Opinion
Argued June 6, 1882
Decided October 10, 1882
Charles Edward Souther for appellant. William Allan for respondent.
The instrument which is the subject of this litigation is described by the plaintiff as a bill of exchange; and claimed by the defendant to operate as an equitable assignment of the commissions alleged to have been earned by Lynch and due from the plaintiff. If a bill of exchange, Tallman could not be made liable for want of acceptance in writing. If the holder can enforce it at all, it must be upon the ground of an equitable assignment. But the circumstance which justifies and induces that equitable construction which treats as an assignment what is not strictly and legally such, is the existence of a valuable consideration for the imperfect transfer. ( Brill v. Tuttle, 81 N.Y. 457.) It proceeds upon a necessity demanded by the justice of the case, and to obviate an injury or a wrong which would otherwise occur. Where the holder has parted with nothing, and so loses nothing by the application of ordinary legal rules, no pressure of justice requires the intervention and the help of an equitable doctrine. And so it follows that, conceding the order to have been drawn on a particular fund ( Att'y-Gen'l v. Continental Life Ins. Co., 71 N.Y. 325; 27 Am. Rep. 55), yet the presence of a valuable consideration upon which the order, or direction to pay, was founded, becomes the essential and necessary element of an equitable assignment. That element is wanting in the present case. It is claimed, however, to be supplied by a legal presumption. It is undoubtedly true that where an actual assignment exists it is presumed, in the absence of proof of the facts, to have been made upon adequate consideration. ( Belden v. Meeker, 47 N.Y. 311.) But here no actual assignment was ever executed. The equitable rule which transforms a mere order into an assignment is brought into play by a just necessity, existing and established, and not by a mere possibility or presumption. But in the case at bar the facts proven repel any such presumption. Not only did both Lynch and Hoey, when upon the witness stand, fail to assert any consideration passing between them for the order on Tallman, but Lynch tells us substantially the contrary. He says that if the order was not paid he expected to get his commissions of Tallman, and afterward did settle with him for them as the real owner to whom they were due. These facts indicate that the order was without actual consideration; that it was held by Hoey merely for collection as the agent and on behalf of Lynch; or at most was an unexecuted and imperfect gift. In neither event could the doctrine of equitable assignment apply. We discover no ground upon which the counter-claim pleaded can rest; and the plaintiff's cause of action for the balance of purchase-money being conceded, a recovery for that was properly allowed.
The judgment should be affirmed, with costs.
All concur.
Judgment affirmed.