Opinion
December 11, 1951.
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Leon County, W. May Walker, J.
Robert M. Ervin (of Ellis, Ervin Wakeman), Tallahassee, for appellant.
Lewis H. Tribble, Tallahassee, for appellee.
Appellant a Florida corporation made a lease agreement with the United States by which the appellant as lessee of the latter was authorized to erect, maintain and operate a housing project of approximately 550 units within the bounds of MacDill Air Force Base near Tampa. The lease was for the period of 75 years subject to earlier termination by the United States on certain conditions not necessary to discuss at this time. A deed conveying the lands to the United States, tax free, was executed by the State March 29, 1950. February 8, 1951, appellee as comptroller requested appellant to file in his office a certificate of registration as provided by Section 18, Chapter 26319, and to remit 3 per cent sales tax on housing unit rentals as provided by Section 3, Chapter 26319, General Acts of 1949. Sections 212.18 and 212.03, Florida Statutes 1949, F.S.A.
In response to this request, appellant advised appellee that it was not required by law to file the certificate of registration and pay three per cent sales tax on housing unit rentals as required by the appellee. A rehearing on the point was requested and denied. March 31, 1951, appellant filed its Bill of Complaint in the Circuit Court of Leon County for declaratory decree and injunctive relief. On final hearing the court dismissed the bill of complaint and ordered the complainant to secure a certificate of registration and pay the sales tax and penalties as required by law. This appeal is from that decree.
The point for determination is whether or not appellant is required by Sections 3 and 18, Chapter 26319, Acts of 1949, to secure a certification of registration, collect three per cent sales tax from the occupants of the housing units in question and remit same to the comptroller, together with interest and penalties thereon.
The purpose of appellant's bill of complaint was to secure a construction of Sections 3 and 18, Chapter 26319, Acts of 1949, and by such interpretation an answer to this question. Appellant contends however, that the question requires a negative answer because the deed conveying the leased lands by the State to the Federal Government and Article 1, Section 8, Clause 17 of the Federal Constitution immunizes it from regulation or any form of taxation by the State of Florida. Surplus Trading Company v. Cook, 281 U.S. 647, 50 S.Ct. 455, 74 L.Ed. 1091; Standard Oil Company of California v. California, 291 U.S. 242, 54 S.Ct. 381, 78 L.Ed. 775 and Johnson v. Yellow Cab Transit Company, 321 U.S. 383, 64 S.Ct. 622, 88 L.Ed. 814, are relied on to support this contention.
Appellee admits that the Federal Government acquired a limited jurisdiction over the lands on which the housing project is constructed by its deed, but denies that such jurisdiction relieves appellant of complying with Sections 3 and 18, Chapter 26319. Appellee contends that by the very terms of the lease agreement appellant agreed to pay the taxes in question, that the Federal Law does not relieve from such payment but affirmatively requires the sales tax to be paid. Gay v. Jemison, Fla., 52 So.2d 137 is relied on to support this contention.
Clause 17, Section 8 of Article 1 of the Federal Constitution as effectuated by act of Congress, authorizes the Federal Government to exercise exclusive legislation over any district acquired from the State for the erection and maintenance of "Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings", or any of them. The act limits such acquirement to this purpose and limits the power of the State to deed them to the Federal Government for more than this. Such lands are exempt from ad valorem taxes by the State but they were deeded "upon the express condition that the state shall retain a concurrent jurisdiction with the United States in and over the land or lands so ceded, and every portion thereof, so far that all process, civil or criminal, issuing under authority of the State or of any of the courts or judicial officers thereof, may be executed by the proper officers thereof upon same, within the limits and extent of lands so ceded, in like manner and to like effect as if this law had never been passed."
It necessarily follows that as to forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards or buildings essential to them, the jurisdiction of the United States is exclusive, but it is not contended or shown here that the housing project in question or any part of it is essential to or has any connection whatever with any of the purposes for which the law gives the Federal Government exclusive jurisdiction. We have examined Surplus Trading Company v. Cook, 281 U.S. 647, 50 S.Ct. 455, 74 L.Ed. 1091 and other cases relied on by appellant and we think they support this conclusion. Surplus Trading Company v. Cook is the best reasoned case on the subject and it not only recognizes the power of the State to qualify the cession of lands for the stated purposes but says in terms that if property so ceded is not held as an incident of military service it may be taxed. We find nothing in these cases or in the language of the pertinent legislative acts that show any purpose whatever to release the jurisdiction of the State over the lands in question so as to prohibit it from imposing the required three per cent sales tax on the housing project.
As to whether or not interest and penalties imposed for nonpayment of the three per cent sales tax on rentals collected from occupants of the housing units can be enforced, Section 212.12 is the applicable law on the subject. Section 215.26, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., also provides a means that appellant might have protected itself but it failed to avail itself of any of the remedies so provided. We are therefore driven to the conclusion that both questions should be answered in the affirmative. Gay v. Jemison, Fla., 52 So.2d 137; McLin v. Florida Auto Owners Protective Ass'n, Inc., 105 Fla. 169, 172, 141 So. 147.
Affirmed.
SEBRING, C.J., and ROBERTS and MATHEWS, JJ., concur.