Opinion
INDEX NO. 151924/2020
10-22-2020
KYNDRA TAYLOR, Plaintiff, v. BARLAS BAYLAR, HUDSON FURNITURE, INC. Defendant.
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 19 MOTION DATE 10/08/2020 MOTION SEQ. NO. 001
DECISION + ORDER ON MOTION
HON. SHAWN TIMOTHY KELLY: The following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEF document number (Motion 001) 4, 5, 6, 7, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18 were read on this motion to/for DISMISSAL.
Defendants Barlas Baylar and Hudson Furniture, Inc., (collectively "Defendants") move to dismiss, pursuant to CPLR §3211(a)(7), for Plaintiff Kyndra L. Taylor's ("Plaintiff") failure to state a cause of action in the Amended Verified Complaint. Specifically, Defendants contend that Plaintiff has failed to state a cause of action for pregnancy discrimination because she has failed to allege facts giving rise to an inference of discrimination. Plaintiff cross-moves pursuant to CPLR §3025(a) to amend her amended complaint to clarify the second cause of action of her amended complaint. In opposition, Plaintiff states that Defendants' motion must be denied because Plaintiff has sufficiently pled her pregnancy/gender discrimination claim under the New York State Human Rights Law ("NYSHRL") and New York City Human Rights Law ("NYCHRL") (Administrative Code of City of NY § 8-101 et seq.). Cross Motion to Amend Amended Complaint
Plaintiff cross-moves pursuant to CPLR §3025(a) to amend her amended complaint to clarify the second cause of action of her amended complaint. Specifically, Plaintiff seeks to correct a typographical error in the second cause of action sub-header. Instead of indicating that the second cause of action is for "Gender/Pregnancy Discrimination (NYCHRL)", the sub-header inadvertently reads "Disability Discrimination (Actual & Perceived)." Defendants do not oppose Plaintiff's cross motion and ask that Defendants' motion to dismiss be treated as having been made against Plaintiff's Second Amended Verified Complaint. Plaintiff's cross motion is granted (see Edenwald Contracting Co., Inc. v City of New York, 60 NY2d 957, 471 NYS2d 55, 459 NE2d 164 [1983]; Cseh v New York City Transit Authority, 240 AD2d 270, 658 NYS.2d 618 [1st Dept 1997]). Relevant Facts
Plaintiff was employed by Defendant Hudson Furniture as sales director from on or about January 2019 until her alleged unlawful termination on September 30, 2019. Plaintiff was qualified for her position as sales director and was the leading salesperson at the time she was terminated. Plaintiff states that on September 23, 2019 during a phone conversation with Defendant Baylar, Plaintiff informed Defendant Baylar that she was pregnant. On September 30, 2019, Defendant Baylar terminated Plaintiff and another male employee via text message telling them "As you know I can't afford to pay you anymore..." Motion to Dismiss
On a CPLR §3211(a)(7) motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the complaint must be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and all factual allegations must be accepted as true" (Alden Global Value Recovery Master Fund, L.P. v KeyBank National Association, 159 AD3d 618, 621-22 [2018]). In addition, "on such a motion, the complaint is to be construed liberally and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of the plaintiff" (Id. at 622). However, vague and conclusory allegations cannot survive a motion to dismiss (see, Kaplan v Conway and Conway, 173 AD3d 452, 452-53 [2019]; D. Penguin Brothers Ltd. v City National Bank, 270 NYS3d 192, 192 [ 2018] [noting that "conclusory allegations fail"]; R & R Capital LLC, et al., v Linda Merritt, 68 AD3d 436, 437 [2010]).
The criterion for establishing whether a complaint should be dismissed pursuant to §3211(a)(7) is "whether the pleading states a cause of action, and if from its four corners factual allegations are discerned which taken together manifest any cause of action cognizable at law" (Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, 43 NY2d 268, 275 [1977]; see also Foley v D'Agostino, 21 AD2d 60, 64-65 [1964]). Whether the pleader will ultimately be able to establish the allegations in the pleading is irrelevant to the determination of a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR §3211(a)(7) (see EBC I, Inc., v Goldman Sachs & Co., 5 NY3d 11, 19 [2005]; Polonetsky v Better Homes Depot, 97 NY2d 46, 54 [2001 ][motion must be denied if "from [the] four corners [of the pleadings] factual allegations are discerned which taken together manifest any cause of action cognizable at law"]). The court's inquiry is limited to determining whether the complaint states any cause of action, not whether there is evidentiary support for it. (Krause v Lancer & Loader Group, LLC, 965 NYS2d 312 [Sup Ct, NY County 2013]). Moreover, employment discrimination cases are generally reviewed under a notice pleading standard, which requires that plaintiff only give defendant "fair notice" of the nature and grounds of the claims (id). As such, plaintiff needs not plead specific facts (id).
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint alleges gender/pregnancy discrimination under the New York State Human Rights Law ("NYSHRL") (N.Y. Executive Law § 290 et seq.) and under the New York City Human Rights Law ("NYCHRL") (N.Y.C Admin. Code § 8-101 et seq.).
The First Department has held that disability provisions of the NYSHRL and NYCHRL are not equivalent and require a different analysis (Phillips v City of New York, 66 AD3d 170, 884 NYS2d 369 [App Div 1st Dept 2009]). Accordingly, "the jurisprudence that has developed in interpreting both the NYSHRL and Title VII should merely serve as a base for the New York City Human Rights Law, not its ceiling" (Krause, 965 N.Y.S.2d 312 at 321; Defrancesco v Railroad, 2012 WL 2396521, citing Jordan v Bates Advertising Holdings, Inc., 816 NYS2d 310 [Sup Ct, NY County 2006]).
While neither the NYSHRL nor the NYCHRL explicitly names pregnancy as a type of discrimination, the Court of Appeals has consistently held that employment discrimination on the basis of pregnancy falls within the prohibitions of the Executive Law § 296(1)(a) as sex or gender discrimination (see Mittl v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 100 NY2d 326, 763 NYS2d 518 [2003] [holding that "the Human Rights Law prohibits discharge of an employee because of pregnancy"]; Elaine W. v Joint Diseases N. Gen. Hosp., 81 NY2d 211, 216, 597 NYS2d 617 [1993] [holding that "distinctions based solely upon a woman's pregnant condition constitute sexual discrimination"] [internal citation omitted]). New York State Human Rights Law
Generally, employment discrimination cases are reviewed under notice pleading standards, so that a plaintiff alleging employment discrimination need not plead specific facts establishing a prima facie case of discrimination "but need only give 'fair notice' of the nature of the claim and its grounds" (Vig v New York Hairspray Co., L.P., 67 AD3d 140, 145 [1st Dept 2009]; Krause v Lancer & Loader Group, LLC, 965 NYS2d 312 [Sup Ct, NY County 2013]).
The New York State Human Rights Law, as set forth in the Executive Law §296(1)(a), makes it an unlawful discriminatory practice for an employer to discriminate against an individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment, inter alia, because of the individual's sex (NYSHRL § 296(1)(a)).
Plaintiff's complaint alleges that she is female, a member of a protected class, and was pregnant at the time of her termination. She has stated that she was qualified for her job, that Defendant Baylar, the president of the company, recruited her to work for Defendant Hudson Furniture, Inc. because he was aware of her strong work ethic and ability to procure sales, that she was a leading sales person at the time she was terminated, and that she had procured almost $2 million in sales during her first eight months. Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that despite these qualifications, within seven days of informing Defendant Baylar that she was pregnant she was terminated. These allegations at the pleading stage are sufficient to meet the fair notice standard (see Montgomery v Elrac, Enterprise Holdings, Inc., No. 25814/2016E, 2019 WL 4929889, at *4 [NY Sup Ct 2019] ["to properly plead a discrimination claim, plaintiff need not plead specific facts; it is sufficient that the plaintiff give notice of the nature of the claim"]; also Petit v Dep't of Educ. of City of New York, 177 AD3d 402, 403, 113 NYS3d 30, 32 [2019] [court reinstated discrimination claims dismissed on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action because "employment discrimination cases are . . . generally reviewed under notice pleading standards"]). New York City Human Rights Law
Pursuant to the New York City Human Rights Law ("NYCHRL"), "[i]t shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice: (a) For an employer or an employee or agent thereof, because of the actual or perceived age, ... disability, ... sexual orientation ... of any person: (3) To discriminate against such person in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment." Moreover, the NYCHRL provides broader protection than its related federal and state statutes. (see Smyth v City of New York, No. 157294/2017, 2018 WL 4080144, at *1 [NY Sup Ct 2018]; Romanello v Intesa Sanpaolo, S.p.A., 22 NY3d 881 [2013]). The NYCHRL states that its provision "shall be construed liberally for the accomplishment of the uniquely broad and remedial purposes thereof, regardless of whether federal or New York state civil and human rights laws ... have been so construed" (Administrative Code of the City of New York § 8-130).
Therefore, as Plaintiff adequately stated her claim for pregnancy-based discrimination to survive Defendants' motion to dismiss under the New York State Human Rights Law, such allegations are equally sufficient for her claim under the even broader protection of the New York City Human Rights Law. Conclusion
At this early juncture of the proceedings, this Court finds that Plaintiff's claims for pregnancy discrimination pursuant to the NYSHRL and the NYCHRL must be allowed to proceed.
Accordingly, it is hereby,
ORDERED that Defendants' motion to dismiss is denied. 10/22/2020
DATE
/s/ _________
SHAWN TIMOTHY KELLY, J.S.C.