Opinion
Nos. 06-14191, 06-14190.
June 2, 2008.
John K. Van De Weert, Jr., Sidney Austin Brown Wood LLP, Washington, DC, Aaron D. Lyons, McClelland, Jones, Lyons Lacey, LC, Melbourne, FL, William J. Nissen, Sidley Austin LLP, Chicago, II, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Peter M. Cardillo, Cardillo Law Firm, Tampa, FL, for Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida. D.C. Docket No. 04-00574-CV-T-24-MAP.
On Petition for Writ of Mandamus to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida. D.C. Docket No. 04-00574-CV-T-24-MAP.
On remand, with our instructions to grant Terminix's motion to compel arbitration before it, see Terminix Int'l Co. v. Palmer Ranch Ltd. P'ship, 432 F.3d 1327, 1333 (11th Cir. 2005) ( Terminix I), the district court granted Palmer Ranch's motion to dismiss Terminix's motion to compel arbitration for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Terminix appeals, and we reverse.
Terminix also filed a petition for a writ of mandamus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1651. We consolidated Terminix's petition, No. 06 14190, and appeal, No. 06-14191. The petition is denied as moot.
A trial court, upon receiving the mandate of an appellate court, may not alter, amend, or examine the mandate, or give any further relief or review, but must enter an order in strict compliance with the mandate[,] . . . implementing] both the letter and the spirit of the mandate, taking into account the appellate court's opinion and the circumstances it embraces. Although the trial court is free to address, as a matter of first impression, those issues not disposed of on appeal, it is bound to follow the appellate court's holdings, both expressed and implied.
Piambino v. Bailey, 757 F.2d 1112, 1119 (11th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
We are "obligated to inquire into subject-matter jurisdiction sua sponte whenever it may be lacking." Chacon-Botero v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 427 F.3d 954, 956 (11th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In Terminix I, we noted without objection that Terminix had alleged federal subject matter jurisdiction over its motion to compel arbitration "based on diversity of citizenship." Terminix I, 432 F.3d at 1329. We then held that "the decision of the district court denying Terminix's motion to compel arbitration and stay the underlying state-court proceedings is reversed, and the case is remanded with instructions to grant that motion and stay these proceedings." Id. at 1333.
A necessary implication of our opinion in Terminix I, and therefore part of our mandate, was that we fulfilled our obligation to consider federal subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte. See Skillern's Ex'rs v. May's Ex'rs, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 267, 3 L.Ed. 220 (1810) ("It appearing that the merits of this cause had been finally decided in this court, and that its mandate required only the execution of its decree, it is the opinion of this court that the circuit court is bound to carry that decree into execution, although the jurisdiction of that court be not alleged in the pleadings.") (internal quotation marks omitted). The district court was therefore bound to deny a challenge to subject matter jurisdiction over an issue we had expressly addressed, and comply with our mandate to grant Terminix's motion to compel arbitration.
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the district court dismissing Terminix's motion to compel arbitration is REVERSED, and the case is REMANDED with instructions to grant that motion and stay these proceedings.