Summary
noting that liability in Barger and Melsheimer was premised on the facts that the dog in Melsheimer was a watchdog and was trained to attack trespassers and that the dog in Barger had broken from its restraint and attacked the plaintiff
Summary of this case from N.M.v. TrujilloOpinion
No. 19,045.
Decided December 30, 1960.
Action against owner of dog for damages resulting from attack. Judgment for plaintiff.
Reversed.
1. ANIMALS — Vicious Dog — Confinement. Defendant who securely restrained dog on premises where it could not reach persons using the common areaways, did everything he was required to do in law, and owed no duty to a trespasser other than the precaution taken.
2. Vicious Dog — Knowledge — Contributory Negligence. Even though owner of dog has knowledge of previous instances of the dog biting or clawing a child, if he keeps the dog suitably restrained he is not subject to liability to a child who appreciates the full risk involved but nevertheless chooses to encounter the dog out of recklessness or bravado.
3. Vicious Dog — Child — Contributory Negligence. Where an 11-year-old plaintiff deliberately approached a dog with full knowledge and understanding of the character of the dog disclosed to him by his companions and their warning that if he went into defendant's yard he would get hurt, notwithstanding such warning and knowledge, ventured into contact with the dog and was injured, he cannot recover.
Error to the District Court of Boulder County, Hon. Dale E. Shannon, Judge.
Messrs. WOOD, RIS HAMES, for plaintiff in error.
Mr. WADE P. CONNELL, for defendant in error.
A JUDGMENT in damages entered by the trial court as a result of a jury verdict in favor of John Krueger, a minor, is sought to be reversed by this writ of error. The Krueger boy had sustained injury as a result of being bitten by Malemute Husky dog belonging to the plaintiff in error Swerdfeger, who was the defendant below.
The three main points relied upon by Swerdfeger in his summary of argument are:
A. That the proof was insufficient to establish that Swerdfeger knew that the dog was vicious.
B. That the court erred in not requiring the plaintiff to elect as to which cause of action he was relying on, i.e., 1. the liability arising from owning or harboring a vicious dog with knowledge of its vicious propensities (scienter), or 2. negligence in keeping a vicious dog.
C. That under the factual situation disclosed the court should have found for the defendant as a matter of law and should have directed the jury to return a verdict in his favor.
Because it is our holding that the defendant was entitled to a directed verdict under point (C), only brief comment is necessary as to the other two points. The knowledge of Swerdfeger is sufficiently established, and it makes no difference whether plaintiff sued under the doctrine of scienter or on the theory of defendant's negligence because the defense of contributory negligence is available to defendant under either action. 66 A.L.R.2d 924 (c); Melsheimer v. Sullivan, 1 Colo. App. 22, 27 Pac. 17.
The facts are not materially in dispute. It is virtually conceded that Swerdfeger had knowledge of previous instances wherein the dog had either bitten other children or had so roughly treated at least one child as to indicate that it and either bitten or scratched the child. The dog was four years old, was not kept as a watch dog, and had not been trained as such. It was a pet of the Swerdfeger children and had been so reared. The Swerdfeger backyard was not fenced but had a row of lilac bushes along the property line bordering on an alley down which the Krueger boy and two other boys were proceeding on their way home from school. The dog was securely chained in the Swerdfeger backyard to a dog house, and the length of chain was such that at its furthermost extension the dog would be well within the Swerdfeger yard, restrained from its outer borders and away from a driveway and back entrance to the house, the normal ingress or egress of persons lawfully entering the premises from the rear. John Krueger was an eleven-year-old boy of more than average intelligence. He and his companions saw the dog lying on top of the dog house, and young Krueger announced that he was "going in to see this dog". But before Krueger entered the yard both of his companions warned him several times that the dog was "bad", "vicious", and that "he might bite" and that he (Krueger) "might get hurt". One of the companions related to Krueger that he himself had been bitten by the dog and warned him not to go into the yard. Krueger replied "he knew dogs and was not afraid of them". Krueger entered the yard between some of the lilac bushes and approached the dog. The dog jumped on Krueger, bit him on the face and back and tore his jeans.
Although plaintiff was not required to make an election as to the theory upon which he attempted to place liability on Swerdfeger, he did not press strongly in the trial court and does not seriously urge here, that a case of negligence had been established. Swerdfeger did everything he was required to do in law. He had securely restrained the dog where it could not reach anyone who used the common areaways. And since Krueger was a trespasser there was no duty on the part of the landowner which transcends what was done here.
The general rule of law is in the Restatement of the Law — Torts § 339 (e) as follows:
"A possessor of land is, under the statement in Comment a, under a duty to keep so much of his land as he knows to be subject to the trespasses of young children, free from artificial conditions which involve an unreasonable risk of death or serious bodily harm to them. This does not require him to keep his land free from conditions which even young children are likely to observe and the full extent of the risk involved in which they are likely to realize. The purpose of the duty is to protect children from angers which they are unlikely to appreciate and not to protect them against harm resulting from their own immature recklessness in the case of known danger. Therefore, even though the condition is one which the possessor should realize to be such that young children are unlikely to realize the full extent of the danger of meddling with it or encountering it, the possessor is not subject to liability to a child who in fact discovers the condition and appreciates the full risk involved therein but none the less chooses to encounter it out of recklessness or bravado".
It appears, therefore, that counsel for Krueger seeks to establish absolute liability on the owner of a dog known to be vicious, however restrained or controlled, and regardless of the status of plaintiff as trespasser and regardless of the acts, knowledge or conduct of plaintiff. In urging such position he relies on Melsheimer v. Sullivan, supra and Barger v. Jimerson, 130 Colo. 459, 276 P.2d 744. Neither case is authority for the proposition urged under the facts here. In the Melsheimer case the dog was kept for the express purpose of attacking trespassers and was so placed by the owner as to be able to reach anyone coming upon the premises. The dog was trained as a watch dog and to attack strangers. The plaintiff in the Melsheimer case was a private policeman, performing his duties and making his rounds, and in pursuit of a suspicious character presumably having no lawful business in the area. In 66 A.L.R.2d at page 294, note (c), the Melsheimer case is cited as placing Colorado along with other states as following the majority rule allowing the defense of contributory negligence in actions based on scienter. It is to be noted that in the Melsheimer case the court specifically found the following three elements as establishing liability:
1. "That the dog was vicious and in the habit of biting mankind."
2. "That the defendant knew it."
3. That he bit and injured the plaintiff without any neglect or fault on his [plaintiff's] part.
Also there the question of the contributory negligence of the plaintiff was squarely before the court, and the court found no neglect or fault on the part of the plaintiff.
In the Barger case liability was established because the dog was able to break loose from its restraining chains and to roam the neighborhood, where he attacked the plaintiff. In that case the court held that the owners "were bound to keep the animal secured at their peril because they had assumed the risk of keeping him secured". The difference in the case at bar is readily apparent because Swerdfeger did keep the dog secured and out of reach of every one except those who deliberately approached the dog. Here, though the action of the boy in going to the animal was not of itself the basis of contributory negligence as a matter of law, additional undisputed facts are present which bar his recovery. He deliberately put himself in harm's way with full knowledge and understanding of what his companions had told him about the dog. Their urgings that he stay out and their warnings that he would get hurt, were brushed aside with the statement that he was not afraid. This brings him squarely within the language found in Restatement of the Law-Torts, quoted above: "* * * the possessor is not subject to liability to a child who in fact discovers the condition and appreciates the full risk involved therein but none the less chooses to encounter it out of recklessness or bravado".
The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded with instructions to the trial court to vacate the judgment and dismiss the action.
MR. JUSTICE FRANTZ and MR. JUSTICE DOYLE dissent.