Summary
finding an allegation that an officer "swore out a Complaint against [the plaintiff] without personal knowledge or probable cause" was sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss
Summary of this case from Poullard v. JonesOpinion
Civil Action No: SA-04-CA-0803-XR.
January 4, 2005
ORDER
On this date the Court considered motions to dismiss filed by nearly all Defendants in this case (docket nos. 2, 3, 4, 5, 27, 28, 29, 30). Plaintiff has sued a number of Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his First Amendment and Due Process rights. Specifically, Plaintiff sued certain officers, directors, and employees of the Bandera County River Authority and Groundwater District ("the River Authority Defendants"), the Bandera County River Authority and Groundwater District itself ("the River Authority"), City of Bandera Police Officers Misty Kelley and Neil McLean, City of Bandera Police Chief Shane Merritt, the City of Bandera Police Department, Bandera County Constable Phil Tobin, the Bandera County Constable's Office, Bandera County Attorney K.H. Schneider, and Bandera Magistrate Tim Tobin. Each individual is sued in both in his or her individual and official capacity. Each motion to dismiss rests on issues of official immunity. As set forth below, the Court grants certain motions, denies certain motions, and orders the Plaintiff to file further documents specifying the factual allegations made against each remaining Defendant.
James Chastain, David Jeffery, Jerry Sides, Russ Luigs, James Hemby, Dale Keith Sr., Ronald Soloman, William Spangler, Randy Roberts, and Susan Queen are sued as officers, directors and employees of Bandera County River Authority and Groundwater District. Each are sued in their individual and official authorities. As do the parties, the Court will address these Defendants as "the River Authority Defendants."
I. Factual and Procedural Background
Plaintiff's Original Complaint is somewhat lacking in specificity as to the factual allegations, but it appears that Plaintiff alleges he was attempting to voice his opinion at a public meeting of the River Authority (at that time known as the Springhills Water Management District) on September 5, 2002 when he was forcibly removed from the meeting. Plaintiff alleges that he was singled out for expressing certain views to the River Authority and its officials via a letter. At this time, Plaintiff was running for election as County Judge of Bandera County, Texas. Plaintiff alleges that a search warrant and an arrest warrant was sworn to by Officer Kelley and signed by Magistrate Tim Tobin later that night. Plaintiff further alleges that he was "lured" from his home by Constable Phil Tobin and arrested by Officer McLean and Constable Tobin and imprisoned overnight. County Attorney Schneider filed an Information against Plaintiff on September 23, 2002 alleging violations of TEX. PEN. CODE § 42.05 (Disrupting a Public Meeting). Plaintiff alleges that the charge was later dismissed by County Attorney Schneider for lack of legal and factual sufficiency. Plaintiff filed this § 1983 action on September 7, 2004, alleging violations of his right to free speech and right to be free from illegal searches and seizures.
Plaintiff specifically invokes the First, Fourth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments.
II. Motions to Dismiss
Nearly all Defendants have moved to dismiss this case based on immunity grounds. The Bandera County Constable's Office has moved to dismiss on the grounds that they are not subject to suit under federal law. The individual Defendants have moved to dismiss on varying grounds of immunity. Plaintiff's Complaint is not subject to dismissal "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45 (1957). "The same rule applies when immunity is urged as a defense by a motion to dismiss." Chrissy F. by Medley v. Mississippi Dep't of Public Works, 925 F.2d 844, 846 (5th Cir. 1991) (citation omitted).A. Governmental Entities
The Bandera County Constables Office moves to dismiss on the ground that it is a non-jural entity. As this governmental entity correctly points out, an entity without a separate jural existence is not subject to suit. Jacobs v. Port Neches Police Dep't, 915 F. Supp. 842, 844 (E.D. Tex. 1996). In his response to the motions to dismiss, Plaintiff has agreed to stipulate to dismissal of all the governmental entities without a separate jural existence. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the Bandera County Constables Office's motion to dismiss (docket no. 30) and DISMISSES Defendant Bandera County Constables Office. The Court also DISMISSES Defendants City of Bandera Police Department and the River Authority as they have no separate jural existence.
B. Individual Defendants
1. Constable Phil Tobin
Constable Phil Tobin has moved for dismissal in both his official and individual capacity. In his official capacity, Constable Tobin argues that he is not a policy maker for Bandera County and his acts or omissions cannot, as a matter of law, constitute the policies of Bandera County. In his individual capacity, Constable Tobin argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity. The entirety of Plaintiff's allegations as to Constable Tobin's action are that "Defendant PHIL TOBIN, under false pretenses, willfully and maliciously lured [Plaintiff] from his home in the night in order to accomplish the illegal search, seizure and arrest of [Plaintiff]." Plaintiff's allegations are wholly insufficient to determine whether Constable Tobin could be liable to Plaintiff in his official or individual capacity. Plaintiff is therefore ORDERED to file a reply pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 7 detailing factual allegations as to the conduct of Constable Tobin on the night in question. Schultea, 47 F.3d at 1434. Constable Tobin's motions to dismiss are DENIED (docket nos. 2 29) without prejudice.
2. Magistrate Tim Tobin
Magistrate Tim Tobin moves for dismissal based on judicial immunity. Judicial officers are entitled to absolute immunity from damage claims arising out of acts performed in the exercise of their judicial functions. Graves v. Hampton, 1 F.3d 315, 317 (5th Cir. 1993). "[J]udicial immunity is not overcome by allegations of bad faith or malice." Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991). A judge is not deprived of immunity because the action taken was in error. Id. at 12-13. A judge's immunity is overcome only for actions not taken in the judge's judicial capacity or action taken in complete absence of all jurisdiction. Id. at 11-12. Plaintiff alleges that Magistrate Tobin "willfully signed a Sworn Complaint and an Arrest Warrant without probable cause" and "willfully failed to magistrate [Plaintiff] until late in the morning." As to the first allegation, Plaintiff alleges only that Magistrate Tobin acted in bad faith. This is not sufficient to overcome judicial immunity. As to the second allegation, there is no recognized cause of action for failing to magistrate a person until late in the morning. Insofar as this complaint alleges that Plaintiff was not brought before the Magistrate because of some personal malice on the part of Magistrate Tobin, this allegation is not sufficient to overcome judicial immunity. The Court finds that Plaintiff's allegations as to Magistrate Tobin are sufficient to make a determination as to judicial immunity, and that judicial immunity acts to bar liability. Accordingly, Magistrate Tobin's motion to dismiss is GRANTED (docket no. 3) and Magistrate Tobin is DISMISSED from this case.
3. Police Officers Misty Kelley and Neil McLean
Officers Kelley and McLean move for dismissal on the basis of qualified immunity. Plaintiff alleges that Officer Kelley "willfully and maliciously swore out a Complaint against [Plaintiff] without personal knowledge or probable cause." "[A]n officer who act[s] with malice in procuring the warrant or the indictment will not be liable if the facts supporting the warrant or indictment are put before an impartial intermediary such as a magistrate or a grand jury, for that intermediary's independent decision breaks the causal chain and insulates the initiating party." Hand v. Gary, 838 F.2d 1420, 1427 (5th Cir. 1988) (internal quotations omitted). The chain of causation is broken only where all the facts are presented to the grand jury or magistrate and the malicious motive of the officer does not lead him to withhold any relevant information. Id. at 1428. Plaintiff's Original Complaint alleges that Officer Kelley swore to a complaint that was without personal knowledge or probable cause. Whether Officer Kelley is entitled to qualified immunity based upon Plaintiff's allegations is not generally susceptible to determination on a motion to dismiss. As the Fifth Circuit in Hand observed, "[a]n independent intermediary breaks the chain of causation unless it can be shown that the deliberations of that intermediary were in some way tainted by the actions of the defendants." Id. (emphasis added). This allegation is more properly examined on summary judgment, when both sides have had the opportunity to conduct discovery as to the actions of Officer Kelley. Accordingly, Officer Kelley's motion to dismiss is DENIED (docket no. 4-1) with prejudice.
As to Officer McLean, Plaintiff alleges only that Officer McLean "willfully executed [an] invalid Arrest Warrant" and "willfully and maliciously imprisoned" Plaintiff. Where a police officer acts in good faith upon an arrest warrant, that officer is not liable for a violation of a plaintiff's constitutional rights, even where the arrest warrant is invalid. U.S. v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). Similarly, detaining an individual on the basis of a facially valid warrant is not actionable. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 143-45 (1979). Therefore, Plaintiff has not alleged any actionable conduct on the part of Officer McLean. Accordingly, Officer McLean's motion to dismiss is GRANTED (docket no. 4-2) and Officer McLean is DISMISSED from this case.
4. Chief Shane Merritt
Chief Merritt moves for dismissal on the basis of qualified immunity. Plaintiff's Original Complaint alleges simply that actions committed by Officers Kelley and McLean were committed either on the instruction or with the knowledge and consent of Chief Merritt. A supervisory police official may be individually liable for the deprivation of constitutional rights by subordinate police officers (1) if the supervisory officer affirmatively participated in the acts that caused the constitutional deprivation or (2) implemented unconstitutional policies that causally resulted in the injury. Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 199 (5th Cir. 1996). Plaintiff generally alleges that Chief Merritt affirmatively participated in depriving Plaintiff of his constitutional rights. However, Plaintiff has not made any factual allegations as to any of Chief Merritt's actual actions. Accordingly, Plaintiff is ORDERED to file a reply pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 7 specifically detailing the allegations as to Chief Merritt's actions on the night in question. Schultea, 47 F.3d at 1434. Chief Merritt's motion to dismiss in his individual capacity is therefore DENIED (docket no. 5-1) without prejudice.
The heightened pleading standard does not apply to claims against Chief Merritt in his official capacity, as that claim is treated as a claim against the City of Bandera. Id. at 195. The Fifth Circuit has stated that claims for a failure to train and supervise police officers against a city are not particularly susceptible to motions to dismiss when evidence might be adduced showing that a police officer has received no training in offenders' rights. Drake v. City of Haltom City, 106 Fed. Appx. 897, 899-900, 2004 WL 1777144, at *1 (5th Cir. Aug. 10, 2004). Therefore, Chief Merritt's motion to dismiss in his official capacity is DENIED (docket no. 5-2) with prejudice, as this claim is more properly examined on summary judgment.
5. The River Authority Defendants
The River Authority Defendants move for dismissal on the basis of legislative immunity. Government officials are immune from suit for the performance of legislative duties. Gravel v. U.S., 408 U.S. 606, 625 (1972). Legislative immunity applies with full force at all levels of government, including to local officials. Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 52-54 (1998). Only those duties that are functionally legislative are protected by legislative immunity. Hughes v. Tarrant Cty., 948 F.2d 918, 920 (5th Cir. 1991). "When an official possessing legislative responsibilities engages in official activities insufficiently connected with the legislative process to raise genuine concern that an inquiry into the motives underlying his actions will thwart his ability to perform his legislative duties, vigorously, openly and forthrightly, he is not entitled to absolute immunity. . . ." Id. It is impossible to determine what actions were taken by the River Authority Defendants from Plaintiff's Original Complaint. Ten people are sued collectively as "officers, directors, and/or employees" of the River Authority. However, there is no indication what position each defendant holds within the River Authority, or what actions were actually taken by each defendant. Plaintiff's Original Complaint is insufficient to allow the Court to determine whether an act that was functionally legislative was taken by any member of the River Authority, or whether qualified immunity would apply, should the Court find that legislative immunity does not. A plaintiff must "support his claim with sufficient precision and factual specificity to raise a genuine issue as to the illegality of defendant's conduct at the time of the alleged acts." Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427, 1434 (5th Cir. 1995). Consequently, Plaintiff is ORDERED to file a reply pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 7 detailing factual allegations as to each of the River Authority Defendants. Id. The River Authority Defendants' motion to dismiss is DENIED (docket no. 27) without prejudice.
6. County Attorney K.H. Schneider
County Attorney Schneider moves for dismissal on the absolute immunity afforded prosecutors intimately associated with the judicial process. State prosecutors are absolutely immune for the initiation of prosecution and for the presentation of the State's case, insofar as that conduct is "intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process." Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976). All actions "which occur in course of the [prosecutor's] role as an advocate for the State" are immune from suit. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 272 (1993). The Court may dismiss a prosecutor under Rule 12 where the plaintiff's allegations cannot establish liability. Esteves v. Brock, 106 F.3d 674 (5th Cir. 1997) (affirming the grant of a Rule 12 motion to dismiss on prosecutorial immunity grounds); Chrissy F., 925 F.2d at 850 (noting that the a prosecutor is absolutely immune for the decision to initiate prosecution). Plaintiff alleges only that County Attorney Schenider "willfully filed an Information . . . [and] knew or should have known that it was facially invalid and wholly unsupported by the law." However, "causing charges to be filed without probable cause will not without more violate the Constitution." Castellano v. Fragozo, 352 F.3d 939, 953 (5th Cir. 2003). Plaintiff's allegations allege only that and as such are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss. Accordingly, Defendant Schneider's motion to dismiss is GRANTED (docket no. 28) and Defendant Schneider is DISMISSED from this case.
III. Conclusion
Plaintiff has sued a number of defendants in relation to the decision to have Plaintiff removed from a meeting of the Bandera County River Authority and Groundwater District and Plaintiff's subsequent arrest. The Court GRANTS the Bandera County Constables Office's motion to dismiss (docket no. 30) and DISMISSES the Bandera County Constables Office. The Court also DISMISSES Defendants the City of Bandera Police Department and the River Authority as they have no separate jural existence. The Court GRANTS the motions to dismiss of Magistrate Tim Tobin (docket no. 3), Officer Neil McLean (docket no. 4-2), and County Attorney Schneider (docket no. 28) and DISMISSES each from the case. The Court DENIES without prejudice the motions to dismiss of Constable Phil Tobin (docket nos. 2 29), Chief Shane Merritt in his individual capacity (docket no. 5-1), and the River Authority Defendants (docket no. 27). The Court DENIES with prejudice the motions to dismiss of Officer Misty Kelley (docket no. 4-1) and of Chief Merritt in his official capacity (docket no. 5-2). Plaintiff is ORDERED to reply within ten (10) days pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 7 with specific factual allegations against Constable Tobin and against Chief Merritt in his individual capacity. Plaintiff is further ORDERED to reply within ten (10) days pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 7 with specific factual allegations as to each of the River Authority Defendants, including an accounting of the positions of each of the River Authority Defendants. In the alternative, Plaintiff will be granted leave to file an amended complaint detailing the specific factual allegations against the remaining Defendants specific to meet the heightened pleading standard.