Opinion
1:02-cv-1130-LJM-WTL
March 30, 2004
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This matter comes before the Court on Defendants', William Spurgeon ("Spurgeon"), Jack L. Cottey ("Sheriff Cottey"), and the Marion County Sheriff's Department (collectively "Defendants"), Motion for Summary Judgment on the claims of Plaintiff, Tracey L. Taylor-Hudgins ("Plaintiff or "Taylor-Hudgins"). The only remaining federal claims in this case are § 1983 claims against Spurgeon in his individual capacity for alleged violations of the Fourth Amendment, the due process clause, and the equal protection clause. In addition to the § 1983 claims against Spurgeon, Taylor-Hudgins has claims against all three Defendants under the following state law theories: wrongful infliction of emotional distress, false arrest, false imprisonment, and defamation. In the instant motion, Defendants seek summary judgment on all remaining claims. For the reasons stated herein, the Court GRANTS Defendants' motion with respect to the federal claims against Spurgeon, and relinquishes jurisdiction over the state law claims.
In a previous order, the Court dismissed Plaintiff's § 1985 conspiracy claim, the § 1983 claim against Sheriff Cottey in his individual capacity, the § 1983 claims against Sheriff Cottey and Spurgeon in their official capacities, and the § 1983 claim against the Marion County Sheriff's Department. Doc. No. 63.
I. BACKGROUND
On June 27, 1997, Donna Johnson, the bookkeeper of Daddy Jack's Restaurant in Indianapolis, Indiana, contacted the Marion County Sheriffs Department to report that several business checks had been stolen. Def.'s Stmt. of Facts at 1. On June 20, 1997, an African-American woman appeared at People's Check Cashing Service, Inc., in Indianapolis and cashed one of the stolen checks for $789.23. Id. at 2. On June 27, 1997, an African-American woman cashed one stolen check at SK Liquor Store in Indianapolis for $789.23, and two other stolen checks — both for $789.23 — at the QC Financial Services, d/b/a Quick Cash. Id. The woman presenting the stolen checks used a driver's licence as identification. Spurgeon Dep. at 17, 21. The license had the following name, address, and date of birth: Tracey L. Taylor, 622 West 39th Street, Indianapolis, Indiana, 46208, 2/16/65. Def.'s Ex. 1. Tracey L. Taylor was Taylor-Hudgins' name before she married in 1994, and February 16, 1965, is Taylor-Hudgins' date of birth. PL's Stmt. of Facts at 1; Def.'s Ex. 1. The driver's licence was current and it had not been reported stolen. Spurgeon Dep. at 30.
On July 16, 1997, Detective Spurgeon assembled a photo array of six African-American women and presented it to Tyrone Payton, a clerk at the SK Liquor Store who had received one of the stolen checks. Def.'s Stmt. of Facts at 2. Taylor-Hudgins was one of the women in the photo array. Id. Tyrone Payton identified Taylor-Hudgins as the person who had cashed the stolen check on June 27, 1997. On August 28, 1997, Spurgeon showed the same photo array to William Marr, a clerk at the People's Check Cashing Service who had received one of the stolen checks. Id. William Marr identified Taylor-Hudgins as the person who had cashed a stolen check on June 20, 1997. Id.
Taylor-Hudgins filed a Motion to Strike these identifications as inadmissible hearsay. However, the identifications are not hearsay because they are not being offered for their truth. Specifically, the identifications are not being offered to show that Taylor-Hudgins actually committed the crimes. Rather, Defendants offer the identifications to show that there was probable cause to arrest Taylor-Hudgins. The statements are admissible for this purpose. Even if the statements were hearsay, the Court would still consider them. FED. R. EVID. 1101 (rules of evidence do not apply at hearings for issuance of arrest warrants); IND. CODE 35-33-5-2 (affidavit in support of application for arrest warrant may be based in part on hearsay, provided that the totality of the circumstances corroborates the hearsay.). See also Woods v. City of Chicago, 234 F.3d 979, 987 (7th Cir. 2000); U.S. v. U.S. Currency Deposited for Active Trade, 176 F.3d 941, 944 (7th Cir. 1999). The Motion to Strike is DENIED.
SK Liquor Store also had a regiscope photograph of the woman who presented the stolen checks in the store on June 27, 1997. Def.'s Ex. 4. In addition, SK Liquor Store had a photograph of the driver's license that the woman presented to its clerk that day. Id. An SK Liquor Store employee gave the photograph of the woman and the photograph of the driver's license to Spurgeon. Spurgeon Dep. at 40-41. Spurgeon concluded that Taylor-Hudgins was the woman depicted in the photos, and that she was wearing a wig when she presented the stolen checks. Id.
On October 15, 1997, Spurgeon filed an Affidavit for Probable Cause for Taylor-Hudgins' arrest with the Marion County Courts, and probable cause was found by the Marion Criminal Court 1. Def.'s Exs. 1,4. That same day, Taylor-Hudgins was charged with two counts of forgery and two counts of theft, and a warrant was issued for her arrest.
Over three years later, on November 11, 2000, the Neshoba County (Mississippi) Sheriff's Office called Taylor-Hudgins and told her they had a warrant for her arrest from the State of Indiana. PL's Stmt. of Facts at 4. Taylor-Hudgins turned herself in, and she was released on bond. Id. However, the Neshoba County Sheriff's Office called her again on December 28, 2000, and told her to surrender herself for transfer to Indiana. Id. Taylor-Hudgins surrendered herself that day, and was detained in Neshoba County Jail until January 11, 2001, when she was picked up by extradition officers for transport to Indiana. Id.
Kelly Hudson ("Hudson"), Taylor-Hudgins' cousin, contacted the Neshoba County Sheriff's Department and obtained Detective Spurgeon's name and phone number in Indianapolis. Hudson Aff. ¶ 5. Hudson telephoned Spurgeon and advised him that Taylor-Hudgins was at work in Philadelphia, Mississippi, when the crimes were committed in Indianapolis. Id. ¶ 6. Hudson contacted Shoney's Restaurant and Silver Star Casino, Taylor-Hudgins' employers, to obtain documentation that Taylor-Hudgins was working at the time in question. Id. ¶ 7. According to Hudson, she faxed the information to Spurgeon, and he acknowledged over the telephone that he had received the fax. Id. ¶ 8. Hudson does not indicate in her affidavit when these communications occurred.
Spurgeon remembers receiving a call from a female relative of Taylor-Hudgins. Spurgeon Dep. at 36-37. The call probably took place in 2000. Id. The woman told Spurgeon that Taylor-Hudgins did not commit the crimes. Id. They talked a second time and Spurgeon told the woman that a warrant had been issued and that it was out of his hands. Id. Spurgeon gave the woman the name and phone number of the prosecutor. Id. Spurgeon testified that he never received any fax about Taylor-Hudgins. Id. at 38.
Taylor-Hudgins was held in Marion County jail until her scheduled trial date of May 3, 2001, because she could not make bail. PL's Stmt. of Facts at 6. On the date of her trial, Deputy Prosecutor Richard Veen dismissed the charges against Taylor-Hudgins, acknowledging on the record that the prosecutor's office had verified information that Taylor-Hudgins was actually at her place of employment in Mississippi when the crimes were committed. Id.
II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
As stated by the Supreme Court, summary judgment is not a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather is an integral part of the federal rules as a whole, which are designed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327(1986). See also United Ass'n of Black Landscapers v. City of'Milwaukee, 916 F.2d 1261, 1267-68 (7th Cir. 1990). Motions for summary judgment are governed by Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides in relevant part:
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
Once a party has made a properly-supported motion for summary judgment, the opposing party may not simply rest upon the pleadings but must instead submit evidentiary materials which "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e). A genuine issue of material fact exists whenever "there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). The nonmoving party bears the burden of demonstrating that such a genuine issue of material fact exists. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986); Oliver v. Oshkosh Truck Corp., 96 F.3d 992, 997 (7th Cir. 1996). It is not the duty of the Court to scour the record in search of evidence to defeat a motion for summary judgment; rather, the nonmoving party bears the responsibility of identifying the evidence upon which she relies. See Bombard v. Fort Wayne Newspapers, Inc., 92 F.3d 560, 562 (7th Cir. 1996). When the moving party has met the standard of Rule 56, summary judgment is mandatory. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23; Shields Enters., Inc. v. First Chi. Corp., 975 F.2d 1290, 1294 (7th Cir. 1992).
In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the Court should draw all reasonable inferences from undisputed facts in favor of the nonmoving party and should view the disputed evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Estate of Cole v. Fromm, 94 F.3d 254, 257 (7th Cir. 1996). The mere existence of a factual dispute, by itself, is not sufficient to bar summary judgment. Only factual disputes that might affect the outcome of the suit in light of the substantive law will preclude summary judgment. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; JPM Inc. v. John Deere Indus. Equip. Co., 94 F.3d 270, 273 (7th Cir. 1996). Irrelevant or unnecessary facts do not deter summary judgment, even when in dispute. See Clifton v. Schafer, 969 F.2d 278, 281 (7th Cir. 1992). "If the nonmoving party fails to establish the existence of an element essential to [her] case, one on which [she] would bear the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment must be granted to the moving party." Ortiz v. John O. Butler Co., 94 F.3d 1121, 1124 (7th Cir. 1996).
III. DISCUSSION A. SECTION 1983 CLAIMS AGAINST SPURGEON
42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates a federal cause of action for "the deprivation, under color of [state] law, of a citizen's rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States." Spiegel v. Rabinovitz, 121 F.3d 251, 254 (7th Cir. 1997). Section 1983 is not itself a font for substantive rights; instead it acts as an instrument for vindicating federal rights conferred elsewhere. Id. As noted above, Taylor-Hudgins contends that Spurgeon violated her Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure, her equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, and her due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Spurgeon does not dispute that he was acting under the color of state law at the time in question. Instead, he maintains that he did not violate Taylor-Hudgins' constitutional rights. First, Spurgeon argues that Taylor-Hudgins' § 1983 Fourth Amendment claim fails due to the existence of probable cause for her arrest. Second, Spurgeon maintains that the § 1983 equal protection claim should be dismissed because Taylor-Hudgins does not have any evidence that he purposefully discriminated against her on the basis of her race. Third, Spurgeon contends that the § 1983 due process claim fails because the circumstances are not egregious enough to support a due process claim. In the alternative, Spurgeon argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity on the constitutional claims. Each argument will be addressed in turn.
1. Fourth Amendment
It is well-settled that the existence of probable cause defeats an unconstitutional arrest claim. See Schertz v. Waupaca County, 875 F.2d 578, 584 (7th Cir. 1989). Probable cause is a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, not a certainty that a crime was committed. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 244 n. 13, 103 S.Ct. 2317 (1983). A judicial officer's finding of probable cause to issue an arrest warrant is not dispositive of the issue in a subsequent civil action. See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 345, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 1098 (1986). Instead, the Court must determine "whether a reasonably well-trained officer in [Spurgeon's] position would have known that his affidavit failed to establish probable cause and that he should not have applied for the warrant." Id. at 345. Probable cause determinations are reviewed based on the information that was available to the officer at the time of the arrest or the application for the arrest warrant, not based on information that came to light subsequent to the arrest. See Beauchamp v. City of Noblesville, Ind., 320 F.3d 733, 743 (7th Cir. 2003).
With these standards in mind, the Court turns to the instant facts. When Spurgeon applied for the arrest warrant, he knew that an African-American woman had cashed stolen checks in several business establishments in Indianapolis. The woman had presented an Indiana driver's license identifying herself as Tracey L. Taylor, which was Taylor-Hudgins' name before she married. The date of birth on the license was February 16, 1965, which was Taylor-Hudgins date of birth. The driver's licence was current and it had not been reported stolen. In addition, eyewitnesses from two of the stores where the stolen checks were presented identified Taylor-Hudgins as the perpetrator of the crime.
Those facts established probable cause for Taylor-Hudgins' arrest. The Seventh Circuit has consistently held that information from an eyewitness about the identity of a perpetrator of a crime establishes probable cause, unless the officer has reason to doubt the truthfulness of the information. See Gramenos v. Jewel Cos., 797 F.2d 432, 439 (7th Cir. 1986). This rule carries the day for Spurgeon on the Fourth Amendment issue. Taylor-Hudgins was identified from a photo array by both Tyrone Payton and William Marr, and she has not adduced any evidence that indicates that there was reason for Spurgeon to doubt either identification. Spurgeon's decision to seek two identifications lessened the danger that one of the witnesses made an error or was untruthful, and the fact that two witnesses identified Taylor-Hudgins also significantly decreased the probability that she was a victim of identity theft. In addition, the driver's licence presented by the woman was current and had not been reported stolen, which also decreased the probability that Taylor-Hudgins had been a victim of identity theft.
Taylor-Hudgins' main argument on the probable cause issue stems from the SK Liquor Store's regiscope photograph of the woman who cashed the stolen checks in the store on June 27, 1997, along with the photo of the driver's license used at the SK Liquor Store that day. According to Taylor-Hudgins, neither of the two photos resembles her at all. Spurgeon, on the other hand, compared the two photos to photos of Taylor-Hudgins and concluded that Taylor-Hudgins was the woman in the photos, although she had disguised herself by wearing a wig. Unfortunately, the original photos are not available and the parties only have blurry copies of the originals. Cf. PL's Ex. 4 and 5; Spurgeon Dep. at 41-42. However, even if it was not entirely clear from the originals that the woman depicted was Taylor-Hudgins, it would not be reasonable to conclude that a reasonably well-trained officer in Spurgeon's position would have known that probable cause did not exist. Two independent eyewitnesses identified Taylor-Hudgins as the perpetrator, the facts related to Spurgeon by the witnesses established a crime, Spurgeon had no reason to doubt the witnesses, and Taylor-Hudgins' valid Indiana driver's license was used as identification at the stores. This is enough to establish probable cause. See Grimm v. Churchill, 932 F.2d 674 (7th Cir. 1991) (concluding that identification by twelve-year-old victim was sufficient to establish probable cause); Jones v. City of Chicago, 856 F.2d 985, 994 (7th Cir. 1988) (stating that an identification given by a "lucid" victim would establish probable cause); Gerald M. v. Conneely, 858 F.2d 378, 381 (7th Cir. 1988) ("The law does not require that a police officer conduct an incredibly detailed investigation at the probable cause stage."). Because the existence of probable cause defeats a Fourth Amendment claim for unconstitutional arrest, the Court GRANTS Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on the § 1983 Fourth Amendment claim.
2. Equal Protection
Spurgeon also moves for summary judgment on Taylor-Hudgins' § 1983 equal protection claim. According to Spurgeon, Taylor-Hudgins does not have any evidence that Spurgeon purposefully discriminated against her on the basis of her race. In her opposition memorandum, Taylor-Hudgins does not respond to Spurgeon's argument about the equal protection claim."To state an equal protection claim, a § 1983 plaintiff must allege that a state actor purposefully discriminated against him because of his identification with a particular (presumably historically disadvantaged) group." Sherwin Manor Nursing Home, Inc. v. McAuliffe, 37 F.3d 1216, 1220 (7th Cir. 1994). See also Shaikh v. City of Chicago, 341 F.3d 627, 635 (7th Cir. 2003). Although Taylor-Hudgins is African-American, she presents no evidence at all that her race had anything to do with her arrest and detention. In fact, as noted above, Taylor-Hudgins does not even mention her equal protection cause of action in her opposition memorandum. As noted by the Seventh Circuit, it is not the duty of the Court to scour the record in search of evidence to defeat a motion for summary judgment. See Bombard v. Fort Wayne Newspapers, Inc., 92 F.3d 560, 562 (7th Cir. 1996). Rather, the nonmoving party bears the responsibility of identifying the evidence upon which she relies. See id. Because Taylor-Hudgins, the non-moving party, has not identified any evidence in support of her equal protection claim, and because the Court is not aware of any evidence in the instant case that would support such a claim, the Court GRANTS Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on the § 1983 equal protection claim against Spurgeon.
3. Due Process
Spurgeon also seeks summary judgment on Taylor-Hudgins' § 1983 due process claim. According to Spurgeon, the circumstances of this case are not egregious enough to support a due process claim. In response, Taylor-Hudgins argues that she was detained for 128 days despite having provided verified evidence of an alibi, and that those facts are sufficient to establish a due process violation.
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States' Constitution guarantees, inter alia, that state actors will not "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. Amend. XIV, § 1. The due process clause was designed to prevent abusive government conduct. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331, 106 S.Ct. 662, 665 (1986). Government conduct that "shocks the conscience" violates the substantive component of the due process clause. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 72 S.Ct. 205 (1952) (pumping a suspect's stomach for evidence is conduct that "shocks the conscience" and violates the due process clause). While the "shock the conscience" standard governs government action in dangerous, fluid situations like high-speed automobile chases or prison riots, the lower standard of "deliberate indifference" applies in custodial situations when government actors actually have a chance to deliberate. See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 851-53, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 1719-1721 (1998) ("As the very term `deliberate indifference' implies, the standard is sensibly employed only when actual deliberation is practical . . ."). The Seventh Circuit has defined "deliberate indifference" as "conscious disregard of known or obvious dangers." Armstrong v. Squadrito, 152 F.3d 564, 577 (7th Cir. 1998). In all events, mere negligent conduct does not implicate the due process clause. See Daniels, 474 U.S. at 332-36 (explaining that the due process clause does not supplant traditional tort remedies).
Taylor-Hudgins contends that Spurgeon acted with deliberate indifference because he allowed her to be detained for 128 days while he had verified evidence of an alibi defense. This contention is misleading and not supported by the record. Taylor-Hudgins has not provided the Court with the verified evidence of her alibi defense, nor has she informed the Court what the verified information consisted of, outside of Hudson's statement that it showed that Taylor-Hudgins was at work in Mississippi when the crimes were committed in Indianapolis. More importantly, Hudson's affidavit gives the Court no indication of when she sent Spurgeon the fax with the verified exculpatory information, except that it was sent after Taylor-Hudgins' arrest. Despite this gap in the evidence, Taylor-Hudgins represents that Spurgeon had the verified alibi evidence for the entire 128-day period that she was detained. PL's Memo in Opposition at 12. While Taylor-Hudgins gets the benefit of reasonable inferences from the evidence at summary judgment, the Court will not credit exaggeration or allow jumps to factual conclusions not supported by the record.
The only evidence in the record about Spurgeon's personal involvement and reaction to the exculpatory evidence comes from Spurgeon's deposition and Hudson's affidavit. According to Spurgeon, he told Taylor-Hudgins' relative that the warrant had been issued and that it was out of his hands. Spurgeon Dep. at 36-37. In addition, Spurgeon testified that he gave the woman the name and phone number of the prosecutor. Id. Hudson's affidavit does not contradict those statements. PL's Ex. 7. Hudson testified that Spurgeon still thought that Taylor-Hudgins was guilty despite her protests. Id.
According to Taylor-Hudgins' complaint, the exculpatory evidence was passed on to the prosecutor. Comp. ¶ 30. The prosecutor is not a defendant in this suit.
These facts are insufficient to support a finding that Spurgeon's actions (or omissions) amounted to deliberate indifference. In contrast to other due process cases where investigating officers defrauded prosecutors by withholding exculpatory evidence, Spurgeon provided Hudson with the prosecutor's name and phone number. See Newsome v. McCabe, 256 F.3d 747, 752 (7th Cir. 2001) (concluding that police officers who withhold Brady material from prosecutors violate the due process clause); Jones v. City of Chicago, 856 F.2d 985, 994 (7th Cir. 1988) (police officers may not defraud prosecutors and then hide behind them to escape § 1983 liability). Based on the evidence he put together for his probable cause affidavit, Spurgeon told Hudson that he still thought Taylor-Hudgins was guilty. Because he concluded his investigation of the case three years earlier, Spurgeon told Hudson that it was out of his hands, and he gave her the prosecutor's phone number. Even if it was negligent for Spurgeon not to do more, negligent conduct does not implicate the due process clause. See Daniels, 474 U.S. at 332-36. Indeed, even grossly negligent behavior is insufficient to establish a due process violation. See also Lewis v. Anderson, 308 F.3d 768, 773 (7th Cir. 2001) ("Negligence or even gross negligence does not suffice to give rise to liability under § 1983.").
At bottom, the circumstances detailed in the record are simply not as egregious as the circumstances present in cases where courts have found due process violations or denied summary judgment on due process claims. Cf. Armstrong v. Squadrito, 152 F.3d 564 (7th Cir. 1998)(§ 1983 plaintiff had voluntarily turned himself in to a lockup facility after learning that a body attachment warrant had been issued for his arrest due to failure to appear in court for hearing on child support; usual case involved a brief detention in lockup before appearing before judge; § 1983 plaintiff held for 57 days despite the plaintiff's constant protests to guards and other prison officials; appellate court held that substantive due process rights abridged); Cannon v. Macon Co., 1 F.3d 1558 (11th Cir. 1993) (concluding that jury verdict in favor of plaintiff on due process claim was supported by the evidence where woman arrested and detained had different date of birth, height, and social security number than the woman sought and where police had the detained woman's driver's licence in their files); Sanders v. English, 950 F.2d 1152, 1164 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that plaintiffs unlawful detention/due process claim survived summary judgment where plaintiff had evidence that officer knowingly and willingly ignored substantial exculpatory evidence indicating that he had arrested wrong man, including three alibi witnesses that he deemed credible (including a police officer), a negative identification by an eyewitness, and a belated identification by the victim under peculiar circumstances).
As the Supreme Court recently emphasized, "only the most egregious official conduct can be said to be arbitrary in the constitutional sense." Lewis, 523 U.S. at 846. The record in the instant case does support such a finding against Detective Spurgeon. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to the due process claim.
B. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
In the alternative, Spurgeon maintains that he is entitled to qualified immunity on the federal claims. The Court agrees with Spurgeon. As the Seventh Circuit has recognized, issues of immunity often overlap with the merits of constitutional claims. See Kelley v. Myler, 149 F.3d 641, 648 (7th Cir. 1994). Because Spurgeon's actions (and omissions) did not violate any constitutional provision, he is immune from Taylor-Hudgins' § 1983 claims. See Alvarado v. Litscher, 267 F.3d 648, 652 (7th Cir. 2001) ("Qualified immunity protects government officials from civil liability when performing discretionary functions so long as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.") (internal quotations and citation omitted).
C. JURISDICTION
Because the Court has granted Spurgeon summary judgment on all of the federal claims against him, original jurisdiction is now lacking and the Court may — pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3)-properly dismiss Taylor-Hudgins' remaining state law claims. "In an ordinary case of supplemental jurisdiction, the presumption is in favor of relinquishment when the claim that is within the original jurisdiction of the district court was dismissed before trial." See also Alonzi v. Budget Constr. Co., 55 F.3d 331, 334 (7th Cir. 1995). Brazinski v. Amoco Petroleum Additives Co., 6 F.3d 1176, 1182 (7th Cir. 1993). The Court chooses to exercise its discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), and hereby DISMISSES without prejudice Taylor-Hudgins' state law claims.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, the Court GRANTS Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to the federal claims against Spurgeon. Due to this disposition of the federal claims, the Court now lacks original jurisdiction over the remaining state claims. Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES without prejudice the state law claims.
IT IS SO ORDERED