Opinion
Civil Action No. 01-3358-KHV.
November 8, 2004
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Michael Lee Strope, an inmate at the Lansing Correctional Facility ("LCF") filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of his rights under the First, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. On April 17, 2003, the Court sustained defendants' motion for summary judgment as to plaintiff's claims that defendants had violated his constitutional rights by refusing to let him use his legal name and subjecting him to cruel and unusual punishment. See Doc. #93. Plaintiff's remaining claims — that defendants Barkley, Gibbens, Karlin, McKune, Phelps, Pritchett, Simmons and Woods violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by retaliating and/or conspiring to retaliate against him for filing grievances — were tried to a jury.
The Court also dismissed plaintiff's claims for damages against each defendant in his or her official capacity.
On July 8, 2004, the jury found that Phelps and Gibbens had retaliated against plaintiff for filing grievances, but otherwise rejected plaintiff's claims. The jury awarded plaintiff $12.85 in damages for the violation by Phelps but awarded no damages for the violation by Gibbons. This matter comes before the Court on plaintiff's Motion For A New Trial (Doc. #181) filed July 14, 2004; plaintiff's Motion For Award Of Costs On Defendant Phelps And Gibbens (Doc. #184) filed July 22, 2004; and plaintiff's Motion To Enforce Judgment Of July 8, 2004 (Doc. #186) filed August 10, 2004. For reasons set forth below, the Court finds that plaintiff's motions should be overruled.
Factual Background
In its Memorandum And Order (Doc. #93) of April 17, 2003, the Court set forth further pertinent factual background, incorporated here by reference.
At trial, plaintiff asserted claims against eight defendants: Charles Simmons, Kansas Secretary of Corrections; David McKune, warden at LCF; Lee Gibbens and Jim Barkley, unit team leaders at LCF; Rod Karlin and Kim Pritchett, LCF shakedown officers; and Rhonda Phelps and Terry Steen Woods, LCF correctional officers. Plaintiff asserted that defendants violated his First Amendment right to free speech and his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection under the law. Plaintiff specifically claimed as follows:
First, on August 13, 2001, plaintiff gave Gibbens a three-page complaint concerning Phelps. Gibbens read the complaint, then told plaintiff that he would be moved back to the dorm so they could "deal with" him. Later, plaintiff was moved to another section of LCF. Second, Phelps intentionally denied plaintiff "yard," showers, ice, access to the law library and evening meals, and harassed and threatened him in retaliation for filing grievances. She threatened to move plaintiff out of his cellhouse if he filed another complaint against her. When he did so, he was moved to D-Cellhouse. Third, Karlin and Pritchett used shakedown searches to harass plaintiff and sanction him for voicing his complaints about them and McKune. Fourth, Woods and Barkley conspired to move plaintiff to a violent cellhouse after plaintiff filed a grievance about Woods. Fifth, McKune conspired with his staff to sanction plaintiff for filing complaints by refusing to answer, process, and respond to several complaints, and failing to prevent searches, cellhouse moves and seizures of property. Finally, because plaintiff named Simmons in another lawsuit in this court, Simmons retaliated against plaintiff by conspiring with his staff to inflict unlawful sanctions on plaintiff for filing complaints.
Plaintiff claimed that in all of the foregoing actions, defendants were retaliating for his filing of grievances, and that defendants lacked any rational basis for this unequal treatment. He sought compensatory and punitive damages.
On July 8, 2004, the jury found that Phelps and Gibbens had retaliated against plaintiff for exercising his First Amendment right to free speech, and found for defendant on plaintiff's remaining claims. The jury awarded plaintiff $12.85 in damages from Phelps, but awarded no damages from Gibbens. Plaintiff argues that he is entitled to a new trial because (1) the verdict was against the weight of the evidence, (2) the damage award was inadequate and contrary to fundamental principles of justice and fairness, and (3) the Court did not properly instruct the jury on plaintiff's claims that defendants conspired to retaliate against him for filing grievances.
New Trial Standards
The decision whether to grant a motion for new trial is committed to the trial court's sound discretion. See Unit Drilling Co. v. Enron Oil Gas Co., 108 F.3d 1186, 1194 (10th Cir. 1997). The party seeking to set aside a jury verdict must demonstrate trial errors which constitute prejudicial error or that the verdict is not based on substantial evidence. White v. Conoco, Inc., 710 F.2d 1442, 1443 (10th Cir. 1983). The Court should ignore errors that did not affect the essential fairness of the trial. McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 553 (1984). Where a new trial motion asserts that the jury verdict is not supported by the evidence, the verdict must stand unless it is clearly, decidedly, or overwhelmingly against the weight of the evidence.See May v. Interstate Moving Storage Co., 739 F.2d 521, 525 (10th Cir. 1984).
Jury Instruction Standards
The decision whether to give a particular jury instruction is within the sound discretion of the Court. The instructions as a whole must provide correct statements of the governing law and provide the jury with ample understanding of the issues and applicable legal standards. Allen v. Minnstar, 97 F.3d 1365, 1368 (10th Cir. 1996). The question is not "whether the charge was faultless in every particular, but whether the jury was misled in any way and whether it had understanding of the issues and its duties to determine these issues." Mason v. Okla. Tpk. Auth., 115 F.3d 1442, 1454 (10th Cir. 1997) (quotations and citations omitted); see Brown v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 11 F.3d 1559, 1564 (10th Cir. 1993) (error in jury instructions mandates reversal of judgment only if, reviewing record as whole, error was prejudicial).
Analysis
I. Motion For New Trial
A. The Verdict Was Against The Weight Of The Evidence
Plaintiff argues that except as to Phelps and Gibbens, the jury verdict that defendants did not retaliate against him for filing grievances is against the weight of the evidence, and that he is entitled to a new trial. Plaintiff points to his testimony that defendants did not answer his grievances and that they subjected him to searches within days or weeks of the dates on which he filed grievances. Plaintiff also notes testimony that Phelps and others deprived him of meals, yard times, ice and showers within days or weeks of when he submitted written or verbal complaints.
Plaintiff's argument overlooks the fact that each defendant testified that he or she never took action to retaliate against plaintiff for filing grievances, or singled him out for differential treatment. Defendants were credible witnesses, and the jury was entitled to believe or disbelieve their testimony. The record therefore contains sufficient evidence to support the jury verdict. Plaintiff is not entitled to a new trial based on his argument that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence.
Indeed, several defendants testified that they did not recognize plaintiff either by sight or by name and did not recall if he had ever filed any grievances.
B. The Damage Award Was Inadequate
Plaintiff asserts that the damage award was inadequate and against fundamental principles of justice and fairness. He argues that the jury awarded him minimal damages because of his status as a prisoner. Plaintiff also points out that although the jury found that Gibbens had violated his First Amendment rights, it did not award him any damages for that violation. Further, plaintiff asserts that the jury should have awarded him punitive damages.
Defendant responds that plaintiff has presented no evidence that the jury treated him unfairly or disregarded the Court's instructions on damages. The Court agrees. The award of punitive damages is exclusively within the province of the jury. See Rahn v. Junction City Foundry, Inc., 161 F. Supp. 2d 1219 (D. Kan. 2001). The Court finds no basis to overturn the verdict as to actual or punitive damages.
C. Jury Instructions
Plaintiff asserts that the Court erred when it did not instruct the jury on a separate theory that defendants conspired to retaliate against him for filing grievances. Plaintiff did not request such an instruction during the trial, and he did not object to the jury instructions which the Court gave.
In ruling on defendants' motion for summary judgment, the Court found that the conspiracy theory remained in the case.
Conducting a de novo review of the jury instructions as a whole, the Court should not grant a new trial unless it has "substantial doubt that the jury was fairly guided." United States v. Guidry, 199 F.3d 1150, 1156 (10th Cir. 1999). "[T]he exclusion of one correct statement of law does not necessarily constitute error. Rather, the instructions as a whole need only convey a correct statement of applicable law." Nat'l Envtl. Serv. Co. v. Ronan Eng'g Co., 256 F.3d 995, 1004 (10th Cir. 2001).
Read together, the instructions in this case adequately presented any theory that defendants conspired to retaliate against him for filing grievances. At trial, the only evidence of any conspiracy was plaintiff's testimony that Gibbens told him that Gibbens and Phelps had agreed that if plaintiff made any more complaints, they would move plaintiff to a different cell-block. The jury indeed found that these two defendants violated his First Amendment right. Failure to give a separate jury instruction on conspiracy was not plain error, and the Court has no reason to believe that the jury would have awarded additional damages if the jury agreed that Gibbens and Phelps had conspired to violate plaintiff's rights.
II. Motion For Award Of Costs
Plaintiff asks the Court to award him costs in the amount of $169.34. See Doc. #184. Plaintiff must follow the local rule for filing a bill of costs. See D. Kan. Rule 54.1(a). The motion is therefore overruled. The Court directs the Clerk to consider an application for costs as timely if plaintiff completes the form by November 30, 2004.
Rule 54.1 (a) provides as follows:
The party entitled to recover costs shall file a bill of costs on a form provided by the clerk within 30 days (a) after the expiration of time allowed for appeal of a final judgment or decree, or (b) after receipt by the clerk of an order terminating the action on appeal. The clerk's action may be reviewed by the court if a motion to retax the costs is filed within five days after taxation by the clerk. The failure of a prevailing party to timely file a bill of costs shall constitute a waiver of any claim for costs.
III. Motion To Enforce Judgment Of July 8, 2004
Plaintiff asks the Court to order Phelps to pay him the judgment of $12.85 plus interest. See Doc. #186. As defendants point out, plaintiff's motion for a new trial under Rule 59, Fed.R.Civ.P. prevented the judgment from becoming final. The Court overrules plaintiff's motion to enforce the judgment as premature.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiff's Motion For A New Trial (Doc. #181) filed July 14, 2004; plaintiff's Motion For Award Of Costs On Defendant Phelps And Gibbens (Doc. #184) filed July 22, 2004; and plaintiff's Motion To Enforce Judgment Of July 8, 2004 (Doc. #186) filed August 10, 2004 be and hereby are OVERRULED.
The Court directs the Clerk to mail plaintiff the form for a bill of costs with a copy of this order. The Clerk shall consider an application for costs as timely if plaintiff submits the form by November 30, 2004.