Opinion
CIVIL NO: 4:19-CV-00659
06-10-2019
HANNA LAURIE TAYLOR, Plaintiff, v. MAUREEN BEIRNE, et al., Defendants.
(Judge Caputo) () REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. Introduction.
In this case, the plaintiff, Hanna Laurie Taylor ("Taylor"), brings §1983 claims against defendants Maureen J. Beirne ("Judge Beirne") and Pat Beirne. Judge Beirne is a judge in Bradford County and Pat Beirne is a public defender in that county. After screening Taylor's complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915A, we conclude that it fails to state a claim because Judge Beirne is entitled to judicial immunity and Pat Beirne is not a state actor. Thus, we recommend that Taylor's case be dismissed with prejudice.
II. Background and Procedural History.
On April 17, 2019, Taylor initiated this case by filing a complaint. Taylor alleges the defendants violated her right to "fair and just sentencing from a judge" and competent counsel. Doc. 1 at 3. She claims that she "received an extensive amount of time in an illegal sentence order imposed by [Judge] Beirne" and that "[she] did not receive competent counsel from Pat Beirne," as he was "by no means . . . adequately or competent[ly] representing [her]" with her "best interest." Doc. 1 at 4. Taylor also alleges that Judge Beirne "gave [her] an extensive illegal state sentence for charges that do not constitute prison time" and that "The Judge . . . and Pat Beirne had no intentions of making sure [she] received a legal and just sentence." Id. She asks in her complaint if because Judge Beirne and Pat Beirne "are family - isn't that a conflict of interest." Id. She alleges that she became aware of the basis for her claim after a conversation on March 25, 2019, when she spoke to Deputy Warden Quattrini and he informed her that she received an "illegal sentence." Doc. 1 at 5. Taylor, in the relief section of her complaint, asks that she receive "time served and be released [from incarceration]," she also asks that she "be compensated for all the days [she] was forced to be in jail, when [she] should have been free." Id.
Since Taylor filed her complaint, the Court has received four letters from Taylor. Each letter generally states the actions Taylor has taken regarding the case, such as calling and mailing the Bradford County Public Defender's Office (see, e.g., docs. 6, 8, 9, 10). One letter shows dates relevant to her sentence. Doc. 8 at 3-9. Taylor also includes various correspondence, in relation to her sentence, between the defendants. Doc. 9 at 3-8. In her last letter dated May 3, 2019, Taylor states that she no longer has counsel and that her previous public defender last filed a "motion PCRA" in response to her habeas corpus petition. Doc. 10 at 1.
Taylor filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus on April 17, 2019, which is also pending before us. Taylor v. Beirne, No. 1:19-CV-00660 (M.D. Pa. filed Apr. 17, 2019). Because it appeared from the petition that Taylor had not exhausted state remedies, we ordered Taylor on April 25, 2019, to show cause, if there is any, why her habeas corpus petition should not be dismissed without prejudice because she failed to exhaust state remedies. Taylor v. Beirne, No. 1:19-CV-00660 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 25, 2019).
III. Discussion.
A. Screening of In Forma Pauperis Complaints—Standard of Review.
We have a statutory obligation to review Taylor's complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which provides that "[t]he court shall review, before docketing, if feasible or, in any event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity." Id. "On review, the court shall identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; orId. § 1915A(b).
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.
A federal court is obligated to dismiss a complaint brought in forma pauperis when the complaint "fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted." Id. § 1915A(b)(1). This statutory text mirrors the language of Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that a complaint should be dismissed for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
To state a claim for relief, a complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Rule 8 "does not require 'detailed factual allegations,' but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). "A pleading that offers 'labels and conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). "Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders 'naked assertions' devoid of 'further factual enhancement.'" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). The complaint must "give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). "In other words, a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff's entitlement to relief. A complaint has to 'show' such an entitlement with its facts." Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2009).
In deciding whether to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, a federal court "must accept all facts alleged in the complaint as true and construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Krieger v. Bank of America, 890 F.3d 429, 437 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Flora v. County of Luzerne, 776 F.3d 169, 175 (3d Cir. 2015)). However, "the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. "[A] court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Id. at 679. In practice, this leads to a three-part standard:
To assess the sufficiency of a complaint under Twombly and Iqbal, a court must: 'First, take note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim. Second, identify allegations that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. Finally, where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.'Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 220 (3d Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted) (quoting Burtch v. Millberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir. 2011)).
Complaints brought pro se are afforded more leeway than those drafted by attorneys. In determining whether to dismiss a complaint brought by a pro se litigant, a federal district court is "required to interpret the pro se complaint liberally." Sause v. Bauer, 138 S. Ct. 2561, 2563 (2018). "[A] pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94. Nevertheless, "pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim." Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013).
B. Section 1983—Legal Standard.
Taylor brings her claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. "Section 1983 imposes civil liability upon any person who, acting under the color of state law, deprives another individual of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States." Shuman v. Penn Manor School Dist., 422 F.3d 141, 146 (3d Cir. 2005). Section 1983 "does not create any new substantive rights but instead provides a remedy for the violation of a federal constitutional or statutory right." Id. To establish a claim under § 1983, the plaintiff must establish a deprivation of a federally protected right and that this deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. Woloszyn v. County of Lawrence, 396 F.3d 314, 319 (3d Cir. 2005).
C. Judge Beirne is Entitled to Judicial Immunity.
"Although § 1983 purports to subject '[e]very person' acting under color of state law to liability for depriving any other person in the United States of 'rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,' the Supreme Court has recognized that § 1983 was not meant to 'abolish wholesale all common-law immunities.'" Yarris v. County of Delaware, 465 F.3d 129, 134-35 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967)). There are two kinds of immunity under § 1983: qualified immunity and absolute immunity. Id. at 135. Although most public officials are entitled only to qualified immunity, public officials who perform "special functions" are entitled to absolute immunity. Id. (quoting Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 508 (1978)).
"[A]bsolute immunity attaches to those who perform functions integral to the judicial process." Williams v. Consovoy, 453 F.3d 173, 178 (3d Cir. 2006). "This immunity was and still is considered necessary 'to assure that judges, advocates, and witnesses can perform their respective functions without harassment or intimidation.'" McArdle v. Tronetti, 961 F.2d 1083, 1084 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting Butz, 438 U.S. at 512).
A functional approach is used to determine whether absolute or qualified immunity applies. Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 224 (1988). The inquiry focuses on the nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it. Id. "[The] Court has consistently adhered to the rule that 'judges defending against 1983 actions enjoy absolute immunity from damages liability for acts performed in their judicial capacities.'" Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27 (1980). The Court has described the reasons for recognizing judicial immunity as follows:
the nature of the adjudicative function requires a judge frequently to disappoint some of the most intense and ungovernable desires that people can have. . . . [T]his is the principal characteristic that adjudication has in common with legislation and with criminal prosecution, which are the two other areas in which absolute immunity has most generously been provided. 792 F.2d, at 660. If judges were personally liable for erroneous decisions, the resulting avalanche of suits, most of them frivolous but vexatious, would provide powerful incentives for judges to avoid rendering decisions likely to provoke such suits. Id., at 660-661. The resulting timidity would be hard to detect or control, and it would manifestly detract from independent and impartial adjudication.Forrester, 484 U.S. at 226-27.
We engage in a two-part inquiry to determine whether judicial immunity is applicable. Gallas v. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 211 F.3d 760, 768 (3d Cir. 2000). First, because immunity applies only to actions taken in a judge's judicial capacity, we must determine whether the challenged actions were taken in the judge's judicial capacity. Id. The relevant factors "relate to the nature of the act itself, i.e., whether it is a function normally performed by a judge, and to the expectations of the parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity." Id. at 768-69 (quoting Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 362 (1978)). "Our task is to 'draw the line between truly judicial acts, for which immunity is appropriate, and acts that simply happen to have been done by judges,' such as administrative acts." Id. at 769 (quoting Forrester, 484 U.S. at 227).
"Second, a judge is not immune for actions, though judicial in nature, taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction." Id. at 768. In this regard, "we must distinguish between acts in the 'clear absence of all jurisdiction,' which do not enjoy the protection of absolute immunity, and acts that are merely in 'excess of jurisdiction,' which do enjoy that protection." Id. at 769 (quoting Stump, 435 U.S. at 356 n.6). Judicial immunity shields a judge from liability for judicial acts even if those acts were taken in error, if they were done maliciously, if they were in excess of the judge's authority, if the judge committed grave procedural errors, or if the judge's actions were unfair or controversial. Id. A judge will be subject to liability only when he or she has acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction. Id. "[O]ur analysis must focus on the general nature of the challenged action, without inquiry into such 'specifics' as the judge's motive or the correctness of his or her decision." Id.
The allegations regarding Judge Beirne in Taylor's complaint relate to actions taken by Judge Beirne in her capacity as a judge overseeing a criminal case in the Court of Common Pleas, and based on the allegations in the complaint, her actions were not taken in the clear absence of jurisdiction. Accordingly, Judge Beirne is entitled to judicial immunity from Taylors § 1983 claims against her.
D.Taylor's Complaint Fails to State a claim Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted Against Pat Beirne Because Pat Beirne Is Not a State Actor.
"Section 1983 is not a source of substantive rights, but merely a method to vindicate violations of federal law committed by state actors." Pappas v. City of Lebanon, 331 F. Supp. 2d 311, 315 (M.D. Pa. 2004) (citing Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284-85 (2002)). Therefore, a viable § 1983 claim requires the plaintiff to establish two indispensable elements: a deprivation of a federally protected right and that this deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. Woloszyn, 396 F.3d at 319. Because the deprivation must be committed by a person acting under color of state law, a § 1983 suit cannot allege a violation through "private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful." Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1002 (1982).
A public defender is not a state actor for the purposes of § 1983. Polk Cty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981) ("[A] public defender does not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer's traditional function as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding."); see also, e.g., Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 303-04 (2001) (noting that a public defender "does 'not act on behalf of the state'" when "doing a defense lawyer's primary job" but is instead "the State's adversary," and "[t]he state-action doctrine does not convert opponents into virtual agents" (quoting Polk Cty., 454 U.S. at 323 n.13)); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., Inc., 500 U.S. 614, 626 (1991) ("[A] public defender is not a state actor in his general representation of a criminal defendant, even though he may be in his performance of other official duties." (citing Polk Cty., 454 U.S. at 325)); Dorn v. Aguilar, 645 F. App'x 114, 115 (3d Cir. 2016) ("Dorn did not state a claim for relief against his public defender and the public defender's office because neither is a state actor for purposes of § 1983."); Rieco v. Hebe, 633 F. App'x 567, 569 (3d Cir. 2015) ("Public defenders are generally not considered state actors for § 1983 purposes when acting in their capacities as attorneys." (citing Polk Cty., 454 U.S. at 325)); Beaver v. Union Cty. Pa., 619 F. App'x 80, 83 (3d Cir. 2015) ("Beaver did not state a claim against either of the public defenders because they were not state actors for purposes of § 1983." (citing Polk Cty., 454 U.S. at 325)). But see Polk Cty., 454 U.S. at 328-34 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that public defenders should be considered state actors).
In this case, the complaint clearly alleges that Pat Beirne was acting in his role as Taylor's counsel, rather than in an administrative role. See doc. 1 at 2. Taylor states that she "did not receive competent counsel from Pat Beirne." Doc. 1 at 4. Taylor further clarifies by stating "Pat Beirne by no means was competent in representing me." Id. Taylor mentions in her letters her interactions with Pat Beirne as her counsel and requests that he file motions on her behalf. Doc. 9 at 1. Pat Beirne, therefore, was not a state actor for purposes of § 1983, and all claims against him should be dismissed.
E. Leave to Amend.
Before dismissing a complaint under the screening provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the court must grant the plaintiff leave to amend his complaint unless amendment would be inequitable or futile. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002). Here, amendment of the claim against Judge Beirne would be futile since she is entitled to absoulute immunity. Amendment of the claim against Pat Beirne would also be futile as he is not a state actor for the purposes of § 1983. Accordingly, we recommend that Taylor's complaint be dismissed with prejudice.
IV. Recommendation.
For the foregoing reasons, we recommend that Taylor's complaint be dismissed with prejudice.
The Parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.
Submitted this 10th day of June, 2019.
S/Susan E . Schwab
Susan E. Schwab
Chief United States Magistrate Judge