Summary
allowing states to prohibit youths from working in dangerous occupations
Summary of this case from In re Estate of S.T.TOpinion
No. 54.
Submitted November 3, 1913. Decided December 1, 1913.
A State is entitled to prohibit the employment of persons of tender years in dangerous occupations; and in order to make the prohibition effective it may compel employers at their peril to ascertain whether their employes are in fact below the age specified. Absolute requirements as to ascertaining age of employes of tender years are a proper exercise of the protective power of government; and if the legislation has reasonable relation to the purpose which the State is entitled to effect it is not an unconstitutional deprivation of liberty or property without due process of law. A classification in employment of labor of persons below sixteen years of age is reasonable and does not deny equal protection of the laws. The provisions of the Child Labor Act of Illinois of 1903 involved in this case are not unconstitutional as denying due process of law, as depriving the employer of liberty of contract, or of his property by requiring him at his peril to ascertain the age of the person employed, or as denying him the equal protection of the law. 250 Ill. 303, affirmed.
Mr. A.W. Bulkley and Mr. C.E. More for plaintiff in error:
The common-law rule of contributory negligence applies to minors. 7 Am. Eng. Ency. of Law, 2d ed., p. 409; Heiman v. Kinare, 190 Ill. 156.
The common-law rule of contributory negligence has not been abolished by child labor statutes. Berdos v. Tremont Mills, 209 Mass. 489-498; Beghold v. Auto Body Co., 149 Mich. 14; Bromberg v. Evans Laundry Co., 134 Iowa 38, 46; Braasch v. Michigan Stove Co., 118 N.W. 366; Burke v. Big Sandy Coal Co., 68 W. Va. 421; Darsam v. Kohlmann, 123 La. 164, 171, 172; Dalm v. Bryant Paper Co., 157 Mich. 550; Evans v. American Iron Co., 42 F. 519; Gaines Leathers v. Blackwell Tobacco Co., 144 N.C. 330; Iron Wire Co. v. Green, 108 Tenn. 161, 165; Jacobson v. Merrill Mill Co., 107 Minn. 74; Kirkham v. Wheeler-Osgood Co., 39 Wn. 415; Nairn v. National Biscuit Co., 120 Mo. App. 144, 147; Nickey v. Steuder, 164 Ind. 189, 196; Norman v. Virginia-Pocahontas Co., 68 W. Va. 405; Perry v. Tozer, 90 Minn. 431; Peters v. Gille Mfg. Co., 133 Mo. App. 412, 419; Queen v. Dayton Coal Co., 95 Tenn. 458, 465; Rolin v. Tobacco Co., 141 N.C. 300; Roberts v. Taylor, 31 Ontario, 10; Sharon v. Winnebago Mfg. Co., 141 Wis. 185, 189; Smith v. National Coal Co., 135 Ky. 671; Sterling v. Union Carbide Co., 142 Mich. 284; Syneszewski v. Schmidt, 153 Mich. 438.
Corporations are persons within the Fourteenth Amendment. Duncan v. Missouri, 152 U.S. 377; Gulf, Col. c. Railway v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 154; Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68; Lowe v. Kansas, 163 U.S. 88; Minneapolis Railroad Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U.S. 29; Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac. Ry., 118 U.S. 394.
Courts will interfere to correct errors of state tribunals if law is administered so as to violate the Fourteenth Amendment. Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275-279; Henderson v. New York, 92 U.S. 259-273; Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370; Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U.S. 703, 710; Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356-373.
Defendant in error Beauchamp was an adult and not a child. Allen v. State, 7 Tex. App. 298[ 7 Tex.Crim. 298]; 16 Am. Eng. Ency., 2d ed., p. 263; 51 Am. Reports, 293; Bell v. State, 18 Tex. App. 53[ 18 Tex.Crim. 53]; Black's Law Dict.; Century Dict.; Hurd's Illinois Stat. 1912, c. 38, Par. 282, p. 818, and § 7, Pars. 279, 280, 281 and 282; Id., c. 3, § 18, p. 11; Id., c. 4, § 4, p. 36; Id., c. 64, §§ 1, 3, p. 1261; McGregor v. State, 4 Tex. App. 599[ 4 Tex.Crim. 599]; Quattlebaum v. Triplett, 69 Ark. 91.
For distinction between contributory negligence and assumption of risk, see Berdos v. Tremont Mills, 209 Mass. 489-497; Cleveland St. L. Ry. Co. v. Baker, 33 C. C.A. 468; 91 F. 224; Narramore v. Cleveland St. L. Ry. Co., 96 F. 298-304; Un. Pac. Ry. Co. v. O'Brien, 161 U.S. 451.
The judgment of the Illinois courts deprives plaintiff in error of equal protection of the laws. Chicago c. R.R. v. Westby, 178 F. 619; Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U.S. 540; Cotting v. Kansas Stockyards Co., 183 U.S. 79; Cooley on Const. Lim., 3d ed., p. 391; Gulf, Col. c. Ry. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150; Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Tucker, 230 U.S. 340; Southern Ry. Co. v. Greene, 216 U.S. 400.
The legislature has no power to give civil remedy to one guilty of fraud and deceit. Black on Const. Law, 2d ed., p. 373; Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623; Story on Const., 5th ed., § 1945; Wilkinson v. Leland, 2 Pet. 627, 657; Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U.S. 274.
Reading into the statute a civil remedy and abolishing common-law defenses are legislative and not judicial acts and transcends power of court. 26 Amer. Eng. Ency., 2d ed., p. 597; Bate Refrigerating Co. v. Sulzberger, 157 U.S. 1; Chicago, B. Q.R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226; Doe v. Considine, 6 Wall. 458; Home Telephone Co. v. Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278; Scott v. McNeal, 154 U.S. 3445; St. Paul c. Ry. Co. v. Phelps, 137 U.S. 528; Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 202; United States v. St. Anthony R.R. Co., 192 U.S. 524; United States v. Fisher, 2 Cr. 358; United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 95; Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U.S. 274, 282.
The statute as held and enforced is not within the police power. Chicago v. Gunning System, 213 Ill. 628; Collins v. New Hampshire, 171 U.S. 30; In re Jacobs, 98 N.Y. 98; Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133; Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U.S. 313, 320; Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661; Ruhstrat v. The People, 185 Ill. 133; State v. Caspare, 80 A. 606. 613 (Md.); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370.
The maxim "No one acquires a right of action from his own wrong" applies to minors. 16 Amer. Eng. Ency., 2d ed., p. 311; Barham v. Turbeville, 1 Swan. 437; Bigelow on Estoppel (5th ed.), p. 606; Commander v. Brazil, 41 So. 497 (Miss.); Coleman v. Himmelberger Land Co., 79 S.W. 981; 22 Cyc., Title Infants, p. 512; Ex parte Banking Asso., 3 DeG. J. 63; Edgar v. Gertison, 112 S.W. 831; Ferguson v. Bobo, 54 Miss. 121; Hall v. Timmons, 2 Rich. (S.C.) 120; 57 L.R.A. 673, n.; Matthews v. Cowan, 59 Ill. 341; Munden v. Harris, 134 S.W. 1076-1080; Pace v. Cawood, 110 S.W. 414 (Ky.); Parker v. Elder, 11 Humph. 546; Rice v. Boyer, 108 Ind. 472; Sanger v. Hibbard, 53 S.W. 330; Vasse v. Smith, 6 Cranch, 226; Vinton v. State, 52 S.E. 79; Wright v. Snowe, 2 DeG. Sm. 321; Williamson v. Jones, 27 S.E. 418; Whittington v. Wright, 9 Ga. 29.
The statute in question is a penal statute to be strictly construed. Bandefield v. Bandfield, 75 N.W. 287; Field v. United States, 137 F. 6; Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657; Sarlls v. United States, 152 U.S. 570, 575; The Ben R., 134 F. 784; United States v. Harris, 177 U.S. 305, 310; United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 96; see also Am. Car Co. v. Armentraut, 214 Ill. 509; Illinois Central R.R. Co. v. O'Connor, 189 Ill. 564; Strafford v. Republic Iron Co., 238 Ill. 371.
Mr. George E. Gorman and Mr. John M. Pollock for defendant in error.
The Sturges and Burn Manufacturing Company is a corporation engaged in manufacturing tinware and other metal products. It employed Arthur Beauchamp, the defendant in error, who was under sixteen years of age, as a press hand to operate a punch press used in stamping sheet metal. Beauchamp was injured in operating the press and brought an action through his next friend, in the Superior Court of Cook County, to recover the damages sustained, counting on the statute of Illinois passed in 1903 (Laws of 1903, p. 187, Hurd's Statutes, 1909, p. 1082) which, by § 11, prohibited the employment of children under the age of sixteen years in various hazardous occupations including that in which the injury occurred. The trial court, refusing to direct a verdict for the defendant, instructed the jury that if the plaintiff was in fact less than sixteen years old and when injured was employed by the defendant upon a stamping machine, the defendant was guilty of a violation of the statute and the plaintiff was entitled to recover. A verdict was rendered for the plaintiff and judgment thereon was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the State. 250 Ill. 303. The case comes here on error.
The plaintiff in error complains of the ruling that a violation of the statute gives a right of action to the employe in case of his injury, but this is a question of state law with which we are not concerned.
The Federal question presented is whether the statute as construed by the state court contravenes the Fourteenth Amendment. It cannot be doubted that the State was entitled to prohibit the employment of persons of tender years in dangerous occupations. Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 392, 395; Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 31; Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421; Chicago, Burlington Quincy R.R. Co. v. McGuire, 219 U.S. 549, 568, 569. It is urged that the plaintiff in error was not permitted to defend upon the ground that it acted in good faith relying upon the representation made by Beauchamp that he was over sixteen. It is said that, being over fourteen, he at least had attained the age at which he should have been treated as responsible for his statements. But, as it was competent for the State in securing the safety of the young to prohibit such employment altogether, it could select means appropriate to make its prohibition effective and could compel employers, at their peril, to ascertain whether those they employed were in fact under the age specified. The imposition of absolute requirements of this sort is a familiar exercise of the protective power of government. Reg. v. Prince, L.R. 2 C.C. 154; People v. Werner, 174 N.Y. 132; State v. Kinkead, 57 Conn. 173; Ulrich v. Commonwealth, 69 Ky. 400; State v. Heck, 23 Minneapolis, 549; State v. Hartfiel, 24 Wis. 60; State v. Tomasi, 67 Vt. 312; Commonwealth v. Green, 163 Mass. 103; 3 Greenleaf on Evidence, § 21; 30 Am. Rep. ( note) 617-620. And where, as here, such legislation has reasonable relation to a purpose which the State was entitled to effect, it is not open to constitutional objection as a deprivation of liberty or property without due process of law. Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota, 218 U.S. 57, 70.
It is also contended that the statute denied to the plaintiff in error the equal protection of the laws, but the classification it established was clearly within the legislative power. Heath Milligan Co. v. Worst, 207 U.S. 338, 354; Louisville Nashville R.R. Co. v. Melton, 218 U.S. 36, 54; Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78; Mutual Loan Co. v. Martell, 222 U.S. 225, 236.
The judgment is
Affirmed.