Summary
holding that plaintiff employee was not entitled to equitable tolling when, three years after termination of her employment, her independent investigation revealed facts indicating that similarly situated males and females were treated differently by her former employer
Summary of this case from Foster v. Overnite Transportation Co.Opinion
Case No. 4:01CV1620
October 9, 2001
MEMORANDUM OF OPINION AND ORDER
On July 7, 2001, Plaintiff Victoria Taylor filed a Complaint in the above-captioned case against Defendant Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction ("ODRC"). In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that ODRC violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000 et seq.) and Ohio Revised Code § 4112 by terminating her from her position as a corrections officer on the basis of her race and sex.
In order to file a Title VII action in federal court, a plaintiff must file a timely discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). Amini v. Oberlin College, 259 F.2d 493, 498 (6th Cir. 2001). In Ohio, a plaintiff must file his or her discrimination charge within 300 days of the alleged discriminatory act. Id. Although the failure to file a charge with the EEOC within the required time period ordinarily bars a plaintiff from filing of a related Title VII claim in federal court, the U.S. Supreme Court and the Sixth Circuit have recognized that equitable tolling may be appropriate in certain limited circumstances. Id. at 500.
Upon reviewing Plaintiff's Complaint, the Court discovered that Plaintiff did not file a charge with the EEOC until May 18, 2001 — more than three years after she was terminated. (ECF No. 1, ¶ 7). Recognizing that Plaintiff's Complaint would be time-barred in the absence of equitable tolling, the Court issued an Order (ECF No. 13) on August 24, 2001, requiring the parties to address whether equitable tolling should apply in this case. On September 6, 2001, Plaintiff submitted a brief (ECF No. 14) arguing in favor of equitable tolling. On September 17, 2001, Defendant submitted a brief in opposition (ECF No. 15). For the reasons that follow, the Court finds that equitable tolling does not apply and that Plaintiff's Complaint (ECF No. 1) must be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
In her brief in favor of equitable tolling (ECF No. 14), Plaintiff contends that equitable tolling should apply because she did not learn that she was treated less favorably than similarly situated males until she engaged in independent research while pursuing a union grievance related to her termination. Plaintiff does not claim that she did not know the time limits for filing a discrimination charge. In fact, Plaintiff states that she contacted the EEOC soon after she was terminated but that she chose not to file a charge at that time because she did not yet know that she had been discriminated against. Although Plaintiff's Complaint also includes allegations of racial discrimination, her brief makes no mention of when she discovered evidence of disparate treatment based upon race.
While courts have recognized the possibility of equitable tolling in Title VII cases, such tolling is "available only in compelling cases which justify a departure from established procedures." Puckett v. Tennessee Eastman Co., 889 F.2d 1481, 1488 (6th Cir. 1989). Indeed, the Sixth Circuit has repeatedly indicated that the factual circumstances of a case are seldom compelling enough to warrant equitable tolling. See, e.g., Dunlap v. United States, 250 F.3d 1001, 1008 (6th Cir. 2001); Graham-Humphreys v. Memphis Brooks Museum of Art, Inc., 209 F.3d 552, 560 (6th Cir. 2000).
In determining whether equitable toiling should apply, courts typically consider the following factors: (1) lack of actual notice of the filing requirement; (2) lack of constructive notice of the filing requirement; (3) diligence in pursuing one's rights; (4) absence of prejudice to the defendant; and (5) a plaintiff's reasonableness in remaining ignorant of the notice requirements. Andrews v. Orr, 851 F.2d 146, 151 (6th Cir. 1988). The Sixth Circuit has stated that while this list of factors is instructive, it is neither comprehensive nor relevant in all cases. Amini, 259 F.3d at 500. In the end, the determination of whether to toll a limitations period must be made on a case-by-case basis. Id. When equitable tolling has been permitted, it is usually because the defendant "engaged in misrepresentations or other wrongdoing" that caused the plaintiff to miss his filing deadline or somehow attempted to thwart the plaintiff's discovery of relevant evidence. Id. at 501.
It is clear that the five factors listed above do not weigh in favor of equitable tolling. Plaintiff has not alleged that she was unaware of the EEOC filing requirements. Instead, she claims that equitable tolling is warranted because she did not discover that she was treated differently than similarly situated males until more than three years after she was terminated. The Sixth Circuit has rejected the application of equitable tolling in such circumstances:
[W]e will not, absent other circumstances weighing in favor of equitable tolling, suspend the running of the statute of limitations in a discrimination action until the plaintiff learns sufficient facts that would lead him to suspect that the defendant acted with discriminatory intent. . . . [I]t might be years before a person apprehends that unpleasant events in the past were caused by illegal discrimination. In the meantime, under plaintiff's theory, the employer would remain vulnerable to suits based on these old acts.Amini, 259 F.3d at 502 (quoting Hill v. United States Department of Labor, 65 F.3d 1331, 1337 (6th Cir. 1995). Thus, in the absence of other compelling circumstances, equitable tolling cannot rest solely upon a plaintiff's late discovery of information. The facts of this case present no such circumstances. The only other argument that Plaintiff is able to offer in support of equitable tolling is that she actively pursued a grievance under her union's collective bargaining agreement. This fact does not, however, excuse Plaintiff's failure to file a timely claim. See, e.g., Kellum v. Erie County Sheriff's Department, 1999 WL 1491772, *3 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 30, 1999) ("[I]t is well settled that resort to a collective bargaining agreement's grievance procedure does not toll the statute of limitations for filing Title VII or ADA charges with the EEOC."). In the absence of evidence suggesting that ODRC somehow prevented Plaintiff from filing a timely claim — of which there is none — the Court is unwilling to equitably toll the limitations period in this case.
Even if equitable tolling were appropriate, Plaintiff's claims would be barred because they were previously litigated. Under the doctrine of res judicata, "a valid, final judgment rendered upon the merits bars all subsequent actions based upon any claim arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action." Grava v. Parkman Township, 73 Ohio St.3d 379, 382 (1995). The doctrine bars not only claims that were raised in the initial action, but also those that could have been brought in the initial action. Id. Decisions rendered by state courts have preclusive effect in federal courts and vice versa. See, e.g., Employees Own Federal Credit Union v. City of Defiance, Ohio, 752 F.2d 243 (6th Cir. 1985); Rogers v. City of Whitehall, 25 Ohio St.3d 70 (1986).
On August 15, 2000, Plaintiff filed a complaint in the Ohio Court of Claims in which she alleged that ODRC violated Ohio Revised Code § 4112 by terminating her on the basis of her race and sex. (ECE No. 15, Ex. A). On October 11, 2000, the Ohio Court of Claims dismissed Plaintiff's lawsuit for failure to meet the applicable statute of limitations. (ECE No. 15, Ex. B). This dismissal is a decision on the merits for purposes of res judicata. See, e.g., Treiber v. Katz, 796 F. Supp. 1054, 1061 (6th Circuit 1992); LaBarbera v. Batsch, 10 Ohio St.2d 106, 116 (1967). As a result, Plaintiff's state law claims cannot be reasserted in this Court. Although Plaintiff did not raise her Title VII claims in her initial lawsuit, the claims could have been litigated because they were based upon the same set of facts and were within the jurisdiction of the Ohio Court of Claims. See, e.g., Manning v. Ohio State Library Board, 62 Ohio St.3d 24 (1991). Consequently, Plaintiff's Title VII claims are also barred by the doctrine of res judicata. For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff's Complaint (ECF No. 1) is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
IT IS SO ORDERED.