Summary
In Teamsters, the Youngstown city council had passed an ordinance granting wage increases to water-department employees.
Summary of this case from State, ex Rel. Vukovich, v. Civil Service CommOpinion
No. 79-1683
Decided December 23, 1980.
Municipal corporations — City council — Authority to set wage rates for city employees — Not superseded by city charter.
A municipality which incorporates the provisions of the Revised Code relating to municipal civil service in its charter does not, in view of R.C. 124.14(B), divest city council of its authority to determine wages of city employees, nor does it empower the municipal civil service commission to order standarization of wages of the employees of the municipality.
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Mahoning County.
The appellees instituted this action in the Court of Common Pleas of Mahoning County on behalf of certain employees in the Youngstown Department of Public Works, Street Department. The appellees sought an injunction requiring the city of Youngstown, its mayor and its council, appellants herein, to grant those employees wage increases.
The dispute between the parties arose in 1975, when the Youngstown city council passed an ordinance that granted wage increases to certain employees of the Youngstown Water Department. Thereafter, the appellees sought similar wage increases for the Street Department employees, arguing that the duties performed by the employees of the two departments were similar. However, council did not pass an ordinance which would have granted the requested wage increases.
In 1977, appellees filed an action in the Court of Common Pleas of Mahoning County requesting a permanent injunction for wage increases comparable to those given to the Water Department employees in 1975. The court denied the requested relief; however, it "referred" the matter to the Youngstown Civil Service Commission for hearings to determine whether the employees of the Water and Street Departments performed similar jobs.
Over objections by the appellants on jurisdictional grounds, the civil service commission held a hearing. The commission found similarity between the positions; however, the commission did not order the establishment of similar wage rates.
Subsequently, on July 7, 1978, appellees initiated this action once again seeking injunctive relief. Thereafter, a judgment was entered in favor of appellees. Appellants were ordered to adjust the wages of the Street Department employees to the wages of the Water Department employees. Additionally, appellees were awarded damages for the disparity in the wages since July 1, 1975.
In affirming, the Court of Appeals acknowledged that Youngstown is a charter city and, as such, city council has the authority to establish wages for municipal employees. However, the court pointed out that Section 52 of the Youngstown Charter adopts, as part of the charter, all provisions of the Revised Code which relate to municipal civil service, and that R.C. 124.40, which relates to municipal civil service, gives to a municipal civil service commission the same duties and power as the Director of Administrative Services. The court further determined that, since the Director of Administrative Services has a duty to standardize wages of state employees who perform similar duties (R.C. 124.14[A]), the Youngstown Civil Service Commission also has the same duty. The Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court's injunction did not violate council's authority to set wages.
The cause is before this court pursuant to the allowance of a motion to certify the record.
Green, Schiavoni, Murphy, Haines Sgambati Co., L.P.A., Mr. Dennis Haines, Mr. Barry Laine and Mr. Eugene Green, for appellees.
Mr. Edward N. Sobnosky, director of law, and Mr. Edwin Romero, for appellants.
The home rule provision of the Ohio Constitution, Section 7 of Article XVIII, gives municipalities the right to adopt charters. It reads:
"Any municipality may frame and adopt or amend a charter for its government and may, subject to the provisions of Section 3 of this article, exercise thereunder all powers of local self-government."
Section 3 of Article XVIII does not limit "the powers of local self-government." Rather, it limits the authority of municipalities to enact "local police, sanitary and other similar regulations" to those that "are not in conflict with general laws." State, ex rel. Canada, v. Phillips (1958), 168 Ohio St. 191.
Youngstown exercised its right and adopted a charter. Section 10 of that charter provides:
"Subject to the provisions of this Charter, Council shall fix by ordinance, the salary or compensation of all officers and employees of the City government***."
The right of a municipality to determine the compensation of its employees is, without question, a power of local self-government. State, ex rel. Mullin, v. Mansfield (1971), 26 Ohio St.2d 129. However, it is argued that this right has been limited by the adoption of Section 52 of the Youngstown Charter. Section 52 reads:
"All of the provisions of the Revised Code of the State of Ohio relating to Municipal Civil Service are hereby adopted and made part of this Chapter***."
In Reed v. Youngstown (1962), 173 Ohio St. 265, 266, this court stated:
"***By adopting and making the portion of the [Revised] Code relating to municipal civil service a part of the Youngstown charter, the people of Youngstown clearly expressed their intention to incorporate into and as a part of their charter all general statutes relating to municipal civil service."
Appellees argue that R.C. 124.40(A) relates to municipal civil service; therefore, by operation of Section 52 it is incorporated into Youngstown's charter. R.C. 124.40(A), in pertinent part, reads:
"***Such municipal civil service commission shall prescribe, amend, and enforce rules not inconsistent with this chapter for the classification of positions in the civil service of such city and city school district, and all the positions in the city health district; for examinations and resignations therefor; for appointments, promotions, removals, transfers, layoffs, suspensions, reductions, and reinstatements therein; and for standardizing positions and maintaining efficiency therein. The municipal civil service commission shall exercise all other powers and perform all other duties with respect to the civil service of such city, city school district, and city health district, as prescribed in this chapter and conferred upon the director of administrative services and the state personnel board of review with respect to the civil service of the state; and all authority granted to the director and the board with respect to the service under their jurisdiction shall, except as otherwise provided by this chapter, be held to grant the same authority to the municipal civil service commission with respect to the service under its jurisdiction."
As this language reveals, a municipal civil service commission shall perform the same duties as the Director of Administrative Services. R.C. 124.14(A) states that the Director of Administrative Services "shall group jobs within a classification so that the positions are similar enough in duties and responsibilities***to have the same pay assigned with equity***." Appellees argue that, by virtue of R.C. 124.40(A), the Youngstown Civil Service Commission has a like duty to standardize wages, and this duty is incorporated into the Youngstown Charter by Section 52. Therefore, contend appellees, the finding by the commission of similarity between the positions in the Water and Street Departments mandates the assignment of equal pay.
The final thrust of appellees' argument is to the effect that since the power of city council to set compensation as set forth in Section 10 of the charter is, by its own grant, subject to other provisions of the charter, the civil service commission's power is predominant.
However, appellees' argument must be viewed and considered in light of R.C. 124.14(B). This section, in pertinent part, provides that:
"Division (A) of this section and section 124.15 of the Revised Code shall not apply to the following persons, positions, offices and employments:
"***
"(4) Any position for which the authority to determine compensation is given by law to another individual or entity."
Applying the latter section, we conclude that the jobs under consideration here are positions "for which the authority to determine compensation is given by law to another individual or entity." Not only does city council have the authority to determine the wages of city employees under Section 10 of the charter, but it also has that authority as a power of local self-government under Section 3 of Article XVIII of the Ohio Constitution regardless of whether a charter has been adopted. See State, ex rel. Mullin, v. Mansfield, supra; Benevolent Assn. v. Parma (1980), 61 Ohio St.2d 375; Craig v. Youngstown (1954), 162 Ohio St. 215.
Further support for the general proposition that the authority to set salaries for municipal employees is vested in city council is to be found in R.C. 731.08, which, in pertinent part, is as follows:
"Except as otherwise provided in Title VII of the Revised Code, the legislative authority of a city, by ordinance or resolution, shall determine the number of officers, clerks, and employees in each department of the city government, and shall fix, by ordinance or resolution, their respective salaries and compensation***."
Therefore, we hold that, by virtue of R.C. 124.14(B), the civil service commission herein did not have the authority to standardize the wages of city employees.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.
Judgment reversed.
CELEBREZZE, C.J., W. BROWN, P. BROWN, SWEENEY, LOCHER and DOWD, JJ., concur.