Opinion
D070498
12-13-2017
JOHN TERRIN et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. STATE OF CALIFORNIA et al., Defendants and Respondents; NORTH COUNTY TRANSIT DISTRICT, Real Party in Interest and Respondent.
Balaban & Spielberger, Andrew J. Spielberger; Esner Chang & Boyer, Holly N. Boyer and Joseph S. Persoff for Plaintiffs and Appellants. No appearance for Defendants and Respondents. McDougal, Love, Boehmer, Foley, Lyon & Canlas, Steven E. Boehmer, M. Anne Cirina and Amanda R. Abeln-Overs for Real Party in Interest and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. 37-2015-00024991-CU-PO-CTL) APPEALS from a judgment and order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, John S. Meyer, Judge. Appeal from judgment affirmed; appeal from order dismissed. Balaban & Spielberger, Andrew J. Spielberger; Esner Chang & Boyer, Holly N. Boyer and Joseph S. Persoff for Plaintiffs and Appellants. No appearance for Defendants and Respondents. McDougal, Love, Boehmer, Foley, Lyon & Canlas, Steven E. Boehmer, M. Anne Cirina and Amanda R. Abeln-Overs for Real Party in Interest and Respondent.
I.
INTRODUCTION
In the primary appeal in this case, we consider two issues. First, does this court have appellate jurisdiction to consider an appeal from an order denying appellants John Terrin and Amanda Sztoltz's motion for leave to amend their complaint to name real party in interest North County Transit District (NCTD) as a defendant in the case? We conclude that the order is appealable as a final judgment as to NCTD because NCTD appeared in the trial court and opposed the motion, and the trial court's ruling denying the motion effectively terminated all litigation between appellants and NCTD. Second, did the trial court err in determining that the doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes appellants from amending their complaint to name NCTD as a defendant? We conclude that the trial court properly applied the doctrine of collateral estoppel and denied the motion for leave to amend. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's order/judgment denying appellants' motion for leave to amend.
As discussed in footnote 8, post, we dismiss as untimely appellants' appeal from a separate order filed in this case.
II.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDUAL BACKGROUND
A. The complaint
Appellants filed this action against the State of California (the State), BNSF Railway Company (BNSF) and several other defendants in July 2015. Appellants alleged that on August 7, 2014, Patrick Terrin (Patrick), was struck and killed by a freight train while crossing a railroad crossing in Carlsbad. According to the complaint, John Terrin (Terrin) is Patrick's father, and Sztoltz is his sister. Sztoltz allegedly witnessed the accident.
The State and the other named defendants in the lawsuit are not parties to this appeal and they have not appeared in this court.
Terrin brought a negligence claim against BNSF and several of its employees, and a claim for dangerous condition of public property against the State, the County of San Diego, and the City of Carlsbad. Sztoltz brought a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress against all defendants.
Appellants alleged that they had complied with the Government Claims Act (Gov. Code, § 900 et seq.), and attached as exhibits to the complaint government claims filed with the State of California, the City of Carlsbad, and the County of San Diego.
Unless otherwise specified, all subsequent statutory references are to the Government Code.
The Government Claims Act generally requires a person seeking to file an action against a governmental entity (§§ 905, 905.2) relating to a cause of action for death or personal injury, to file a claim with the governmental entity within six months of the accrual of the cause of action. (§ 911.2, subd. (a).) The failure to timely present a claim to the governmental entity generally bars the person from filing a lawsuit against that entity. (§ 945.4.)
The complaint further alleged that NCTD was "owned, controlled, and run" by the State. B. The State's demurrer
The State filed a demurrer to appellants' complaint in which the State argued that NCTD was not controlled by the State, among other contentions. In its order sustaining the State's demurrer with leave to amend as to the dangerous condition of property cause of action, the trial court ruled, "[NCTD] is not an agency of the State; it is a separate public entity." C. Appellants' applications to file a late claim with the NCTD
Although the State's demurrer is not in the record, this fact is undisputed.
Appellants filed applications to file a late claim with NCTD in October, 2015. NCTD returned the applications on the ground that the applications had not been filed within one year of the accrual of the cause of appellants' cause of action, as required pursuant to 911.4, subdivision (b). D. Appellants' section 946 .6 petition
If the person fails to file a timely claim, he or she may file an application to file a late claim with the entity (§ 911.4, subd. (a)). Such an application must be filed no later than one year after the accrual of the cause of action. (§ 911.4, subd. (b).)
In December 2015, appellants filed a petition in the trial court pursuant to section 946.6 seeking to be relieved from the bar to suit contained in section 945.4 due to appellants' failure to timely present a government claim to NCTD. In arguing that the trial court should grant its section 946.6 petition, appellants contended that NCTD should be estopped from asserting that the Government Claims Act barred their action. In their opening brief in support of their petition, appellants argued, " 'Obviously, if presented with good cause, late government claims must be accepted; by informal action the same result follows in an estoppel relationship.' " (Quoting J.P. v. Carlsbad Unified School Dist. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 323, 334.) Appellants reasserted their equitable estoppel argument in their reply brief in support of their petition, as follows:
"This Court has jurisdiction to grant relief to [appellants] because NCTD is estopped from asserting the limitations of the claims statute because its agents or employees prevented or deterred the filing of a timely claim by providing inaccurate information to [appellants'] counsel regarding filing of government claims, and by hiding all information regarding government claims from its publicly available website. '[I]t is well settled that a public entity may be estopped from asserting the limitations of the claims statute when its agents or employees have prevented or deterred the filing of a timely claim by some affirmative act. [Citations]. Estoppel most commonly results from misleading statements about the need for or advisability of a claim; actual fraud or the intent to mislead is not essential.['] "
The trial court denied the petition and expressly rejected appellants' equitable estoppel argument on February 5. The court ruled:
"[Appellants] also cite J.P. v. Carlsbad Unified School District[, supra,] 232 Cal.App.4th 323, in which appellate court affirmed the finding that the District was estopped from asserting the limitations period in which to bring a claim when the District's employees prevented or deterred the filing of a timely claim.
"Here, there is no evidence that the NCTD prevented or deterred plaintiffs from filing a timely claim. According to the evidence, NCTD did not have knowledge of the claim until October 2015. Plaintiffs complain that the NCTD website does not provide information for filing a tort claim and that such information is
otherwise difficult to ascertain. Significantly, however, online information establishes that NCTD is a separate governmental entity (entitled to tort claim procedures). Furthermore, plaintiffs did eventually find the appropriate place to submit a claim. And the Court can take judicial notice of the court records which indicate that many other lawsuits have been successfully brought against the NCTD."
NCTD served notice of entry of the order prior to February 12. E. Appellants' motion for leave to file a second amended complaint
On April 20, 2016, appellants filed a motion for leave to file a second amended complaint to name NCTD as a defendant and to allege "an estoppel argument against [NCTD]," based on purported misrepresentations made by NCTD that "deterred [appellants] from filing timely claims." NCTD filed an opposition to the motion in which it contended that the doctrine of collateral estoppel precluded appellants from naming NCTD as a defendant and bringing equitable estoppel allegations against it.
In February 2016, appellants filed a first amended complaint that alleged that NCTD was "an agent . . . of the State of California and/or the County of San Diego and/or the City of Carlsbad." (Formatting omitted.) The first amended complaint did not name NCTD as a defendant, and the legal sufficiency of the first amended complaint is not before us.
The court held a hearing on the motion at which appellants and NCTD appeared. The trial court denied the motion for leave to amend on May 10. The trial court reasoned that the doctrine of collateral estoppel precluded appellants from filing a complaint containing equitable estoppel allegations against NCTD because the court had previously determined the issue adversely to the appellants in connection with the section 946.6 petition. F. Appellants' appeals
Appellants filed a notice of appeal from the trial court's February 5 order denying their section 946.6 petition on May 13. That same day, appellants filed a second notice of appeal from the trial court's May 10 order denying the motion for leave to amend.
This court solicited briefing with respect to whether we have appellate jurisdiction over appellants' appeals. In a letter brief, appellants acknowledged that their appeal from the February 5 order "appear[ed] untimely" because it was filed more than 60 days after notice of entry of the order.
After receiving the parties' briefing, this court issued an order concluding that appellants' appeal from the trial court's February 5 order denying the section 946.6 petition was untimely and limiting the issues on appeal to those raised in appellants' appeal from the May 10 order denying appellants' motion for leave to amend. In our order, we also requested that appellants and NCTD further address the appealability of the May 10 order in their briefing on appeal. Appellants and NCTD have complied with our request.
Pursuant to this court's August 2, 2016 order, John Terrin and Amanda Sztoltz's May 13, 2016 appeal from the trial court's February 5, 2016 order denying appellants' petition for relief from the Government Claims Act (Gov. Code, § 900 et seq.) is dismissed as untimely. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104(a)(1)(B).)
III.
DISCUSSION
A. This court has appellate jurisdiction to review the trial court's May 10 order as a final judgment between appellants and NCTD
Appellants contend that this court has appellate jurisdiction to review the trial court's final determination of the litigation between appellants and NCTD.
1. Governing law
An appeal to the Court of Appeal may be taken from a final judgment in a civil proceeding, except in a limited civil case. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 904, 904.1, subd. (a)(1).) "[A] judgment is final, and therefore appealable, ' " 'when it terminates the litigation between the parties on the merits of the case and leaves nothing to be done but to enforce by execution what has been determined.' " ' " (Dhillon v. John Muir Health (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1109, 1115.) " ' "It is not the form of the decree but the substance and effect of the adjudication which is determinative. As a general test, which must be adapted to the particular circumstances of the individual case, it may be said that where no issue is left for future consideration except the fact of compliance or noncompliance with the terms of the first decree, that decree is final, but where anything further in the nature of judicial action on the part of the court is essential to a final determination of the rights of the parties, the decree is interlocutory." ' " (Ibid.) Thus, a ruling denominated as an order may constitute an appealable judgment because "it is the substance and effect of an order, not its label or form, that determines whether it is a final judgment." (Crespin v. Shewry (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 259, 270.)
The law is also well settled that a plaintiff may appeal from a judgment that is final as to one party in a case even if the case involves multiple defendants. (See, e.g., Millsap v. Federal Express Corp. (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 425, 430 ["It is settled that the rule [that an appeal may not be taken from an 'interlocutory' judgment] does not apply when the case involves multiple parties and a judgment is entered which leaves no issue to be determined as to one party"].)
"[O]rders denying leave to amend a complaint, denying substitution of parties, and granting motions to strike parts of a pleading, although ordinarily not appealable, are appealable where the orders 'have the effect of eliminating issues between a plaintiff and defendant so that nothing is left to be determined . . . .' " (Randle v. City and County of San Francisco (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 449, 454.) For example, in Ingram v. Superior Court (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 483, 489 (Ingram), the Court of Appeal concluded that an order striking a complaint against a defendant (the Estate of Russel Marvin Parks) and an order denying the plaintiff's motion for leave to file an amended complaint against the administrator of the estate of Parks were appealable as a final judgment since the "court's action had the effect of eliminating the estate of Parks from the case." (Ibid.)
2. Application
The trial court's order denying appellants' leave to file a second amended complaint to name NCTD as a defendant had the effect of eliminating all of the issues between appellants and NCTD. As such, it constitutes an appealable final judgment between appellants and NCTD. (See Ingram, supra, 98 Cal.App.3d at p. 489.)
NCTD contends that the trial court's ruling does not constitute an appealable final judgment because "NCTD is not, and was never, a party to the underlying action," and thus, appellants must wait until a final judgment is entered in the case against the remaining defendants to challenge the trial court's ruling denying appellants' motion for leave to amend. We are not persuaded. NCTD actively opposed the motion for leave to amend by filing an opposition and appearing at the hearing. Moreover, in opposing the motion, NCTD characterized itself as a real party in interest in the litigation, a characterization with which we agree. (See In re A.L. (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 354, 363 ["A real party in interest is defined as ' " 'any person or entity whose interest will be directly affected by the proceeding . . . .' " ' "].) Further, the trial court's ruling denying the motion for leave to amend is, in essence, a ruling that appellants cannot state a legal claim against NCTD, and thus constitutes a final adjudication of the merits of appellants' claim against NCTD.
Accordingly, we find distinguishable cases cited in NCTD's brief such as Evans v. Dabney (1951) 37 Cal.2d 758, 759, in which courts have concluded that "an order denying a motion to bring in new cross-defendants [is] not appealable where the persons sought to be brought in were not parties, were not served, and did not appear, because the order adjudicate[s] nothing as between defendants-cross-complainants and the persons sought to be brought in." (Ibid.) In this case, as outlined above, NCTD did appear in the case and successfully opposed the motion for leave to file the second amended complaint against it, and the trial court's ruling did constitute an adjudication as between appellants and NCTD.
We also are not persuaded by NCTD's contention that the motion to file a second amended complaint was "actually" a motion for reconsideration pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1008, subdivision (a), and thus, the trial court's order denying the motion is not appealable pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1008, subdivision (g). (See ibid. ["An order denying a motion for reconsideration made pursuant to subdivision (a) is not separately appealable"].) While NCTD contends that the motion for leave to amend sought reconsideration of the trial court's February 5 order denying appellants' section 946.6 petition, the motion did not request that the trial court "reconsider the matter and modify, amend, or revoke the [February 5] order." (§ 1008, subd. (a).) Rather, the motion for leave to amend sought permission to name NCTD as a defendant in the action and to allege equitable estoppel allegations against NCTD.
Accordingly, we conclude that this court has appellate jurisdiction to consider appellants' appeal from the court's denial of their motion for leave to file a second amended complaint. B. The trial court did not err in determining that the doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes appellants from amending their complaint to name NCTD as a defendant and from bringing a claim of equitable estoppel against NCTD
Appellants claim that the trial court erred in determining that the doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes appellants from amending their complaint to name NCTD as a defendant and from bringing a claim of equitable estoppel against NCTD.
We review appellants' claim applying the de novo standard of review. (See, e.g., Robinson v. U-Haul Co. of California (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 304, 321 ["Whether collateral estoppel applies is a question of law reviewed de novo"].)
1. Governing law
" '[C]ollateral estoppel, or issue preclusion,' . . . ' "precludes relitigation of issues argued and decided in prior proceedings." ' " (Mills v. U.S. Bank (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 871, 895 (Mills).) The doctrine may be applied if all of the following requirements are met:
" 'First, the issue sought to be precluded from relitigation must be identical to that decided in a former proceeding. Second, this issue must have been actually litigated in the former proceeding. Third, it must have been necessarily decided in the former proceeding. Fourth, the decision in the former proceeding must be final and on the merits. Finally, the party against whom preclusion is sought must be the same as, or in privity with, the party to the former proceeding.' " (Id. at pp. 895-896.)
"Even if the minimal requirements for application of collateral estoppel are satisfied, courts will not apply the doctrine if considerations of policy or fairness outweigh the doctrine's purposes as applied in a particular case [citation], or if the party to be estopped had no full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior proceeding." (Zevnik v. Superior Court (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 76, 82.)
2. Application
Appellants do not dispute that the " 'identical' " equitable estoppel issue that they seek to allege in a second amended complaint was " 'actually litigated' " in the section 946.6 proceeding. (Mills, supra, 166 Cal.App.4th at p. 895.) Nor do appellants dispute that the trial court's decision on the section 946.6 proceeding was final and on the merits. It is also undisputed that appellants were parties to both the section 946.6 proceeding and the proceedings on the motion for leave to file a second amended complaint.
Appellants also do not dispute that they cannot state a claim against NCTD without alleging that NCTD is equitably estopped from asserting the bar to suit for failure to present a timely government claim (§ 945.4).
However, according to appellants, the "primary reason" that collateral estoppel does not apply is because the question whether the doctrine of equitable estoppel applies in this case "was not necessarily decided as part of [appellants'] petition for relief [pursuant to section 946.6] . . . ." (Italics added.)
An issue is " ' "necessarily decided" ' by an order if the issue was not ' "entirely unnecessary" to the judgment in the initial proceeding.' " (Anne H. v. Michael B. (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 488, 498 (Anne H.)) " ' "This requirement 'prevent[s] the incidental or collateral determination of a nonessential issue from precluding reconsideration of that issue in later litigation.' " ' " (Creative Ventures, LLC v. Jim Ward & Associates (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1430, 1451 (Creative Ventures).)
The trial court's equitable estoppel ruling squarely rejecting a distinct argument that appellants' raised in their section 946.6 briefing was not " ' " 'incidental or collateral' " ' " (Creative Ventures, supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at p. 1451) nor " ' "entirely unnecessary" ' " (Anne H., supra, 1 Cal.App.5th at p. 498). (See pt. II.D, ante) Appellants contend, however, that the trial court's equitable estoppel ruling cannot be given collateral estoppel effect because "[appellants'] argument that [NCTD] should be equitably estopped from arguing that [appellants'] claims are untimely 'is not within the scope of the [section 946.6] proceeding.' " In other words, appellants argue that even though they raised the issue of equitable estoppel to justify their late filing of a claim against NCTD in the section 946.6 proceedings, they now maintain that the issue may not be addressed in such a proceeding.
Appellants cite no authority for the proposition that the " ' "necessarily decided" ' " (Anne H., supra, 1 Cal.App.5th at p. 498) element of collateral estoppel should be interpreted to permit a party to relitigate an issue that the party previously raised in another proceeding, on the ground that the party could not have legally prevailed on the issue in the first proceeding. However, even assuming that the "necessarily decided" element should be interpreted in such a manner, appellants' argument is without merit in this case because, as discussed in the text, we reject appellants' contention that the issue of equitable estoppel is not within the scope of a section 946.6 proceeding.
In making this argument, appellants cite three cases, Ngo v. County of Los Angeles (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 946 (Ngo), Rason v. Santa Barbara City Housing Authority (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 817 (Rason), Toscano v. County of Los Angeles (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 775 (Toscano). However, in none of these cases did the Court of Appeal hold that the issue of equitable estoppel is beyond the scope of a section 946.6 proceeding. (Ngo, supra, 207 Cal.App.3d at pp. 948-952; Rason, supra, 201 Cal.App.3d at pp. 820-832; Toscano, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at p. 779.)
On the contrary, in Toscano, an appeal from a trial court's denial of a section 946.6 petition (Toscano, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at p. 779), the Court of Appeal considered, and rejected, appellants' equitable estoppel argument on the merits. (Id. at p. 786.) After reviewing the evidence presented on the equitable estoppel issue, the Toscano court reasoned, "[T]he [trial] court reasonably concluded that petitioners had not met their burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that their failure to file a timely claim was induced by respondent." (Ibid.)
Indeed, numerous appellate courts, including our Supreme Court, have considered equitable estoppel arguments on the merits in reviewing section 946.6 orders. (See, e.g., J.M. v. Huntington Beach Union High School Dist. (2017) 2 Cal.5th 648, 656; Santee v. Santa Clara County Office of Education (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 702, 715 (Santee); Reyes v. County of Los Angeles (1988) 197 Cal.App.3d 584, 594.) In none of these cases, nor in any other case of which we are aware, has a court held that the issue of equitable estoppel may not be raised in a section 946.6 proceeding. Moreover, section 946.6, subdivision (b) specifically requires a section 946.6 petition to show "[t]he reason for failure to present the claim within the [statutory] time limit," and there is nothing in the text of section 946.6 that precludes a petitioner from arguing that petitioner's failure to timely present the claim was due to conduct on the part of the putative defendant and thus, that the putative defendant should be equitably estopped from raising an objection to the filing of a late claim. (§ 946.6, subd. (b).)
While the Ngo court concluded that a section 946.6 proceeding is "not designed to resolve the issue of actual compliance with the claim filing requirements" (Ngo, supra, 207 Cal.App.3d at p. 951), and that a trial court ruling on a section 946.6 petition "lacks the power to determine questions that should properly be left to a jury" (Ngo, at p. 951), a determination as to whether equitable estoppel applies does not require the resolution of the issue of actual compliance with claim filing requirements, and, as explained below, does not involve a question for a jury.
As discussed in Santee, there is a split of authority on this issue. (Santee, supra, 220 Cal.App.3d at p. 715.) However, we need not determine whether the issue of actual compliance with claim filing requirements may be determined in a section 946.6 proceeding. Further, as we note in the text, no case of which we are aware supports appellants' contention that a trial court may not address the issue of equitable estoppel in a section 946.6 proceeding.
While appellants contend that the trial court "did not . . . have the power" to rule on the equitable estoppel issue in the context of the section 946.6 proceeding because "[w]hether or not a party is equitably estopped from raising an argument is a question of fact for a jury," both the Supreme Court and this court have held to the contrary. (Italics added.) In Hopkins v. Kedzierski (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 736, this court considered an appellant's contention that the trial court erred in "denying her request for a jury trial on the issue[ ] of whether equitable estoppel . . . applied to make her action timely." (Id. at p. at 744.) We rejected appellant's contention, explaining:
" 'As the name suggests, equitable estoppel is an equitable issue for court resolution.' (Hoopes v. Dolan [(2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 146, 161]; see C & K Engineering Contractors [v. Amber Steel Co. (1978) 23 Cal.3d 1, 9] ['equitable estoppel may be tried by the court without a jury'].)" (Id. at p. 745.)
Accordingly, we reject appellants' argument that the applicability of the doctrine of equitable estoppel must be decided by a jury and that the trial court therefore did not have the authority to rule on the issue of equitable estoppel in ruling on their section 946.6 petition.
Finally, appellants contend that it would "be fundamentally unfair" to apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel to preclude them from relitigating the question whether NCTD should be equitably estopped from contending that appellants' lawsuit against NCTD is barred for failure to present a timely government claim. In support of this contention, appellants argue that they "would have the benefit of discovery," in proving their estoppel allegations in this action, while appellants "did not have [the benefit of discovery] when petitioning the court for relief" (italics omitted), pursuant to section 946.6. This argument fails for several reasons. To begin with, it was appellants who raised the equitable estoppel issue in the context of their section 946.6 petition. (See Gurrola v. County of Los Angeles (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 145, 153 [rejecting argument that collateral estoppel should not apply to factual finding rendered in section 946.6 proceeding in part because "it was appellant who placed in issue the [matter] in the [section 946.6] proceeding"].) In addition, appellants do not contend that the provisions of the Civil Discovery Act (Code Civ. Proc., § 2016.010 et seq.) do not apply in a section 946.6 proceeding. Nor do appellants argue that they were precluded from conducting discovery in connection with their petition. Finally, appellants do not present any argument with respect to the specific evidence that they might have obtained in discovery, so as to permit them to establish their equitable estoppel claim. Under these circumstances, considerations of fundamental fairness do not preclude the trial court's application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel.
"A petition for relief from the claim presentation requirement under Government Code section 946.6 is a special proceeding" (Ovando v. County of Los Angeles (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 42, 64), and "courts have repeatedly concluded . . . that the discovery act applies to statutorily enacted special proceedings [such as section 946.6] that are silent with respect to discovery." (City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 272, 286.) However, we need not determine the applicability of the Civil Discovery Act to section 946.6 proceedings, given appellants' failure to make any argument that they were denied the opportunity to conduct discovery in litigating their section 946.6 petition.
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err in determining that the doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes appellants from amending their complaint to name NCTD as a defendant and from bringing a claim of equitable estoppel against NCTD.
IV.
DISPOSITION
The May 10, 2016 order/judgment denying appellants' motion for leave to amend is affirmed. Appellants' appeal from the trial court's February 5, 2016 order is dismissed. Appellants are to bear costs in both appeals.
AARON, J. WE CONCUR: NARES, Acting P. J. HALLER, J.