Opinion
No. C 01-0672 CRB
March 30, 2001
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
The plaintiffs filed the present complaint on February 13, 2001, alleging that the defendants, Associate Justice Timothy A. Reardon of the California Court of Appeal, First District, Judge Morton R. Colvin (retired) of the California Superior Court for the County of San Francisco, and Judge William Ingram, Senior U.S. District Judge for the Northern District of California, violated their civil rights. The complaint appears to allege that the plaintiffs served on a criminal jury in 1973 and that Judge Colvin, Judge Ingram, and then-Deputy Attorney General Reardon failed to enter the jury's verdict of not guilty and instead order the re-trial of the defendant Ruchell Magee.
The plaintiffs allege that Associate Justice Reardon was the Deputy Attorney General, Judge Colvin was a judge in the Superior Court of Santa Clara County, and Judge Ingram was a judge in the Superior Court of Santa Clara County during the events described in the complaint.
The claim shall be dismissed for two independent reasons. First, any federal claims arising from the incident would be time-barred. Section 1983 civil rights claims brought in a federal district court in California have a one-year statute of limitations. See Tyson v. City of Sunnyvale. 159 F.R.D. 528, 530 (N.D.Cal. 1995) (citing Cabrales v. County of Los Angeles, 864 F.2d 1454, 1462 (9th Cir. 1988)).
Second, the defendants are entitled to absolute judicial immunity. See Harvey v. Waldron, 210 F.3d 1008, 1012 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting that absolute judicial immunity is only overcome for nonjudicial actions or actions taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction, neither of which is present here); see also Pierson v. Ray 386 U.S. 547, 553-54 (1967) ("Few doctrines were more solidly established at common law than the immunity of judges from liability for damages for acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction.").
Since the plaintiffs' complaint is time-barred and is barred by absolute judicial immunity, it is hereby DISMISSED with prejudice.
Because the complaint is dismissed, the Court need not consider Ruchell Magee's motion for permissive joinder. Even if he were joined as a plaintiff, the complaint would still be subject to dismissal.