Swartz v. Berkshire Life Insurance Company

Full title: JAMES P. SWARTZ, Plaintiff, v. BERKSHIRE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant

Court: United States District Court, S.D. New York

Date published: Sep 22, 2000

99 Civ. 9462 (JGK) (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 22, 2000)

Opinion

99 Civ. 9462 (JGK)

September 22, 2000

Stanley Sanders for the Plaintiff

George Berger for the Defendant

OPINION AND ORDER

JOHN G. KOELTL, United States District Judge.

Plaintiff James Swartz alleges in this diversity action that the defendant, Berkshire Life Insurance Company, refused to pay him the disability benefits to which he was entitled under certain disability insurance policies. The plaintiff's complaint asserts a claim for breach of contract and seeks damages equal to the amount that the plaintiff alleges is owed him under the policies. The defendant now moves pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 for summary judgment on the plaintiff's claim.

I.

The standard for granting summary judgment is well established. Summary judgment may not be granted unless "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986);Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs., Ltd. Partnership, 22 F.3d 1219, 1223 (2d Cir. 1994). In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, a court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences against the moving party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (citing United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962)); see also Gallo, 22 F.3d at 1223. Summary judgment is improper if there is any evidence in the record from any source from which a reasonable inference could be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. See Chambers v. TRM Copy Ctrs. Corp., 43 F.3d 29, 37 (2d Cir. 1994). "In considering the motion, the court's responsibility is not to resolve disputed issues of fact but to assess whether there are factual issues to be tried." Knight v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 9, 11 (2d Cir. 1986). On a motion for summary judgment, once the moving party meets its initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party must come forward with specific facts to show there is a factual question that must be resolved at trial. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). The non-moving party must produce evidence in the record and "may not rely simply on conclusory statements or on contentions that the affidavits supporting the motion are not credible." Ying Jing Gan v. City of New York, 996 F.2d 522, 532 (2d Cir. 1993); see Scotto v. Almenas, 143 F.3d 105, 114-15 (2d Cir. 1998) (collecting cases); Wyler v. United States, 725 F.2d 156, 160 (2d Cir. 1983).

II.

The facts underlying the case are undisputed except where specifically noted. The plaintiff, James Swartz, then a resident of New York, purchased four disability insurance policies ("the policies") from the defendant, Berkshire Life Insurance Co. ("Berkshire"), between 1981 and 1986. (Exs. A-D to Answer; Pl.'s Rule 56.1 Statement ¶¶ 5-8; Def.'s Resp. to 56.1 Statement ¶¶ 5-8.) He also purchased fourteen life insurance policies from Berkshire; they are not the subject of this suit. The disability policies provided for varying monthly indemnities, totaling $4100, in the event that the plaintiff became totally disabled and unable to work. (Compl. ¶¶ 7-10.) Upon notice of claim, Berkshire would provide claim forms to the claimant within fifteen days; if Berkshire failed to do so, the claimant would be deemed to have fulfilled the requirements for proof of loss upon submitting the forms. (Exs. A-D to Answer.) The policies required the plaintiff to provide written proof of loss within ninety days after the end of the period for which Berkshire was liable, unless it was not reasonably possible to do so. Proof submitted more than a year after the proof was otherwise required would not be deemed valid, except in the absence of legal capacity. (Exs. A-D to Answer.)

On April 5, 1991, the plaintiff notified Berkshire that he wished to make a claim for disability benefits. On the same day, Berkshire sent Mr. Swartz the claim forms that he was required to complete and submit in order to provide proof of his disability. (See Affidavit of Jeffrey Yeager ("Yeager Aff."), dated Nov. 19, 1999, ¶¶ 6-7.) On April 20, 1991, Mr. Swartz was forced to resign from his position as vice president of Michael Swartz Agency, Inc., due to a "mental condition" that would later be diagnosed as bipolar disorder, or manic depression. (See Ex. B, attached to Affirm. of Michael Villek dated Dec. 18, 1999. ("Villek Affirm.")) Mr. Swartz failed to complete and return his claim forms, however, despite repeated reminders from Berkshire, and so Berkshire closed his claim file on July 27, 1991. (Yeager Aff. ¶¶ 8-10.)

All four disability policies were lapsed for non-payment of premiums on January 4, 1992. (Yeager Aff. ¶ 11.) The life insurance policies, which are not at issue in this case, remained in force because Mr. Swartz's family continued to pay the premiums. (Yeager Aff. ¶ 11; Affidavit of Joyce Swartz, dated Dec. 17, 1999.) In October 1995, the plaintiff wrote to Berkshire to request that more claim forms be sent to him. Mr. Swartz also acknowledged that his disability policies had lapsed, and stated that he had been able to resume full-time employment in July 1995. (Ex. F attached to Yeager Aff.) Berkshire sent him the claim forms, along with a letter that noted that because the policies had lapsed in 1992, Berkshire was not sure that it would be able to pay Mr. Swartz benefits, even if his claim were valid. (Exs. E and G to Yeager Aff.) Once again, Mr. Swartz failed to return the forms.

In March 1996, the plaintiff wrote to Berkshire to explain that he had not filed his disability claim forms because of his mental condition, and he requested the forms needed to file a claim for a waiver of his life insurance premiums due to his disability. (Ex. H to Yeager Aff.) On October 17, 1996, Berkshire received a claim form submitted on behalf of the plaintiff, both for the plaintiff's disability policies and life policies. (Yeager Aff. ¶ 24 and Ex. N.) In April 1997, Berkshire approved Mr. Swartz's request for a waiver of life insurance premiums, with an effective date of October 17, 1995. (Yeager Aff. ¶ 27.) On June 3, 1997, Berkshire informed the plaintiff that it was gathering additional medical information to substantiate his claim for disability benefits under the lapsed disability policies, although it did not appear that disability benefits would be paid because the policies had not been in force since 1991. (Ex. P to Yeager Aff.) On September 11, 1997, Berkshire wrote to the plaintiff that its investigation did not "substantiate ongoing disability commencing while your disability contracts were in force and for which medical care and medical certification of disability was rendered prior to your contracts lapsing." (Ex. Q to Yeager Aff.) Berkshire therefore declined to provide Mr. Swartz with disability benefits. According to Berkshire's Director of Claims, Jeffrey Yeager, the plaintiff did not provide any evidence that he had been entitled to benefits in 1991, before his policies lapsed. (Yeager Aff. ¶ 30.) Mr. Swartz alleges, however, that the medical evidence that he provided to Berkshire proved that he was disabled as of April 1991. (Compl. ¶ 24).

The plaintiff asserts that he was repeatedly unable to complete his claim forms because his bipolar disorder prevented him from concentrating or "functioning in society." (See Affidavit of James Swartz, dated Dec. 17, 1999.) He did not begin to see a doctor for his condition until 1993, but subsequently was seen by a succession of several different psychiatrists and therapists. His doctors agree on his diagnosis, and all state that his condition includes a diminished ability to concentrate and function, and that he lacks insight into the nature of his condition. (See Exs. C and D to Villek Affirm.; Ex. N to Yeager Aff.)

The plaintiff commenced this action in the New York State Supreme Court, New York County, on August 6, 1999. (See Summons and Complaint.) The defendant removed this action to this Court based on diversity of citizenship jurisdiction.

III.

In a case where jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship, a federal court applies the conflict of law principles of the forum state.See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., Inc., 313 U.S. 487, 496-97 (1941). In Brink's Ltd. v. South African Airways, 93 F.3d 1022 (2d Cir. 1996), the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit explained the approach used by New York courts:

In contract cases, New York courts now apply a "center of gravity" or "grouping of contacts" approach. Under this approach, courts may consider a spectrum of significant contacts, including the place of contracting, the places of negotiation and performance, the location of the subject matter, and the domicile or place of business of the contracting parties. New York courts may also consider public policy "where the policies underlying conflicting laws in a contract dispute are readily identifiable and reflect strong governmental interests." The traditional choice of law factors, the places of contracting and performance, are given the heaviest weight in this analysis.

Id. at 1030-31 (citations omitted); see also APC Commodity Corp. v. Ram Dis Ticaret A.S., 965 F. Supp. 461, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). The parties agree that New York has the most significant contacts in this case because the plaintiff was a resident of New York during the period in which he purchased the four disability policies, and also in April 1991, when the plaintiff alleges that he became totally disabled, and the cause of action accrued. While Berkshire is incorporated and maintains its principal place of business in Massachusetts, it is qualified by the New York State Superintendent of Insurance to conduct business in New York State. The application of New York law is appropriate under these circumstances.

IV.

The plaintiff's complaint alleges that Berkshire breached its contract under the disability policies in 1991 when it failed to provide the plaintiff with disability benefits. The defendant argues that it is entitled to summary judgment because the plaintiff's claim is time-barred. Under New York law, the statute of limitations for breach of contract is six years. N.Y. C.L.P.R. § 213(2); (See also Simpson v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., No. 97 Civ. 1339, 2000 WL 322780, at *5 (S.D.N Y March 28, 2000). Since the alleged breach of contract occurred in April 1991, and the plaintiff did not file this action until August 6, 1999, the plaintiff's claim is barred by the statute of limitations.

The plaintiff argues that summary judgment should be denied because the statute of limitations was tolled due to the plaintiff's alleged insanity at the time that the cause of action accrued. In the alternative, the plaintiff asks that a hearing be held to determine whether he was insane for the purposes of tolling. New York law provides that, where a person is under a disability due to insanity at the time that the cause of action accrues, the applicable statute of limitations will be tolled. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 208. If the statute of limitations is three years or longer, as it is here, under § 208 it can be tolled until three years after the disability has ceased, or until the original statute of limitations would have run out, whichever is longer. If the disability does not cease, the claim will become time-barred ten years after the cause of action accrued. Consequently, if Mr. Swartz was insane within the meaning of § 208 in April 1991, and he remained continuously insane, this action, brought in 1999, is timely.

New York State courts have defined "insanity" quite narrowly, holding that the term applies only to "those individuals who are unable to protect their legal rights because of an over-all inability to function in society." McCarthy v. Volkswagen of America. Inc., 435 N.E.2d 1072, 1075 (N.Y. 1982). As the Court of Appeals noted, the legislative history of § 208 indicates that the New York State Legislature intended the toll of the statute to be "narrowly interpreted," and the legislature had specifically rejected the substitution of the phrase "mental illness" for "insanity." McCarthy, 435 N.E.2d at 1074. The test for insanity therefore takes into account not only medical analysis, but also whether the plaintiff has been able to work and function, and whether the plaintiff has attempted to protect the plaintiff's legal rights. Graboi v. Kibel, 432 F. Supp. 572, 579 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Rodriguez v. The American Friends of the Hebrew University, Inc., No. 96 Civ. 240, 1998 WL 146227, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. March 25, 1998)

While the plaintiff relies on Yannon v. RCA Corporation, 517 N.Y.S.2d 205 (App.Div. 1987), to argue that the definition of insanity is more lenient than these cases hold, Yannon followed McCarthy's strict definition in ruling that Mr. Yannon was insane. The plaintiff calls attention to some of Mr. Yannon's less severe symptoms, such as his erratic behavior and his inability to do his former job, to assert that the definition of insanity is quite broad, but the plaintiff fails to note that Mr. Yannon was also suffering from presenile dementia and could not remember his name or recognize his wife. Id. at 207. Therefore, it is clear that New York law requires severe impairment of the plaintiff's ability to think and function before the plaintiff can be considered insane under § 208. Mr. Swartz has not produced evidence sufficient to create an issue of fact as to his insanity as of April 1991, or to warrant a hearing on the subject.

The plaintiff has the burden of establishing insanity for the purposes of the toll, Graboi, 432 F. Supp. at 580, and Mr. Swartz has not presented evidence that would satisfy this burden. Mr. Swartz did not even begin to see a doctor until 1993, two years after he claimed that his disability began. Consequently, the only sworn statement from a medical practitioner that the plaintiff can provide comes from Dr. Linda Bergman, a psychologist who treated Mr. Swartz for a month in 1993. She states that, in her opinion, Mr. Swartz's bipolar disorder began around 1989, and that his condition includes poor judgment and "a diminished ability to concentrate." (See Affidavit of Linda Bergman dated Dec. 16, 1999). Dr. Bergman did not opine that the plaintiff was unable to function in society in 1993 or in 1991. (See id.) In addition, the plaintiff proffers unsworn letters from two psychiatrists who saw Mr. Swartz in 1994 and 1995, both of whom assert that his disorder had existed since 1991 or before. (See Exs. C and D to Villek Affirm.) These unsworn letters are not evidence that can be relied upon to resist a motion for summary judgment. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). Moreover, none of the practitioners had personal knowledge of the plaintiff in 1991, and none of them claim that the plaintiff was ever completely unable to function in society, or that he could not comprehend his legal rights. Difficulty in functioning is not sufficient to establish insanity for the purposes of § 208; rather, the plaintiff must be totally unable to function as a result of a "severe and incapacitating" disability. See Dumas v. The Agency for Child Development-New York City Head Start, 569 F. Supp. 831, 833 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (stating that mere mental illness is not sufficient to constitute insanity)

The plaintiff has provided only one affidavit from a person who actually had contact with him in 1991. The plaintiff's mother, Joyce Swartz, states that she believes that the plaintiff "could not function in society" beginning in 1991. (See Affidavit of Joyce Swartz, dated Dec. 17, 1999.) She does not give any specific details to support her conclusory statement, however, besides noting that the plaintiff's ex-wife told her that the plaintiff was unable to speak to people for days at a time.¹ This is hearsay and would not be admissible in evidence. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). Mr. Swartz's mother also states that her son seemed to be "completely depressed" and "suffering from manic depression." (Affidavit of Joyce Swartz.) Depression, even if it is severe, does not rise to the level of insanity under § 208. See Dumas, 569 F. Supp. at 833; Sanders v. Kiley, No. 91 Civ. 6320, 1995 WL 77916, at *4-*5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 1995) (holding that plaintiff had failed to prove that a diagnosis of depression constituted insanity). Ms. Swartz's affidavit therefore does not provide any factual basis to conclude that her son was completely unable to function in 1991.

1 An affidavit from a relative with specific details based on personal observation of a plaintiff's inability to function can constitute sufficient evidence to warrant a hearing on the question of insanity. See Stackrow v. New York Property Ins. Underwriter's Ass'n, 496 N.Y.S.2d 794, 795-96 (App.Div. 1985). However, the plaintiff's father is deceased, the plaintiff does not provide an affidavit from his ex-wife herself, and the affidavit from the plaintiff's mother does not provide sufficient details based on personal knowledge to provide sufficient evidence that Mr. Swartz was insane within the meaning of § 208.

Mr. Swartz's own affidavit indicates that since 1989 he "was very depressed," could not "communicate with those around [him]," "considered committing suicide," and "was often unable to groom [himself]." (Affidavit of James Swartz, dated December 17, 1999.) These symptoms, while severe, are not sufficient to constitute insanity unless the plaintiff is also completely unable to function in society. See Graboi, 432 F. Supp. at 580; Dumas, 569 F. Supp. at 833. The plaintiff does allege several times that he was "unable to function in society," but such a conclusory statement, without more, is not evidence of insanity.See Dumas, 569 F. Supp. at 834 n. 4 (stating that "we need not assume the correctness of conclusory assertions such as Dumas' statement that '[t]his affliction left me generally unable to function in society'");see also Sanders, 1995 WL 77916, at *6.

Indeed, Mr. Swartz's actions during the period in question indicate that he was able to function and manage his own affairs. His letter of resignation, dated April 20, 1991, is lucid, and evidences an understanding of the procedures involved. (See Ex. B to Villek Affirm.) While Mr. Swartz alleges that he was not able to complete and submit his insurance claim forms in April 1991, he did call Berkshire and request the forms, suggesting that he understood his legal rights at the time.See Graboi, 432 F. Supp. at 580. In addition, Mr. Swartz personally took out loans against his insurance policies in June 1992, December 1993, and December 1994, indicating that he was able to manage his own affairs during that period. (See Affidavit of Jeffrey Yeager, dated January 3, 2000.)

Finally, the plaintiff argues that Berkshire admits that Mr. Swartz was insane, because Berkshire itself determined in 1997 that he was disabled and waived his life insurance premiums. However, there is no evidence that Berkshire ever concluded that Mr. Swartz was insane within the meaning of § 208 and there is no evidence that the "disability" sufficient for a waiver of the premiums for the life insurance policies was the equivalent of the definition of "insanity." In addition, the plaintiff's argument is without merit because Berkshire determined that Mr. Swartz was disabled beginning in 1995, not 1991, and Mr. Swartz would have had to have been insane in 1991 in order to take advantage of the tolling provision of § 208. (See Yeager Aff. ¶¶ 27-28.)

Even if the plaintiff were insane at the time that the cause of action accrued, the summary judgment evidence establishes that Mr. Swartz regained his ability to function at least by 1995, when he stated that he had resumed full-time employment.² (Ex. F to Yeager Aff.) In his October 2, 1995, letter to the defendant, the plaintiff explained that by July 15, 1995, "the right combination of drugs were found to allow me to work steadily full time." (Id.) The statute of limitations begins running again once the plaintiff experiences an interval of lucidity that would allow him the opportunity to protect his legal rights. Jordan v. State, 290 N.Y.S.2d 621, 626 (Ct.Cl. 1968); Graboi, 432 F. Supp. at 578-79. Since the plaintiff wrote to Berkshire in October 1995 that he had been working full-time since July, and indeed had been working sporadically for the year before that, he had already had a significant period in which to protect his rights, but failed to do so. See von Bulow by Auersperg v. von Bulow, 634 F. Supp. 1284, 1300 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) ("Any lucid interval or break in disability precludes tolling under CPLR § 208."); Graboi, 432 F. Supp. at 579. Even if the plaintiff had a subsequent relapse, the statute of limitations can only be tolled once, and so an ensuing period of insanity would not affect the statute of limitations. Since § 208 provides that the time in which the action may be commenced shall be extended no more than three years after the disability ceases, this action became time-barred in July 1998, at the very latest.

2 The plaintiff argues that his statements about being able to work full-time should not be credited, because, as his doctors agree, he never fully understood his condition. This argument is unavailing because Mr. Swartz's not having insight into the nature of his illness would not have prevented him from being aware that he was working full-time. In addition, under New York law, employment itself is enough to render a plaintiff not insane, even if the mental condition persists throughout employment and inhibits the plaintiff's ability to function on the job.See Dumas, 569 F. Supp. at 834.

The plaintiff has not proffered a factual basis to withstand the defendant's motion for summary judgment or to warrant a hearing on the issue of his insanity. See Sanders, 1995 WL 77916, at *6 (denying a hearing on insanity because the plaintiff had failed to establish insanity and the evidence indicated that the plaintiff was capable of managing his own affairs); De Los Santos v. Fingerson, No. 97 Civ. 3972, 1998 WL 740851, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 1998) (noting that the New York Court of Appeals and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit have upheld cases in which a hearing on insanity was denied because the plaintiff failed to carry the burden of showing insanity). Because the plaintiff cannot rely upon the tolling provision of § 208, his claim is time-barred, and the defendant is entitled to summary judgment.

V.

The plaintiff's claim is also time-barred as a result of the provision in the disability policies that limits the time in which actions to recover on the policies may be brought. According to each of the disability policies, "no action at law or in equity may be brought to recover on the policy . . . after three years from the time that written proof of loss is required to be furnished." (See Exs. A-D to Answer.) This provision is required by New York law, and is enforceable without regard to any other statutes of limitations. N.Y. Insurance Law § 3216(d)(1)(K); Estock v. Associated Hospital Service of N.Y., 257 N.Y.S.2d 559, 561 (Civ.Ct. 1964) (stating that a three-year contractual limitation that is shorter than the applicable statute of limitations is not against public policy). Proof of loss was required to be filed no later than one year after it was due, which in this case meant that the proof of loss had to be filed at least in 1992. A lawsuit brought more than three years after that date was time-barred under the contract. Therefore, this lawsuit, which was only brought in 1999, was plainly time-barred under the contract. In addition, the limitation on actions in the insurance policies does not include a tolling provision, nor does the Insurance Law require one. Consequently, the plaintiff's claim is barred on this ground as well.

VI.

The defendant also argues that the plaintiff cannot establish that Berkshire breached the contract when it did not begin paying Mr. Swartz's disability benefits in April 1991, because Mr. Swartz did not fulfill a condition precedent in the disability policies. Mr. Swartz failed to furnish proof of his disability within the time specified by the policies, upon which Berkshire's obligation under the policies was conditioned.

It is undisputed that Berkshire provided the plaintiff with claim forms on April 5, 1991, thereby fulfilling its obligation under the policies to provide the forms within fifteen days. (See Yeager Aff. ¶¶ 6-7; Pl.'s Rule 56.1 Statement ¶ 12.) The plaintiff, however, failed to submit any claim forms during 1991, and indeed never submitted claim forms until October, 1996. (See Yeager Aff. ¶ 24 and Ex. N.) Berkshire closed the plaintiff's claim file in July 1991, because it had not received the plaintiff's claim forms. (See Yeager Aff. ¶ 10.)

The policies explicitly conditioned the payment of benefits on the submission of the proof of loss. "Any benefits to be paid under this policy other than as periodic payments will be paid when we receive written proof of such loss." (Exs. A-D to Answer.) The plaintiff has claimed that Berkshire breached its obligation to pay him benefits, and this claim accrued in April 1991. (See, e.g., Pl.'s Mem. at 1.) However, the defendant did not breach any obligation to the plaintiff in 1991 because the plaintiff never submitted any proof of loss in 1991, which was a condition precedent to the defendant's obligation to pay any benefits. The disability policies lapsed in January 1992, because premiums on the policies had not been paid. (See Yeager Aff. ¶ 11.) Because the policies are unambiguous as to the conditional nature of Berkshire's obligations, and Mr. Swartz did not submit proof of his disability within the specified period, Berkshire was not obligated in 1991, or at any later date, to pay Mr. Swartz any benefits under the policies. See Bergholm v. Peoria Life Ins. Co., 284 U.S. 489 (1932);Griffiths v. Mass. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 96 F.2d 57, 59 (2d Cir. 1938) (L. Hand, J.) ("[T]he privileges in question depended, not only upon the fact of disability but upon proof of that disability, filed with insurer at its home office. Until the insured complied with that condition, the insurer was not bound. . . ."); Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U.S. v. Manelis, 92 N.Y.S.2d 637 (Sup.Ct. 1949).

The plaintiff argues, however, that he lacked the legal capacity to file his claim, and therefore, under the terms of the policy, the limitation on the time in which to file his proof of loss did not apply to him. The policies provide: "proof which is furnished later than one year from the time proof is otherwise required will not be deemed valid, except in the absence of legal capacity." (Exs. A-D to Answer.) The plaintiff cannot rely on this provision to excuse the fact that he never submitted the proof of loss at least within one year of the time that the proof of loss was required to be submitted and that therefore Berkshire never became obligated to pay him benefits. While this provision does extend the time to submit proof of loss, and can extend the time beyond one year from the time it is otherwise required, that extension beyond one year is only available where there is "absence of legal capacity." Under New York law, a person who has not been judicially declared incompetent has the legal capacity to sue and otherwise to protect that person's rights. Huber v. Mones, 653 N.Y.S.2d 353, 354 (App.Div. 1997) (holding that "a person of unsound mind but not judicially declared incompetent may sue or be sued in the same manner as any ordinary member of the community") (citations omitted); Anonymous v. Anonymous, 162 N.Y.S.2d 984, 987-88 (App.Div. 1957) (explaining that a person who has not yet been judicially declared incompetent may make valid transactions and protect his legal rights). Mr. Swartz was never judicially declared incompetent, so he always had the legal capacity to file his claim. Therefore, Mr. Swartz was required to file his claim in 1992, at the very latest, and because he failed to do so, Berkshire was never obligated to provide him with disability benefits. Accordingly, the defendant is also entitled to summary judgment on this basis.

CONCLUSION

For all of the foregoing reasons, the defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted. It is unnecessary to reach the other grounds asserted by the defendants for summary judgment. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment dismissing the complaint and closing the case.

SO ORDERED.