Opinion
CASE NO. 1:02-cv-1008-DFH
January 15, 2004
ENTRY ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff Otha Taylor worked as a deputy sheriff for the Marion County Sheriff's Department. When Taylor was fired, it was the third time the sheriff had recommended such action to the Merit Board. The third recommendation followed an incident in which Taylor became involved in a belligerent and vulgar altercation with the civilian clerk of an adult erotica store and with Indianapolis police officers who responded to the incident. In this action, Taylor has sued the department and former Sheriff Jack Cottey. Taylor contends that he was terminated based on his race in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000 et seq. Defendants contend that Taylor has not come forward with evidence of a prima facie case for disparate treatment in his termination. After the defendants moved for summary judgment, Taylor withdrew his claims for racially discriminatory failure to promote and disparate impact, as well as his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which included claims against Sheriff Cottey in his individual capacity.
On the termination claim, the decisive issue is whether Taylor, who is African American, has come forward with evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to find that he was treated more harshly than similarly situated deputies who are not African American. He has not. Taylor has failed to identify any employees who could be considered similarly situated for the purpose of Title VII. Both the quantity and quality of Taylor's disciplinary history distinguish him from the deputies to whom he tries to compare himself.
Summary Judgment Standard
The purpose of summary judgment is to "pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). Summary judgment is appropriate where the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, affidavits, and other materials demonstrate that there exists "no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Only genuine disputes over "material facts" can prevent a grant of summary judgment, and "material facts" are defined as those that might affect the outcome of the suit. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A genuine issue exists only if there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party. Id. On a motion for summary judgment, the moving party must first come forward and identify those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, which the party believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).
As required when deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court considers those facts that are undisputed and views additional evidence, and all reasonable inferences drawn from it, in the light reasonably most favorable to Taylor, the nonmoving party. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323; Baron v. City of Highland Park, 195 F.3d 333, 337-38 (7th Cir. 1999). However, the existence of some metaphysical doubt does not create a genuine issue of fact. "A party must present more than mere speculation or conjecture to defeat a summary judgment motion." Sybron Transition Corp. v. Security Ins. Co. of Hartford, 107 F.3d 1250, 1255 (7th Cir. 1997). The court should neither "look the other way" to ignore genuine issues of material fact, nor "strain to find" material factual issues where there are none. Mechnig v. Sears, Roebuck Co., 864 F.2d 1359, 1363-64 (7th Cir. 1988).
Where the moving party has met the threshold burden of supporting the motion, the opposing party must "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). Local Rule 56.1 requires the party opposing a motion for summary judgment to identify specific and material factual disputes.
As in any case, a court weighing a summary judgment motion in an employment case must take care not to invade the province of the trier of fact. Employment cases are governed by the same rules that govern summary judgment in other cases. They are equally amenable to summary disposition if there is no genuine dispute as to material facts. Gonzalez v. Ingersoll Milling Mach. Co., 133 F.3d 1025, 1031 (7th Cir. 1998), citing Giannopoulos v. Brach Brock Confections, Inc., 109 F.3d 406, 410 (7th Cir. 1997).
Undisputed Facts
On February 24, 2000, the Marion County Sheriff's Merit Review Board ordered Sheriff Jack Cottey to act on his recommendation to terminate Taylor's employment with the Marion County Sheriff's Department. In rendering its decision, the Merit Review Board referred to Taylor's prior disciplinary record with the department.
In 1982, Taylor began his employment as a merit deputy for the Marion County Sheriffs Department. As a merit deputy, Taylor received and was expected to be familiar with the department's rules and regulations.
In 1983, Taylor entered the Indiana Law Enforcement Academy. On March 7, 1983, Taylor was given a five day suspension for violating an academy rule prohibiting male cadets from being in a female cadet's room with the door closed. Taylor Dep. at 32.
After joining the Sheriff's Department in 1982 and before June 1984, Taylor received disciplinary action on three occasions. Taylor Dep. Ex. 5. On one of these occasions, Taylor was given a fifteen day suspension for violating Rules 334 (Cruel Treatment of Persons or Animals) and 335 (Conduct in Making Arrests or Toward Inmates).
On August 1, 1984, Taylor was charged with violating Special Order 27 (failing to report the discharge of a firearm) and Rule 306 (failure to properly perform duties). These charges arose from an altercation Taylor had with a female officer he was dating at the time. That officer allegedly tried to shoot Taylor with his own gun during the disagreement. Taylor Dep. at 35-36. This matter was forwarded to the Merit Review Board with a recommendation by then-Sheriff Wells that Taylor's employment be terminated. The record is silent as to the Merit Review Board's decision but it is clear that Taylor was not terminated after this incident.
In February 1985, Taylor enlisted in the Navy, where he served until his honorable discharge in August 1989. After his discharge, Taylor resumed his job with the Sheriff's Department. Several months later, in December 1990, Taylor received a written reprimand from his superior at the time, Major Billy Romeril.
In February 1993, Taylor was issued a letter of caution (under the administration of Sheriff Joseph G. McAtee) as a result of a vehicle accident in which he had been involved.
A year later, in February 1994, a disciplinary board determined that Taylor was guilty of a rule violation for his off-duty conduct while attending a high school wrestling match. Frustrated by the officiating of the match, Taylor had thrown a chair in "disgust." Id. at 43. The chair struck a sixteen-year-old wrestler. Taylor Dep. Ex. 8.
Between November 1994 and June 1995, Taylor received letters of caution and reprimand for two more vehicle accidents that were deemed by the department's accident review board to have been preventable. Taylor Dep. Exs. 9-10.
On April 30, 1996, a disciplinary review board found Taylor guilty of seven rule violations in connection with a series of incidents involving Taylor's former wife, Anita Pochop. The violations resulted from a number of incidents that occurred as Taylor's marriage was dissolving. Taylor used white shoe polish to write "Honey, I love you. Let's work out our marriage" on Ms. Pochop's car. He also followed Ms. Pochop home from work, prompting her to file a complaint with the police department. Taylor Dep. Ex. 14; Taylor Dep. at 57. During this period, Taylor was also criminally charged with auto theft, although the charges were eventually dismissed. As a result of the disciplinary review board's findings, Taylor was ordered to appear before the Merit Review Board with Sheriff Jack Cottey's recommendation that he be dismissed from the Sheriff's Department. Taylor Dep. Ex. 11. He was also put on suspension until the Merit Review Board's hearing.
At the Merit Review Board hearing on August 20, 1996, Taylor was represented by counsel and allowed to cross-examine all witnesses who gave testimony. The Merit Review Board found Taylor guilty of three rule violations, including conduct unbecoming an officer and improper use of a county vehicle. The Board declined to terminate Taylor's employment and instead gave him an additional sixty day suspension. Taylor Dep. Ex. 13. Taylor appealed the Board's decision to a state court. The court reversed the Board on the improper vehicle operation rule violation, finding that the Board's determination of that violation was not supported by substantial evidence. The court affirmed the Board on the other two rule violations. Taylor Dep. Ex. 14.
On June 17, 1997, a disciplinary board found Taylor guilty of three rule violations as a result of conduct that reflected poorly upon his truthfulness and attention to duty. Taylor had marked his vehicle as "out of service" without notifying his supervisor. When he was confronted, he claimed that the car had an oil leak, but no evidence of any leak was found. After reviewing Taylor's "extensive history of Rules and Regulations violations," Deputy Chief McAtee found Taylor guilty of an additional rule violation for breach of discipline. As a result of these violations, Taylor was given a fifteen day suspension. Taylor Dep. Ex. 15.
The incident that ultimately resulted in Taylor's termination occurred on the night of September 6, 1999. That night, Taylor drove to an adult erotica store to pick up an item for a friend. Taylor asked the female sales clerk if he could use the store's phone. When the clerk refused, a verbal altercation occurred. According to Taylor, the clerk called him a "nigger" and he responded by calling her a "cunt" and by telling her "to go back to her trailer and watch Jerry Springer." Taylor Dep. at 66, 69. (Taylor testified that he did not recall using other offensive terms that the clerk said he had used.) The sales clerk demanded that Taylor leave the store. He eventually did, although he returned approximately twenty minutes later. The sales clerk renewed her demand that Taylor leave the store, and she called the Indianapolis police. Taylor eventually left the store for the second time and was sitting in his car in the parking lot when officers from the Indianapolis Police Department ("IPD") arrived at the scene.
IPD Officers Robert Pearsey and Carol Carson were the first to arrive at the store. Taylor refused their repeated requests for identification. According to Officers Pearsey and Carson, Taylor called Carson a "bitch" during the encounter. Taylor Dep. Ex. 19. (Taylor's deposition testimony does not specifically deny that statement to Carson, though he testified more generally that he did not use the word "bitch" that night. Taylor Dep. at 70. More to the point, Taylor does not dispute that the Merit Review Board received undisputed information that he did use that term to address Carson.) Eventually, more IPD officers arrived at the scene, as did Taylor's supervisors from the Marion County Sheriff's Department.
A disciplinary board found Taylor guilty of seven rule violations stemming from his behavior the night of September 6, 1999. In concurrence with this finding, Sheriff Cottey ordered the case to be heard by the Merit Review Board. Sheriff Cottey again recommended that Taylor's employment with the Sheriff's Department be terminated. Taylor Dep. Ex. 17. At the hearing, the Merit Review Board received evidence from Dr. Jeffrey C. Savitsky, a psychologist who often consults with law enforcement agencies on personnel matters, and who had been retained after the incident to evaluate Taylor. Based on his examination of Taylor, Dr. Savitsky concluded that Taylor's behavioral problems, exemplified by his conduct in the incident with the sales clerk, would probably continue in the future. Upon hearing the evidence, the Merit Review Board unanimously found Taylor guilty of seven rule violations, including improper conduct toward citizens, use of prohibited language, conduct unbecoming an officer, improper relations with other law enforcement officers and breach of discipline. The Board ordered that Taylor's employment be terminated, as Sheriff Cottey had recommended. Taylor Dep. Ex. 18-19.
On April 21, 2000, Taylor filed a complaint with the Indiana Civil Rights Commission and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission claiming that he had been terminated because of his race. On April 2, 2002, the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice issued Taylor a "right to sue" letter. Taylor filed this action on July 3, 2002. Other facts are noted below as needed, keeping in mind the standard for a summary judgment motion.
Discussion
Under Title VII it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an employee because of the employee's race or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). In a case alleging disparate treatment based on race, a plaintiff must prove that the employer intentionally discriminated against him based on race. St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993). A Title VII plaintiff can satisfy his burden of proof in one of two ways: (1) by presenting direct evidence of discriminatory intent or, because of the difficulty in directly proving discrimination, (2) he may rely on circumstantial evidence by using the indirect, burden-shifting procedure set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Pasqua v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 101 F.3d 514, 516 (7th Cir. 1996). A plaintiff may also rely on what the Seventh Circuit has described as a "mosaic" of circumstantial evidence — such as comments by supervisors, suspicious timing, inconsistent explanations or behavior, and so on — that can support a reasonable inference of discrimination. See , e.g., Venters v. City of Delphi, 123 F.3d 956, 973 (7th Cir. 1997) (reversing summary judgment for employer; "remarks and other evidence that reflect a propensity by the decisionmaker to evaluate employees based on illegal criteria will suffice as direct evidence of discrimination even if the evidence stops short of a virtual admission of illegality"); Troupe v. May Department Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 736 (7th Cir. 1994) (circumstantial evidence — like suspicious timing, ambiguous statements oral or written, behavior — is admissible to provide a basis for drawing an inference of intentional discrimination).
Taylor does not have direct evidence of racial discrimination by Sheriff Cottey and the Sheriffs Department. He relies instead on the ubiquitous McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis, which requires Taylor to come forward with evidence that would allow a jury to find the elements of a prima facie case of racial discrimination. Pasqua, 101 F.3d at 516. To establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination, Taylor must come forward with evidence that: (1) he was a member of a protected class; (2) he was performing his job satisfactorily; (3) he was the subject of an adverse employment action; and (4) similarly situated employees outside of the protected class were treated more favorably. Brummett v. Lee Enterprises, Inc., 284 F.3d 742, 744 (7th Cir. 2002). Once he comes forward with evidence sufficient to support findings on these elements of a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to "articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for its action. Williams v. Seniff, 342 F.3d 774, 788 (7th Cir. 2003).
In his brief, Taylor mentions a 1994 incident he observed in which an internal affairs officer appeared in the office wearing the white robe and hood of the Klu Klux Klan. Taylor makes no attempt to link this incident with his termination. He does not contend that the officers involved in this alleged incident were a part of the decision-making structure that was responsible for his firing. The incident therefore has no bearing on the 2000 decision to fire Taylor.
If the Sheriff's Department meets its burden of merely articulating a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its termination of Taylor, the burden then shifts back to him to show that the stated reason was a false pretext hiding some other motive. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804. The ultimate burden of proof remains with Taylor at all times. Gonzalez, 133 F.3d at 1031-32. Thus evidence of pretext alone would not guarantee a win for Taylor on his racial discrimination claims at trial, but it would be sufficient to permit an inference that the real reason for the employer's action was unlawful. Pilditch v. Board of Education, 3 F.3d 1113, 1116 (7th Cir. 1993).
Taylor satisfies the first and third prongs of the prima facie case for racial discrimination. As an African American, he is a member of a protected class. The adverse employment action he suffered was the termination of his position with the Sheriff's Department. See Crady v. Liberty Nat'l Bank Trust Co., 993 F.2d 132, 136 (7th Cir. 1993) (materially adverse employment action indicated by termination of employment).
Taylor concedes that he was not performing his job satisfactorily, but argues that the Sheriff's Department was applying its legitimate employment expectations in a discriminatory matter. Under this theory in a case alleging racial discrimination in discipline, the second and fourth prongs of the McDonnell Douglastest essentially merge into one. The decisive question becomes whether Taylor can demonstrate that he was disciplined more harshly than similarly situated non-African American employees. See Peele v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 288 F.3d 319, 329 (7th Cir. 2002); Curry v. Menard, Inc., 270 F.3d 473, 477-78 (7th Cir. 2001).
A "similarly situated" employee is someone who is "directly comparable to [the plaintiff] in all material respects." Patterson v. Avery Dennison Corp., 281 F.3d 676, 680 (7th Cir. 2002). "In determining whether two employees are similarly situated a court must look at all relevant factors, the number of which depends on the context of the case." Radue v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 219 F.3d 612, 617 (7th Cir. 2000). In disciplinary cases such as this one, "a plaintiff must show that he is similarly situated with respect to performance, qualifications and conduct." Id. "This normally entails a showing that the two employees dealt with the same supervisor, were subject to the same standards, and had engaged in similar conduct without such differentiating or mitigating circumstances as would distinguish their conduct or the employer's treatment of them." Id. at 618, citing Mitchell v. Toldeo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577, 583 (6th Cir. 1992).
Taylor therefore must show "substantial similarity" between himself and non-African American Sheriff's Department employees who were not terminated. Radue, 219 F.3d at 618, citing Ercegovich v. Goodyear Tire Rubber Co., 154 F.3d 344, 352 (6th Cir. 1998).
Taylor has identified several other Marion County deputies for comparison. Taylor contends that he is comparable to Deputies Melvin Wright, James Durm, Kenneth Anders, Michael Meek, Michael Hurd, and Martin Hunter. The undisputed facts show that none of these deputies are similarly situated employees within the meaning of McDonnell Douglas.
None of these former and current deputies are parties to this case. For present purposes, the court must assume that Taylor's evidence about their conduct is accurate, without vouching for its truth.
According to the evidence presented by Taylor, Melvin Wright was subject to discipline on five occasions: for using racial slurs; for transporting his brother to the wrong jail; for failing to promptly turn in a misappropriated shotgun; for drunk driving in a marked police car; and for supplying minors with alcohol and marijuana. Wright's case, however, is not helpful to Taylor. The undisputed facts show that Wright, like Taylor, was terminated as a result of his conduct. Def. Reply Br. Ex. C.
James Durm has two incidents of discipline on his record, both for engaging in improper conduct toward female citizens while on duty. The more serious of the two incidents amounted to a sexual assault on a female he had stopped for drunk driving. The record before the court shows that Sheriff Cottey suspended Durm for 15 days and referred his case to the Merit Review Board. Although his actions could have warranted firing, and perhaps criminal prosecution, he was not fired. The suspension was increased to 30 days. The incident was Durm's first disciplinary incident. (The second incident, involving allegations that he tried to "pickup" a woman he stopped for speeding, took place after the first incident but before the disciplinary hearing. The second incident resulted in a three day suspension.)
Kenneth Anders has been disciplined three times: once for failing to respond to a radio run for a 911 call because he was engaged in sexual conduct while on duty, once for treating his fellow employees and supervisors with disrespect, and once for taking his patrol car to the department garage without notifying his supervisor.
Michael Meek received a written reprimand for being romantically involved with a seventeen-year-old girl. He also was found guilty of five rule violations stemming from problems that he had with a car dealership, but that incident did not involve other police forces or the sort of belligerent confrontation with fellow officers in which Taylor engaged.
Michael Hurd has been disciplined once, for drunk driving in a patrol car. He was suspended for 114 days for that first violation.
Martin Hunter has been disciplined once in his twenty-year career. He received a three-day suspension as a result of his arrest for public indecency and battery.
Although some of the individual incidents may fairly be compared to Taylor's misconduct, the undisputed facts establish several points that distinguish Taylor's case from those of the other deputies who were not actually fired.
First, none of the disciplinary histories of the deputies listed above even begins to approach the length and depth of Taylor's own disciplinary record. By the court's count, from his hiring in 1982 until his firing, Taylor had been disciplined or reprimanded ten times. He had been suspended on six separate occasions for a total of more than 155 days. Taylor had been recommended for termination on two prior occasions before the Merit Review Board finally ordered his dismissal. He had been brought before a disciplinary board four times, and the Merit Review Board three times. He had been found guilty of seventeen separate rule violations over the course of his career as a law enforcement officer.
By contrast, the worst offender identified by Taylor, Melvin Wright, was fired after only five disciplinary incidents and far less suspension time than Taylor had received before he was fired. Of the identified deputies who are still with the Sheriff's Department, none has been disciplined or reprimanded more than three times.
Second, the tenor of Taylor's repeated offenses distinguishes his case from those of the other deputies. Taylor's most serious violations — the chair-throwing incident, the incident with his ex-wife, and the final incident with the sales clerk — obviously demonstrate serious anger control issues. Incidents of drunk driving by deputies, of course, should not be taken lightly. But Taylor's disciplinary record reveals a police officer, armed and acting under the color of law, who has repeatedly been unable or unwilling to conform his behavior to acceptable standards. That record presents a pattern of deliberate behavior sufficiently dangerous to the Sheriff's Department and to the public as a whole to set him apart from the officers he claims are similarly situated.
Third, in the few instances where Taylor's misconduct superficially matches up with the misconduct of one of the identified deputies, Taylor has failed to flesh out adequate similarities in substance. Deputy Anders, for example, was disciplined for showing disrespect toward fellow officers or supervisors. However, Taylor provides no other details from which the court might draw parallels to his own case. Taylor did not present evidence that Deputy Anders's misconduct was equivalent to referring to a female colleague as a "bitch" and to actively hindering a police investigation by refusing to identify himself. Similarly, there is no evidence that Deputy Meek's disagreement with the car dealership resulted in a situation akin to the one Taylor was involved in with the store clerk, where his conduct prompted a 911 call and a multi-agency law enforcement response consisting of seven police officers. Moreover, it bears repeating that Anders' and Meek's overall disciplinary histories are scant compared to Taylor's. The sexual assault by Durm is Taylor's best evidence here, but it was Durm's first rule violation and it was one that Durm admitted. By contrast, Taylor came before the Merit Review Board as a repeat offender who had shown his inability to control his temper both on and off the job.
Taylor complains that he has been denied access to all of the deputies' complete internal affairs files. Taylor's motion to compel the production of these files was denied by Magistrate Judge Baker on the basis of the law enforcement investigatory privilege. Docket No. 48. His motion to reconsider was also denied. Docket No. 68. Taylor did not appeal that decision, and the court does not interpret the briefs on summary judgment as a belated vehicle for such an appeal.
The court has no interest in making excuses for other deputies' misconduct, for this is a case that plumbs the depths of the Sheriff's Department. However, the undisputed evidence includes another feature that makes Taylor's case unique. Because of the repeated incidents in which Taylor became angry and was unable to control his actions, he was evaluated by Dr. Savitsky. The Merit Review Board considered Dr. Savitsky's opinion that Taylor's misconduct was likely to continue in the future. There is no evidence of any similar finding with regard to the deputies to whom Taylor compares himself.
Fourth, unlike several of the other deputies, Taylor never admitted in the disciplinary process that he had done anything wrong. Deputies Wright, Hurt and Hunter admitted to their violations at the disciplinary review board stage. Durm admitted at least the more serious violation, the one amounting to sexual assault on a woman stopped for drunk driving. See Taylor Dep. 121. Of the seventeen rule violations that Taylor was found to have committed over the course of his career, he admitted to only one, using prohibited language during the incident with the sales clerk. He made that admission only after the case had already proceeded from the disciplinary board to the Merit Review Board. Taylor's reluctance to accept responsibility for his misconduct further distinguishes him from several of the deputies to whom he claims to be similarly situated. See Spath v. Hayes Wheels Int'l-Indiana, Inc., 211 F.3d 392, 396-97 (7th Cir. 2000) (employee who persisted in making false statements to employer is not similarly situated to an employee who initially made false statements but later recanted the statements and told the truth).
The point is familiar to all federal judges who reduce a criminal defendant's offense level under the Sentencing Guidelines when the defendant accepts responsibility for his or her actions. See USSG § 3E1.1. The adjustment, like the mercy shown by decision-makers in a myriad of similar contexts, reflects the view that a person who understands and accepts responsibility for misconduct is less likely to repeat the offense. Taylor's record shows no such acceptance of responsibility. It shows instead repeated misconduct and repeated denial.
Given all of these differences, which are established by the undisputed evidence before the court, Taylor has failed to come forward with evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to find that any white officers were similarly situated but were not fired, so that a jury might further infer that the decision to fire Taylor was based on his race. The undisputed facts show that Deputies Durm, Anders, Meek, Hurd, and Hunter were not similarly situated employees for the purpose of the McDonnell Douglas test. Accordingly, Taylor has failed to establish a prima facie case of race discrimination. As a result, the court need not address Taylor's pretext argument. See Peele, 288 F.3d at 331.
Finally, the court must put this case in a larger context. The citizens of Marion County give sheriff's deputies great responsibility and great power. If a deputy misuses that power, the consequences can be severe and even tragic. Deputies are expected to maintain their composure even when provoked by the use of deeply offensive language, including vile racial epithets. A substantial portion of this court's docket consists of civil rights cases brought by civilians who allege that law enforcement officers, such as Marion County Sheriff's Deputies, have violated their constitutional rights. Some of those claims are valid and some are not, of course. But where the defendant deputy has a prior record of misconduct, plaintiffs routinely allege that the Sheriff and the Merit Review Board violated the federal Constitution by failing to remove the deputy. The Sheriff and the Merit Review Board have a legal and moral responsibility to all citizens to ensure that abusive and dangerous deputies are removed from their jobs. This is not to say that racially discriminatory discipline will be tolerated. Nevertheless, based on the evidence before the Merit Review Board showing Taylor's repeated inability to control his temper, it is difficult to see how the Board could have reached any decision other than firing him before he committed even worse actions under the authority of his badge.
Conclusion
The court grants defendant's motion for summary judgment in all respects. Final judgment for the defendants will be entered.
So ordered.