Suttles v. U.S.

Full title: FRED SUTTLES, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent

Court: United States District Court, N.D. Florida, Pensacola Division

Date published: Jul 17, 2006

Case No.: 3:06mc12/MCR/MD (N.D. Fla. Jul. 17, 2006)

Opinion

Case No.: 3:06mc12/MCR/MD.

July 17, 2006

ORDER

M. RODGERS, Magistrate Judge

Fred Suttles has filed a document entitled "1st Refusal For Cause UCC 3-501[;] Notice of Void Subpoena; Notice to Vacate Grand Jury; Verified Affidavit." (See doc. 4). Essentially, Suttles challenges the grand jury's right to investigate him for tax evasion, claiming that the investigation is a "fraud" because he is a "Sovereign American," "a non-U.S. Tax payer," and a "non-citizen." The court construes Suttles' submission as a motion to quash the grand jury subpoena requiring his appearance to testify before the grand jury tomorrow, July 18, 2006.

It is a well-settled principle of law that the court supervises the conduct of the grand jury. See e.g., Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 282, 39 S.Ct. 468, 63 L.Ed. 979 (1919) (stating that a grand jury witness is "not entitled to set limits to the investigation that the grand jury may conduct"); Brown v. United States, 359 U.S. 41, 49, 79 S.Ct. 539, 546, 3 L.Ed.2d 609 (1959) (noting that "[a] grand jury is clothed with great independence in many areas, but it remains an appendage of the court, powerless to perform its investigative function without the court's aid, because powerless itself to compel the testimony of witnesses"), overruled in part on other grounds, Harris v. United States, 382 U.S. 162, 86 S.Ct. 352, 15 L.Ed.2d 240 (1965); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 708, 92 S.Ct. 2646, 2670, 33 L.Ed.2d 626 (1972) (observing that "[g]rand juries are subject to judicial control and subpoenas to motions to quash"). Even though the court has the power to oversee the grand jury's conduct, the court should not intervene in the grand jury process absent some compelling reason. See United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 16-18, 93 S.Ct. 764, 772-73, 35 L.Ed.2d 67 (1973). The grand jury is entitled to "every man's evidence" unless the person has a constitutional, statutory, or common law privilege. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 688.

Under Rule 17(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, a party may move to quash a subpoena and the court may, if the subpoena is unreasonable or oppressive, quash or modify the subpoena. Fed.R.Crim.P. 17(c). Whether one requests a protective order or asks the court to modify a subpoena, the effect is the same and Rule 17(c) must be satisfied in either instance. See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 710 (Powell, J., concurring) (remarking that a party can challenge grand jury subpoena with motion to quash and for protective order); In re Grand Jury Proceedings Under Seal, 947 F.2d 1188, 1189 (4^th Cir. 1991) (construing motion for protective order as motion to quash). When considering a motion to quash under Rule 17 court should be mindful of the independent nature of the grand jury and reluctant to interfere or invade its province. As the Supreme Court has cautioned: "[t]he function of the grand jury is to inquire into all information that might possibly bear on its investigation until it has identified an offense or has satisfied itself that none has occurred. As a necessary consequence of its investigatory function, the grand jury paints with a broad brush." United States v. R. Enterprises, Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 297-98, 111 S.Ct. 722, 726, 112 L.Ed.2d 795 (1991). Moreover, the grand jury is, and should be, recognized as an entity existing independent of the judiciary:

The whole theory of [the grand jury's] function is that it belongs to no branch of the institutional government, serving as a kind of buffer or referee between the Government and the people. Although the grand jury normally operates, of course, in the courthouse and under judicial auspices, its institutional relationship with the judiciary branch has traditionally been . . . at arm's length.

United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 112 S.Ct. 1735, 1742, 118 L.Ed.2d 352 (1992). Thus, "[a] district court simply does not intervene in the normal operations of a grand jury investigation." In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 995 F.2d 1013, 1016 (11^th Cir. 1993). Flowing from these notions are the presumptions that "absent a strong showing to the contrary, a grand jury acts within the legitimate scope of its authority" and "the burden of showing unreasonableness must be on the recipient who seeks to avoid compliance." United States v. R. Enterprises, Inc., 498 U.S. at 301.

It is with these principles in mind that the court DENIES the motion to quash of Fred Shuttles. This court will not invade the province of the grand jury absent an obvious and compelling reason.

DONE and ORDERED.