Opinion
No. 2428
11-05-2019
ENRIQUE TAPIA v. STATE OF MARYLAND
Circuit Court for Montgomery County
Case No. 97373
UNREPORTED
Beachley, Reed, Salmon, James P. (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ. Opinion by Reed, J. *This is an unreported opinion, and it may not be cited in any paper, brief, motion, or other document filed in this Court or any other Maryland Court as either precedent within the rule of stare decisis or as persuasive authority. Md. Rule 1-104.
In 2003, Enrique Tapia (hereinafter "Appellant") pled guilty to a charge of possession with the intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance. In September of 2017, Appellant attempted to challenge his 2003 guilty plea through a petition for writ of error coram nobis. In this petition, Appellant alleged that he was not informed by his attorney that pleading guilty to the criminal charge of possession with the intent to distribute subjected him to removal proceedings pursuant to § 237(a)(2)(B)(i) of the Immigration and Naturalization Act. Relying on Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S 356 (2010) and Denisyuk v. State, 422 Md. 462 (2011), Appellant argues that his trial counsel "was obligated, but failed, to provide advice on the deportation consequences" of accepting a guilty plea, and therefore, Appellant suffered ineffective assistance of counsel in terms of the Strickland test. The circuit court denied the coram nobis petition, finding that Padilla did not apply retroactively to Appellant's petition. This appeal followed, wherein Appellant presents a single question for our review, which we have rephrased for clarity:
See also accompanying discussion infra.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S 688 (1984). See also accompanying discussion infra.
Appellant presents the following question:
1. Was the circuit court's denial of Appellant's Writ of Error Coram Nobis legally and factually correct?
I. Did the circuit court err when it denied Appellant's Writ of Error Coram Nobis Petition?For the stated reasons, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Appellant grew up in Bolivia and accompanied his parents to the United States in February of 1992. Up until the criminal matter at issue, Appellant was a lawful permanent resident with no prior criminal history.
On February 12, 2003, Appellant was arrested and charged in the Circuit Court of Montgomery County with three criminal offenses: possession with the intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance, possession of marijuana and possession of drug paraphernalia. Following a plea agreement, on May 20, 2003, Appellant pled guilty to one count of possession with intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance in violation of Maryland Code, Criminal Law Article (hereinafter "C.L."), § 5-602. Appellant was represented during this proceeding by counsel. During the plea hearing, the following discussion took place:
[The Court]: I'm required to advise you that if you're not a United States citizen you may face additional consequences of deportation, detention, or ineligibility for citizenship. If you have any concern about that you should discuss it with your lawyer. Do you understand what I've just said?Appellant likewise confirmed that he understood his constitutional rights, understood that he could change his mind, and reaffirmed his desire to plead guilty. Appellant was sentenced to 18 months of incarceration, all of which was suspended in favor of 18 months of probation.
[Mr. Tapia]: Yes sir.
On September 27, 2017, Appellant filed a petition for a writ of error coram nobis in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. Appellant contended that he sustained collateral consequences when his attorney did not inform him that his conviction would expose him to removal proceedings. Appellant claimed that if he had been advised of the adverse immigration consequences, he would have not accepted the plea, and would have continued with a trial. Appellant asserted that due to his attorney's error, he received ineffective assistance of counsel, and since Denisyuk v. State held that Padilla applied retroactively, he is entitled to coram nobis relief, pursuant to the Padilla decision.
In a written opinion dated August 21, 2018, the circuit court denied Appellant's coram nobis petition, finding that based on the binding precedent set forth by the Court of Special Appeals in Guardado v. State, 218 Md. App. 640 (2014), Padilla does not apply retroactively to Appellant's guilty plea, as his plea took place seven years before the Padilla decision. The circuit court addressed the fact that just as the Court had found in Guardado, where the judge advised the defendant about immigration consequences of a guilty plea, the circuit court judge had also informed Appellant of these potential penalties, and he still plead guilty. The circuit court further reasoned that because there was no state law violation applicable to Appellant's writ of error coram nobis, the court could not grant the Appellant's petition. This timely appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
A. Parties' Contentions
As outlined above, Appellant maintains that because he was not made aware of the adverse immigration implications of a guilty plea by his attorney, pursuant to Strickland, he experienced ineffective assistance of counsel as defined by Padilla, which is a collateral consequence for the purposes of coram nobis relief; under Denisyuk, Appellant argues, he is entitled to this relief. The State (hereinafter "Appellee"), on the contrary, submits that in accordance with subsequent precedent set by Chaidez v. United States, 568 U.S. 342 (2013), Miller v. State, 435 Md. 174 (2013), and Guardado v. State, Padilla does not apply retroactively to cases where the guilty plea became final before Padilla's holding and where there is no independent basis in state law for Appellant's claim. Additionally, Appellee asserts that Appellant has failed to demonstrate that he has suffered collateral consequences meriting coram nobis relief.
B. Standard of Review
The circuit court's decision to grant or deny coram nobis relief is reviewed for abuse of discretion. State v. Rich, 454 Md. 448, 471 (2017). Notwithstanding the "extraordinary nature" of the relief sought through a coram nobis petition, "appellate courts should not disturb the coram nobis court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous . . . ." Id. Here, while the circuit court made factual findings as to Appellant's petition, the court's ultimate conclusion that Padilla is not retroactive to Appellant's case was an assessment concerning legal sufficiency. Accordingly, in examining the circuit court's "legal determination" in denying coram nobis relief, we review this decision de novo. Rich, 454 Md. at 471.
C. Analysis
However straight forward the answer to this question is now, it is suitable, in the least, to briefly outline the progression of the law on this matter, in light of the rather recent diversity of holdings governing the issue.
"Coram nobis is extraordinary relief designed to relieve a petitioner of substantial collateral consequences outside of a sentence of incarceration or probation where no other remedy exists." State v. Smith, 443 Md. 572, 623 (2015). To qualify for this relief, the petitioner must show that, among other things, he or she "suffer[ed] or fac[ed] significant collateral consequences." Smith, 443 Md. at 623-624 (quoting Skok v. State, 361 Md. 52, 78-79 (2000)). Further, "the grounds for challenging the criminal conviction must be of a constitutional, jurisdictional or fundamental character." Skok v. State, 361 Md. at 78 (citing United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 512 (1954)).
The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution, as applied to the States through the 14th Amendment Due Process Clause, in addition to Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, mandates that every criminal defendant be afforded the right to effective assistance of counsel. See Duvall v. State, 399 Md. 210, 220-21 (2007). In establishing that a defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel, Strickland v. Washington extensively outlines the standard for evaluating the validity of such a claim, finding that in order to obtain relief, a defendant must first show that "counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. After meeting this "heavy burden", the defendant must then demonstrate that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different . . . ." Id.
See Harris v. State, 303 Md. 685, 697 (1985).
The Supreme Court, in Padilla v. Kentucky, held that a criminal defense attorney is obligated to inform a criminal, non-citizen client about the adverse immigration consequences that accompany a guilty plea, and failure to do so is subject to Strickland's two prong ineffective assistance of counsel test. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 369-370. Whether this holding applied retroactively, however, was left unclear, and there emerged a divide between federal and state courts as to the extent in which Padilla applied, particularly with convictions that became final before Padilla was decided. In Denisyuk v. State, the Maryland Court of Appeals ruled that Padilla did "appl[y] retroactively to all cases arising out of convictions based on guilty pleas that occurred after April 1, 1997", which was the effective date of the enactment of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act of 1996. Denisyuk, 422 Md. at 478-479. In finding that Padilla did apply retroactively, the court reasoned that [Padilla] did not "establish a rule of prospective application only" but "applied 'settled precedent [i.e. Strickland] to [a] new and different factual situation[]' ". Id. at 481-482 (citing Potts v. State, 300 Md. 567, 577 (1984)).
Even so, three years after Padilla, the Supreme Court resolved the split regarding the retroactivity of Padilla, and in Chaidez v. United States, the Court held that the Padilla decision was in fact "a new rule" and therefore, did not have a retroactive effect in collateral proceedings. Chaidez, 568 U.S at 347. The Court supported this conclusion by agreeing with the Seventh Circuit in its analysis that "Padilla's holding was new because it ran counter to that widely accepted 'distinction between direct and collateral consequences.' " Id. at 346 (quoting Chaidez v. U.S., 655 F.3d 684, 693 (2011)). The Court further concurred that " 'the [Supreme] Court had never held that the Sixth Amendment requires a criminal defense attorney to provide advice about matters not directly related to [a] client's criminal prosecution,' including the risks of deportation." and thereby "impos[ed] a new obligation" in doing so. Id. (quoting Chaidez, 655 F.3d at 691; Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301 (1989)).
In light of this clarification and within months of the Chaidez decision, the Maryland Court of Appeals again addressed the issue of Padilla's retroactivity, in Miller v. State. The Miller Court acknowledged that even though the Supreme Court had found that Padilla was not retroactive, Maryland was not bound by Teague "to provide a remedy for a violation that is declared 'nonretroactive' under Teague." Miller, 435 Md. at 194 (quoting Denisyuk, 422 Md. at 480 n. 8). Still, the Court identified Chaidez as controlling and concluded that it "could not create a federal remedy denied by the Supreme Court" and Padilla's retroactive effect only applied when there is an independent basis grounded in state law - not federal law - to challenge the alleged violation. 435 Md. at 194. Judge Battaglia, writing the plurality opinion, perceived the reality that Maryland has "consistently recognized" allegations regarding ineffective assistance of counsel as claims based in federal law pursuant to the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel, as opposed to Maryland's Article 21 provision. Id. at 198.
In accordance with Teague, a criminal defendant cannot seek relief under a new rule on collateral review if their conviction is final before the new rule is announced. Chaidez, 568 U.S. at 343. A "case announces a new rule if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction became final." Teague, 489 U.S. at 301. --------
Within the year, this Court relied on Miller, and found that in Guardado, supra, Padilla does not apply retroactively to an ineffective assistance claim. Guardado, 218 Md. App. at 653. Despite the fact that the defendant in Guardado had not sought relief under Article 21, our Court reiterated that even if "Article 21 is [] read in pari materia with the Sixth Amendment", id. (citing State v. Walker, 417 Md. 589, 604 n. 8 (2011)), we follow the understanding, as articulated in Miller, that Article 21, alone, does not "provide[] an independent state basis for finding counsel deficient based upon a failure to provide advice regarding adverse immigration consequences prior to or during guilty plea proceedings." Id. at 652 (citing Miller, 435 Md. at 199).
There are no guidelines more dispositive of this matter than the aforementioned holdings. As so well-put in Guardado and applied here, "the linchpin of [Appellant's] contentions, namely, that Padilla applie[s] retroactively to his case, [is] incorrect." Guardado, 218 Md. App. at 653. In the instant case, Appellant's guilty plea of possession with intent to distribute marijuana became final in 2003, preceding Padilla by seven years. Appellant does not make an argument concerning any state law grounds for which this Court could grant him relief; we concur with Appellee that "[t]here is none." (citing Miller, 435 Md. at 192; Guardado, 218 Md. App. at 653)). For this reason, Appellant simply cannot take advantage of the implications of Padilla. Appellant's reliance on Denisyuk is plainly wrong, and Appellant is bound by the precedent set in Miller and Guardado, respectively.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, we find that the circuit court did not err when it denied the writ of error coram nobis petition for lack of legal sufficiency, in accordance with Miller and Guardado, finding that Padilla did not apply retroactively to Appellant's claim.
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR MONTGOMERY COUNTY AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT.