Opinion
Case No. 2:00-cv-918-MEF (WO).
June 23, 2006
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiffs — persons with significant disabilities, including physical disabilities and mental retardation — bring this suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to remedy alleged violations of the Medicaid Act by Defendants, various representatives of the state of Alabama in their official capacities. On June 15, 2004, the Court summarily denied the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss — which argued that the relevant provisions of the Medicaid Act were not actionable under § 1983 — in light of the Eleventh Circuit's holdings in Doe v. Chiles, 136 F.3d 709 (11th Cir. 1998) and Doe v. Bush, 261 F.3d 1037 (11th Cir. 2001). The Defendants have now filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Doc. #62), essentially renewing the arguments they made in their earlier motion on the basis of the Supreme Court's ruling in Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002).
In the Court's opinion, Gonzaga does not alter the preexisting case law to such an extent that reconsideration of the Court's prior ruling or Eleventh Circuit precedent is necessary. This position is amply supported by the unanimity among the Courts of Appeal and District Courts that have addressed this question since the issuance of the Supreme Court's opinion in Gonzaga. As a result, the Court finds that the Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Doc. #62) must be DENIED.
See, e.g., Watson v. Weeks, 436 F.3d 1152, 1158-1162 (9th Cir. 2006) (recognizing that "[n]o circuit court has held that section 1396a(10) does not create a section 1983 right"); S.D. ex rel. Dickson v. Hood, 391 F.3d 581, 602-07 (5th Cir. 2004) (finding that § 1396a contains "precisely the sort of `rights-creating' language identified in Gonzaga as critical to demonstrating a congressional intent to establish a new right"); Sabree ex rel. Sabree v. Richman, 367 F.3d 180, 193 (3d Cir. 2004) ("The language used by Congress in 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(10) . . . and 1396a(a)(8) . . . explicitly creates rights."); Rabin v. Wilson-Coker, 362 F.3d 190, 201-02 (2d Cir. 2004) (allowing suit based on violations of the Medicaid Act brought pursuant to § 1983); Bruggeman v. Blagojevich, 324 F.3d 906 (7th Cir. 2003) (same); Bryson v. Shumway, 308 F.3d 79, 88-89 (1st Cir. 2002) (finding "that there is a § 1983 cause of action arising from the `reasonable promptness' provision of 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(8) under the state model waiver plan as approved"); Rosey D. v. Romney, 410 F. Supp. 2d 18, 33 (D. Mass. 2006) (holding that § 1983 could be used to enforce § 1396a(a)(8) and 1396a(a)(10)); Westside Mothers v. Olszewski, 368 F. Supp. 2d 740, 757-62 (E.D. Mich. 2005) (same); Okla. Chapter of Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. Fogarty, 366 F. Supp. 2d 1050 (N.D. Okla. 2005) (same); Michelle P. ex rel. Deisenroth v. Holsinger, 356 F. Supp. 2d 763 (E.D. Ky. 2005) (same); Clark v. Richman, 339 F. Supp. 2d 631 (M.D. Pa. 2004) (same); Kenny A. ex rel. Winn v. Perdue, 218 F.R.D. 277, 293-94 (N.D. Ga. 2003) (finding that § 1983 provides a private right of action to enforce § 1396a(a)(10)(A)); Lewis v. N.M. Dep't of Health, 275 F. Supp. 2d 1319, 1332-33 (D.N.M. 2003) (holding that § 1983 confers a private right of action to enforce § 1396a(a)(8)); Mo. Child Care Ass'n v. Martin, 241 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1037-42 (W.D. Mo. 2003) (noting that Gonzaga did not intend to overrule Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498 (1990), which allowed suit brought pursuant to § 1983 to enforce a provision of the Medicaid Act); Martin v. Taft, 222 F. Supp. 2d 940, 977-78 (S.D. Ohio 2002) (holding that the "reasonable promptness" requirement of § 1396a(a)(8) was enforceable through § 1983); Alexander A. ex rel. Barr v. Novello, 210 F.R.D. 27, 34-35 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (same).
In accordance with the Court's ruling, it is further ORDERED that the parties shall file by July 7, 2006 a joint status report under the same conditions as prescribed in the Court's order (Doc. #48) of July 8, 2005.