law enforcement officer may lawfully stop a motorist who commits a traffic violation. Garcia v. State, 827 S.W.2d 937, 944 (Tex.Crim.App. 1992). In general, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable when an officer has probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred. Walter v. State, 28 S.W.3d 538, 542 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000); Wolf v. State, 137 S.W.3d 797, 801 (Tex.App.-Waco 2004, no pet.); see Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996).
Officers may stop and briefly detain persons suspected of criminal activity on less information than is constitutionally required for probable cause to arrest. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968). Because a routine traffic stop is more analogous to an investigative detention than a custodial arrest, such stops are analyzed as Terry stops. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984). A traffic stop and any concomitant investigative detention must be reasonable under the United States and Texas Constitutions. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 9.
Under Terry, a temporary investigative detention is reasonable, and therefore constitutional, if (1) the officer's action was justified at the detention's inception, and (2) the detention was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in the first place. Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20. For the officer's initial action to be justified under the first Terry prong, we ask whether there existed specific, articulable facts that, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warranted that intrusion. Id. at 21. Specifically, the officer must have a reasonable suspicion that some activity out of the ordinary is occurring or has occurred, some suggestion to connect the detainee with the unusual activity, and some indication that the unusual activity is related to crime. See Davis v. State, 947 S.W.2d 240, 244 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997) (citing Garza v. State, 771 S.W.2d 549, 558 (Tex.Crim.App. 1989)). We give due weight, not to the officer's inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or "hunch," but to the specific reasonable inferences that he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience. See id. at 243. "Reasonable suspicion exists if the officer has specific, articulable facts that, when combined with rational inferences from those facts, would lead him to reasonably conclude that a particular person actually is, has been, or soon will be engaged in criminal activity." Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d 488, 492 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005).
D. ANALYSIS
The Department contends the county court at law erred in reversing the ALJ's decision because the county court's decision was based on the incorrect conclusion that radar evidence should not have been admitted at the administrative hearing. We agree.
The admissibility or inadmissibility of the radar evidence is not at issue. What is at issue is whether Officer Cavasos had reasonable suspicion to stop Ricks. The ALJ admitted Officer Cavasos' report without objection. In his report, Officer Cavasos explained that he had spotted Ricks speeding and his radar unit showed Ricks' speed was sixty-one m.p.h. in a thirty-five m.p.h. zone. These specific, articulable facts when combined with rational inferences could reasonably have led Officer Cavasos to believe that Ricks was in violation of sections 545.351 and 545.352 of the transportation code. See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 545.351, 545.352 (Vernon 2005) (laws regarding maximum speed requirement and prima facie speed limits). Because Officer Cavasos' report was admissible and supported the ALJ's decision to suspend Ricks' driver's license, the trial court erred in concluding that the ALJ's decision was not supported by substantial evidence. We sustain the Department's sole issue.
We reverse the judgment of the county court at law and render judgment that the ALJ's order upholding the Department's suspension of Ricks' driver's license be reinstated.