Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-0593-13T4
07-16-2014
ANGELITA TAVERAS,1 Plaintiff-Respondent, v. JUAN R. ROMAN and BETZAIDA RUIZ, Defendants, and CURE AUTO INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant. YOLANDA M. MARIOT and LINO MARIOT, her husband, Plaintiffs, v. ANGELITA TAVERAS, JUAN R. ROMAN, and SCHOOL TYME TRANSPORTATION, Defendants.
Danielle J. Reiss argued the cause for appellant (Bright & Sponder, attorneys; Ms. Reiss, of counsel and on the briefs). Randi S. Greenberg argued the cause for respondent (The Law Offices of John C. Sinuk, attorneys; Ms. Greenberg, on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
Before Judges Espinosa and O'Connor.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Middlesex County, Docket Nos. L-7314-11 and L-7788-11.
Danielle J. Reiss argued the cause for appellant (Bright & Sponder, attorneys; Ms. Reiss, of counsel and on the briefs).
Randi S. Greenberg argued the cause for respondent (The Law Offices of John C. Sinuk, attorneys; Ms. Greenberg, on the brief). PER CURIAM
The question posed by this appeal is whether a minivan that is used as a school vehicle falls within the definition of "automobile" under N.J.S.A. 39:6A-2(a). Plaintiff Angelita Taveras was driving a minivan owned by her employer, School Tyme Transportation (School Tyme) home from work when the motor vehicle accident occurred. Her application for personal injury protection (PIP) benefits was denied by her insurer, defendant CURE Auto Insurance Company (CURE). CURE now appeals from an order that denied its motion for summary judgment. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
I
Taveras was employed as a driver for School Tyme, a company that contracted with various school districts for the transportation of children with special needs to and from school. The company owned between one hundred and two hundred vehicles, both yellow school buses and minivans.
School Tyme allowed Taveras to use one of the minivans for travel to and from work and to keep the minivan at her home overnight. The collision occurred just after the end of a work day while Taveras was driving home with her coworker, Yolanda Mariot, in a 2000 Chrysler Grand Voyager minivan owned by School Tyme.
Mariot filed a separate action, which was consolidated with this matter. She is not a party to this appeal.
N.J.S.A. 39:1-1 provides the following definitions:
"School bus" means every motor vehicle operated by, or under contract with, a public or governmental agency, or religious or other charitable organization or corporation, or privately operated for the transportation of children to or from school for secular or religious education, which complies with the regulations of the New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission affecting school buses, including "School Vehicle Type I" and "School Vehicle Type II" as defined below:
. . . .
"School Vehicle Type II" means any vehicle designed to transport less than 16 passengers, including the driver, used to transport enrolled children, and adults only when serving as chaperones, to or from a school, school connected activity, day camp, summer day camp, summer residence camp, nursery school, child care center, preschool center or other similar places of education.
Such vehicle shall comply with the regulations of the New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission and either the Department of Education or the Department of Human Services, whichever is the appropriate supervising agency.
The minivan's rear bumper was clearly marked with the words "SCHOOL VEHICLE." Its license plate began with "S2," which the Motor Vehicle Commission (MVC) describes as a Code 18 plate on its list of commercial vehicles. See State of New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission, http://www.state.nj.us/mvc/Commercial/ Commercialvehicle.htm (last visited July 2, 2014). MVC's website states that such plates are subject to special conditions, which include the following:
A vehicle registered as a School Vehicle I or II may only be used to transport enrolled children and adults serving as chaperones to or from:
School
School related activity
Day camp
Summer day camp
Nursery school
Child-care center
Pre-school
Similar places of education
Taveras was stopped at a traffic light when the minivan was struck from behind by a car owned by Betzaida Ruiz and operated by Juan Roman. Taveras suffered injuries and was taken by ambulance to a hospital for treatment.
At the time of the collision, Taveras had an automobile insurance policy issued by defendant CURE, which covered her personally owned 1999 Dodge Caravan minivan. Taveras filed a claim for PIP benefits following the collision, but CURE denied the claim on the ground that her injuries did not result from the ownership, maintenance, or use of an "automobile" as that term is defined in N.J.S.A. 39:6A-2(a) for purposes of the New Jersey Automobile Reparation Reform Act (No Fault Act), N.J.S.A. 39:6A-1 to -35. Taveras then filed suit against CURE, Roman, and Ruiz. CURE moved for summary judgment on the ground that Taveras was not entitled to PIP benefits as a matter of law because the vehicle she was operating when injured was not an "automobile" as defined in the statute.
Her claims against Roman and Ruiz were settled.
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The trial judge denied the motion. In his oral statement of reasons, the judge made no finding as to whether the vehicle fell within the statutory definition of "automobile." He found that the definition for School Vehicle Type II did not apply, stating he interpreted the designation as applying when
the vehicle . . . [is] functionally used for the purpose of transporting enrolled children. This vehicle was not used for that purpose on this day. Whether it was habitually used, whether it was used every other day is irrelevant. On this day it was used purely for commutation. On that basis,
I deny the motion for summary judgment and the case will proceed accordingly.
II
In reviewing an order granting summary judgment, this court employs the same standard of review as the trial court, Coyne v. N.J. Dep't of Transp., 182 N.J. 481, 491 (2005); R. 4:46-2(c); see also Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995). Here, the parties agree that Taveras was injured while driving home from work in a minivan labeled "SCHOOL VEHICLE" that was owned by her employer for the primary purpose of transporting children to and from school. The parties disagree only as to the purely legal question as to whether that vehicle falls within the definition of "automobile" contained in N.J.S.A. 39:6A-2(a). Our review is therefore de novo, and we need not give deference to the trial judge's interpretation of law. Zabilowicz v. Kelsey, 200 N.J. 507, 512-13 (2009).
PIP coverage is only available when the automobile involved meets the statutory definition of "automobile." N.J.S.A. 39:6A-2(a); Perez v. Farmers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. of Salem Cnty., 417 N.J. Super. 403, 407 (App. Div. 2011). Because N.J.S.A. 39:6A-16 requires that the No Fault Act be construed liberally to effect its remedial purpose to provide broad protection for accident victims, "we must construe the language of the definition in a manner that sensibly applies the No Fault Act and fulfills its policy objectives." N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co. v. Hardy, 178 N.J. 327, 332-33 (2004).
N.J.S.A. 39:6A-2(a) defines "automobile" as
a private passenger automobile of a private passenger or station wagon type that is owned or hired and is neither used as a public or livery conveyance for passengers nor rented to others with a driver; and a motor vehicle with a pickup body, a delivery sedan, a van, or a panel truck or a camper type vehicle used for recreational purposes owned by an individual or by husband and wife who are residents of the same household, not customarily used in the occupation, profession or business of the insured other than farming or ranching
. . . .
The Supreme Court has interpreted this definition as follows:
[T]he statute refers to a "type" of vehicle, and then excludes specific vehicles based on their use. The first clause of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-2(a) uses the insurance rating classification term "private passenger automobile" and includes two types of that classification: "private passenger" or "station wagon" "type" automobiles. The definition then exempts certain private-passenger-type and station-wagon-type automobiles based on their specific use: those that are used "as a public livery or conveyance for passengers" or "rented to others with a driver" are excepted from the definition. The second clause of the definition addresses the broader category of "motor vehicle[s]." It establishes that certain identified types of motor vehicles are considered automobiles for the purpose of the No
Fault Act provided that they are not used for business purposes. Again, the statute begins with a "type" of vehicle and then exempts some vehicles based on specific uses.
[Hardy, supra, 178 N.J. at 334.]
Stated simply, "the meaning of 'automobile' in N.J.S.A. 39:6A-2(a) . . . focuses first on the type of vehicle and then examines its use." Id. at 335; see also Perez, supra, 417 N.J. Super. at 407. The statute establishes two categories of vehicles subject to PIP coverage. The first category, stripped of exceptions not applicable here, applies to "a private passenger automobile of a private passenger or station wagon type." The second category applies to a variety of other specified types of motor vehicles, that are not used for business purposes. See ibid.
The Supreme Court found further "that the Legislature used the term 'private passenger automobile' as a term of art to distinguish such vehicles from 'public' passenger automobiles (such as taxicabs), and from private 'freight' automobiles (such as trucks)." Hardy, supra, 178 N.J. at 335. The Court concluded that this interpretation "gives meaning to all of the words employed in the statute and furthers the legislative intent to achieve broad protection of accident victims." Id. at 336. Applying this analysis, the Supreme Court found that a police cruiser was a "private passenger automobile" under the No Fault Act when a police officer was injured while on patrol in the police cruiser. Id. at 338.
In a decision cited with approval in Hardy, we held that a minivan, such as that used by Taveras here, is a "station wagon type automobile" that falls within the first of the categories of "automobile" in N.J.S.A. 39:6A-2(a). Giordano v. Allstate Ins. Co., 260 N.J. Super. 329, 331-33 (App. Div. 1992). In Giordano, the minivan was owned by a car dealership and assigned to a salesman for unrestricted personal use. Because the vehicle fell within the first category of "automobiles," the fact that the minivan was used in the dealership as a demonstration vehicle for customers did not affect its status as an "automobile" under the statute. Id. at 332-33. Similarly, the minivan here falls within the first category of automobiles. Therefore, it is not examined under the criteria applicable to the second category of "automobiles," and we are not concerned with whether the vehicle is used generally for business purposes.
Rather, the disqualifying use for vehicles that otherwise fall within the first category of automobiles is whether the vehicle was "used as a public or livery conveyance for passengers [or] rented to others with a driver." N.J.S.A. 39:6A-2(a). CURE does not argue that either of those exceptions apply here. In fact, defendant specifically asserts, and we agree, that the minivan driven by Taveras was not a "public or livery conveyance" because it was held open only to certain passengers on certain occasions, specific children traveling to or from school, and not held open to the general public. See generally CSC Ins. Servs. v. Graves, 293 N.J. Super. 244 (Law Div. 1996).
Instead, CURE argues that the minivan was not an "automobile" under N.J.S.A. 39:6A-2(a) because it was a "school bus" under N.J.S.A. 39:1-1. However, neither statute states that the characterization of a vehicle under its definition excludes the application of the other. Although N.J.S.A. 39:6A-2(a) does not exclude "school buses" from the definition of "automobile," it does exclude certain vehicles from the definition based on their use. Specifically, vehicles such as the minivan here are not "automobiles" if "used as a public or livery conveyance for passengers nor rented to others with a driver." N.J.S.A. 39:6A-2(a). CURE agrees that this exception does not apply. The disqualifying use for the second category of vehicles (and therefore not applicable to our consideration of the minivan's status) is that the vehicle is "not customarily used in the occupation, profession or business of the insured other than farming or ranching." Ibid. Consistent with the Supreme Court's and the Legislature's admonitions to construe the No Fault Act liberally in favor of broad coverage, Hardy, supra, 178 N.J. at 332 (2004); N.J.S.A. 39:6A-16, we will not read an exclusion into the statute where no exclusion exists.
CURE's reliance upon our decision in Beaugard v. Johnson, 281 N.J. Super. 162 (App. Div. 1995) does not support a contrary conclusion. In Beaugard, we determined whether the verbal threshold applied to a fifteen-year-old plaintiff who was injured while a passenger on a school bus. Id. at 165-66. To make that determination, we first had to decide whether plaintiff had the right to receive PIP benefits. If she did, she would have been bound by the verbal threshold election in her father's automobile insurance policy. Ibid. In holding that plaintiff was not bound by the verbal threshold, we concluded that she was not entitled to PIP benefits because she "was a passenger in a school bus at the time of the accident" and a "school bus is not an 'automobile' as that term is defined under the statute." Id. at 169.
A mechanical reading of Beaugard suggests that the two definitions are mutually exclusive and that any passenger vehicle used to transport children to and from school, no matter how small, is a school bus and is therefore not an "automobile" under N.J.S.A. 39:6A-2(a). However, the facts of Beaugard do not reveal whether the school bus involved was a large yellow bus, a minivan or some other type of school vehicle. More importantly, Beaugard was decided before the Supreme Court clarified that our analysis of the "automobile" definition should focus first on the type of vehicle and then on its use. Hardy, supra, 178 N.J. at 335.
Therefore, while we agree with CURE's argument that the motion judge erred in relying upon the nature of the use of the vehicle at the time of the accident rather than whether its character fell within the definition of "automobile" for purposes of the No Fault Act, see Bello v. Hurley Limousines, 249 N.J. Super. 31, 37 (App. Div. 1991); Graves, supra, 293 N.J. Super. at 249-50, we conclude that the minivan driven by Taveras was an "automobile" as defined by N.J.S.A. 39:6A-2(a) and may not serve as a basis for CURE to deny PIP benefits to Taveras.
Affirmed. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION