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finding the sophisticated user doctrine applicable where the plaintiff argued that his accident was caused by a foreseeable misuse of the defendant's product
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NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County No. S-1500-CV 258456. Sidney P. Chapin, Judge.
Law Office of Gene R. Lorenz and Gene R. Lorenz for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker, Thomas C. Corless and Robert Cooper for Defendant and Respondent.
Wiseman, Acting P.J.
A manufacturer makes an incendiary device, used by firefighters to start backfires, by mixing three ingredients and adding igniter material and a fuse. Leftover quantities of the three-ingredient mix are set aside for disposal. When the manufacturer’s employee is burned by the leftover mixture’s accidental ignition, is the supplier of one of the three ingredients liable to the employee for failing to warn the manufacturer about the combustion hazards associated with the mixture? We conclude the answer is no and affirm the summary judgment entered for the supplier.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORIES
Quoin International (Quoin) manufactured a device called a flare. At the time of the accident, June 2004, Mike Jacobson was president and CEO of Quoin. Jacobson invented the device and held a patent on it.
The core of the flare consisted of 50 percent aluminum powder, 10 percent black iron oxide, and 40 percent plaster of Paris. This combination, which Quoin called the core mix, is effective in starting fires because aluminum powder, in the presence of an oxidizer like iron oxide, can be ignited and burn at several thousand degrees Fahrenheit. The combination of aluminum powder and an oxidizer is called a thermite powder, and the reaction is known in chemistry as a thermite or aluminothermic reaction.
The process is not new and has multiple industrial applications. The reaction was discovered in 1893 by the German chemist Hans Goldschmidt and patented by him in 1895; the process is also known as the Goldschmidt reaction. Thermite powders and reactions are sufficiently well-known that a trademark for a thermite powder, Thermit, appears in abridged dictionaries. The definition is “a mixture of finely granulated aluminum with an oxide of iron or other metal, which produces great heat and is used in welding and in incendiary bombs.” (Webster’s New World Dictionary (2d College ed. 1982) at p. 1476.) We take judicial notice of the chemical and historical facts. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (h).)
Workers mixed the three ingredients with water in buckets, placed the mixture in squeeze bottles, and squeezed the mixture into cardboard tubes. A fuse cord and a powdered igniter material—another thermite powder called Thermoweld—were added. Jacobson described the series of events that ignites the core mix when a flare is used for its intended purpose: “When the flare is launched from the launcher, the gun powder within the launcher cartridge ignites a delay fuse. The delay fuse burns down into an igniter bag which has an easy-to-ignite material. That ignites and then that, in turn, lights the material that we’re talking about, the core material.”
Quoin purchased the aluminum powder in 55-gallon barrels from Valimet, its sole supplier. The powder was accompanied by a material data safety sheet (safety sheet), which warned of three types of hazards arising from potential chemical reactions. First, it warned that if the powder is suspended in air, forming a dust/air mixture, it may explode when ignited. Nonsparking, conductive tools and properly grounded electrical equipment were necessary to avoid this risk. Second, the safety sheet warned that the powder reacts with water, acids, and alkalis to produce heat and hydrogen. Third, it warned that the powder should not be stored with oxidizing materials. Under the heading “WASTE DISPOSAL METHODS,” the safety sheet stated that “[a]luminum is not listed as a toxic or hazardous waste. However, aluminum powders may meet the criteria for water reactive materials and may be regulated as such.” A label on the barrels had briefer, but similar, warnings. The label advised avoiding contact between the powder and oxidizers.
The accident was caused by core mix that was left over from the process of making flares. This residual core mix was rinsed from the buckets and squeeze bottles with water and deposited outdoors in plastic wading pools to dry in the sun. After it hardened, Quoin’s practice was to break it up by sledgehammer, mix it with soil, place it in trash bags, and put it out for trash collection. Plaintiff Luke Teston and an employee named Rad Everett were engaged in this process the day of the accident. Standing at one of the wading pools, each struck one sledgehammer blow on the hardened core mix, which filled the pool to about two or three inches from its rim. It was very hard and did not crack. As Everett struck a second blow, Teston thought he saw a metallic object on the core mix. Then he saw a flash of light and heard a hissing sound. Realizing the mix was on fire, Teston turned and ran, but the flames had already reached him and he was badly burned. Everett was also burned and died of his injuries.
Teston filed a complaint in superior court against Quoin, a successor company, and 150 Doe defendants on June 22, 2006. The complaint alleged strict products liability, negligence, and breach of warranty. On May 23, 2007, Teston amended the complaint to substitute Valimet for a Doe defendant. The amendment alleged failure to warn and negligence against Valimet. Quoin settled and Teston dismissed his claims against the successor company, leaving Valimet as the only defendant.
Valimet filed a motion for summary judgment. The motion was based on what Valimet referred to as “‘the raw material supplier defense’ or the ‘bulk sales/sophisticated purchaser rule.’ Among the undisputed facts,” the motion went on, “are that Valimet sold aluminum powder in bulk to a sophisticated buyer, Quoin; Quoin substantially altered the aluminum powder during the manufacturing process to create an explosive product—the flares; Quoin was aware of the hazards of this explosive product and its components; and Valimet had no role in developing or designing the flares or their manufacturing and disposal process.”
In opposing the motion, Teston relied on the deposition testimony of Beth Sumners to support its claim that Quoin lacked knowledge of the risks. At the time of the accident, Sumners was president of Quoin Manufacturing. Mike Jacobson, president and CEO of Quoin International, was her supervisor. The essence of her testimony was that, although she knew the product deposited in the wading pools was core mix and knew that core mix was “the ignitable part of the flare,” she did not know it could ignite without igniter material and a fuse: “We didn’t believe that you could ignite the pool because it did not have an igniter the way that the flares do; so we did not anticipate anything like that ever happening.” Sumners also knew pure aluminum powder could cause an explosion if suspended in air; if not suspended in air, she said, it would combust if ignited with an igniter, but otherwise would not. She said Jacobson gave her a demonstration with the pure aluminum powder to prove this fact. Sumners testified that, although she discussed the handling of aluminum powder with a Valimet employee named David Oberholtzer and described Quoin’s manufacturing and waste-disposal process to him, Oberholtzer never gave her any advice on waste disposal. She said Quoin’s waste-disposal method—the process of depositing the residual core mix in wading pools and later breaking it up with sledgehammers—was designed by Mike Jacobson. Jacobson testified that he personally bought some of the wading pools for this purpose. Sumners also said she believed the core mix was less dangerous than the pure aluminum powder.
Teston submitted declarations by two expert witnesses, James McMullen and Jerry Hildreth. Both opined that aluminum powder is inherently dangerous and that the safety sheet Valimet shipped with its aluminum powder contained inadequate warnings. In particular, they stated, Valimet should have advised Quoin of a safe process for disposal, which should have included the employment of a hazardous waste disposal company. They believed the accident was foreseeable.
Valimet filed 19 evidentiary objections to McMullen’s declaration and 25 evidentiary objections to Hildreth’s declaration. The court excluded the declarations, saying Valimet’s objections to them were “sustained on one or more of the grounds stated” by Valimet.
The court granted the motion for summary judgment. Its order stated:
“There is no triable issue of material fact but that the component supplier defense of Valimet is a complete defense to plaintiff’s claim against Valimet. Valimet sold a single bulk product to a sophisticated user, Quoin International, the employer of plaintiff; and Quoin, by combining the Valimet bulk product with other non-Valimet supplied products substantially changed the bulk product into a combustible or explosive flare, an end product that did not exist at the time the single bulk product was sold by Valimet to Quoin. Valimet did not supply any other components of Quoin’s product; further, Valimet had no involvement in the developing or designing of the finished product or with Quoin’s manufacturing or disposal procedures. Beyond warnings undisputedly given concerning its product, Valimet did not have a duty to warn with regard to the finished product or disposal of manufacturing residue from the production of the Quoin finished product.”
DISCUSSION
Teston contends that the trial court should have denied Valimet’s motion for summary judgment. We review an order granting summary judgment de novo. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 860.) We independently review the record and apply the same rules and standards as the trial court. (Zavala v. Arce (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 915, 925.) The trial court must grant the motion if “all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) “There is a triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co., supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 850.) We view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and assume that, for purposes of our analysis, his version of all disputed facts is correct. (Sheffield v. Los Angeles County Dept. of Social Services (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 153, 159.)
The trial court relied primarily on the component-supplier or raw-material-supplier defense. Its discussion indicated a secondary reliance on the sophisticated-user defense. The parties briefed both doctrines on appeal. As we will explain, each of these doctrines has a role in the analysis in this case.
Teston argues that the court reached an erroneous conclusion partly because it wrongly ruled his experts’ declarations to be inadmissible. For the sake of argument, we will assume everything in those declarations was admissible, with a few exceptions.
The sophisticated-user doctrine states that “[a] manufacturer is not liable to a sophisticated user of its product for failure to warn of a risk, harm or danger, if the sophisticated user knew or should have known of that risk, harm, or danger.…” (Johnson v. American Standard, Inc. (2008) 43 Cal.4th 56, 71 (Johnson).) This doctrine is “‘a natural outgrowth of the rule that there is no duty to warn of known risks or obvious dangers.’” (Id. at p. 67.) It applies both to a claim that a failure to warn resulted in strict liability and a claim that a failure to warn was negligent, the two claims at issue here. (Id. at p. 71.)
The state Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson, which adopted the sophisticated-user defense (Johnson, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 61), was issued on April 3, 2008, after briefing was completed on the motion for summary judgment but before the court ruled on the motion. Both parties discuss Johnson in their appellate briefs and neither party claims the holding of Johnson should not be applied here because of its date of issuance. As the Johnson court recognized, prior Court of Appeal decisions, while not squarely adopting the defense, applied reasoning similar to it or endorsed it in dictum (id. at pp. 67-68), so there was nothing to prevent the trial court or parties here from relying on it.
The question in this case is not whether plaintiff, Teston, knew or should have known of the combustion hazard associated with defendant’s product, but whether Quoin, his employer, knew or should have known. “The rationale supporting the defense is that ‘the failure to provide warnings about risks already known to a sophisticated purchaser usually is not a proximate cause of harm resulting from those risks suffered by the buyer’s employees or downstream purchasers.’” (Johnson, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 65.) If Quoin knew but did not tell its employees of the risk, there is no reason to think a warning from Valimet to Quoin would have made a difference.
There is no genuine dispute in this case about whether Quoin knew or should have known that aluminum powder presents a combustion hazard when combined with the other ingredients in the core mix. Quoin International CEO Mike Jacobson invented the core mix as part of an incendiary device—“the ignitable part,” as Quoin Manufacturing CEO Beth Sumners admitted she knew. Given the undisputed facts that Quoin invented the flare, that the flare’s purpose is to start fires, and that the core mix is the part of the flare that burns, it is obvious that Quoin knew that aluminum powder, when incorporated into the core mix, was dangerous. One of Teston’s experts opined that Quoin employees’ testimony showed they did not know this, but this opinion, even if admissible, does not create a triable issue of fact. The claim that Quoin did not know of the hazards of its core mix—did not know that its thermite mixture could cause a thermite reaction—is incompatible with the undisputed facts about the company’s reason for existing. Individual Quoin employees’ ignorance would not prove ignorance on the part of the company and would not impose on Valimet a duty to warn.
For these reasons, to the extent that Teston’s suit is based on the claim that Valimet failed to warn Quoin that aluminum powder is combustible when combined with the other ingredients in the core mix, the sophisticated-user defense is a complete defense and there are no triable questions of material fact that could defeat its applicability. Quoin must have known of the combustibility of aluminum powder when incorporated into its core mix because combustion was the mix’s purpose.
Arguably, however, Teston’s suit is based on a narrower claim: that Valimet should have warned Quoin of a more specific danger, the combustion hazard arising from Quoin’s method of breaking up the dried core mix residue. Framing the claim this way might allow Teston to overcome the sophisticated-user defense, since there was evidence that Quoin did not know of the specific danger associated with handling the core mix as it did. Sumners testified to her belief that neither aluminum powder alone nor core mix would ignite without the igniter material to start the reaction. We must assume these were her actual beliefs, and there is no other evidence about what Quoin actually believed regarding the danger of hitting dried core mix with sledgehammers.
Further, there is no evidence in the record from which we could conclude that Quoin should have known of that particular danger. Where the question is not what the sophisticated user actually knew but what it should have known, the “focus … is whether the danger in question was so generally known within the trade or profession that a manufacturer should not have been expected to provide a warning.…” (Johnson, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 72.) The record contains no evidence that it was generally known in the trade that a dried mixture containing aluminum powder and an oxidizer can be ignited by hitting it with a sledgehammer. What is more, the conclusion that Quoin was not an entity that should have known of this risk would not necessarily absolve Valimet of an obligation to know and warn of it. A supplier is liable for failing to warn of risks knowable by the application of available scientific knowledge, not merely those generally known in the trade or profession. (Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. (1991) 53 Cal.3d 987, 990, 1003.) Since Valimet produced no evidence about whether the risk of combustion from hitting the mix with a sledgehammer was scientifically known or knowable, was this not a triable question?
Here is where the raw-material or component-supplier defense comes in. The Court of Appeal described the elements of this defense in Artiglio v. General Electric Co. (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 830 (Artiglio):
“[C]omponent and raw material suppliers are not liable to ultimate consumers when the goods or material they supply are not inherently dangerous, they sell goods or material in bulk to a sophisticated buyer, the material is substantially changed during the manufacturing process and the supplier has a limited role in developing and designing the end product.” (Artiglio, supra, 61 Cal.App.4th at p. 839.)
The essence of the defense is that a raw-material supplier should not be held liable for harm arising from risks created by a manufacturer’s decisions regarding the use of the raw material. Quoting a comment in the Restatement (Third) of Torts, the Artiglio court explained:
“‘Inappropriate decisions regarding the use of [raw] materials are not attributable to the supplier of the raw materials but rather to the fabricator that puts them to improper use. The manufacturer of the integrated product has a significant comparative advantage regarding selection of materials to be used. Accordingly, raw materials sellers are not subject to liability for harm caused by defective design of the end-product.… To impose a duty to warn would require the seller to develop expertise regarding a multitude of different end-products and to investigate the actual use of raw materials by manufacturers over whom the supplier has no control. Courts uniformly refuse to impose such an onerous duty to warn.’” (Artiglio, supra, 61 Cal.App.4th at p. 839.)
The reasoning that cuts off the supplier’s liability for not warning about the fabricator’s integrated product applies equally to risks arising from the manufacturer’s decisions regarding manufacturing and disposal processes.
This defense precludes any reliance by Teston on a duty to warn of the danger of combining aluminum powder with an oxidizer and striking it with a sledgehammer. To the extent that Teston is relying on Quoin’s ignorance of the specific risk of igniting the core mix by striking it, without a fuse and igniter, his claim is that Valimet was required to warn Quoin of a danger arising from a product and manufacturing process Quoin designed. There is no material question of triable fact that could prevent the application of the raw-material-supplier defense to that claim.
Teston argues that the aluminum powder was not substantially changed by Quoin. A quotation in Artiglio of a comment in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, however, shows how the concept of a substantial change should be applied:
“‘It seems reasonably clear that the mere fact that the product is to undergo processing, or other substantial change, will not in all cases relieve the seller of liability under the rule stated in this Section [i.e., Rest.2d of Torts, § 402A]. If, for example, raw coffee beans are sold to a buyer who roasts and packs them for sale to the ultimate consumer, it cannot be supposed that the seller will be relieved of all liability when the raw beans are contaminated with arsenic, or some other poison.… On the other hand, the manufacturer of pigiron, which is capable of a wide variety of uses, is not so likely to be held to strict liability when it turns out to be unsuitable for the child’s tricycle into which it is finally made by a remote buyer.’” (Artiglio, supra, 61 Cal.App.4th at p. 838.)
The fundamental nature of aluminum powder is not changed by mixing it with an oxidizer or striking the mix with a sledgehammer, but that does not mean the defense is inapplicable; for it is equally true that the fundamental nature of pigiron is not changed by making a tricycle from it. It is the manufacturer’s use of the raw material, in both instances, to which the danger ought to be attributed. By the same token, it is not true that aluminum powder will probably cause harm no matter how a buyer processes it, as is the case with the arsenic-laced coffee beans. Aluminum powder “turns out to be unsuitable” to be incorporated into Quoin’s core mix and then hit with sledgehammers pursuant to Quoin’s waste disposal method, but that does not mean the raw material supplier had a duty to warn against that particular danger.
This conclusion in reinforced by Walker v. Stauffer Chemical Corp. (1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 669 (Walker), in which a drain cleaner consisting of 50 percent sulfuric acid and 50 percent alkaline base exploded and injured a consumer, who sued the company that supplied the sulfuric acid to the maker of the drain cleaner, among others. (Id. at p. 671.) The Court of Appeal affirmed summary judgment for the sulfuric acid supplier on the consumer’s strict-liability claim:
“We do not believe it realistically feasible … to require the manufacturer and supplier of a standard chemical ingredient such as bulk sulfuric acid, not having control over the subsequent compounding, packaging or marketing of an item eventually causing injury to the ultimate consumer, to bear the responsibility for that injury. The manufacturer (seller) of the product causing the injury is so situated as to afford the necessary protection.” (Walker, supra, 19 Cal.App.3d at p. 674.)
If anything, the drain cleaner maker changed the bulk sulfuric acid less, merely diluting it with another ingredient, than Quoin changed the bulk aluminum powder.
Relying on his experts’ opinions, Teston also argues that the raw-material-supplier defense does not apply because aluminum powder is inherently dangerous. While we agree that the record leaves no room for disputing that aluminum powder has inherent dangers, it also leaves no room for disputing that Quoin knew of those dangers. The narrowly described danger that Quoin did not know of (the danger of combustion arising from Quoin’s sledgehammer-disposal method), however, was not inherent in the aluminum powder within the meaning of the doctrine. This is true for the same reason that Quoin’s processing of the aluminum powder was a substantial change within the meaning of the doctrine. The risk arose from Quoin’s product design and the method Quoin chose for disposing of leftover core mix. After all, there is no evidence and no claim that aluminum powder on its own will ignite if hit with a sledgehammer. Walker is again instructive. Bulk sulfuric acid is dangerous on its own, but this did not make the raw-material-supplier defense inapplicable.
Finally, Teston claims there is a dispute over the extent of Valimet’s role in developing and designing its product and manufacturing and waste-disposal processes. Again, the record precludes a genuine dispute. Jacobson invented the product and the manufacturing and waste-disposal processes. Sumners testified that Oberholtzer discussed the handling of pure aluminum powder with her but gave no advice about handling core mix. There is no evidence that Valimet had any role in developing the product or the procedures that led to the accident. Teston’s expert opined that Oberholtzer’s discussion with Sumners about the risks of dust clouds “led Quoin to believe these were ‘the’ hazards.” This testimony was speculative, as Valimet objected and the trial court found. Sumners’s own testimony was that she knew core mix was the ignitable part of the flare; that it would ignite with a fuse and igniter; that her source of information on these points was Jacobson; and that Oberholtzer gave her no advice about disposing of the core mix “because they just sell us one component” and “because their material had been altered.”
Teston cites Arena v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1178, in which the raw-material-supplier defense was held not to bar the liability of a raw asbestos supplier for injuries to users of manufactured asbestos products. The case is distinguishable. The Arena court held that the raw asbestos was not substantially changed, essentially because the health risks from breathing raw asbestos dust were comparable to those of breathing dust from the manufactured asbestos products. (Id. at pp. 1187-1190.) Quoin did substantially change Valimet’s raw aluminum powder, however, because the risks associated with raw aluminum powder were quite different from those associated with Quoin’s core mix and Quoin’s process for disposing of leftover core mix. It was the latter risks that resulted in Teston’s injuries.
In Torres v. Xomox Corp. (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1, which Teston also cites, the Court of Appeal upheld a jury verdict against the manufacturer of a valve that malfunctioned and killed a factory worker. In doing so, the court concluded the jury could reasonably find that modifications to the valve by the factory owner were not a superseding cause of the accident. (Id. at p. 19.) Here, by contrast, there was no triable question of fact regarding whether the accident was caused by Quoin’s product and disposal procedures rather than by Valimet’s raw material. True, one of Teston’s experts declared that the “aluminum powder is the ingredient that caused the burn injuries,” and his other expert declared that “[t]he other flare ingredients (plaster of [P]aris and iron oxide) are benign ingredients.” The only reasonable interpretation of these statements, however, is simply that the aluminum powder was the fuel for the thermite reaction, not that the thermite reaction could have taken place without the oxidizer and without something, like the sledgehammer blow, to set it off. In other words, the expert’s comments cannot mean that the injuries would have happened even if Quoin had not turned the aluminum powder into core mix, dried it, and told Teston and Everett to break it up with sledgehammers. The same experts refer to “the inherent danger posed by aluminum powder when combined with an oxidizing agent such as iron oxide” and “the combustibility of Valimet’s aluminum powder when combined with iron oxide,” and state that “[a]luminum powder combined with iron oxide will burn at a high temperature” (italics added).
Teston cites additional cases that do not involve raw materials, component parts, or modifications and therefore do not present the same legal issues as this case: Midgley v. S. S. Kresge Co. (1976) 55 Cal.App.3d 67, 74-75 (consumer damaged eye after incorrectly assembling telescope designed for viewing sun; error not to instruct jury on failure to warn where assembly instructions packed with telescope were alleged to be inadequate; component-supplier defense not at issue); Wright v. Stang Manufacturing Co. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1218, 1233-1234, 1236 (error to grant water cannon manufacturer’s motion for summary judgment against firefighter injured when incorrectly mounted cannon broke loose from fire truck; genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether manufacturer provided adequate warnings about mounting problems; component-supplier defense held not relevant); Huynh v. Ingersoll-Rand (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 825, 831-835 (error to grant grinding disc manufacturer’s motion for summary judgment against worker injured when disc shattered; issues of material fact existed as to whether worker caused accident by using disc with grinder operating at speed greater than that for which disc was rated and whether manufacturer provided adequate warning about speed; component-supplier defense not discussed); DeLeon v. Commercial Manufacturing & Supply Co. (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 336, 342-348 (error to grant summary judgment motion of manufacturer that custom-built machinery for food-processing plant where risk resulting in worker’s injury arose from installation of machinery next to other machinery; triable issue existed as to whether manufacturer contributed to choice of location; manufacturer held not to be component supplier). Teston claims all these cases are relevant because they involve foreseeable misuses of the defendant’s product; he contends that his accident also was caused by a foreseeable misuse. He cites no authority, however, stating that a plaintiff can overcome the raw-material-supplier and sophisticated-user defenses and establish a duty to warn by showing the accident was caused by the sophisticated buyer’s foreseeable misuse of the raw material. The Johnson court expressly declined to rule on whether or not the sophisticated-user defense can be defeated in this manner. (Johnson, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 69, fn. 5.)
To summarize, Valimet has produced sufficient evidence to establish each element of the sophisticated-user defense (so far as Teston’s claim is that Valimet had a duty to warn of the combustion hazards of aluminum powder combined with an oxidizer) and the raw-material-supplier defense (so far as Teston’s claim is that Valimet had a duty to warn of the more specific hazards arising from Quoin’s method of disposing of leftover core mix). Teston did not respond with evidence giving rise to a genuine issue of material fact with respect to any element of these defenses. As a result, summary judgment correctly was granted for Valimet.
As Valimet points out, Teston is equivocal about whether his claim is that Valimet had a duty to warn only Quoin or also to warn him directly. Our discussion has been framed in terms of the claimed duty to warn Quoin, but it also resolves any claimed duty to warn Teston directly. The sophisticated-user and raw-material-supplier defenses both incorporate the policy that a purchasing manufacturer is in a superior position to protect downstream users. (Wiler v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 621, 629-630 [accident happened when tire made by Firestone went flat because of defective valve stem attached by Ford; Firestone not liable to car buyer because Firestone was entitled to rely on Ford to discover and remedy danger]; Walker, supra, 19 Cal.App.3d at p. 674 [warning to end user by supplier of bulk chemical ingredient not realistic or feasible; intermediate manufacturer “is so situated as to afford the necessary protection”].)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Costs on appeal are awarded to Valimet.
WE CONCUR: Dawson, J., Kane, J.