Opinion
Supreme Court No. S-13404.
June 22, 2011.
Appeal from the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, John Suddock, Judge, Superior Court No. 3AN-08-04379 CI.
Mary Jane Sutliff, pro se, Anchorage, Appellant. Matthew D. Jamin and Karen L. Lambert, Jamin Law Office, Kodiak, for Appellee.
Before: Carpeneti, Chief Justice, Fabe, Winfree, Christen, and Stowers, Justices.
NOTICE
Memorandum decisions of this court do not create legal precedent. See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d). Accordingly, this memorandum decision may not be cited for any proposition of law or as an example of the proper resolution of any issue.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND JUDGMENT
Entered pursuant to Appellate Rule 214.
I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Richard (Dick) and Mary Jane Sutliff married on March 20, 1980. Mary Jane filed for divorce on January 14, 2008.
The parties evenly divided some liquid assets from their various bank accounts. They proceeded to trial to determine the appropriate division of the remaining assets. Although both parties are attorneys, they were represented by counsel — Matthew Jamin represented Dick and Timothy Peters represented Mary Jane.
On December 12, 2008, during the trial, the parties conducted a settlement conference with the trial judge, Superior Court Judge John Suddock. Dick produced a valuation spreadsheet proposing what he considered an equal division of the marital assets as a basis for the negotiations. After six hours, the parties reached an agreement regarding all major assets other than personal property. About an hour later, the parties agreed to a personal property division.
The spreadsheet also identified some assets as Dick's separate property.
Dick and Mary Jane also agreed to a separate written stipulation regarding a trophy animal collection. Peters suggested the stipulation be read into the record at the same time that the settlement was read into the record, but this did not occur. Judge Suddock retained possession of the written stipulation.
Jamin agreed to draft and submit the divorce decree; he submitted it on December 15. On December 17 Mary Jane objected "to the court signing the proposed Decree without any Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, written Stipulation [regarding] Trophy Animals or Property Spreadsheet." She argued the divorce decree should not be entered "until the other documents are filed and ready for final adoption by the court." Dick responded that the court should enter the "content neutral" decree, as "the grant of the divorce was critical for [Dick] because of the tax implications." The court entered the divorce decree on December 18.
The court instructed Jamin, "[i]f you want to write something up later more at leisure and have it be findings of fact, conclusions of law, I will sign it. If you don't feel a need to do that, you are welcome to rely on the oral record, which is not going anywhere." Neither Peters nor Mary Jane objected.
Mary Jane then moved to vacate the divorce decree, reinstate the trial, and enter her own proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. On March 6, 2009, the superior court upheld the settlement and issued several rulings from the bench. On April 1 the court signed Dick's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. On June 29 the court entered a second divorce decree incorporating the findings and conclusions and previous decree. Dick had lodged the decree, which included language about sanctions against Mary Jane for her post-decree motion practices. But Judge Suddock struck that language and, with some added commentary on the decree, ordered the parties to bear their own costs and fees under the terms of their settlement.
Peters withdrew as Mary Jane's attorney on February 9, 2009 and Mary Jane continued the litigation pro se.
Mary Jane appeals, arguing primarily that the parties never reached a settlement agreement or alternatively that the superior court's findings of fact and conclusions of law do not accurately reflect the parties' agreement.
II. DISCUSSION
A. There Was A Settlement Agreement.
Mary Jane argues that no settlement was reached because the parties did not have a meeting of the minds. We disagree.
The settlement was read into the record after lengthy negotiations. The court explained at the outset of placing the settlement on the record that the parties' negotiations had begun with Dick's spreadsheet "as a base document as a point of discussion" but that Mary Jane had found "factual and analytical fault" with the spreadsheet, and that fault was "the subject of negotiation." The court then stated that ultimately the parties would "accept that everything that's set forth on the [spreadsheet] will happen . . . with one critical adjustment. . . . Mr. Sutliff will . . . write a check from his own funds, from whatever source, to her in the amount of $300,000." After confirming with Mary Jane's counsel that he had the same understanding of the terms of the parties' settlement agreement, the superior court asked Dick's lawyer if he also agreed:
The Court: Mr. Jamin, is that your understanding of what's happened here today? (whispered conversation)
Mr. Jamin: Your honor, the court did mention that Dick had to write a check for $300,000. Our understanding was that the liquid accounts, Mrs. Sutliff would receive 300 more than we had originally envisioned.
The Court: That's — it comes to the same thing. That's what I meant.
Dick's lawyer then recited the terms of the agreement, reading from the spreadsheet that had been used during the settlement conference and specifying the disposition of each asset. When he explained the disposition of the "liquid accounts" — which he defined as accounts that are "not retirement accounts[,] [t]hat is, they have already been taxed" — Mary Jane's lawyer clarified that "liquid accounts" was the line item from which Dick would transfer $300,000 to Mary Jane:
Mr. Peters: And is it true also . . . that's the line item[], the $300,000 amount that Mr. Sutliff will be transferring . . .
Mr. Jamin: That's correct, Mr. Peters, yes.
The parties also resolved various other expenses incurred by both spouses, including fees for Mary Jane's valuation expert witness.
Both parties testified under oath that they knowingly and voluntarily agreed to the settlement's terms and that the court did not unfairly influence the outcome. The court stated that "both sides have compromised. Neither side leaves here with what they originally desired." The court asked Mary Jane whether "within the broad range of the concept of fairness" the "property division is fair to you and fair to Mr. Sutliff?" Mary Jane responded, "[i]f I get full cooperation and don't incur additional attorneys' fees that are as excessive as they were, I feel that it's fair." In addition Peters — Mary Jane's attorney — agreed that the settlement as read into the record accurately reflected the parties' agreement. After the subsequent personal property settlement, Mary Jane again affirmed under oath that the agreement was "acceptable." Dick, also under oath, affirmed the agreement's fairness. According to the court, the personal property agreement "comprehensively close[d] out the case."
We have recognized that a settlement agreement is binding when read into the record in open court. And we can see nothing in the record to suggest that there was a material misunderstanding of any kind as to the settlement's terms. We therefore affirm the superior court's enforcement of the settlement.
Murphy v. Murphy, 812 P.2d 960, 965 (Alaska 1991) (citing Interior Credit Bureau, Inc. v. Bussing, 559 P.2d 104, 106-07 (Alaska 1977)); see also Ford v. Ford, 68 P.3d 1258, 1265 (Alaska 2003) (holding settlement agreement read into record was binding); Kerslake v. Kerslake, 609 P.2d 559, 560 (Alaska 1980) (citing Interior Credit Bureau, 559 P.2d at 106-07) (same).
B. The Findings Of Fact And Conclusions Of Law Match The Settlement Agreement.
Mary Jane argues that the settlement entitled her to half of all the marital assets and that the superior court erred by dividing the assets as described in Dick's settlement spreadsheet. According to Mary Jane, the parties agreed to split the assets equally based on objectively correct valuations, with a $300,000 payment from Dick in addition to the equal division. She also argues that the superior court erred by signing Dick's proposed findings and conclusions, which effectively call for Dick to use marital funds to make the $300,000 equalization payment.
The settlement agreement was read into the record and the transcript reflects that the parties intended to allocate each major item of property expressly; nothing in the transcript suggests that Dick and Mary Jane agreed to an equal division with the ultimate characterization of specific items to be determined based on later valuations. The court specified that Dick's property allocation spreadsheet was the basis for the settlement; the $300,000 "adjustment" in Mary Jane's favor was added to resolve the disagreements between the parties about the characterization or valuation of specific property. And although the superior court initially stated that "Mr. Sutliff will . . . write a check from his own funds, from whatever source, to her in the amount of $300,000," both parties' attorneys emphasized that the money was to come out of the "untransferred liquid assets" item in Dick's spreadsheet. Jamin specified that "[o]ur understanding was that [out of] the liquid accounts, Mrs. Sutliff would receive [$300,000] more than we had originally envisioned." After reciting the settlement agreement, Jamin again stated, "[w]e are planning to give . . . [$]300,000 from the untransferred liquid accounts to Mary Jane." Later, when discussing untransferred liquid assets, Peters clarified, "that's the line item, the $300,000 amount that Mr. Sutliff will be transferring?" Jamin responded, "[t]hat's correct."
Mary Jane's additional argument that the trophy animal stipulation in the record inaccurately reflects the parties' true agreement is also unconvincing. Judge Suddock "located the stipulation in the court's settlement file, which was located at all times in the court's office." Mary Jane has not pointed to any evidence in the record to support her argument that the stipulation in Judge Suddock's possession was not the stipulation the parties agreed to in the settlement conference.
Our review of the record convinces us that the superior court did not, by using Dick's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, misstate the parties' settlement. We therefore affirm the superior court's findings and conclusions. C. Other Issues 1. Orders effectuating the settlement
See Indus. Indem. Co. v. Wick Constr. Co., 680 P.2d 1100, 1108 (Alaska 1984) ("A trial court is . . . entitled to adopt findings and conclusions prepared by counsel, so long as they reflect the court's independent view of the weight of the evidence.").
Mary Jane argues that the superior court erred because it entered orders to effectuate the settlement that were inconsistent with its oral rulings. She claims the court should not have ordered the sale of certain financial assets and the division of their proceeds, which caused her "adverse tax consequences." Mary Jane also disagrees with the superior court's order giving Dick a nominal monthly payment and survivorship rights from her state retirement account.
The parties agreed that Mary Jane had the option to buy Dick's marital share of her retirement account, but that she would "leave him with a $1 account." This practice is commonly employed to allow a former spouse to purchase medical insurance benefits. See AS 39.35.535(d). The court later awarded Dick $1 annually from that account.
When parties to a property division settlement do not express how specific assets are to be divided, the superior court has "wide latitude in fashioning an appropriate property division." Here the parties' settlement agreement did not expressly address how these accounts would be individually divided, affording the superior court wide latitude. We cannot say that the superior court abused its discretion by ordering the sale of the financial assets and a division of the proceeds or by awarding Dick a nominal monthly payment and survivorship rights from Mary Jane's state retirement account. 2. Handwritten notes in the second decree
Tillmon v. Tillmon, 189 P.3d 1022, 1026, 1032 (Alaska 2008) (reviewing for abuse of discretion superior court's implementation of parties' property division agreement); see also Hartley v. Hartley, 205 P.3d 342, 351 (Alaska 2009).
Mary Jane argues that the trial court wrongfully added notations on the second divorce decree. We agree with Mary Jane that she is entitled to a "clean" decree; we therefore remand for the issuance of a new divorce decree.
III. CONCLUSION
We AFFIRM the superior court's decisions regarding the property division settlement and its related orders but REMAND for the issuance of a new divorce decree.