Opinion
FSTFA175017411S
09-27-2018
Joseph TARNOWSKY v. Theresa N. IORFINO
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
OPINION
HELLER, J.
On September 28, 2017, the plaintiff Joseph Tarnowsky filed a complaint, returnable October 17, 2017, seeking the dissolution of his marriage to the defendant Theresa N. Iorfino and an equitable division of their property and debts. On October 25, 2017, the defendant filed an answer to the complaint (# 101.00). She filed a cross complaint on November 1, 2017, in which she sought dissolution of the parties’ marriage and equitable distribution of the marital estate (# 102.00).
A limited contested trial took place on May 30, 2018. The court heard testimony from the parties, reviewed the exhibits that were admitted into evidence, took judicial notice of the contents of the court file, and considered the arguments of counsel. The court reserved decision at the conclusion of the trial.
As financial matters were in dispute, the court ordered that the automatic sealing of the parties’ financial affidavits be terminated pursuant to Practice Book § 25-59A(h) (# 117.00).
I
FINDINGS
Having carefully considered the relevant and credible evidence offered at trial, the court makes the following findings.
The plaintiff and the defendant, who kept her birth name following the marriage, were married on January 26, 1985 in Stamford, Connecticut. The marriage was the second for the plaintiff and the first for the defendant. Three children were born of this marriage, all of whom have reached the age of majority: Alixzandria Tarnowsky, born on January 31, 1987; Joseph Tarnowsky III, born on August 17, 1990; and Kazzandra Tarnowsky, born on September 13, 1992.
The marriage of the parties has broken down irretrievably, with no reasonable prospect of reconciliation.
Neither the State of Connecticut nor any municipality has contributed any financial assistance for the support or maintenance of either party. The State of Connecticut did not appear in this case.
The allegations of the complaint are found to be true. The court has jurisdiction because the plaintiff and the defendant have resided continuously in the state of Connecticut for at least the twelve months preceding the filing of the dissolution complaint.
The plaintiff husband : The plaintiff is sixty-five years old. He described his health as fairly good. He suffers from chronic obstructive pulmonary disease and thyroid disease.
The plaintiff is a 1971 graduate of Darien High School. He attended one semester at Norwalk Community College.
The plaintiff had his own moving company at the time of the marriage. After an accident in 1997, the plaintiff was unable to work as a mover. He could still drive his truck, but he needed someone to help him.
The plaintiff is currently employed as a truck driver by C. Blackburn, Inc. (Blackburn), a contract carrier for the United States postal service. He has worked for Blackburn for approximately five years. Before he was hired by Blackburn, he was unemployed for approximately nine months. The plaintiff’s prior employment was with Freddy’s U.S. Mail, another contractor for the post office. The plaintiff also served as a constable for the Town of Darien in 1997, and he ran errands for Abate & Fox, the defendant’s employer, until approximately 2004.
The plaintiff hopes to move to Montana to work as a truck driver or a cowboy following the dissolution of the parties’ marriage. He testified that he always wanted to be a rancher or a farmer.
The defendant wife : The defendant is sixty-three years old. She described her health as good. She said that she does not see a doctor, and she is not on any medications. She is a smoker.
At the time of the marriage, the defendant was employed as a paralegal by the Stamford law firm then known as Abate & Fox. The defendant has worked for the firm, now known as Fox & Fox, since April 1, 1982. The plaintiff described the defendant as the "brain" in the marriage, while he was the "brawn."
The marriage: The parties met in a bar in 1983. They were married a year and a half later. About three hundred guests attended their wedding.
The parties resided in a house located at 14 Grove Street in Darien, Connecticut (the Grove Street property) after they were married. The plaintiff’s parents had transferred ownership of the Grove Street property to him by quitclaim deed on February 6, 1984.
The existing house on the Grove Street property was a small cottage. In 1985, the defendant’s father and his crew tore the house down and built a new home on the property- described by the defendant as a "mini-colonial"- for the parties. The parties lived in an apartment in a building owned by the defendant’s father while the new house was being built. The cost to build the new house was approximately $60,000 to $65,000, which was paid for mostly from the parties’ wedding gifts.
The parties’ three children were born during the time that they lived in the house on the Grove Street property. As the children grew, it became apparent that the Grove Street property was not large enough for a family of five. On September 30, 1996, the parties purchased the property located at 9 Richmond Drive in Darien (the Richmond Drive property) for $360,000. They took title in the defendant’s name to shield the property from potential claims arising from the plaintiff’s moving company.
Each of the parties contributed to the purchase price of the Richmond Drive property. The defendant borrowed the balance of the purchase price from her father and her brother. According to the defendant’s current financial affidavit (# 116.00), there is still a balance due of $163,249 on the loan from her father for the purchase of the Richmond Drive property.
References to a party’s financial affidavit herein shall mean the party’s current financial affidavit unless otherwise indicated.
The parties still owned the Grove Street property when they purchased the Richmond Drive property. The plaintiff testified that she was carrying two houses until the Grove Street property was sold in March 1998. The net sale proceeds were deposited into the defendant’s savings account. The defendant used the sale proceeds to repay a portion of what was owed to her father and her brother.
On May 24, 2013, the defendant transferred the Richmond Drive property by quitclaim deed to "The Theresa N. Iorfino Revocable Trust u/a dated May 24th, 2013" (the trust). The plaintiff said that he was not aware of the trust at the time of the transfer, although he learned of it at some point in time. He did not discuss it with the defendant because they had stopped speaking to each other years earlier.
The defendant was the primary breadwinner for the family throughout the marriage. Her salary went into her checking account, and she paid the household bills as they came due. The plaintiff testified that his only bill was the telephone bill. He said that he did not have much money because he stayed home with the children and worked only part time.
The plaintiff testified that the marriage broke down as a result of an incident that occurred in 2004. He said that he was disciplining one of the children when the defendant intervened and told him that he "disgusted" her. From that point on, he stopped speaking to the defendant, and he did not respond if she spoke to him. According to the plaintiff, he thought that the defendant would ask him what was bothering him, but she never did.
The defendant testified that the incident in question occurred in 2001. She said that they had just returned from picking Alixzandria up from horseback riding camp. According to the defendant, the plaintiff was outside screaming at the children. She told him that the neighbors could hear him and that he was just "white trash."
The defendant said that this was the proverbial "straw that broke the camel’s back." She moved out of the marital bedroom and has been sleeping on the living room couch since that time. The parties stopped speaking to each other. They never sought marital counseling. By the time of the dissolution trial, the parties had not spoken to each other for fourteen years- according to the plaintiff- or seventeen years- according to the defendant- yet they continued to reside together in the Richmond Drive property.
The defendant considers the plaintiff to be solely responsible for the breakdown of the marriage. The plaintiff thinks that both of them are at fault. The court finds that this marriage was a troubled one for many years, due primarily to the parties’ manifest inability to communicate with each other, the plaintiff’s unemployment or underemployment for much of the marriage, and their financial dependency on the defendant’s father. The court finds that both of the parties contributed to the breakdown of the marriage.
The parties’ assets : Both parties brought assets to the marriage. The plaintiff owned the Grove Street property, his moving truck, and several guns. The defendant had some money in her bank account when the parties were married.
As of the trial date, the parties owned the following:
(a) The Richmond Drive property : As discussed above, title to the Richmond Drive property is held by The Theresa N. Iorfino Revocable Trust u/a dated May 24, 2013. The defendant is the settlor and the trustee of the trust. There is a First County Bank home equity line of credit on the Richmond Drive property with a balance due of $230,500 as of the trial date.
The defendant obtained the First County Bank home equity line of credit to refinance a Chase home equity line of credit. The Chase home equity line of credit was used to pay for most of Alixzandria’s college education and Joseph’s education at Universal Technical Institute.
The plaintiff offered two appraisals of the Richmond Drive property that were admitted into evidence. According to a December 26, 2017 appraisal prepared by Jeffrey Smith of Smith Appraisal Services, the fair market value of the Richmond Drive property was $840,000. The appraisal prepared by Taylor Beerbower of Mulberry Street Appraisals, dated April 3, 2018, found the fair market value of the Richmond Drive property to be $800,000.
The defendant testified that she believed that the fair market value of the Richmond Drive property was significantly lower than the value in either appraisal. In her view, the value of the Richmond Drive property was $640,000. She testified that the house was essentially a tear-down. There were three jacks in the basement to support the house that had been there since they bought it. The house did not have air conditioning. The windows were single pane. The furnace and the hot water heater were twenty-two years old, and the roof was at least that old. She described the house as the least attractive house in the neighborhood, noting that there were houses on the street that sold for more than a million dollars.
(b) The Montana property : The plaintiff purchased a small ranch in Highwood, Montana, about fifty miles from Great Falls, on April 11, 2013. He paid $90,000 for the property. He obtained $45,000 of the purchase price from a loan against his life insurance policy and the balance came from his savings.
According to the plaintiff, the Montana property is only worth about $70,000 at this time. He said that the Montana real estate market has not caught up to the market on the East Coast.
The plaintiff hopes to build a house on the property so that the children can visit him. He plans to have horses and cows as well.
(c) Bank accounts : The plaintiff has two Bank of America checking accounts and a Bank of America savings account. The total balance of these accounts is $906, as reflected on his financial affidavit (# 115.00).
The defendant has a checking account and a savings account at First County Bank. According to her financial affidavit, she has $4,531 in her checking account and $2,908 in her savings account.
(d) Securities accounts : The defendant has a TD Ameritrade account with a value of $6,936, as set forth on her financial affidavit. The plaintiff does not have any securities accounts.
(e) Retirement accounts : According to his financial affidavit, the plaintiff has two IRAs and two 401(k) accounts with a total value of $255,040. The defendant funded the plaintiff’s IRAs from 1985 until 2001. The defendant has three IRAs with a total value of $247,821.
(f) Personal property : The plaintiff’s financial affidavit reflects personal property with a total value of $3,790, comprised of his guns, tools, and equipment. The defendant’s financial affidavit indicates that she has jewelry with a value of $3,000. Neither party listed any other personal property on his or her financial affidavit.
The plaintiff testified about certain paintings and pictures located in the Richmond Drive property that he would like to keep, including a painting of a man on a horse chasing a steer; a painting of a man on a horse going down an incline with a dog; a reproduction of a Frederick Remington painting; and a painting of a small cottage with a pond in front of it that belonged to his parents. The defendant had no objection to the plaintiff’s retaining the paintings; she said that the plaintiff could have all of the personal property in the house. She noted that none of the furniture had been replaced in twenty-two years.
The plaintiff testified that his nephew took the box of family photographs from the Richmond Drive property. He said that he was willing to ship them back to the defendant at his cost.
(g) Automobiles: The plaintiff owns two vehicles: a 2003 Nissan Altima, valued at $3,480 on his financial affidavit, and a 2002 GMC, valued at $5,890. Both vehicles are driven exclusively by the plaintiff
The defendant owns a 2001 Jeep Grand Cherokee with an estimated value of $3,000. This vehicle recently had the engine replaced at a cost of $2,800, which the defendant borrowed from her father. The defendant also owns a 2011 Jeep Liberty, valued at $15,000. This vehicle is registered in the defendant’s name and primarily operated by the parties’ daughter Kazzandra. Both parties gave her money to buy the vehicle.
The parties’ liabilities: The plaintiff reports a balance due on his L.L. Bean credit card in the amount of $25,100. The plaintiff testified that he took a $25,000 cash advance on the card and gambled with it in Montana. He considered that to be his last gambling excursion; he said it was like a "guy with his bachelor party."
The defendant reports debts on her financial affidavit totaling $300,996, in addition to the home equity line of credit, although she testified during the trial that she owed her father a total of $409,300. In addition to the funds that she borrowed from her father for the purchase of the Richmond Drive property, the defendant obtained loans from him to pay for Alixzandria’s first semester of college, Alixzandria’s graduate education, Kazzandra’s college education, Joseph III’s legal fees after he was arrested, and, most recently, repairs to her Jeep Grand Cherokee.
The parties’ income: The plaintiff reports gross weekly income of $790 and net weekly income of $634 on his financial affidavit. He earned $47,389 in 2017, according to his Form W-2 attached to the parties’ joint 2017 federal income tax return. The plaintiff testified that his income varied depending upon how much he wanted to work.
The defendant reports gross weekly income of $1,611 and net weekly income of $1,167 on her financial affidavit. She earned $91,037 in 2017, as set forth on her 2017 Form W-2.
The parties’ tax returns: The parties have filed joint income tax returns each year during the marriage. The defendant was responsible for filing their income tax returns. With the exception of one or two years, the defendant kept whatever tax refund they received.
The parties’ expenses: The plaintiff reports total weekly expenses of $168 on his financial affidavit, comprised of his expenditures for groceries, restaurants, and life insurance. According to the defendant’s financial affidavit, her total weekly expenses are $1,236. The defendant pays all of the expenses for the Richmond Drive property.
Health insurance: At the time of the dissolution trial, the plaintiff had health insurance coverage with Blue Cross. The defendant’s health insurance was with Cigna.
Life insurance: The plaintiff has a Northwestern Mutual life insurance policy with a total death benefit of $166,523 and a total cash value of $93,113. The defendant maintains two life insurance policies. One policy is through All State, with a cash value of $16,250. The other policy is a $60,000 CBIA term life insurance policy.
II
ORDERS
The court has fully considered the criteria set forth in General Statutes § § 46b-81 and 46b-82, as well as the applicable case law, the evidence, the court records judicially noticed, the parties’ demeanor and credibility, their proposed orders, and the arguments of counsel in making the findings set forth above and in reaching the decisions that are reflected in the orders that issue below.
Dissolution of the marriage: The marriage is hereby dissolved on the ground of irretrievable breakdown.
Property distribution: "The trial court is empowered to deal broadly with the equitable division of property incident to a dissolution proceeding, and, consistent with the purpose of equitable distribution statutes generally, the term property should be interpreted broadly as well." (Citation omitted.) Roos v. Roos, 84 Conn.App. 415, 420, 853 A.2d 642, cert. denied, 271 Conn. 936, 861 A.2d 510 (2004). Under General Statutes § 46b-81(a), the court may assign to either party all or any part of the estate of the other party at the time of entering a decree dissolving a marriage. Subsection (c) of § 46b-81 provides in pertinent part that, "[i]n fixing the nature and value of the property, if any, to be assigned, the court ... shall consider the length of the marriage, the causes for the ... dissolution of the marriage ... the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, earning capacity, vocational skills, education, employability, estate, liabilities and needs of each of the parties and the opportunity of each for future acquisition of capital assets and income. The court shall also consider the contribution of each of the parties in the acquisition, preservation or appreciation in value of their respective estates." General Statutes § 46b-81(c).
"General Statutes § 46b-81 confers broad powers upon the court in the assignment of property, and the allocation of liabilities and debts is a part of the court’s broad authority in the assignment of property." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Roos v. Roos, supra, 84 Conn.App. at 420. "The issues involving financial orders are entirely interwoven. The rendering of a judgment in a dissolution case is a carefully crafted mosaic, each element of which may be dependent upon the other." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cleary v. Cleary, 103 Conn.App. 798, 807, 930 A.2d 811 (2007).
Each of the parties has submitted proposed orders addressing the equitable distribution of the assets that the parties acquired during this thirty-three year marriage. In arriving at an equitable division of the marital estate, the court has considered the requests of the parties regarding the allocation of their assets and liabilities.
(a) The Richmond Drive property: The parties disagree as to the disposition of the Richmond Drive property. The plaintiff has no objection to the defendant’s retaining the Richmond Drive property, but he asks that half of the equity in the property be awarded to him. The defendant asks the court to award the Richmond Drive property to her, free and clear of any claim by the plaintiff.
The court finds that neither proposal regarding the Richmond Drive property is fair and equitable under the circumstances. While the defendant’s financial contribution to the marriage was significantly greater than that of the plaintiff, an award of the Richmond Drive property solely to the defendant would not take into account any of the contributions of the plaintiff, including the Grove Street property that he brought to the marriage. On the other hand, dividing the equity in the Richmond Drive property equally between the parties, without similarly allocating the substantial debt to the defendant’s father that is reflected on the defendant’s financial affidavit, would be inequitable. Moreover, in view of the substantial disparity between the defendant’s opinion of the value of the Richmond Drive property and the two appraisals offered by the plaintiff, the court is of the view that the fair market value can best be determined if the property is sold in an arm’s length transaction.
Therefore, the court orders that the Richmond Drive property shall be listed for sale within thirty days of the date of the dissolution judgment with a real estate agent having at least ten years of experience in the greater Darien area. The defendant shall select the real estate agent who shall be the listing broker for the Richmond Drive property. The Richmond Drive property shall be listed for sale at the listing price recommended by the listing broker. The defendant shall accept any offer containing no unusual contingencies within 5 percent of the listing price. Every sixty days, the defendant shall review the listing price with the listing broker, and the listing price will be reduced to the greater of the revised listing price recommended by the listing broker or 95 percent of the prior listing price. The plaintiff shall cooperate fully in the sale of the Richmond Drive property.
The defendant shall have exclusive possession of the Richmond Drive property until it is sold. The plaintiff shall vacate the Richmond Drive property within twenty days of the date of entry of the dissolution judgment.
The defendant shall maintain the Richmond Drive property in good condition, reasonable wear and tear excepted, and she shall use reasonable efforts to keep the property clean and orderly for showing to potential purchasers. The defendant shall be solely responsible for paying all household expenses, including the First County Bank home equity line of credit, real property taxes, homeowner’s insurance, and utilities, from the date the dissolution judgment is entered until the closing of the sale of the Richmond Drive property.
The court shall retain jurisdiction over the terms and conditions of the sale of the Richmond Drive property. Upon the closing of the sale of the Richmond Drive property, the sale proceeds shall first be applied to the First County Bank home equity line of credit, real property taxes, real estate commissions, and other normal and customary closing costs. After these payments are made, the defendant shall be reimbursed for any costs or expenses that she incurred for repairs to the Richmond Drive property or to prepare the property for sale. If the balance then remaining is $400,000 or less, it shall be paid to the defendant, free and clear of any claim by the plaintiff. If the remaining sale proceeds are greater than $400,000, they shall be distributed as follows: (i) $400,000 shall be paid to the defendant, free and clear of any claim by the plaintiff; and (ii) the balance shall be divided between the parties, with the defendant receiving 60 percent and the plaintiff receiving 40 percent.
(b) The Montana property: The Montana property shall be retained by the plaintiff, free and clear of any claim by the defendant. The plaintiff shall be responsible for all expenses relating to the Montana property, and he shall hold the defendant harmless from same.
(c) Bank accounts: The plaintiff shall retain the separate bank accounts identified on his financial affidavit, free and clear of any claim by the defendant.
The defendant shall retain the separate bank accounts identified on her financial affidavit, free and clear of any claim by the plaintiff.
(d) Securities accounts: The defendant shall retain her TD Ameritrade account, free and clear of any claim by the plaintiff.
(e) Retirement accounts: Each party shall retain his or her own retirement accounts.
(f) Personal property: Each party is awarded his or her own clothing, jewelry, and personal items such as books and memorabilia. The plaintiff is awarded his guns, tools, and equipment.
The plaintiff shall retain the painting of a man on a horse chasing a steer; the painting of a man on a horse going down an incline with a dog; the reproduction of a Frederick Remington painting; and the painting of a small cottage with a pond in front of it that belonged to his parents.
The parties shall equally divide the family photographs, videos, and DVDs, and they shall share equally the expense of copying any photographs, videos, and DVDs that are selected by both parties. The plaintiff shall arrange and pay for the return to the defendant of the family photographs that are currently in the possession of his nephew.
The parties shall divide equally any other property not specifically discussed herein on or before October 30, 2018. If the parties are not able to agree on the disposition of specific items, those items shall be sold at fair market value on or before November 30, 2018. All costs of sale and the net proceeds shall be shared equally between the parties.
Any personal property awarded to the plaintiff that is located at the Richmond Drive property shall be removed from the property on or before October 30, 2018. The defendant shall provide reasonable access to the plaintiff to remove such property. The plaintiff shall be responsible for all costs and expenses of removal, storage, and shipping.
(g) Automobiles: The plaintiff shall retain the 2008 Nissan Altima and the 2002 GMC, free and clear of any claim by the defendant. He shall be solely responsible for all costs associated with the ownership and operation of said vehicles, including automobile insurance, personal property taxes, and repairs, and he shall indemnify and hold the defendant harmless from any liability therefrom. The defendant shall execute and deliver to the plaintiff at no cost any and all documents or forms necessary to effectuate the terms of this provision.
The defendant shall retain the 2001 Jeep Grand Cherokee and the 2011 Jeep Liberty, free and clear of any claim by the plaintiff. She shall be solely responsible for all costs associated with the ownership and operation of said vehicles, including automobile insurance, personal property taxes, and repairs, and she shall indemnify and hold the plaintiff harmless from any liability therefrom. The plaintiff shall execute and deliver to the defendant at no cost any and all documents or forms necessary to effectuate the terms of this provision.
(h) Life insurance: The plaintiff shall retain the Northwestern Mutual life insurance policy. The defendant shall retain the All State and CBIA life insurance policies.
Alimony: As set forth in General Statutes § 46b-82(a), the court "may order either of the parties to pay alimony to the other ... In determining whether alimony shall be awarded, and the duration and amount of the award, the court shall ... consider the length of the marriage, the causes for the ... dissolution of the marriage ... the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, earning capacity, vocational skills, education, employability, estate and needs of each of the parties, and the award, if any, which the court may make pursuant to section 46b-81 ..." General Statutes § 46b-82(a). The court must fashion its financial orders on the basis of the available net income of the parties, not on their gross income. Hughes v. Hughes, 95 Conn.App. 200, 204, 895 A.2d 274, cert. denied, 280 Conn. 902, 907 A.2d 90 (2006). "[W]hat a spouse can afford to pay for support and alimony is a material consideration in the court’s determination as to what is a proper order." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Panganiban v. Panganiban, 54 Conn.App. 634, 642-43, 736 A.2d 190 (1999). "A party’s ability to pay is a material consideration in formulating financial awards." (Citation omitted.) Utz v. Utz, 112 Conn.App. 631, 635, 963 A.2d 1049, cert. denied, 291 Conn. 908, 969 A.2d 173 (2009); see Cleary v. Cleary, supra, 103 Conn.App. at 807.
"[C]ourts have begun to limit the duration of alimony awards in order to encourage the receiving spouse to become self-sufficient." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Marmo v. Marmo, 131 Conn.App. 43, 47, 26 A.3d 652 (2011). "In many cases, time-limited alimony is appropriate so the receiving spouse can rehabilitate his or her vocational skills and return to the workforce." Scott v. Scott, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. HHD-FA-04-4005987-S (Mar. 24, 2014, Carbonneau, J.).
The plaintiff seeks an award of $150 per week as periodic alimony for a term of five years, which award shall be non-modifiable as to term or amount. The defendant asks in her proposed orders that no periodic alimony be awarded to either party. She proposes that she pay lump sum alimony to the plaintiff in the amount of $50,000, provided that he vacates the Richmond Drive property within fourteen days of the date of entry of the dissolution judgment.
The court has considered all of the factors set forth in § 46b-82(a); the court’s findings with respect to some of these factors are particularly relevant here. The parties have been married for thirty-three years, albeit unhappily so for at least half of that time. The plaintiff has been unemployed or underemployed during most of the marriage. The defendant has been the primary source of financial support for the family during the entire marriage.
The court finds that a time-limited award of alimony is appropriate here. Effective November 1, 2018, the defendant shall pay to the plaintiff the sum of $500 per month as and for periodic alimony, until the earliest of the death of either party, the plaintiff’s remarriage, the plaintiff’s cohabitation within the meaning of General Statutes § 46b-86(b), or November 1, 2023. The term of the alimony award shall be non-modifiable by either party. The alimony shall be taxable income to the plaintiff and shall reduce the gross income of the defendant. This award may be modified pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-86. The defendant did not seek an alimony award. No alimony is awarded to the defendant.
Debts and liabilities: As set forth above, the First County Bank home equity line of credit shall be paid from the proceeds of the sale of the Richmond Drive property. The defendant shall pay the monthly payments due on the First County Bank home equity line of credit until the closing of the sale of the Richmond Drive property.
The plaintiff shall be solely responsible for the liabilities set forth on his financial affidavit, and he shall indemnify and hold harmless the defendant from any and all liability therefrom.
The defendant shall be solely responsible for the liabilities set forth on her financial affidavit, and she shall indemnify and hold harmless the plaintiff from any and all liability therefrom.
Health insurance: Each party shall maintain his or her own health care coverage. Each party shall be solely responsible for his or her own uninsured or unreimbursed medical expenses.
Taxes: Each party shall file federal and state income tax returns individually for 2018 and thereafter. The plaintiff shall be entitled to all federal and state income tax deductions relating to the Montana property. The defendant shall be entitled to all federal and state income tax deductions relating to the Richmond Drive property.
Attorneys fees: Neither party seeks an award of attorneys fees. Each party shall be responsible for his or her own attorneys fees.
Effectuation of orders: Each party is ordered to sign whatever documents are presented by the other party to effectuate these orders within ten days of presentment. Unless otherwise specifically set forth herein, these orders are effective immediately.