Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, No. 37-2007-00056997-CU-BT-NC William S. Dato, Judge.
McDONALD, J.
Po-Hai Tang filed this lawsuit alleging various tort claims against CS Clean Systems AG (CSAG), asserting CSAG was responsible for causing Tang's employer to terminate his employment. At the time of the alleged wrongful conduct and resulting injury, Tang was a Taiwanese resident working for a Taiwanese employer in Taiwan, CSAG was a German corporation, and the actionable conduct occurred in either Taiwan or Germany. Tang filed the action in California.
CSAG moved to dismiss the action, asserting California did not have personal jurisdiction over it and, in the alternative, that forum non conveniens principles required dismissal. The trial court agreed with the latter assertion and dismissed Tang's action. This appeal followed.
I
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
CSAG is a German corporation headquartered in Germany that develops, manufactures, and sells equipment and materials for the semiconductor industry. ICS Technology Co., Ltd. (ICS), is a Taiwanese corporation that employed Tang, and was the exclusive distributor for CSAG's products in Taiwan and China. Between 2004 and 2007, Tang was a registered permanent resident of Taiwan and worked as general manager for ICS at its Taiwan headquarters.
In July 2007, Tang's employment was terminated by ICS as its general manager in Taiwan. Tang believed CSAG persuaded ICS to terminate his employment by engaging in tortious conduct outside of California. Tang alleged Christoph Scholtz, a high-level executive with CSAG apparently based in Germany, communicated with ISC via e-mails (apparently emanating from Germany for delivery to ICS's Taiwan offices) that defamed Tang, and that threatened to end CSAG's business relationship with ICS unless it terminated Tang's employment. Shortly after Scholtz's last e-mail, ICS terminated Tang's employment.
In October 2007 Tang filed a lawsuit in San Diego Superior Court against CSAG alleging interference with contractual relations, inducing breach of contract, intentional and negligent interference with prospective economic advantage, and other negligence claims. CSAG appeared specially and sought dismissal of Tang's complaint, arguing CSAG did not have sufficient minimum contacts with California to permit California to assert personal jurisdiction over it. CSAG alternatively asserted that, even if California could assume personal jurisdiction over it, the court should dismiss Tang's complaint under forum non conveniens principles.
In support of its forum non conveniens argument, CSAG asserted the action had no connection to California: all of the alleged conduct occurred outside of California, neither Tang nor CSAG were California residents, and there were alternative forums both available and more suitable. CSAG argued the private interests weighed in favor of dismissal because most of the witnesses were in either Taiwan or Germany, and there were substantial logistic and legal difficulties associated with compelling these foreign witnesses to appear in California for trial. CSAG also asserted the public interest weighed in favor of dismissal because the parties were residents of Taiwan and Germany and all of the relevant conduct occurred in Taiwan and Germany, and those countries had an interest in adjudicating the dispute while California had no comparable interest.
Tang opposed the motion and asserted, in response to CSAG's forum non conveniens argument, that he was a former California resident, and used his Taiwanese income to provide financial support to his family residing in California, providing California with an interest in the outcome of the litigation. He also asserted there were California-based witnesses (limited to providing evidence of damages), and peremptorily asserted the foreign witnesses could provide evidence in the form of declarations. He finally argued, without authority or explanation, that neither Taiwan nor Germany provided him with an adequate forum to litigate the dispute. Based on these arguments, Tang argued dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds was improper.
Tang's sole evidentiary basis for asserting Taiwan and Germany were not adequate forums were hearsay statements that (1) Taiwan did not recognize the types of legal theories asserted in his California lawsuit, and (2) German lawyers rarely accept contingency fee cases.
The trial court, after noting that in personam jurisdiction over CSAG was arguably proper under the "representative services" doctrine, concluded the action nevertheless should be dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds. The court, applying the first element of the two-part test described in Stangvik v. Shiley Inc. (1991) 54 Cal.3d 744 (Stangvik), concluded there appeared to be suitable alternative forums (in either Taiwan or Germany) in which Tang's claims could be litigated, and his arguments concerning the alleged unsuitability of those forums focused on tactical disadvantages of litigating in those forums and not on the relevant criteria for determining the availability of a suitable alternative forum. The court then applied the second element of Stangvik's two-part test-balancing the competing factors involving the relevant public and private interests that militated for and against retaining jurisdiction in California-and concluded the private and public interests did not favor litigating Tang's lawsuit in California. The court noted Tang was not a California resident, CSAG was not a California corporation, none of the actionable events occurred in California, and little or none of the evidence was within California. The court, concluding "California has no interest in 'adjudicat[ing] disputes between non-California claimants against out-of-state defendants over causes of action governed by foreign law and about which California has no interest whatsoever, ' " granted CSAG's motion to dismiss the action on grounds of forum non conveniens.
Tang moved ex parte for reconsideration to submit additional evidence. Tang sought to obtain reconsideration based on (1) his declaration that he was a California resident at the time he filed his lawsuit, and (2) a list of California-based witnesses who would testify to the damages (both economic and emotional) he suffered as a result of CSAG's conduct. CSAG opposed Tang's motion, arguing (1) none of the proffered evidence was "newly discovered" evidence on which a motion for reconsideration could be premised, and (2) governing Supreme Court precedent precluded obtaining reconsideration via ex parte motion. The court ruled Tang could not obtain reconsideration by ex parte application but could only do so by noticed motion, and specified that after Tang reviewed the order he could file a noticed motion for reconsideration if he so elected. Tang did not subsequently move for reconsideration.
II
ANALYSIS
A. Legal Principles
When a motion is brought to stay or dismiss a case on the basis of forum non conveniens, the courts follow the procedure set forth in Stangvik: "In determining whether to grant a motion [to dismiss] based on forum non conveniens, a court must first determine whether the alternate forum is a 'suitable' place for trial. If it is, the next step is to consider the private interests of the litigants and the interests of the public in retaining the action for trial in California." (Stangvik, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 751.) CSAG, as the moving party, bears the burden of proof on a motion to dismiss based on forum non conveniens. (Ibid.)
Suitability of Forum: De Novo Review
The threshold determination of whether an alternative forum is suitable is nondiscretionary, subject to de novo review on appeal. (Chong v. Superior Court (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1032, 1036-1037 (Chong); Stangvik, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 752, fn. 3; American Cemwood Corp. v. American Home Assurance Co. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 431, 436-439 [suitability determination includes inquiry into whether alternative forum is actually available and feasible].) "A forum is suitable if there is jurisdiction and no statute of limitations bar to hearing the case on the merits. [Citation.] '[A] forum is suitable where an action "can be brought, " although not necessarily won.' " (Chong, at pp. 1036-1037.)
Balancing of Interests: Review for Abuse of Discretion
If the trial court concludes a suitable alternative forum exists, the trial court then must exercise its discretion in the balancing of the respective forum-related interests, and that discretionary determination is given substantial deference on appeal. (Stangvik, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 751; Chong, supra, 58 Cal.App.4th at p. 1037.)
The analysis of the private and public interest factors "must be applied flexibly, without giving undue emphasis to any one element." (Stangvik, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 753.) Stangvik, discussing the balancing that must be performed, explained:
"The private interest factors are those that make trial and the enforceability of the ensuing judgment expeditious and relatively inexpensive, such as the ease of access to sources of proof, the cost of obtaining attendance of witnesses, and the availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling witnesses. The public interest factors include avoidance of overburdening local courts with congested calendars, protecting the interests of potential jurors so that they are not called upon to decide cases in which the local community has little concern, and weighing the competing interests of California and the alternate jurisdiction in the litigation. [Citations.]" (Id. at p. 751.)
In some cases, a plaintiff's choice of forum in his or her state of residence may be afforded substantial weight (Chong, supra, 58 Cal.App.4th at p. 1038), in part because the state has strong interests in assuring that its own residents will have an adequate forum for the resolution of disputes. (Stangvik, supra, 54 Cal.3d at pp. 754-755.) However, Stangvik cautioned that: "It is difficult to justify giving preferential status to a plaintiff's choice of forum if the plaintiff is not a resident. Since the preference is based on factors which apply only to residents, it would appear that the underlying justification for the preference does not apply to nonresidents." (Id. at p. 755, fn. 7.)
A reviewing court does not undertake a discretionary reweighing of the factors relating to forum selection, and does not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court in discretionary matters. (Stangvik, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 755, fn. 7; Walker v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 257, 272.)
B. The Court Correctly Found Germany or Taiwan Provided Suitable Alternative Forums
An alternative forum is suitable if it has jurisdiction and there is no statute of limitations bar precluding it from hearing the case on its merits. (Chong, supra, 58 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1036-1037.) Both requirements can be satisfied where, as here, the defendant has stipulated both to the jurisdiction of the alternative forum over the defendant and to tolling the statute of limitations to permit the action to be filed in the alternative forum. (Morris v. AGFA Corp. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1452, 1464 (Morris).)
Tang contends CSAG's oral stipulations-to submit to jurisdiction in either Germany or Taiwan and to waive statute of limitations defenses for one year to permit Tang to file the action in those jurisdictions-are insufficient to demonstrate suitability because (1) only express written stipulations signed by CSAG suffice to satisfy the stipulation that is satisfactory under cases such as Morris, and (2) there is nothing to preclude either a German or Taiwanese court from dismissing the action on jurisdictional or other grounds regardless of the stipulation. We are not persuaded by Tang's first argument because he cites nothing to suggest the oral stipulation by CSAG's counsel entered on the record in this case was not binding on CSAG, and the courts have held to the contrary. (See, e.g., Roman v. Liberty University, Inc. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 670, 683.) We are not persuaded by Tang's second argument because it was not raised below, and is therefore forfeited. (Junkin v. Golden West Foreclosure Service, Inc., supra, 180 Cal.App.4th at p. 1158.)
Tang also appears to assert the suitability determination was erroneous because the one-year period may have infringed on Tang's rights by imposing a limitations period shorter than that prescribed under foreign law. First, this argument was not raised below, and is therefore forfeited. (Junkin v. Golden West Foreclosure Service, Inc. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1150, 1158.) Moreover, even assuming Tang may raise the issue, courts have approved dismissal for forum non conveniens where even shorter periods were prescribed within which the plaintiff could file the action in the alternative forum. (See, e.g., Guimei v. General Electric Co. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 689, 693-694, 696-697 (Guimei) [upholding order requiring plaintiff to litigate in China where order conditioned on waiver of applicable statutes of limitations so long as the actions were refiled in China within six months of the dismissal or stay]; Van Schijndel v. Boeing Co. (C.D.Cal. 2006) 434 F.Supp.2d 766, 775 [dismissal conditioned on defendants willing to submit to personal jurisdiction in Singapore and to waive any applicable statute of limitations for 60 days after dismissal]; Gambra v. International Lease Finance Corp. (C.D.Cal 2005) 377 F.Supp.2d 810, 816 [dismissal conditioned on defendants' agreement as a condition of dismissal to submit to jurisdiction of French court in actions refiled by plaintiffs in France and to toll any statute of limitations that might apply to such refiled actions for 120 days after dismissal].)
Tang also asserts, because CSAG did not show that either Taiwanese or German law recognized the type of tort claims Tang was pleading against CSAG, those forums must be deemed unsuitable because the remedy available in those forums is "clearly unsatisfactory." (Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno (1981) 454 U.S. 235, 255, fn. 22.) The courts have recognized "there may be 'rare circumstances' in which the 'remedy provided by the alternative forum is so clearly inadequate or unsatisfactory that it is no remedy at all' " (Ceramic Corp. of America v. Inka Maritime Corp. Inc. (9th Cir. 1993) 1 F.3d 947, 949 [quoting Piper Aircraft, at p. 254]), including where the alternative forum might lack jurisdiction to resolve the case (Phoenix Canada Oil Co. Ltd. v. Texaco, Inc. (D.C.Del. 1978) 78 F.R.D. 445, 456), or where the proposed alternative forum would immediately dismiss the action based on a forum selection clause. (Ceramic Corp. at pp. 949-950.)
However, both the state courts (see Shiley Inc. v. Superior Court (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 126, 134) and the federal courts (see, e.g., Tuazon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. (9th Cir. 2006) 433 F.3d 1163, 1179) have concluded that the fact the substantive law of the alternative forum may be less favorable to the plaintiff than California law is not the test, because the "no remedy at all" doctrine "does not require that California courts become the depository for nonresident plaintiffs' cases involving causes of action that are not recognized or would not be successful in [the alternative forum]." (Shiley, at p. 134.) Instead, an "alternative forum is suitable if it has jurisdiction and the action in that forum will not be barred by the statute of limitations. [Citation.] It bears emphasis that '[i]t is sufficient that the action can be brought, although not necessarily won, in the suitable alternative forum.' [Quoting Morris, supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at p. 1464; [citation].] That the law is less favorable to the plaintiffs in the alternative forum, or that recovery would be more difficult if not impossible, is irrelevant to the determination whether the forum is suitable unless 'the alternative forum provides no remedy at all.' [Quoting Stangvik, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 764.] [¶] The 'no remedy at all' exception applies 'only in "rare circumstances, " such as where the alternative forum is a foreign country whose courts are ruled by a dictatorship, so that there is no independent judiciary or due process of law.' [Quoting Shiley, at pp. 133-134.]" (Guimei, supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at pp. 696-697.)
Numerous courts in other jurisdictions have concluded the German judicial system (see, e.g., Gita Sports Ltd. v. SG Sensortechnik GmbH & Co. KG (W.D. N.C. 2008) 560 F.Supp.2d 432, 438-439 [collecting cases holding German courts are adequate forum to fairly litigate dispute]), as well as the Taiwanese judicial system (see In re Air Crash Over Taiwan Straits on May 25, 2002 (C.D.Cal. 2004) 331 F.Supp.2d 1176, 1188-1189 [concluding Taiwan was adequate forum]; Nai-Chao v. Boeing Co. (N.D.Ca1. 1982) 555 F.Supp. 9, 15-17 [same]), provides an adequate alternative forum for purposes of forum non conveniens analysis. We are unpersuaded by Tang's arguments that either Germany or Taiwan are inadequate forums, and we therefore consider the second element of the Stangvik approach: to balance the private interests of the litigants and the interests of the public in retaining the action for trial in California.
C. The Conclusion That the Balance of Private and Public Interests Favored Litigation in the Alternative Forum Was Not an Abuse of Discretion
The trial court carefully considered the various factors involved in the second step of the Stangvik analysis and ruled there were "few if any public or private interests that favor maintaining this lawsuit in California." The court noted (1) none of the events that formed the core of Tang's claims against CSAG occurred in California, (2) Tang was not a California resident at the time his claims accrued, (3) CSAG was not a California corporation, and (4) the bulk of the evidence relevant to Tang's claims was outside of California. The trial court concluded the balance of factors favored dismissal because, quoting Baltimore Football Club, Inc. v. Superior Court (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 352, 364, California had no interest in " 'adjudicat[ing] disputes between non-California claimants against out-of-state defendants over causes of action governed by foreign law and about which California has no interest whatsoever.' "
We may interfere with the trial court's determination on balancing private and public interests only if there is an abuse of discretion. On the record below, we cannot find " 'under all the evidence, viewed most favorably in support of the trial court's action, no judge could have reasonably reached the challenged result. [Citation.] "[A]s long as there exists 'a reasonable or even fairly debatable justification, under the law, for the action taken, such action will not be... set aside....' " ' " (Guimei, supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 696.) There was substantial evidence that neither Tang nor CSAG were California residents, the events giving rise to Tang's claims had no nexus to California, and the evidence germane to Tang's claims was almost exclusively outside of California.
Tang challenges the trial court's determination by arguing that both the public interest and private interest factors "weigh heavily" in favor of retaining the case in California. Tang's principal public interest factor is that California has a strong interest in adjudicating claims brought by its residents. Although a plaintiff's choice of forum in his state of residence may be afforded substantial weight (Chong, supra, 58 Cal.App.4th at p. 1038), no similar preferential status is accorded to a plaintiff's choice of forum where the plaintiff is not a resident of the selected forum. (Stangvik, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 755, fn. 7.) Because there is substantial evidence to support the conclusion Tang was a resident of Taiwan at the time his claim accrued, and Tang introduced no contrary evidence, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in according no weight to his choice of California.
"[R]esidency is synonymous with domicile, the latter term meaning ' "both the act of residence and an intention to remain...." ' " (In re Marriage of Dick (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 144, 153.) The party asserting residency bears the burden of establishing it. (Ibid.) Residency is a question of fact, which we review for substantial evidence. (Ibid.; In re Marriage of Tucker (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 1249, 1259.) CSAG introduced evidence Tang's "registered permanent residence" was in Taipei City, Taiwan, and Tang conceded at the hearing below that he had produced no evidence to support his alleged California residency.
Moreover, even assuming Tang had properly introduced evidence that he was a California resident at the time he filed his lawsuit, we agree with the cases that have concluded it is the plaintiff's residence at the time his or her claim accrued (not later-acquired residency) that is the relevant consideration. (See, e.g., Henderson v. Superior Court (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 583, 598 [relevant residence is the plaintiff's residence at time claim accrued, not when lawsuit filed]; Van Keulen v. Cathay Pacific Airways, Ltd. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 122, 126, fn. 2 [where plaintiffs not California residents at the time claim arose, but subsequently became California residents prior to the time suit was filed, " 'serious issues as to forum shopping' " raised by California lawsuit]; cf. Huynh v. Chase Manhattan Bank (9th Cir. 2006) 465 F.3d 992, 1001-1002 [California has " 'consistently declined to recognize after-acquired residence as a source of governmental interest on the grounds that consideration of this factor would encourage forum shopping' " where plaintiffs were residents of Vietnam when claim accrued but moved to California before filing suit].) Although Tang correctly notes that Ford Motor Co. v. Insurance Co. of North America (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 604 (Ford Motor) stated a contrary rule, and stated the strong presumption applies to a nonresident's choice of forum except when the plaintiff is a noncitizen (id. at pp. 610-611), our interpretation of Stangvik is that a nonresident's choice of forum is entitled to only a minimal preference, and numerous other courts have agreed. (Century Indemnity Co. v. Bank of America (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 408, 412-413 [applying Stangvik to give only minor significance to the choice of a Pennsylvania resident]; Rinauro v. Honda Motor Co. (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 506 [placing no emphasis on nonresident plaintiffs' choice of forum];Campbell v. Parker-Hannifin Corp. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 1534, 1543 [criticizing Ford Motor].)
Tang sought to cure the absence of evidence of his California residence by seeking to introduce new evidence in an ex parte application for reconsideration. The trial court correctly rejected the ex parte application under Le Francois v. Goel (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1094, 1107-1109, but left open the opportunity for Tang to seek reconsideration by a properly noticed motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 1008. Because Tang did not thereafter pursue any motion for reconsideration, we give no consideration to any evidence attached to his ex parte application.
We also reject Ford Motor's statement, relied on by Tang, that to overcome a plaintiff's choice of forum, a defendant bears the burden of proving the plaintiff's forum is a "seriously inconvenient forum." (Ford Motor, supra, 35 Cal.App.4th at p. 611.) When considering whether to stay an action on forum non conveniens grounds, "the plaintiff's residence is but one of many factors which the court may consider." (Archibald v. Cinerama Hotels (1976) 15 Cal.3d 853, 860; Century Indemnity Co., supra, 58 Cal.App.4th at pp. 408, 413.) Moreover, the defendant's residence is also a factor to consider. (Stangvik, supra, 54 Cal.3d at pp. 755-756.)
Tang's other public interest arguments are also unpersuasive. A trial court could reasonably conclude the lawsuit would add to the burden of local courts with congested calendars and would require potential jurors to decide cases in which the local community has little concern, and could also conclude California's interest in resolving disputes between residents of two foreign countries based on facts that occurred almost entirely beyond California's borders is de minimus in comparison to the interest of Germany or Taiwan in the dispute. While Tang is correct that the applicability of foreign law to this dispute does not preclude California from entertaining the lawsuit, it is a factor that may be weighed by a trial court in determining whether to dismiss for forum non conveniens. (See, e.g., Appalachian Ins. Company v. Superior Court (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 427, 434 [" '[t]here is an appropriateness, too, in having the trial of a diversity case in a forum that is at home with the state law that must govern the case, rather than having a court in some other forum untangle problems in conflict of laws, and in law foreign to itself' "]; Abad v. Bayer Corp. (7th Cir. 2009) 563 F.3d 663, 669 [applicable law is "a powerful argument" for litigating in the forum whose law will apply to the dispute].)
Tang finally asserts the trial court abused its discretion in the balance it struck concerning the private interests. Tang argues (1) CSAG submitted no evidence to support a conclusion that any private interests weighed in favor of litigating in the alternative forums, and (2) the private interests in fact weighed in favor of retaining jurisdiction. Tang's attack on CSAG's evidentiary showing argues that Ford Motor stated the moving defendant must submit particularized evidence of the costs and difficulties of compelling out-of-state witnesses for there to be evidentiary support for the trial court's determination that California is an inconvenient forum. (Ford Motor, supra, 35 Cal.App.4th at p. 610.) However, the court in Morris, supra, 144 Cal.App.4th 1452 explained that Ford Motor's "sole authority in support of this statement is Bechtel Corp. v. Industrial Indem. Co. (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 45, 48, which said only that such a determination must be supported by substantial evidence." (Morris, at p. 1462.) Although a listing of out-of-state witnesses would suffice, Morris rejected the argument that such a showing is a prerequisite, explaining "the evidence before the court, which may include affidavits of the parties, discovery responses, and the undisputed general knowledge of the nature of the action, need only be sufficient to give the court the ability to soundly exercise its discretion regarding the applicability of the general considerations of the [Stangvik] factors to the question of forum non conveniens." (Ibid.)
The federal approach is similar. In Piper Aircraft v. Reyno, supra, 454 U.S. 235, the United States Supreme Court explained the "Court of Appeals found that the problems of proof could not be given any weight because Piper and Hartzell failed to describe with specificity the evidence they would not be able to obtain if trial were held in the United States. It suggested that defendants seeking forum non conveniens dismissal must submit affidavits identifying the witnesses they would call and the testimony these witnesses would provide if the trial were held in the alternative forum. Such detail is not necessary. Piper and Hartzell have moved for dismissal precisely because many crucial witnesses are located beyond the reach of compulsory process, and thus are difficult to identify or interview. Requiring extensive investigation would defeat the purpose of their motion. Of course, defendants must provide enough information to enable the District Court to balance the parties' interests. Our examination of the record convinces us that sufficient information was provided here." (Id. at pp. 258-259, fn. omitted.) Although Tang argues it was incumbent on CSAG to specifically identify which foreign-based witnesses it intended to call for trial and to demonstrate why obtaining (or compelling) their attendance would be difficult, he did not raise that argument below. Indeed, Tang's argument below-that the foreign testimony was not an impediment to trial in California because "[f]oreign testimony can be obtained as declarations through informal or diplomatic channels"-implicitly conceded that obtaining their live testimony at a California venue would be difficult.
Here, the court was aware of the undisputed general facts underlying Tang's action: he alleged that (1) persons in Germany communicated with persons in Taiwan seeking to induce the latter to terminate Tang's employment in Taiwan, (2) the decision was made by persons in Taiwan to terminate his employment, (3) the decision to terminate his employment was caused by the communications, and (4) as a result Tang suffered damages. All of the critical testimonial evidence on liability issues appears beyond the reach of California's compulsory processes. We conclude substantial evidence supported the trial court's conclusion that "the ease of access to sources of proof, the cost of obtaining attendance of witnesses, and the availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling witnesses" (Stangvik, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 751) weighed against retaining the case in California.
Tang's complaint in effect alleges he had an "exemplary record" with ICS and his employment would not have been terminated "but for [CSAG's] continuous interference" with his employer. Accordingly, Tang's case would require delving into his employment record, potentially requiring evidence from numerous ICS personnel (as well as ICS's other customers with whom Tang dealt), to determine why ICS's board members voted to terminate Tang's employment. A trial court engaged in the weighing process may certainly consider the materiality and importance of the anticipated evidence and witnesses' testimony and determine their accessibility and convenience to the forum to decide whether it is appropriate to retain the case in the selected forum. (Lueck v. Sundstrand Corp. (9th Cir. 2001) 236 F.3d 1137, 1146.)
Tang finally asserts that, even assuming CSAG's evidentiary showing sufficed, the private interests weighed so heavily in favor of retaining jurisdiction that the trial court's contrary decision was an abuse of discretion. Tang argues the court overlooked his relatively modest financial resources and the financial burden he would incur from litigating in a foreign court, miscalculated the relative importance of the California-based damages witnesses compared with the Taiwanese-based and German-based liability witnesses, and misweighed the relative difficulties of litigating, or enforcing judgments, in those countries when it granted CSAG's motion. However, Tang in effect argues this court should undertake a discretionary reweighing of the factors relating to forum selection and to substitute its judgment for that of the trial court in these discretionary matters, which ignores that we must give the trial court's determination substantial deference on appeal (Stangvik, supra, 54 Cal.3d at pp. 751-752) and not merely substitute our judgment for that of the trial court. (Ibid.; Walker v. Superior Court, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 272.) We may only reverse when " 'no judge could have reasonably reached the challenged result' " (Guimei, supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 696), and we conclude a reasonable judge could have concluded California's interest in adjudicating a dispute "between non-California claimants against out-of-state defendants over causes of action governed by foreign law and about which California has no interest whatsoever" (Baltimore Football Club, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 171 Cal.App.3d at p. 364) was outweighed by the competing interests.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. CSAG is entitled to costs on appeal.
WE CONCUR: BENKE, Acting P. J.NARES, J.