Opinion
23-CV-6767 (CS)
08-15-2023
BENJAMIN TAGGER, Plaintiff, v. THE STRAUSS GROUP ISRAEL; MICHAEL AVNER, Ex. VP and Chief Legal Officer; HUNTON ANDREWS KURTH LLP; JOSEPH SALTARELLI, Counselor; SILVIA OSTROWER, Counselor, Defendants.
ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH LEAVE TO REPLEAD
CATHY SEIBEL, United States District Judge
Plaintiff, appearing pro se, brings this action for which the filing fees have been paid. For the reasons set forth below, the Court dismisses the complaint, but grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within 30 days of the date of this order.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court has the authority to dismiss a complaint, even when the plaintiff has paid the filing fees, if it determines that the action is frivolous, Fitzgerald v. First E. Seventh Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 363-64 (2d Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (citing Pillay v. INS, 45 F.3d 14, 16-17 (2d Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (holding that Court of Appeals has inherent authority to dismiss frivolous appeal)), or that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999). Moreover, the Court “has the power to dismiss a complaint sua sponte for failure to state a claim,” Leonhard v. United States, 633 F.2d 599, 609 n.11 (2d Cir. 1980), so long as the plaintiff is given notice and “an opportunity to be heard,” Thomas v. Scully, 943 F.2d 259, 260 (2d Cir.1991) (per curiam); see also Perez v. Ortiz, 849 F.2d 793, 797 (2d Cir. 1988); Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1357, at 301 & n.3. The Court is obliged, however, to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
Although pro se litigants enjoy the Court's “special solicitude,” Ruotolo v. I.R.S., 28 F.3d 6, 8 (2d Cir. 1994) (per curiam), their pleadings must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. A complaint states a claim for relief if the claim is plausible. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To review a complaint for plausibility, the Court accepts all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draws all reasonable inferences in the pleader's favor. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). But the Court need not accept “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially legal conclusions. Id. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). As set forth in Iqbal:
[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require detailed factual allegations, but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation. A pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.Id. (internal citations, quotation marks, and alteration omitted). After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible - not merely possible - that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Benjamin Tagger, who resides in Greenwich, Connecticut, brings this complaint using the court's general complaint form. He checks a box indicating that he seeks to invoke the court's federal question jurisdiction (ECF No. 1 at 2.) The Court is unable to discern Plaintiff's claims because his complaint is difficult to understand, and his handwriting is difficult to read. Plaintiff does, however, attach to his complaint a Civilian Crime Report for the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York, wherein he lists docket numbers for a prior action he filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, and subsequent appeals he filed in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, and the United States Supreme Court.
In the Eastern District case, wherein Plaintiff asserted claims against The Strauss Group, the Honorable Brian M. Cogan, of that court, granted Defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Tagger v. The Strauss Grp., Ltd., No. 18-CV-2923 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2018), aff'd, No. 18-3189 (2d Cir. June 22, 2020), cert. denied, No. 20-0684 (2021) (“Tagger I”). Judge Cogan's September 12, 2018, memorandum decision and order noted that the dispute between Plaintiff and Defendant, The Strauss Group, arose “out of a 1999 contract between two Israeli citizens, which was executed in Israel, involv[ing] an ongoing Israeli debt collection process, and concern[ed] a parcel of real property located in Israel.” (Tagger I, ECF No. 27 at 10-11.) Judge Cogan also noted that Plaintiff's claims must be heard before a “competent Israeli court.” (Id.)
Plaintiff brings this action against The Strauss Group Israel; Michael Avner, who is an attorney in Israel; Hunton Andrews Kurth LLP, the firm that represented The Strauss Group in the Eastern District action; and attorneys Joseph Saltarelli and Silvia Ostrower, who are employed by Hunton Andrews Kurth LLP and were the attorneys of record for The Strauss Group.
See https://il.linkedin.com/in/michael-avner-48294a52.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff's complaint is short, but it lacks the facts necessary for the Court to determine whether Plaintiff is entitled to any relief. It is not clear what these Defendants allegedly did or failed to do that harmed Plaintiff.
Because Plaintiff invokes the court's federal question jurisdiction, the complaint can be construed as asserting claims that Defendants violated his constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege both that: (1) a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) the right was violated by a person acting under the color of state law, or a “state actor.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48-49 (1988).
A. Private Defendants
A claim for relief under § 1983 must allege facts showing that each defendant acted under the color of a state “statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Private parties are therefore not generally liable under the statute. Sykes v. Bank of America, 723 F.3d 399, 406 (2d Cir. 2013) (citing Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001)); see also Ciambriello v. Cnty. of Nassau, 292 F.3d 307, 323 (2d Cir. 2002) (“[T]he United States Constitution regulates only the Government, not private parties.”).
Because Michael Avner, Joseph Saltarelli, Silvia Ostrower, and Hunton Andrews Kurth LLP are private parties, the Court dismisses any § 1983 claims Plaintiff may have intended to assert against these Defendants. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
B. Claim Preclusion
Under the doctrine of claim preclusion, also known as “res judicata,” a litigant may not bring a new case that includes claims or defenses that were or could have been raised in an earlier case in which the same parties were involved if that case resulted in a judgment on the merits. Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 131 (1979). Claim preclusion “bars a plaintiff from relitigating claims against a defendant that it lost in a previous action against the same defendant and claims that the plaintiff could have brought in that earlier action but did not.” Marcel Fashions Grp. Inc. v. Lucky Brand Dungarees, Inc., 898 F.3d 232, 236-37 (2d Cir. 2018). The doctrine “‘serves the interest of society and litigants in assuring the finality of judgments, [and] also fosters judicial economy and protects the parties from vexatious and expensive litigation.'” Id. at 237 (quoting Curtis v. Citibank, N.A., 226 F.3d 133, 138 (2d Cir. 2000)). Claim preclusion generally applies if “(i) an earlier action resulted in an adjudication on the merits; (ii) that earlier action involved the same counterparty or those in privity with them; and (iii) the claim sought to be precluded was raised, or could have been raised, in that earlier action.” Id.
To determine if a claim could have been raised in an earlier action, courts look to whether the present claim arises out of the same transaction or series of transactions asserted in the earlier action, see Pike v. Freeman, 266 F.3d 78, 91 (2d Cir. 2001), or, in other words, whether facts essential to the second suit were present in the first suit, NLRB v. United Techs. Corp., 706 F.2d 1254, 1260 (2d Cir. 1983). “A party cannot avoid the preclusive effect of res judicata by asserting a new theory or a different remedy.” Brown Media Corp. v. K&L Gates, LLP, 854 F.3d 150, 157 (2d Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Although claim preclusion is an affirmative defense to be pleaded in a defendant's answer, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(c), a court may, on its own initiative, raise the issue, see, e.g., Grieve v. Tamerin, 269 F.3d 149, 154 (2d Cir. 2001) (affirming district court's dismissal on grounds of issue preclusion even though defendant failed to plead that defense, and noting that “principles of preclusion involve” not only “the rights and interests of the parties,” but also “important interests of the public and the courts in avoiding repetitive litigation and potentially inconsistent decisions”); Doe v. Pfrommer, 148 F.3d 73, 80 (2d Cir. 1998) (affirming sua sponte application of collateral estoppel in motion for summary judgment); Salahuddin v. Jones, 992 F.2d 447, 449 (2d Cir. 1993) (“The failure of a defendant to raise res judicata in [an] answer does not deprive a court of the power to dismiss a claim on that ground.”).
Plaintiff's claims against The Strauss Group Israel likely were or could have been raised in Tagger I. Thus, Plaintiff's claims against this Defendant are presumably barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion.
Because Plaintiff seeks to assert claims against private Defendants, likely brings claims against The Strauss Group Israel that were or could have been raised in a previous action, and he fails to comply with the Rule 8 pleading standard, the Court dismisses Plaintiff's complaint. In light of Plaintiff's pro se status, however, the Court grants Plaintiff 30 days' leave to amend his complaint.
C. New York Legal Assistance Group
Plaintiff may consider contacting the New York Legal Assistance Group's (“NYLAG”) Clinic for Pro Se Litigants in the Southern District of New York, which is a free legal clinic staffed by attorneys and paralegals to assist those who are representing themselves in civil lawsuits in this court. The clinic is run by a private organization; it is not part of, or run by, the court. It cannot accept filings on behalf of the court, which must still be made by any pro se party through the Pro Se Intake Unit. A copy of the flyer with details of the clinic is attached to this order.
LEAVE TO AMEND
Plaintiff proceeds in this matter without the benefit of an attorney. District courts generally should grant a self-represented plaintiff an opportunity to amend a complaint to cure its defects unless amendment would be futile. See Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2011); Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988). Indeed, the Second Circuit has cautioned that district courts “should not dismiss [a pro se complaint] without granting leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.” Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2d Cir. 1999)). The Court is doubtful that Plaintiff can cure the deficiencies in the complaint, but in an abundance of caution, the Court grants Plaintiff 30 days' leave to replead his claims. The amended complaint must contain a short and plain statement showing that he is entitled to relief.
Plaintiff must provide a short and plain statement of the relevant facts supporting each claim against each defendant. If Plaintiff has an address for any named defendant, Plaintiff must provide it. Plaintiff should include all of the information in the amended complaint that Plaintiff wants the Court to consider in deciding whether the amended complaint states a claim for relief. That information should include:
a) the names and titles of all relevant people;
b) a description of all relevant events, including what each defendant did or failed to do, the approximate date and time of each event, and the general location where each event occurred;
c) a description of the injuries Plaintiff suffered; and
d) the relief Plaintiff seeks, such as money damages, injunctive relief, or declaratory relief.
Essentially, Plaintiff's amended complaint should tell the Court: who violated his federally protected rights and how; when and where such violations occurred; and why Plaintiff is entitled to relief.
Because Plaintiff's amended complaint will completely replace, not supplement, the original complaint, any facts or claims that Plaintiff wants to include from the original complaint must be repeated in the amended complaint.
CONCLUSION
The Court dismisses the complaint for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted.
Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint that complies with the standards set forth above. Plaintiff must submit the amended complaint to this Court's Pro Se Intake Unit within 30 days of the date of this order, caption the document as an “Amended Complaint,” and label the document with docket number 23-CV-6767 (CS). An Amended Complaint form is attached to this order. No summons will issue at this time. If Plaintiff fails to comply within the time allowed, and he cannot show good cause to excuse such failure, the Court will direct the Clerk of Court to enter judgment in this case.
The Clerk of Court is instructed to hold this matter open on the docket until a civil judgment is entered.
The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore IFP status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. Cf. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962) (holding that an appellant demonstrates good faith when he seeks review of a nonfrivolous issue).
SO ORDERED.