Opinion
C. A. 22-256-TLW-PJG
06-07-2023
Thomas Leon Taylor, Plaintiff, v. Ofc. Debra Luz; Major J. Smith; Internal Affairs, Investigations; Tonya James; Henger; Jennifer McDuffie; Capt. Brown; Armstrong; Huff; Bergarso, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
PAIGE J. GOSSETT, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Thomas Leon Taylor, a self-represented prisoner, filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This matter is before the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.) for a Report and Recommendation on the motion for summary judgment filed by Defendants Debra Luz, Jayson H. Smith, Tonya T. James, Joseph M. Henger, Jennifer D. McDuffie, Jerome K. Armstrong, and Pamela T. Hough (incorrectly identified as “Huff”) on December 19, 2022. (ECF No. 85.) Pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), the court advised Taylor of the summary judgment and dismissal procedures and the possible consequences if he failed to respond adequately to the defendants' motion. (ECF No. 86.) The court granted Taylor four extensions of time providing Taylor almost four additional months in which to respond to the defendants' motion. (ECF Nos. 103, 111, 119, 126.)
Defendants Internal Affairs, Capt. Brown, and Bergarso were not served in this case. The court authorized service of process as to these defendants through the United States Marshals Service but the summonses were returned unexecuted. Taylor was provided the opportunity to file corrected service document that would allow the Marshals to properly serve the defendants, (ECF No. 34), but Taylor failed to file corrected service documents. Consequently, Defendants Internal Affairs, Capt. Brown, and Bergarso should be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m).
Notwithstanding these generous extensions of time, Taylor did not respond to the motion. Having reviewed the record presented and the applicable law, the court concludes for the reasons stated in the defendants' motion that the motion should be granted.
Specifically, the court agrees with the defendants' argument that Taylor's due process claims related to his November 5, 2021 disciplinary proceeding are barred because Taylor cannot demonstrate that the disciplinary conviction has been previously invalidated. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) (holding a state prisoner's claim for damages is not cognizable under § 1983 where success of the action would implicitly question the validity of the conviction or duration of the sentence, unless the prisoner can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has been previously invalidated); see also Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 648 (1997) (applying the Heck bar requirement to claims for damages and declaratory relief brought by a state prisoner challenging the validity of procedures used to deprive him of good-time credits under § 1983); accord Moskos v. Hardee, 24 F.4th 289, 295 (4th Cir. 2022). Taylor was sanctioned with the loss of good time credit in his November 5, 2021 disciplinary hearing. (ECF No. 96 at 5.) Therefore, Taylor's claims as to this proceeding are barred by Heck and its progeny.
As to his due process claims relating to his other disciplinary hearings, Taylor cannot show that he was deprived of his right to due process because he was not sanctioned with the loss of good time credits, restrictive confinement, or some other restriction that implicates his right to due process. See, e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557 (1974) (stating due process rights must be afforded to prisoners in disciplinary proceedings that seek to revoke good time credits); Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483-84 (1995) (stating due process rights are owed to prisoners where a sanction poses a significant and atypical hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life). Thus, the defendants could not have interfered with Taylor's right to due process in those proceedings. Also, even assuming due process protections applied to those proceedings, as argued by the defendants, the record before the court reflects that due process was satisfied because there is at least “some evidence” supporting the disciplinary hearing officer's findings. See Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst., Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445 (1985).
As to Taylor's claims about violations of his right to privacy, the court agrees with the defendants' argument that Taylor cannot present evidence of such a violation here based on Defendant Luz's purported brief exposure to Taylor's genitals when Luz was investigating Taylor's behavior in the shower. Inmates retain a right to privacy in their genitals against involuntary exposure of them in the presence of the opposite sex when not reasonably necessary. See Lee v. Downs, 641 F.2d 1117, 1119 (4th Cir. 1981); see also X v. Bratten, 32 F.3d 564 (4th Cir. 1994); Riddick v. Sutton, 794 F.Supp. 169, 171 (E.D. N.C. 1992). However, infrequent or isolated exposures of male's bodies to female guards does not violate the constitution. See, e.g., Thomas v. Shields, 981 F.2d 1252 (4th Cir. 1992); Ashann-Ra v. Com. of Va., 112 F.Supp.2d 559, 565 (W.D. Va. 2000) (collecting cases); Farrell v. Cooper, No. 5:13-CT-3097-FL, 2016 WL 866324, at *5 (E.D. N.C. Mar. 3, 2016) (same). And regardless, Taylor's brief exposure was reasonably necessary for Luz to investigate Taylor's behavior. Consequently, Taylor cannot put forth evidence that his right to privacy was violated by Defendant Luz.
As to Taylor's retaliation claims, the court agrees with the defendants' argument that Taylor cannot produce evidence to support a retaliation claim. To state a colorable retaliation claim, a plaintiff must allege he engaged in a constitutionally protected activity, the defendant took some action that adversely affected the plaintiff's constitutional right, and there was a causal relationship between his protected activity and the defendant's conduct. Martin v. Duffy, 858 F.23d 239, 249 (4th Cir. 2017). To show causation, the plaintiff must initially show that that the defendants aware of that he engaged in a protected activity. Shaw v. Foreman, 59 F.4th 121, 130 (4th Cir. 2023). As explained by the defendants, (Defs.' Mem. in Supp. of Summ. J., ECF No. 851 at 12-13), the record indisputably shows that Defendant Luz was not aware of Taylor's PREA complaint and Defendant McDuffie filed disciplinary charges against Taylor because there was evidence that Taylor's PREA complaint was false. Therefore, Taylor cannot produce evidence that the defendants' actions were retaliatory.
Finally, as to Taylor's failure to protect claim, the court agrees with the defendants that Taylor fails to identify a serious deprivation from which the defendants failed to protect him. (Defs.' Mem. in Supp. of Summ. J., ECF No. 85-1 at 15.) Generally, to proceed with a claim under the Eighth Amendment, a prisoner must demonstrate: (1) objectively, the deprivation suffered or injury inflicted was “sufficiently serious,” and (2) subjectively, the prison officials acted with a “sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994); Williams v. Benjamin, 77 F.3d 756, 761 (4th Cir. 1996); see also Anderson v. Kingsley, 877 F.3d 539, 545 (4th Cir. 2017) (“Farmer defines deliberate indifference as the intentional taking of a risk that the defendant knows might cause harm while lacking any intent to cause such harm.”) (emphasis in original). Here, the court has already observed that Taylor's brief exposure to a female guard did not violate his constitutional rights. Taylor cannot put forth evidence that the defendants failed to protect him from a risk of serious harm.
Based on the foregoing, the court recommends that the defendants' motion for summary judgment be granted. (ECF No. 85.)
The parties' attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.' ” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
901 Richland Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).