Opinion
A22D0307
04-07-2022
MICHAEL LYDON STRONG v. THE STATE.
The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order:
Michael Lydon Strong has been charged with aggravated stalking, criminal trespass, and disorderly conduct. Proceeding pro se, he filed in the trial court a motion for default judgment and a statutory speedy trial demand. In two orders, each issued on February 9, 2022, the trial court dismissed Strong's motions. On March 21, 2022, Strong filed this application, seeking discretionary review of both orders. Because the application is untimely, we lack jurisdiction.
In violation of Court of Appeals Rule 31 (e), Strong has not provided a copy of his motions with the application materials.
Pretermitting whether a criminal defendant may seek default judgment, the trial court's order denying Strong's motion for default judgment is an interlocutory ruling, which generally requires a party to follow our interlocutory review procedure. See Ware v. Handy Storage, 222 Ga.App. 339, 339 (474 S.E.2d 240) (1996); see also OCGA § 5-6-34 (b). In contrast, the trial court's order dismissing Strong's statutory speedy trial demand is directly appealable. See Hubbard v. State, 254 Ga. 694, 695-696 (333 S.E.2d 827) (1985). Ordinarily, when a party seeks discretionary review of a directly appealable order, we grant the application under OCGA § 5-6-35 (j). To be granted an appeal under OCGA § 5-6-35 (j), however, the application must be filed within 30 days of entry of the order to be appealed. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (d), (j). Here, Strong filed his application 40 days after the trial court's orders were entered. His application is therefore untimely and subject to dismissal. See Crosson v. Conway, 291 Ga. 220, 220 (1) (728 S.E.2d 617) (2012).
Accordingly, Strong's application is hereby DISMISSED.