Opinion
Civ. No. 03-5486 (RHK/SRN).
January 21, 2005
Daniel S. Goldberg and Douglas A. Hedin, Hedin Goldberg Glidden, PA, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for Plaintiff.
Thomas W. Tinkham and Kristina L. Carlson, Dorsey Whitney LLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Dr. Stuart Taylor worked as a research scientist at Mayo Clinic Rochester and Mayo Foundation for Medical Education and Research (collectively "Mayo") from 1971 until his termination in 2003. In this action, Dr. Taylor alleges that Mayo's decision to terminate his employment was based upon age discrimination in violation of the Minnesota Human Rights Act ("MHRA") and was a breach of his employment contract. Mayo has filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment contending that Dr. Taylor's age discrimination claim must be dismissed as untimely and that his termination was consistent with the conditions of his employment contract. For the reasons set forth below, Dr. Taylor's age discrimination claim will be dismissed, but his breach of contract claim will remain.
BACKGROUND
Dr. Taylor's Employment Contract with Mayo
In December 1970, Dr. John Blinks, the founding Chairman of the Department of Pharmacology at Mayo, offered Dr. Taylor a research and teaching position at Mayo. At the time, Dr. Taylor was an Instructor and Assistant Professor at the State University of New York, Downstate Medical Center, in Brooklyn, New York. (Taylor Aff. ¶ 5; Hedin Aff. Ex. A.) Dr. Blinks's offer was conveyed through a letter (the "1970 offer letter") stating that "the Research Committee has just approved [the] proposal that you be offered a position as consultant at Mayo (i.e., a position of tenure)." (First Am. Compl. Ex. A.) Dr. Blinks wrote that he doubted "very much whether it will be possible to come up with a promotion in academic rank, but I'll try (remember that this is a tenure position nevertheless)." (Id.) Being "30 something," Dr. Taylor felt that the position was "a great opportunity because it meant that [he] was able to focus really on [his] research and [his] family . . . [and was] allowed . . . to advance on the usual academic ladder." (Hedin Aff. Ex. B at 14-15.) According to Dr. Taylor, "[Dr. Blinks] made it a point of emphasis in recruiting me that I was being offered a tenured position." (Id. at 14.) Dr. Taylor accepted the offer and began working at Mayo in 1971.
At the time Dr. Taylor began working at Mayo, the "Mayo Clinic and Mayo Foundation Tenure Policy," dated June 12, 1969, was in effect (the "1969 Policy"). (First Am. Compl. Ex. F.) The 1969 Policy applied "to all physicians, scientists, and administrators who are members of the permanent staff of" Mayo. (Id.) In relevant part, the 1969 Policy provided:
Each appointment is made with the expectation that it will continue until the normal retirement date of the individual.
As in many other professional organizations, continuation of an appointment is subject to satisfactory performance.
Normal retirement is at the end of the calendar quarter in which occurs the individual's 65th birthday.
Mayo has since implemented superseding policies that apparently do not provide for a "normal retirement date." (See, e.g., Burnett Aff. Ex. A.)
(Id. (emphasis added).) Dr. Taylor "had not seen [the 1969 Policy] before" January 2004. (Hedin Aff. Ex. B at 23.)
Mayo filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint and attached the 1969 Policy to its supportive memorandum. It was at that time that Dr. Taylor first became aware of the "normal retirement" age of 65. Mayo argued that under the 1969 Policy Dr. Taylor was no longer entitled to "tenure" because he was 65 years old (and so was past his "normal retirement date"). (See Mem. in Supp. of Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 6) at 7 ("Under the [1969] Policy, [Dr. Taylor's] tenure ended at the end of the calendar quarter in which he turned 65.").) Mayo withdrew its Motion when Dr. Taylor amended his Complaint to add a claim of age discrimination.
One of Dr. Taylor's responsibilities as a research scientist involved applying for grants to obtain outside funding for his research. Some grant applications required that the "Department Head" comment on the institution's "plans" regarding the researcher submitting the application. Dr. Blinks wrote of Dr. Taylor on a November 29, 1971 grant application:
His present position as a consultant on the staff of the Mayo Foundation is a permanent appointment, and his salary is now being paid from the resources of the Mayo Foundation. It is anticipated that Dr. Taylor will continue indefinitely on the Mayo Staff, developing his already substantial skill in the laboratory and teaching in the area of his interest.
(First Am. Compl. Ex. B (emphasis added).) Similarly, on a 1973 grant application, Dr. Blinks wrote: "Dr. Taylor's appointment is without limit of time. He can expect to continue on the Mayo Staff indefinitely, subject to continued competence and diligent performance." (Id. at Ex. C (emphasis added).)
In Dr. Blinks's 1990 retirement speech, he discussed some of Mayo's employment policies and Dr. Taylor received a typed copy of the speech shortly after it was delivered. In part, Dr. Blinks stated:
An investigator who is prennially [sic] unsuccessful in the grant market will eventually be recycled into some other function. He won't lose his job (if he has a permanent staff position), but he will lose his laboratory, and with it, if he is like most career scientists, his self-respect.
(Taylor Aff. Ex. 3.)
After more than 30 years at Mayo, Dr. Taylor's employment was terminated on June 20, 2002, to be effective December 31, 2002. (First Am. Compl. Ex. E.)
In December 2002, Mayo extended Dr. Taylor's termination date to March 31, 2003. (Lynch Aff. Ex. F.)
Funding for Dr. Taylor's Laboratory Research
Prior to his 2002 termination, Dr. Taylor had been a career research scientist at Mayo as a member of the Biophysics, Physiology and Pharmacology departments. His position at Mayo included some teaching responsibilities, but consisted primarily of laboratory research which involved running a research lab. One aspect of maintaining an active research lab at Mayo is the researcher's ability to obtain "extra-mural" funding. "Extra-mural" funding consists of outside grant monies — funds which do not originate from Mayo. Researchers apply to outside entities (such as the National Institutes of Health ("NIH")) for grants. David Lynch, a Research Administrator at Mayo, was working with Dr. Taylor on the administrative aspects of obtaining extra-mural funding when Dr. Taylor was terminated. (Lynch Aff. ¶¶ 1-2.)
Although, at the time of his termination, Dr. Taylor had not received any significant extra-mural funding for his lab since 1996 (Burnett Aff. ¶ 4, Ex. B), he had been researching, collaborating, and working on grants that allowed him access to equipment at other schools (Hedin Aff. Ex. B at 60). From 1995 to 2002, Dr. Taylor had obtained four grants. (Id.) These grants were collaborative efforts and the actual funds from the grants went to laboratories at other schools (specifically Stanford, Cornell, and the University of Chicago (Argonne)). (Id. at 9, 60.) Owen McClure was the Research Administrator prior to Lynch and, according to Dr. Taylor, had overseen and approved of Dr. Taylor's collaborative research and extra-mural funding. (Hedin Aff. Ex. B at 68-70; Taylor Aff. Ex. 4.)
The record contains some conflicting information with respect to when Dr. Taylor's lab stopped receiving significant funding. For purposes of this Motion, the Court accepts Dr. Taylor's testimony that 1996 was the last time his lab at Mayo received significant grant monies. (Hedin Aff. Ex. B at 60.)
All citations to the Affidavit of Dr. John Burnett refer to the October 29, 2004 Affidavit (rather than the December 15, 2004 Affidavit).
In early 2001, Dr. Taylor submitted a grant application to the NIH together with Dr. Lincoln Ford of Indiana University (the "Indiana Grant"). Dr. Ford was the "Principal Investigator" and Dr. Taylor was the "Collaborating Investigator" on the Indiana Grant. (Carlson Aff. Ex. A.) As the Principal Investigator, Dr. Ford would be awarded the Indiana Grant and would then subcontract for Dr. Taylor's work at Mayo. The Indiana Grant application lists both Indiana University School of Medicine and the Mayo Foundation and Medical School as "Performance Sites" and lists Dr. Taylor as one of four persons designated as "Key Personnel." (Id.) In conjunction with the Indiana Grant, Mayo and Indiana University signed a Statement of Intent to Establish a Consortium Agreement ("Statement of Intent") regarding Dr. Taylor's role as subcontractor should Dr. Ford be awarded the Grant. (Lynch Aff. ¶ 4.)
In late 2001, the Indiana Grant was approved and funded by the NIH. After the approval, however, Dr. Ford decided not to subcontract with Mayo and, in effect, backed-out of the Statement of Intent. (Id. ¶ 7.) Dr. Taylor "was directly responsible for authoring at least one-third of the [Indiana Grant] application." (Taylor Aff. ¶ 2.) He had also been lending a substantial amount of equipment to Dr. Ford in anticipation of the planned collaboration. (Lynch Aff. Ex. A.) Dr. Taylor had "invested a year of work and [the] equipment in the project with [Dr.] Ford." (Id.;see Carlson Aff. Ex. I (in a letter to the NIH, Dr. Taylor wrote: "I have worked on [the Indiana Grant] since October 2000 essentially to the exclusion of any other project for the past 17 months").)
The decision by Dr. Ford to cancel the subcontract with Mayo was unanticipated. As late as November 27, 2001, after consulting the NIH, Lynch reported that the Indiana Grant had "received an outstanding score . . . and will almost certainly be funded" and "the prime recipient [of the Grant] will be Indiana University-Purdue University at Indianapolis . . ., and the Mayo Clinic Rochester will be a subrecipient. . . ." (Taylor Aff. Ex. 8 (emphasis in original).) Of the Indiana Grant situation, one NIH official wrote to Lynch: "I sympathize that this has been a very difficult situation . . . one of the hazards of collaborative research that is rare, but happens from time to time." (Taylor Aff. Ex. 13.) Dr. Ford's decision left Dr. Taylor's lab devoid of funding once again.
The Court will not consider that part of paragraph eight of the Lynch Affidavit pertaining to the supposed reasons for Dr. Ford's decision regarding the Indiana Grant. Such testimony, because it is hearsay, would be inadmissible at trial. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e) ("Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, [and] shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence."); see also Tuttle v. Lorillard Tobacco Co., 377 F.3d 917, 923-24 (8th Cir. 2004) ("In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the district court must base its determination regarding the presence or absence of a material issue of factual dispute on evidence that will be admissible at trial." (internal quotation omitted)).
October 2001 and June 2002 Meetings
The events that led-up to Dr. Taylor's termination largely began on October 26, 2001, when Dr. Taylor, Dr. John Burnett (the Director of Research at Mayo), and Bonnie Edwards (Lynch's supervisor) had an "annual budget meeting." (Hedin Aff. Ex. B at 43.) According to Edwards, "the purpose of the [October 26, 2001] meeting had been to discuss Dr. Taylor's lack of funding." (Hedin Aff. Ex. C at 13.) At this meeting, Dr. Taylor informed Dr. Burnett and Edwards about the Indiana Grant, which he anticipated would be approved shortly. Edwards's notes from the meeting indicate that Dr. Taylor was willing to give up some of his lab space and was expecting that the Indiana Grant would provide him with extra-mural funding beginning in December 2001. (Hedin Aff. Ex. E.) Her meeting notes state: "wait to see when grant awarded — regroup then." (Id.) According to Edwards, the end result of the meeting was that Mayo was "waiting . . . to find out more information about [the Indiana] grant. And . . . if the grant were awarded, then [Mayo] would follow through on some other decisions." (Hedin Aff. Ex. C at 15.) According to Dr. Burnett, Dr. Taylor was informed at the October meeting that "his lab would be closed if he did not obtain outside grant funding to support it." (Burnett Aff. ¶ 4.) An e-mail from Dr. Burnett to Dr. Taylor on October 27, 2001 — the day after the meeting — stated that he "appreciate[d] [Dr. Taylor's] efforts in securing these NIH funds. . . ." (Taylor Aff. Ex. 7.)
Edwards's deposition testimony corroborates this. (Hedin Aff. Ex. C at 13-15.)
At the time of the meeting, Dr. Taylor was not receiving any extra-mural funding to support his lab at Mayo (Lynch Aff. ¶ 5), and he was aware of possible concerns regarding this lack of funding. Prior to the meeting, on October 4, 2001, he noted that the Indiana Grant was "the `life preserver' that might determine whether or not I keep swimming or am asked to start packing in a 35 year career. . . ." (Lynch Aff. Ex. G.)
Shortly after the October 26 meeting, Dr. Taylor's anticipated receipt of funds from the Indiana Grant fell through when Dr. Ford backed-out of the planned collaboration. In early April 2002, Dr. Taylor wrote to Dr. Sinnett, of the NIH, to explain the depth of his concern about Dr. Ford's decision not to subcontract with Mayo on the Indiana Grant:
My position at Mayo . . . is like that of all laboratory investigators who are not physicians. I am assigned lab space provided I can at least partially recover the cost in extra-mural funds. I have no fixed teaching responsibilities or material rewards connected with my academic appointment. I was officially informed last October that my lab space would be assigned to someone else if this grant was not funded. Consequently, with no lab space, no teaching responsibilities, and no clinical credentials, my interest in getting a copy of [documents regarding the Indiana Grant] is to discover whether I need to start thinking of myself as potentially unemployed.
(Carlson Aff. Ex. I. (emphasis in original).)
In June 2002, Dr. Taylor was the only career scientist at Mayo with no extra-mural funding (Lynch Aff. ¶ 12), and he had no pending grant applications (Burnett Aff. ¶ 6). On June 20, 2002, Dr. Burnett, Lynch, and Edwards again met with Dr. Taylor and, according to Dr. Burnett, "informed [Dr. Taylor] that he needed to retire or leave Mayo by the end of 2002 because of his failure to secure outside grant money to support his lab." (Id.) Although Dr. Taylor acknowledges that he was told to retire or leave Mayo by the end of the year, he maintains that Dr. Burnett did not tell him the reason for Mayo's decision. (Hedin Aff. Ex. B at 42-44.) Dr. Taylor testified that Dr. Burnett "mentioned the idea about funding has been a problem and [Dr. Burnett] looked to [Lynch and Edwards] for support and they said no and he dropped it." (Id. at 43-44.) He also testified:
Taylor: It got to a point where I said, "Do you have any reason to offer?" and [Dr. Burnett] looked at [Lynch and Edwards] and they indicated to him that he could not use the issue of the [Indiana Grant] and he said, no, he had no reason.
Question: He said he had no reason for asking you to leave?
Taylor: Exactly. I said, "But is the reason simply me?" and [Dr. Burnett] just mumbled "Yes."
(Id. at 42-43; see also Lynch Aff. ¶ 11 (noting Dr. Burnett's communication to Dr. Taylor "that he must either retire or leave Mayo by the end of 2002").
Post-June 2002 and the Indiana Grant Dispute
Immediately following the June 20, 2002, meeting, Lynch requested that the NIH initiate a review of Dr. Ford's refusal to adhere to the Statement of Intent to collaborate with Dr. Taylor. (Taylor Aff. Ex. 13.) This was the first attempt by Mayo, as an institution, to have Dr. Ford's decision formally reviewed. (Hedin Aff. Ex. B at 48, Ex. D at 27.) In pursuing this avenue, Lynch was "fighting on Dr. Taylor's behalf to see if the NIH could get his portion of the work awarded." (Hedin Aff. Ex. D at 30.) Until the June 20, 2002, meeting, Dr. Taylor had been "under the impression [that for the past] six months . . . the legal department was indeed exploring the fact they had the contract [pursuant to the Indiana Grant]." (Hedin Aff. Ex. B at 47.) The legal department, however, had not been asked to pursue any issues, contractual or otherwise, pertaining to the Indiana Grant. (Hedin Aff. Ex. D at 31-32.)
Dr. Taylor contends that such apathy on the part of the Mayo administration was inconsistent with the administration's normal duties: "It's the responsibility of the institutions to administer all of the details of the funding once the grant is awarded. . . . Once the investigator has the grant funded [the investigator is] not allowed to talk to the NIH." (Hedin Aff. Ex. B at 47, Ex. D at 31 (Lynch testified that Dr. Taylor's "role is the science. My role is administration.").) Dr. James Rae, the Director of Mayo Medical School's Physiology class, wrote an e-mail to Dr. Gary Sieck, Chairman of the Department of Physiology, in support of Dr. Taylor's interpretation of the events leading to his termination:
It would appear to me that Mayo handled this Indiana thing badly and that Stuart is not getting some credit he deserves. Also, I was amazed at his productivity in his last five years. The papers also appeared in excellent journals.
(Taylor Aff. Ex. 1.)
Dr. Taylor's Charges of Discrimination
On August 5, 2002, six weeks after the June 2002 meeting, Dr. Taylor filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") alleging that he had been wrongfully terminated because of his age. (Beed Aff. Ex. A.) He stated in his Charge that "[w]ithout any word of warning or any stated reason, I was dismissed on June 20, 2002." (Id.) On October 16, 2002, Dr. Taylor filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Minnesota Department of Human Rights ("MDHR"), alleging the same age-based discrimination. (Id. at Ex. B.) Both Charges were dismissed in late 2002 for lack of sufficient evidence. (Carlson Aff. Exs. E, F.)
On December 12, 2002, Dr. Taylor met with Lynch, Dr. Burnett, and Dr. Brimijoin (Dr. Taylor's Administrative Department Chair). (Lynch Aff. Ex. F.) At the meeting, Dr. Burnett "reiterated that the Research Committee will close [Dr. Taylor's] research program on December 31, 2002," but "Dr. Burnett agreed to support Dr. Taylor at his regular salary through" March 31, 2003. (Id.) Dr. Burnett states that the provision of "three months' additional salary was simply a respectful accommodation to [Dr. Taylor], to give him extra time to physically vacate his lab," and was not due to any reconsideration of the June 2002 decision to terminate Dr. Taylor. (Burnett Aff. ¶ 9.) "The June decision [to terminate Dr. Taylor's employment] was a final decision." (Id.) On January 29, 2003, Dr. Burnett sent Dr. Taylor a letter confirming that March 31, 2003, would be his "last day of employment at Mayo," and if he did not resign by March 31, his employment would be "involuntarily terminated on that date." (First Am. Compl. Ex. E.) This action followed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is proper if, drawing all reasonable inferences favorable to the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986). The moving party bears the burden of showing that the material facts in the case are undisputed. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322; Mems v. City of St. Paul, Dep't of Fire Safety Servs., 224 F.3d 735, 738 (8th Cir. 2000). The court must view the evidence, and the inferences that may be reasonably drawn from it, in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Graves v. Arkansas Dep't of Fin. Admin., 229 F.3d 721, 723 (8th Cir. 2000); Calvit v. Minneapolis Pub. Schs., 122 F.3d 1112, 1116 (8th Cir. 1997). The nonmoving party may not rest on mere allegations or denials, but must show through the presentation of admissible evidence that specific facts exist creating a genuine issue for trial. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256; Krenik v. County of Le Sueur, 47 F.3d 953, 957 (8th Cir. 1995).
ANALYSIS
I. Age Discrimination
Dr. Taylor claims that he was terminated because of his age in violation of the MHRA, Minn. Stat. § 363A.08, subd. 2(c). Following his termination, Dr. Taylor filed a Charge of Discrimination with the MDHR alleging that he was fired based upon his age. His Charge was dismissed for lack of evidence. Mayo seeks dismissal of Dr. Taylor's MHRA claim on the ground that it is untimely. In the alternative, it argues that Dr. Taylor's claim fails on its merits. Because the Court determines that Dr. Taylor's MHRA claim is time barred, it does not reach the merits of his allegations.
There are two relevant statutes of limitations under the MHRA. First, when a Charge of Discrimination is filed with the MDHR, a civil action must be brought "within 45 days after receipt of notice" that the Charge is dismissed. Minn. Stat. § 363A.33, subd. 1(1). Second, "[a] claim of an unfair discriminatory practice must be brought as a civil action . . . within one year after the occurrence of the practice." Minn. Stat. § 363A.28, subd. 3. Mayo asserts that Dr. Taylor missed both statutory deadlines, requiring dismissal of his discrimination claim. The Court will examine each deadline in turn.
A. The 45-day Deadline
Dr. Taylor does not dispute that he missed the 45-day deadline under the MHRA; his MDHR Charge was dismissed by letter dated December 6, 2002, but Dr. Taylor didn't file his Complaint in this action until October 7, 2003, 10 months later. (Mem. in Opp'n at 19 n. 8.) However, he maintains that he could not have filed suit within the 45-day time limit because he was still working at Mayo at that time and had he sued Mayo, "Mayo would have moved (successfully) to dismiss his suit because he had suffered no tangible job loss." (Id.) This argument is without merit. It is well established that under the MHRA "[t]he notice to terminate embodies the discriminatory decision . . . what happens on the date of termination is seen more as a consequence of the discriminatory act." Turner v. IDS Fin. Servs., Inc., 471 N.W.2d 105, 108 (Minn. 1991). Because he failed to file suit within 45 days of the dismissal of his Charge, Dr. Taylor's MHRA claim must be dismissed.
At oral argument, counsel suggested that because Dr. Taylor's MDHR Charge was not based on the 1969 Policy's retirement age of 65, as Dr. Taylor was unaware of the Policy when he filed the Charge, the discrimination claim alleged in the instant suit is not subject to the 45-day limitation period. Such reasoning, however, confuses the relevant issue for statute of limitations purposes; his awareness of the 1969 Policy does not change the substance of his claim — that his termination was discriminatory based on his age. The discriminatory act at issue (the termination of his employment) is the same whether or not the 1969 Policy is part of Dr. Taylor's claim. See, e.g., National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 113 (2002).
B. The One-year Deadline
Mayo also contends that Dr. Taylor's MHRA claim is time barred because he filed suit after the one-year statute of limitations had expired. According to Mayo, Dr. Taylor's claim accrued when he was given notice of his pending termination, on June 20, 2002. Thus, his Complaint was filed on October 7, 2003, more than one year after the statute of limitations started to run, and his claim is time barred.
Dr. Taylor argues that he was not terminated on June 20, 2002, because, at his meeting with Dr. Burnett on that date, he was told to retire by the end of 2002. He did not end up having to leave Mayo by the end of 2002, however, and it was not until January 29, 2003, that Mayo sent an official letter notifying Dr. Taylor that he had until March 31, 2003, to resign. In his brief, he argues that "[c]ontrary to its first notice in June 2002, Mayo did not fire Dr. Taylor at the end of the year. If it had, its limitations argument would be unassailable. But it changed its mind." (Mem. in Opp'n at 21.) If Dr. Taylor's position is correct, January 29, 2003, is the date on which the statute of limitations began to run, and his Complaint was filed within the one-year time frame. But his position is not correct.
Under the MHRA, "where an unequivocal, unconditional notice of termination is given, the statute of limitations begins to run from the time the notice of termination is received by the employee." Turner, 471 N.W.2d at 108. In Turner, the Minnesota Supreme Court was following the federal rule that "`the proper focus is upon the discriminatory acts, not upon the time at which the consequences of the acts become most painful.'" Id. at 107 (quoting Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 258 (1980)).
In the federal courts, this rule has been enforced in termination situations much more ambiguous than Dr. Taylor's. See, e.g., Cooper v. St. Cloud State Univ., 226 F.3d 964 (8th Cir. 2000) (applying the same rule in the context of Title VII). In Cooper, the plaintiff was given three years to obtain his Ph.D. and, if he was unable to obtain the degree within that time, he was informed that he would be automatically terminated. Id. at 967. After the initial notification, the eventual termination date was extended by one year. Id. at 967 n. 3. The Eighth Circuit determined that the plaintiff's discrimination claim was time barred because "the limitations period began to run when [the defendant] notified him of its official tenure decision" which occurred more than four years prior to his eventual termination. Id. at 967.
Similarly, in Dring v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 58 F.3d 1323, 1328 (8th Cir. 1995), in the context of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the Eighth Circuit recognized that "the accrual date is simply the date on which the adverse employment action is communicated to the plaintiff." Such was the case despite the plaintiff's claims that he did not conclude he was discriminated against until the second, "formal" notice of termination was communicated to him, and a younger employee was hired.Id.
Here, as in Cooper and Dring, there was a lapse in time between the original notification of the adverse employment action — June 20, 2002 — and Dr. Taylor's last day of work — March 31, 2003. Dr. Taylor's argument, however, that his MHRA action did not accrue in June 2002 because Mayo kept him on its payroll for three months past the date that was set at the June 2002 meeting for his termination is discredited byCooper. The plaintiff in Cooper was given a notification that was subject to change at any time depending on his ability to obtain a Ph.D. Further, the termination date in Cooper was stalled for a full year beyond the date that the plaintiff was initially given as a termination date.
Dr. Taylor also claims that Mayo reversed its decision to terminate him at the end of 2002, then reinstated the decision, but delayed his termination date for three months. He does not, however, direct the Court's attention to any evidence of a change of Mayo's decision to terminate him. A change in the date of his eventual last day of work at Mayo is not, in and of itself, sufficient to change the date that the limitations period will start to run. Clearly, the uncertainties that the Eighth Circuit found inapposite in Cooper were far more explicit than the inferences Dr. Taylor asks the Court to make in the instant case. See also Curby v. Solutia, Inc., 351 F.3d 868, 873 (8th Cir. 2003) (citing Ricks, 449 U.S. at 259, 260-61, as "holding Title VII limitations period commences at the time decision is made and communicated to the plaintiff, even where the effects of the decision do not occur until some future date or are subject to change" (emphasis added)).
Uncertainties regarding the date of his last day of work are the most that Dr. Taylor can claim based on the evidence. Dr. Taylor does not state in his Affidavit that Mayo changed its position as to his termination date. He does state that "[d]espite being told by Dr. Burnett I was being retired effective December 31, 2002, my Physiology Department Chairman, Gary Sieck, re-appointed me to Biomedical Engineering graduate faculty." (Taylor Aff. ¶ 4.) However, Dr. Sieck's re-appointment of Dr. Taylor to the faculty is not relevant to Mayo's position regarding Dr. Taylor's termination. There is no evidence that Dr. Sieck had any input in or influence over the termination decision; in fact, Dr. Sieck's decision to re-appoint Dr. Taylor to the faculty had no apparent effect on Dr. Taylor's termination date. Furthermore, Dr. Sieck's re-appointment of Dr. Taylor occurred in March 2003, after Dr. Taylor was formally notified of his March 31, 2003 exit date.
It is clear from Dr. Taylor's two Charges of Discrimination that he understood the June 20, 2002 meeting to be the notification of his termination; for instance, he stated in his EEOC Charge that he "was dismissed on June 20, 2002." (Beed Aff. Exs. A, B.) It is also clear from the Charges, which he filed on August 5, 2002 (with the MDHR) and October 16, 2002 (with the EEOC), that he attributed his termination to age discrimination shortly after the June 2002 meeting. Because the decision to terminate Dr. Taylor was communicated to him on June 20, 2002, and there is no evidence that Mayo ever reversed and then reinstated that decision on a later date, the Court determines that Dr. Taylor's MHRA claim is also time barred under the one-year deadline.
That Dr. Taylor believed, shortly after the June 2002 meeting, that the decision to terminate him was based on age discrimination bolsters the Court's determination that his cause of action accrued in June 2002. Cf. Dring, 58 F.3d at 1327-28 (holding that initial notification date was the date on which the limitations period began to run despite the plaintiff's assertion that it was not until a 38-year-old employee was hired to replace him "that he was `able to tie everything together and determine in his mind that his layoff was because of age discrimination'").
Because Dr. Taylor's age discrimination claim is time barred, it is unnecessary to address the merits of the claim. The Court notes, however, that Dr. Taylor's evidence appears to fall far short of establishing a prima facie case of age discrimination under the MHRA.
II. Breach of Contract
Mayo asserts that it is entitled to summary judgment on Dr. Taylor's breach of contract claim. It contends that Dr. Taylor's failure to obtain extra-mural funding year after year justified his termination under the terms of his employment contract. According to Mayo, its decision was justified as a matter of law because Dr. Taylor's employment contract required that he obtain extra-mural funding in order to perform his job satisfactorily. Dr. Taylor, on the other hand, alleges that obtaining extra-mural funding was not the only aspect of the satisfactory performance standard. He claims that Mayo failed to recognize all of his professional accomplishments in making its decision to fire him. Dr. Taylor urges that whether or not he was performing satisfactorily at the time of his termination is a question for the jury. Because the Court determines that there are genuine issues of material fact regarding Dr. Taylor's performance under the contract, summary judgment on this claim will be denied.
There is no dispute between the parties that Dr. Taylor's employment contract provided him with some job security; in other words, neither party asserts that Dr. Taylor was an at-will employee. Further, the parties do not dispute that Dr. Taylor's continued "satisfactory performance" was a requirement of his employment contract with Mayo. (See, e.g., Mayo's Mem. in Supp. at 17-18 (Dr. Taylor's "tenure" at Mayo was defined by the 1969 Policy which "made continued employment at Mayo contingent on `satisfactory performance,' which included a `continued fulfillment of responsibilities'"); Dr. Taylor's Mem. in Opp'n at 12, 14 ("Dr. Taylor received verbal assurances from Mayo authorities that he had job security so long as he performed his duties in a satisfactory manner."; "Clearly the `real intent' of Dr. Taylor and Mayo . . . was that [Dr. Taylor] could only be discharged for good cause — that is, if he did not perform his duties satisfactorily.").)
While the parties agree that a "satisfactory performance" standard is applicable to Dr. Taylor, it is unclear how the Court would evaluate Dr. Taylor's performance in relation to such a standard. As Mayo conceded at oral argument, no definition of "satisfactory performance" is provided in Mayo's past or current policies. Mayo repeatedly refers to the policy in effect when Dr. Taylor was terminated as making clear the consequences that Dr. Taylor would face if he did not obtain extra-mural support. But nothing in the policy manuals states that a researcher will be fired if he fails to obtain extra-mural funding. (Burnett Aff. Ex. A.) In fact, Dr. Blinks made clear in his retirement speech that a career researcher who is "unsuccessful in the grant market . . . won't lose his job. . . ." (Taylor Aff. Ex. 3.)
Mayo also highlights statements Dr. Taylor made to third parties prior to his termination acknowledging that his employment or his possession of lab space at Mayo was in peril. (Mem. in Supp. at 18-19.) According to Mayo, these statements support its contention that Dr. Taylor had not been performing at a satisfactory level as a matter of law. Specifically, Mayo emphasizes the October 4, 2004 e-mail Dr. Taylor wrote to Lynch in which he referred to the Indiana Grant as "the `life preserver' that might determine whether or not I keep swimming or am asked to start packing in a 35 year career." (Lynch Aff. Ex. G.) Similarly, in a letter to the NIH regarding the Indiana Grant, Dr. Taylor stated that his "interest in getting a copy of [documents regarding the Indiana Grant] is to discover whether I need to start thinking of myself as potentially unemployed." (Carlson Aff. Ex. I.)
The Court cannot conclude, however, that these statements, in and of themselves, define Dr. Taylor's employment contract. Dr. Taylor could have been responding to Mayo's position regarding the future of his employment despite the fact that Mayo's position may not have been consistent with his employment contract. Even if he were not making such statements in direct response to statements made by Mayo, his opinions alone cannot define the terms of his contract. Dr. Taylor's statements indicating that he did not want to lose his job do not make his eventual termination justified under the contract as a matter of law.
It is clear that the reduction or elimination of lab space was a possible response to a tenured researcher's lack of extra-mural funding, and Dr. Taylor has not argued otherwise. (See, e.g., Lynch Aff. Ex. A (e-mail from Dr. Taylor stating "[p]lease remember that I have been expecting for several years that my lab space would contract, if indeed it is not taken away altogether"); Hedin Aff. Ex. E (notes from October 2001 meeting at which Dr. Taylor offered to "give up space" even if the Indiana Grant came through); Taylor Aff. Ex. 1 (email from Dr. Rae, stating that he thought Dr. Taylor "would be willing to tolerate the loss of his lab space but he should be allowed to complete the work on the data he has in hand").) Dr. Blinks noted in his retirement speech that, where a researcher loses his lab space, his self-respect often follows; Dr. Blinks also made clear, however, that there was a difference under Mayo policy between a researcher losing his lab space on one hand, and losing his job on the other.
Mayo does not address the context in which Dr. Taylor made the statements about his job. The e-mail to Lynch referring to the Indiana Grant as a "life preserver" does not have the tone of a serious note discussing imminent termination. After explaining that he will either "keep swimming" or be "asked to start packing in a 35 year career," Dr. Taylor goes on to write "I strongly prefer the former . . . thank you very (!) much." Further, the statements he made in the letter to the NIH were aimed at convincing the organization to give serious consideration to his requests regarding the Indiana Grant. It is for a jury to determine whether such surrounding circumstances are of consequence.
Accordingly, the Court concludes that there are genuine issues of material fact regarding whether or not Dr. Taylor's job performance was "satisfactory," including: whether Dr. Taylor's lack of funding justifies, in and of itself, his termination under his employment contract; whether he was entitled to greater notice of such a decision, as Mayo apparently knew that he was without funding for six or more years prior to his termination; whether Mayo was sufficiently supportive of Dr. Taylor's efforts to pursue his subcontract on the Indiana Grant; and, whether Dr. Taylor's professional accomplishments during the time he was without extra-mural funding offset his lack of funding. These are issues for a jury to decide. See Norton v. Caremark, Inc., 20 F.3d 330, 337 (8th Cir. 1994) (whether employer breached employment contract in terminating the plaintiff was "in the first instance an issue for the jury"); Larsen v. Miller-Dwan Med. Ctr., Inc., Civ. No. 00-2017, 2001 WL 1325963, at *7 (D. Minn. Oct. 2, 2001) (Magnuson, J.) (denying summary judgment for employer on breach of employment contract claim and stating that "determining whether `good cause' existed is a question of fact"). Therefore, summary judgment as to Dr. Taylor's employment contract claim will be denied.
It would appear likely to the Court that if Dr. Ford had not backed-out of the Statement of Intent, Dr. Taylor's employment at Mayo would have continued. Thus, Mayo's efforts in pursuing the Indiana Grant subcontract could have been a decisive factor in whether Dr. Taylor would keep his job.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, and all the files, records and proceedings herein IT IS ORDERED that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 16) is:
I. GRANTED with respect to Dr. Taylor's MHRA age discrimination claim and that claim is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE; and
II. DENIED with respect to Dr. Taylor's breach of contract claim and that claim remains for trial.