Opinion
Oct. 8, 1974.
Editorial Note:
This case has been marked 'not for publication' by the court.
Division of property and awards of alimony, child support and attorneys' fees are within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed on appeal in absence of showing of abuse of discretion.
Page 909
James B. Radetsky, David A. Fogel, Denver, for plaintiff-appellant and cross-appellee.
Meer, Wolf & Slatkin, P.C., Albert B. Wolf, Denver, for defendant-appellee and cross-appellant.
KELLY, Judge.
This appeal stems from a divorce action begun in 1966 by Ruby Sunshine. Temporary orders were entered and thereafter a decree was granted stating that all prior orders of the court should remain in full force and effect until such time as the matters were heard on permanent orders. On appeal from the permanent orders subsequently entered, the judgment was reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings. Sunshine v. Sunshine, 30 Colo.App. 67, 488 P.2d 1131.
Following that decision, the husband filed a motion to determine the present status of alimony and support requirements. The wife then filed motions seeking arrearages and a citation for contempt, based on the failure to comply with the temporary orders of June 10, 1966. After hearings, the wife's motions for contempt and for arrearages were denied. New permanent orders were entered in 1972.
The wife appeals, asserting that the temporary orders were revived when the original permanent orders were overturned on appeal, that the 1972 permanent orders were grossly unfair and an abuse of discretion, and that she should be awarded her attorneys' fees. Husband has cross-appealed, claiming that certain allocations made in the 1972 permanent orders were improper. We affirm.
We reject the wife's argument that on reversal of the permanent orders by this court, the previous temporary orders were revived and that the husband should have been paying alimony and child support in accordance with their terms. Temporary orders cease to have any effect whatsoever following the entry of subsequent permanent orders in a divorce case. See, e.g., McGrail v. McGrail, 51 N.J.Eq. 537, 26 A. 705. Here, the temporary orders were by their own terms to continue 'until further order of the court'. Upon entry of a further order they expired. The trial court properly dismissed the wife's claim for arrearages under the temporary orders.
The wife also contends that the 1972 permanent orders were grossly unfair and that she should have been awarded attorneys' fees. The husband cross-appeals asserting that there were inequitable allocations of moneys. The contentions of both parties are without merit.
It is the duty of the trial judge in a divorce proceeding to base his final orders on all the evidence before him. Division of property and awards of alimony, child support and attorneys' fees are within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed on appeal in the absence of a showing of abuse of discretion. Carlson v. Carlson, 178 Colo. 283, 497 P.2d 1006; Krall v. Krall, 31 Colo.App. 538, 504 P.2d 681. In this case, no abuse has been shown.
Judgment affirmed.
COYTE and VAN CISE, JJ., concur.