Opinion
Civil No. 05-1205 (JAF).
July 19, 2006
OPINION AND ORDER
Before the court is Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration under Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, filed on June 12, 2006. Docket Document No. 32; FED. R. CIV. P. 60 (1992 Supp. 2005). In it, Plaintiff urges us to revisit our March 15, 2006, Opinion and Order granting Defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismissing her complaint. Docket Document Nos. 30, 32. Defendants opposed Plaintiff's motion on June 26, 2006. Docket Document No. 33.
We begin by examining Plaintiff's choice to file her motion for reconsideration under Rule 60(b), and not the much more commonly-invoked Rule 59(e), of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Docket Document No. 32. Given that Plaintiff's motion was filed on June 12, 2006, almost three months after we issued the March 15, 2006, Opinion and Order it seeks to alter, it would have been subject to summary dismissal had it been made under Rule 59(e), which requires that "[a]ny motion to alter or amend a judgment [be] filed no later than 10 days after entry of the judgment." FED. R. CIV. P. 59 (1992 Supp. 2005).
Rule 60(b) motions, on the other hand, are not subject to this stringent ten-day time limit and need only be made "within a reasonable time;" it is no wonder, then, that Plaintiff's counsel, filing so late, would invoke Rule 60(b) and not Rule 59(e). FED. R. CIV. P. 60. Rule 60(b) does not exist, however, to provide an easy Plan B approach for lawyers who did not pay attention to Rule 59(e) reconsideration motion deadlines.
Rule 60(b) provides relief from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for, inter alia, "mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect" and can only be invoked in "special situations justifying extraordinary relief." Id; Silk v. Sandoval, 435 F.2d 1266 (1st Cir. 1971). Plaintiff's disagreement with the court's legal conclusions regarding this case was apparent to her on the very day we issued our March 15, 2006, Opinion and Order and, therefore, does not constitute a "special situation" status justifying the "extraordinary relief" afforded by Rule 60(b).Hoult v. Hoult, 57 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1995) ("The gravamen of defendant's argument is that the district court wrongly decided a point of law. This is not grounds for relief under Rule 60(b).");Elias v. Ford Motor Co., 734 F.2d 463, 467 (1st Cir. 1984) (observing the First Circuit's longstanding position that "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect" does not include alleged errors of law);Silk, 435 F.2d at 1267-68 (ruling that a construction of "mistake" under Rule 60(b) that is coextensive with that under Rule 59(e) undermines the interest in speedy disposition and finality that Rule 59(e) reflects).
Because Plaintiff's motion must, therefore, be construed as coming under Rule 59(e), and not Rule 60(b), it is plainly untimely and is summarily dismissed. See Elias, 734 F.2d at 466 (1st Cir. 1984) ("[The] strict ten-day limitation [of Rule 59(e)] cannot be extended."); Alvarado Aviles v. Burgos, 601 F. Supp. 29, 32 (D.P.R. 1984). Even if Plaintiff's Rule 59(e) motion had been timely filed, however, we would still conclude that our March 15, 2006, Opinion and Order is correct and that Plaintiff is not entitled to the relief she requests.
A complete factual summary for this pregnancy discrimination case can be found in our March 15, 2006, Opinion and Order.Docket Document No. 30. In that Opinion and Order, which was written after discovery in this case had concluded, we analyzed Defendants' motion for summary judgment using the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. Id. (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)). In order to defeat Defendants' summary judgment motion under McDonnell Douglas, Plaintiff had to first establish a prima-facie case of unlawful pregnancy discrimination, which she did; then, a burden of production shifted to Defendants to articulate some legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action, which they did; and finally, a burden of persuasion shifted back to Plaintiff to produce evidence showing that discriminatory animus, and not Defendants' espoused non-discriminatory excuse, motivated the adverse employment action against her, which she did not. Id. Because she did not, we granted summary judgment in Defendants' favor as the law required us to do. Id.
Plaintiff now argues that our disposition of the case was incorrect because Defendants never submitted: (1) sufficient economic data to substantiate their claim that they fired Plaintiff for economic reasons; or (2) evidence to show what other cost-cutting measures they took, besides her termination, in order to alleviate their economic strife. Docket Document No. 32. Without such evidence, Plaintiff argues that this court cannot possibly say, as a matter of law, that Defendants' reason for her dismissal was not attributable to pregnancy discrimination. Id.
Plaintiff misunderstands what her legal burden was in all of this. As we briefly sketched out two paragraphs ago, and explained in what we thought was extremely clear detail in our March 15, 2006, Opinion and Order, all Defendants were obligated to do under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework on summary judgment was articulate some legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for why Plaintiff was terminated.Docket Document No. 30. Defendants satisfied this burden of production by explaining that economic woes and an attempt to downsize were the legitimate, non-discriminatory reason behind Plaintiff's termination. Id. After that, the ball was in Plaintiff's court to save her lawsuit from dismissal by pointing to evidence showing that Defendants' economic excuse was pretextual and that they instead discriminated against her because of her pregnancy. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804. Plaintiff did not do this: In an attempt to meet her burden of persuasion, Plaintiff presented the court with three pieces of evidence, each of which we found utterly unconvincing. Docket Document No. 30. We need not re-review our thoughts on Plaintiff's evidence here for they are quite fully and clearly discussed in our March 15, 2006, Opinion and Order. Id.
For the reasons stated herein, we DENY Plaintiff's motion to reconsider. Docket Document No. 32.
IT IS SO ORDERED.