Opinion
No. 76-684
Decided June 16, 1977.
After plaintiff's attorney had obtained a third trial continuance on basis that client was out of town because of family illness, he discovered client had in fact been in the city. Attorney informed trial court, which awarded opposing party costs and attorney's fees, and subsequently dismissed the action with prejudice. Plaintiff appealed dismissal.
Reversed
1. DISMISSAL AND NONSUIT — Failure to Prosecute — Generally — Trial Court's Discretion — Abuse — Dismissal Cannot Stand. While, in general, dismissals for failure to prosecute are a matter within the trial court's discretion, nevertheless, this discretion is not without limit, and where there is an abuse of same, the dismissal cannot stand.
2. Dismissal With Prejudice — Drastic Sanction — Especially True — No Indication — Prejudice to Defendant — Failure to Prosecute — Lesser Sanctions — Used First. Dismissal with prejudice is a drastic sanction to be applied only in extreme situations, and this is especially true where there is no indication of prejudice to the defendant by the delay associated with the failure to prosecute, and in such case court should first resort to lesser sanctions.
3. Third Continuance Granted — Counsel's Statement — Plaintiff Out of Town — Inaccurate — Result of "Misunderstanding" — Court Promptly Informed — — Dismissal With Prejudice — Abuse of Discretion. Where, on trial date following two continuances, plaintiff's attorney sought and was granted a further continuance based on the assertion that his client was out of town but that statement was later found to be inaccurate, and the trial court found that the inaccuracy resulted from a "misunderstanding," and counsel promptly informed the court of that error as soon as he became aware of it, the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing the action for failure to prosecute.
Appeal from the District Court of the City and County of Denver, Honorable Henry E. Santo, Judge.
Victor F. Crepeau, H. William Huseby, for plaintiff-appellant.
Ronald A. White, James S. MacDonald, for defendants-appellees.
Plaintiff, Elaine Tell, assignee of a promissory note, sued defendants, Joe and Della M. McElroy. After two continuances initiated by Tell and agreed to by the McElroys, trial was set for April 21, 1976. On that date, Tell's attorney requested and was granted a continuance based on the assertion that Tell was out of town as a result of her mother being ill. Later, the attorney discovered that, in fact, Tell was in Denver on the trial date, and he reported this to the trial court. Thereafter, the McElroys' attorney moved for sanctions and was awarded costs and attorney fees of $313. Subsequently the McElroys moved to dismiss with prejudice Tell's claim for failure to prosecute pursuant to C.R.C.P. 41(b)(1). This motion was granted, Tell appeals, and we reverse.
[1,2] While, generally speaking, dismissals pursuant to C.R.C.P. 41(b)(1) are a matter within the trial court's discretion, Rudd v. Rogerson, 152 Colo. 370, 381 P.2d 995, 15 A.L.R.3d 668 (1963), nevertheless, this discretion is not without limit, and where there is an abuse of same, the dismissal cannot stand. See Rudd v. Rogerson, supra. "Dismissal with prejudice is a drastic sanction to be applied only in extreme situations." Syracuse Broadcasting Corp. v. Newhouse, 271 F.2d 910 (2d Cir. 1959). Especially is this true where there is no indication of prejudice to the defendant by the delay. See Richman v. General Motors Corp., 437 F.2d 196 (1st Cir. 1971). The court should first resort to lesser sanctions, as were imposed here. See, e.g., Canada v. Mathews, 449 F.2d 253 (5th Cir. 1971).
As stated in Mizar v. Jones, 157 Colo. 535, 403 P.2d 767 (1965): "It is worthy of note that courts do exist primarily to afford a forum to settle litigable matters between disputing parties, [and] one's day in court should not be denied except upon a serious showing of wilful default."
Here, after a hearing, the trial court found that inaccuracy of counsel's statements to the court resulted from a "misunderstanding." And, counsel promptly informed the court of that error as soon as he became aware of it.
[3] Under these circumstances the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing the action. The dismissal, coming after the granting of sanctions under C.R.C.P. 41(b)(1) was tantamount to twice penalizing Tell for the same act. Cf. Bardin v. Mondon, 298 F.2d 235 (2d Cir. 1961).
Judgment reversed and cause remanded with directions to reinstate the complaint.
JUDGE PIERCE and JUDGE BERMAN concur.