Opinion
Case No. 7:17-cv-02738-BHH-JDA
09-12-2018
Jarvis Terrell, Plaintiff, v. City of Spartanburg, City of Spartanburg Police Department, Bryan Shaw, Michael Parris, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This matter is before the Court on motions for summary judgment filed by the Defendants in this action brought in part under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. [Docs. 44; 48.] Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2), D.S.C., this magistrate judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters in cases filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and to submit findings and recommendations to the District Court.
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed this action on October 10, 2017, alleging excessive force and three state-law claims pursuant to the South Carolina Tort Claims Act: battery, assault, and malicious prosecution. [Doc. 1.] Plaintiff named as Defendants the City of Spartanburg (the "City"), the City of Spartanburg Police Department, and City of Spartanburg Police Department Officers Bryan Shaw and Michael Parris.
Plaintiff has sued the officers in their individual capacity only. [Doc. 1.] Additionally, because the City's police department is not a separate suable entity from the City itself, but rather a mere subdivision of the City, the City and its police department are referred to as a single entity. See Christy v. City of Myrtle Beach, No. 4:09-cv-1428-JMC-TER, 2012 WL 2149777, at *1 n.1 (D.S.C. Apr. 26, 2012), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2012 WL 2149780 (D.S.C. June 13, 2012).
On April 26, 2018, the City and Officer Parris filed a motion for summary judgment. [Doc. 44.] The following day, the Court issued an Order in accordance with Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), advising Plaintiff of the summary judgment/dismissal procedure and of the possible consequences if he failed to adequately respond to the motion. [Doc. 45.] On May 18, 2018, Officer Shaw also filed a motion for summary judgment. [Doc. 48.] And on May 21, 2018, the Court issued another Roseboro Order. [Doc. 49.] On May 29, 2018, and June 19, 2018, Plaintiff filed responses in opposition to the summary judgment motions. [Docs. 51; 54.] Defendants filed replies to those responses on June 5, 2018, and June 26, 2018. [Docs. 53; 56.] Accordingly, the motions are ripe for review.
BACKGROUND
Viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the record reveals the following facts.
On October 11, 2015, Officers Shaw and Parris were dispatched to a disturbance regarding a male on scene refusing to leave. [Docs. 44-2 at 3; 48-1 at 2.] While en route, they "were advised that this was a domestic disturbance and that both a male and female were on scene." [Doc. 44-2 at 3.]
When the officers arrived, the complainant Annie Foster indicated that Plaintiff and Foster's daughter, Shaunda Woodruff, had been fighting. [Docs. 44-2 at 3; 48-1 at 2.] Foster had told Plaintiff to leave several times, but he had refused. [Docs. 44-2 at 3; 48-1 at 2.] Woodruff and other family members then emerged from the house and Plaintiff "began to point and yell." [Docs. 44-2 at 3; 48-1 at 2.] The officers asked Woodruff and the family to go back inside so that the officers could speak with each party separately. [Docs. 44-2 at 3; 48-1 at 2.]
As the officers attempted to talk with Plaintiff, Officer Shaw "observed an abnormally large bulge that was shiny and silver in [Plaintiff's] back right pocket." [Doc. 48-1 at 2; see Doc. 44-2 at 3.] Officer Shaw believed the object might be a weapon. [Doc. 48-1 at 2.] The officers then asked Plaintiff for his identification. [Docs. 44-2 at 3; 48-1 at 2.] He refused, claiming that he knew his rights and did not have to provide identification. [Docs. 44-2 at 3; 48-1 at 2.]
The officers at that point were attempting to proceed with their investigation and believed they had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for trespass after notice, but were concerned that Plaintiff might be armed. [Docs. 44-2 at 5; 48-1 at 3.] Officer Shaw informed Plaintiff that he was not under arrest but that the officers were going to pat him down for weapons. [Docs. 44-2 at 3; 48-1 at 2.] Plaintiff refused and claimed he knew his rights, that the pat down was illegal, and that no one was going to search him. [Docs. 44-2 at 3; 48-1 at 2.] The officers then attempted to gain physical control over Plaintiff, with each officer grabbing one of Plaintiff's arms. [Docs. 44-2 at 3; 48-1 at 2-3.] Officer Parris told Plaintiff to relax and that everything would be fine, but that they were going to pat him down and it would take only a few seconds. [Docs. 44-2 at 3; 48-1 at 3.] Plaintiff struggled against the officers, refusing to be patted down. [Docs. 44-2 at 3; 48-1 at 3.] They continually told him to stop resisting, but he failed to comply. [Docs. 44-2 at 3; 48-1 at 3-4.] They also asked him to lay on the ground, but he refused. [Docs. 44-2 at 4; 48-1 at 3.]
The officers then decided to take Plaintiff to the ground to gain control of him. [Docs. 44-2 at 4; 48-1 at 3-4.] They attempted to trip him several times but failed. [Docs. 44-2 at 4; 48-1 at 4.] He continued to refuse to cooperate and claimed that what they were doing was illegal. [Docs. 44-2 at 3-4; 48-1 at 3.] Additionally, during much of the encounter, Plaintiff was yelling to someone who was recording the incident. [Docs. 44-2 at 3-4; 48-1 at 3.]
Officer Shaw attempted unsuccessfully to bring Plaintiff down by putting his right arm over Plaintiff's head near his left shoulder and grabbing his left hand to lock it in and take him to the ground. [Docs. 44-2 at 4; 48-1 at 4; 48-2 at 3.] The officers then attempted again to trip him, but that attempt also failed. [Doc. 44-2, Ex. F at 0:26-0:38.]
With open-hand measures not having worked, Officer Shaw increased the level of force applied, striking Plaintiff with his right fist and right knee several times in the chest and jaw. [Docs. 48-1 at 4; 48-2 at 3.] With the last blow, and with Officer Parris pulling Plaintiff's leg off the ground, the officers were able to bring Plaintiff down. [Docs. 44-2, Ex. F at 0:56-0:58; 48-1 at 4.] Holding onto his hands, the officers rolled Plaintiff onto his back. [Doc. 44-2, Ex. F at 0:58-1:00.] They then turned him over again, handcuffed him, and were able to finally pat him down, including his right back pocket. [Id. at 1:16-2:20.]
A subsequent search of Plaintiff's person revealed "a black wallet and a set of large keys" in his right back pocket. [Doc. 48-2 at 3.]
After their interaction with Plaintiff was over, the officers spoke with Woodruff and Foster. Foster informed them that she was the resident of the house and had told Plaintiff to leave several times and he had refused. [Doc. 48-1 at 4.] Officer Shaw charged Plaintiff with trespass after notice and with two counts of assault. [Doc. 29-5.]
APPLICABLE LAW
Liberal Construction of Pro Se Complaint
Plaintiff brought this action pro se, which requires the Court to liberally construe his pleadings. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). Even under this less stringent standard, however, the pro se complaint is still subject to summary dismissal. The mandated liberal construction means only that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so. Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999). A court may not construct the plaintiff's legal arguments for him. See Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1993). Nor should a court "conjure up questions never squarely presented." Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
Requirements for a Cause of Action Under § 1983
Plaintiff's excessive force claim is filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a private cause of action for constitutional violations by persons acting under color of state law. Section 1983 "'is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides 'a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'" Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). Accordingly, a civil action under § 1983 allows "a party who has been deprived of a federal right under the color of state law to seek relief." City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 707 (1999).
Section 1983 provides, in relevant part,
"Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or any person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . ."42 U.S.C. § 1983. To establish a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove two elements: (1) that the defendant "deprived [the plaintiff] of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States" and (2) that the defendant "deprived [the plaintiff] of this constitutional right under color of [State] statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage." Mentavlos v. Anderson, 249 F.3d 301, 310 (4th Cir. 2001) (third alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
The under-color-of-state-law element, which is equivalent to the "state action" requirement under the Fourteenth Amendment,
reflects judicial recognition of the fact that most rights secured by the Constitution are protected only against infringement by governments. This fundamental limitation on the scope of constitutional guarantees preserves an area of individual freedom by limiting the reach of federal law and avoids imposing on the State, its agencies or officials, responsibility for conduct for which they cannot fairly be blamed."Id. (quoting Dowe v. Total Action Against Poverty in Roanoke Valley, 145 F.3d 653, 658 (4th Cir. 1998)) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Nevertheless, "the deed of an ostensibly private organization or individual" may at times be treated "as if a State has caused it to be performed." Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001). Specifically, "state action may be found if, though only if, there is such a 'close nexus between the State and the challenged action' that seemingly private behavior 'may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.'" Id. (quoting Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974)). State action requires both an alleged constitutional deprivation "caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the State . . . or by a person for whom the State is responsible" and that "the party charged with the deprivation [is] a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor." Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982). A determination of whether a private party's allegedly unconstitutional conduct is fairly attributable to the State requires the court to "begin[ ] by identifying 'the specific conduct of which the plaintiff complains.'" Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 51 (1999) (quoting Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982)).
Summary Judgment Standard
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states, as to a party who has moved for summary judgment:
The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is "material" if proof of its existence or non-existence would affect disposition of the case under applicable law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). An issue of material fact is "genuine" if the evidence offered is such that a reasonable jury might return a verdict for the non-movant. Id. at 257. When determining whether a genuine issue has been raised, the court must construe all inferences and ambiguities against the movant and in favor of the non-moving party. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962).
The party seeking summary judgment shoulders the initial burden of demonstrating to the court that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the movant has made this threshold demonstration, the non-moving party, to survive the motion for summary judgment, may not rest on the allegations averred in his pleadings. Id. at 324. Rather, the non-moving party must demonstrate specific, material facts exist that give rise to a genuine issue. Id. Under this standard, the existence of a mere scintilla of evidence in support of the non-movant's position is insufficient to withstand the summary judgment motion. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. Likewise, conclusory allegations or denials, without more, are insufficient to preclude granting the summary judgment motion. Ross v. Commc'ns Satellite Corp., 759 F.2d 355, 365 (4th Cir. 1985), overruled on other grounds, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). "Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Further, Rule 56 provides in pertinent part:
A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by:
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). Accordingly, when Rule 56(c) has shifted the burden of proof to the non-movant, he must produce existence of a factual dispute on every element essential to his action that he bears the burden of adducing at a trial on the merits.(A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials; or
(B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.
DISCUSSION
Excessive Force Claim as Against All Defendants
Merits
All Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's excessive force claim. [Docs. 44-1 at 5-17; 48-5 at 4-14.] The Court agrees.
"[A]ll claims that law enforcement officials have used excessive force—deadly or not—in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other 'seizure' of a free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its 'reasonableness' standard . . . . " Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989). The Fourth Amendment test is "an objective one: the question is whether the officers' actions are 'objectively reasonable' in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation." Id. at 397. The test of reasonableness is "not capable of precise definition or mechanical application." Id. at 396. In determining the reasonableness of the use of force, the court must balance "the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests" against the importance of the governmental interest alleged to justify the intrusion. Id. (citations omitted). Courts have "long recognized that the right to make an arrest . . . necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it." Id. (citations omitted). This right is obviously greater when the suspect is resisting arrest and refusing to comply with the officer's orders. Id.
The Graham Court set forth several factors to consider when determining whether officers' actions are reasonable, including "the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight." Id. (citations omitted). The Supreme Court explained this reasonableness inquiry by noting that there must be an "allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation." Id. at 396-97.
In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the Supreme Court specifically held that an officer does not violate a suspect's Fourth Amendment rights when he "conduct[s] a brief, investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot." Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000). During such an investigatory stop, an officer is authorized to frisk the suspect if the officer has a reasonable suspicion that the suspect is armed. See United States v. Robinson, 846 F.3d 694, 700 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc). And the right to make a Terry stop "necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree of physical coercion . . . to effect it." Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.
Here, Plaintiff has failed to create a genuine factual dispute regarding whether the officers used excessive force. The summary judgment record makes clear that the officers were justified to conduct a Terry stop of Plaintiff in furtherance of their investigation into the alleged domestic disturbance and trespass. And Officer Shaw's observance of the "large bulge that was shiny and silver in [Plaintiff's] back right pocket" certainly provided reasonable suspicion that Plaintiff was armed, justifying the pat down. When the belligerent suspect refused their attempts to pat him down, the officers took care to apply only the minimum amount of force necessary to effect the pat down, gradually increasing the force as lesser levels proved insufficient.
Plaintiff argues that the officers were "informed [by the dispatcher] that the call contains no weapons or alcohol." [Doc. 51 at 4.] But the fact that the dispatcher had not told them of any report of weapons to that point certainly does not negate the possibility that Plaintiff was carrying a weapon.
Plaintiff does not argue that the officers used more force than was necessary to physically force him to submit to the pat down. He argues only that had they explained why they wanted to pat him down, he might have stopped resisting and allowed them to frisk him. [Doc. 51 at 5.] But, given the obvious safety concerns that the belligerent, resisting—and possibly armed—suspect presented, the officers were justified in taking the immediate and relatively nonintrusive step of patting him down to protect themselves and others in the area. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1052 n.16 (1983) ("[W]e have not required that officers adopt alternate means to ensure their safety in order to avoid the intrusion involved in a Terry encounter."). It was reasonable for the officers to consider that engaging in further discussion or debate with Plaintiff would have given him an opportunity to utilize the weapon that the officers were concerned he had.
Plaintiff similarly maintains that, even during the struggle, the officers had the opportunity to simply stop applying force and conduct the pat down. [Doc. 51 at 3.] However, Plaintiff's view notwithstanding, the video recording of the interaction shows that the officers were struggling mightily to bring the belligerent suspect under their control. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007) ("When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment."). Any reasonable factfinder would recognize the danger they would subject themselves to by pausing in their efforts to gain control of him. Elliott v. Leavitt, 99 F.3d 640, 641 (4th Cir. 1996) ("The Constitution simply does not require police to gamble with their lives in the face of a serious threat of harm.").
Plaintiff finally argues that there is a genuine factual dispute as to whether the officers had already sufficiently patted him down during the struggle before they ever started striking him. [Doc. 51 at 2-3.] He claims Officer Parris was able to "rub[] across each pocket" during the struggle and that Officer Parris even had a view of his back pocket. [Id.] However, again, Plaintiff's opinion regarding what would constitute a sufficient pat down is not sufficient to create a genuine factual dispute. The video recording makes clear that the officers at all times were struggling with Plaintiff in an attempt to gain control of him, and it was only after they were able to bring him to the ground that they were able to fully pat down his pockets to ensure he was not armed. For all these reasons, Plaintiff has failed to create a genuine factual dispute as to whether the force applied to him was excessive.
Additionally, the City is entitled to summary judgment for another reason. A municipality or other local government entity may only be held liable under § 1983 "where the constitutionally offensive acts of [ ] employees are taken in furtherance of some municipal 'policy or custom.'" See Milligan v. City of Newport News, 743 F.2d 227, 229 (4th Cir. 1984) (citing Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)); see also Wolf v. Fauquier Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 555 F.3d 311, 321 (4th Cir. 2009) ("A county may be found liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 only 'when execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury.'") (citations omitted). Further, the doctrine of respondeat superior is generally inapplicable to § 1983 suits, such that an employer or supervisor is not liable for the acts of employees, absent official policy or custom resulting in an illegal action. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694-95. Plaintiff fails to point to any evidence of a governmental policy or custom of the City that caused his constitutional rights to be violated. Thus, the Court concludes that the City is entitled to summary judgment on this basis as well.
Qualified Immunity
In addition to their merits arguments, Officers Parris and Shaw argue they are entitled to summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. [Docs. 44-1 at 14-17; 48-5 at 9-14] The Court agrees.
Qualified immunity protects government officials performing discretionary functions from civil damage suits as long as the conduct in question does not "violate clearly established rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Thus, qualified immunity does not protect an official who violates a constitutional or statutory right of a plaintiff that was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation such that an objectively reasonable official in the official's position would have known of the right. Id. Further, qualified immunity is "an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability." Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985).
"In determining whether an officer is entitled to summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity, courts engage in a two-pronged inquiry." Smith v. Ray, 781 F.3d 95, 100 (4th Cir. 2015). The first concerns whether the facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, demonstrate that the officer's conduct violated a federal right. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). The second "asks whether the right was clearly established at the time the violation occurred such that a reasonable person would have known that his conduct was unconstitutional." Smith, 781 F.3d at 100. For purposes of this analysis, a right is "clearly established" if "[t]he contours of the right [are] sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right." Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987).
District court judges are "permitted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand." Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). If a court decides in the negative the first prong it considers—i.e., the court decides the plaintiff has not alleged the deprivation of an actual constitutional right or the right was not clearly established at the time of the alleged violation—the court need not consider the other prong of the qualified immunity analysis. See id. at 243-45; Torchinsky v. Siwinski, 942 F.2d 257, 260 (4th Cir. 1991) (holding the court "need not formally resolve" the constitutional question of "whether the [plaintiffs] were arrested without probable cause" to address the plaintiffs' § 1983 claim; the court stated that it "need only determine whether [the defendant]—a deputy sheriff performing within the normal course of his employment—acted with the objective reasonableness necessary to entitle him to qualified immunity").
As discussed above, Plaintiff has failed to create a genuine factual dispute regarding whether Defendants violated his constitutional rights. Therefore, Officers Parris and Shaw are entitled to qualified immunity on this basis.
State Law Claims
Assault and Battery
Under South Carolina law, "an assault occurs when a person has been placed in reasonable fear of bodily harm by the conduct of the defendant, and a battery is the actual infliction of any unlawful, unauthorized violence on the person of another, irrespective of degree." Jones v. Winn-Dixie Greenville, Inc., 456 S.E.2d 429, 432 (S.C. Ct. App. 1995). "A police officer who uses reasonable force in effectuating a lawful arrest is not liable for assault or battery." Roberts v. City of Forest Acres, 902 F. Supp. 662, 671-72 (D.S.C. 1995) (footnote omitted). Here, for the reasons discussed above, the amount of force employed was reasonable as a matter of law. Accordingly, the motions for summary judgment should be granted with respect to Plaintiff's claims for assault and battery.
Malicious Prosecution
"[T]o maintain an action for malicious prosecution [under South Carolina law], a plaintiff must establish: (1) the institution or continuation of original judicial proceedings; (2) by or at the instance of the defendant; (3) termination of such proceedings in plaintiff's favor; (4) malice in instituting such proceedings; (5) lack of probable cause; and (6) resulting injury or damage." Law v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., 629 S.E.2d 642, 648 (S.C. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted) (first alteration in original).
The Supreme Court of South Carolina has held that "where an accused establishes that charges were nolle prossed for reasons which imply or are inconsistent with innocence, an action for malicious prosecution may be maintained." McKenney v. Jack Eckerd Co., 402 S.E.2d 887, 888 (S.C. 1991). However, plaintiffs bear the "affirmative burden of proving that the nolle prosequi was entered under circumstances which imply or are consistent with innocence of the accused." Nicholas v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 33 F. App'x 61, 65 (4th Cir. 2002).
Here, Plaintiff contends that at least two of the charges against him were nolle prossed. However, because he has forecasted no evidence of the reasons for that decision, he has failed to create a genuine factual dispute as to the whether the judicial proceedings were terminated in his favor under circumstances which imply or are consistent with innocence of the accused. See Vaughn v. Whitfield, No. 8:12-cv-2405-RMG, 2013 WL 5144751, at *21 (D.S.C. Sept. 12, 2013). Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the malicious prosecution claim as well.
Additionally, with regard to Officer Parris, Plaintiff has offered no evidence that he instituted judicial proceedings; it was Officer Shaw who issued the tickets for the charges in question. And the City is immune from liability for malicious prosecution under the South Carolina Tort Claims Act. S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-60(23) ("The government entity is not liable for a loss resulting from . . . institution or prosecution of any judicial or administrative proceeding."); McCoy v. City of Columbia, 929 F. Supp.2d 541, 567 n.10 (D.S.C. 2013) (ruling that liability for malicious prosecution falls within the ambit of § 15-78-60(23)). Because the Court recommends that summary judgment be granted for these reasons, the Court declines to address Defendants' additional arguments. --------
RECOMMENDATION
Wherefore, based upon the foregoing, the Court recommends that Defendants' motions for summary judgment [Docs. 44; 48] be GRANTED.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
s/ Jacquelyn D. Austin
United States Magistrate Judge September 12, 2018
Greenville, South Carolina