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In Stromberg v. Board of Education of Bratenahl, 64 Ohio St.2d 98, 100, 413 N.E.2d 1184, 1186 (1980) (per curiam), the Supreme Court of Ohio unequivocally stated that the doctrine of res judicata "applies not only to what was determined but also to every question which might properly have been litigated."
Summary of this case from City of Canton, Ohio v. MaynardOpinion
No. 80-126
Decided December 17, 1980.
Judgments — Dissolution of local school district — Res judicata — Applicability to complainant as a taxpayer.
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County.
The instant cause arose from a complaint filed in the Court of Common Pleas by Sidney Stromberg, appellant herein, as a taxpayer and resident of the village of Bratenahl, challenging the dissolution and merger on July 1, 1970, of the Bratenahl School District with the Cleveland School District and the constitutionality of R.C. 3311.29, and praying for injunctive relief with respect to the order of merger and the transfer of property and funds. The transfer of the property, assets and management of Bratenahl School District has been completed.
The dissolution of the Bratenahl School District and its merger on July 1, 1970, has had an extensive and protracted history of litigation in this court and in the federal courts. The controversy involved the efforts of the Bratenahl School District to preserve its independent identity despite its failure to maintain a school system consisting of grades one through twelve, inclusive, as required by R.C. 3311.29.
In State, ex rel. Bd. of Edn., v. State Bd. of Edn. (1978), 53 Ohio St.2d 173, certiorari denied, 439 U.S. 865, the Bratenahl board of education challenged the state's final order of dissolution. In upholding the validity of the order, the majority opinion concluded, at page 178, "that the Bratenahl Local School District was properly dissolved on July 1, 1970, by the state board." Seeking to stop this dissolution, the board of education then filed a complaint in prohibition and mandamus in the Court of Appeals for Franklin County. Citing the above decision of this court, the Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint sua sponte, by finding that the first Bratenahl case was res judicata. This judgment was affirmed by this court in State, ex rel. Bd. of Edn., v. State Bd. of Edn. (1979), 58 Ohio St.2d 189.
Expressing the issues in terms of denials of equal protection and due process under the Constitution of the United States, the Bratenahl board of education, joined by individual taxpayers and students, then asserted the same issues in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio. The District Court dismissed the action. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit agreed with the District Court that the Ohio litigation fully and completely disposed of all claims, and affirmed the dismissal. Wilt v. State Bd. of Edn. (C.A. 6, 1979), 608 F.2d 1126.
The status of the Bratenahl Local School District was before this court again in Wiss v. Bd. of Elections, 61 Ohio St.2d 298, decided March 12, 1980. While this case involved the eligibility of a resident and elector of the village of Bratenahl to be a candidate for the Cuyahoga County Board of Education, the initial question raised was whether the Bratenahl Local School District had been dissolved. This court stated, at page 299, as follows: "A review of these cases shows that the status of the Bratenahl School District has been established and the same was dissolved on July 1, 1970, and the issue is res judicata." Further, on page 300, it was noted that "[i]n Wilt v. Bd. of Edn., supra, the federal circuit court also found this issue to be res judicata." The candidate argued that the Bratenahl controversy was still alive because the constitutionality of R.C. 3311.29 was under attack in the instant case, then pending in the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County. This court stated that this rationale for qualifying the Bratenahl issue as viable is tenuous at best, and that an allegation of unconstitutionality of a statute in a case pending in a lower court is not justification for overturning a determination twice made by this court.
The appellees herein, State Board of Education and Cleveland Board of Education, filed motions to dismiss based upon the earlier decisions of this court that the judgment in the action between the State Board of Education and the Bratenahl board of education was res judicata as to appellant's complaint. The trial court dismissed appellant's complaint and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
The cause is now before this court upon the allowance of a motion to certify the record.
Mr. James A. Chiara and Mr. Terence E. Scanlon, for appellant.
Messrs. Weston, Hurd, Fallon, Paisley Howley, Mr. John M. Baker, Mr. Lawrence N. Gang and Ms. Mary A. Lentz, for appellee Cleveland Board of Education.
Messrs. Alexander, Ebinger, Holschuh, Fisher McAlister, Mr. John D. Holschuh, Ms. Adele E. O'Conner, Mr. William J. Brown, attorney general, and Mr. Gary E. Brown, for appellee State Board of Education.
While one may admire the persistence of the citizens and taxpayers of the village of Bratenahl to reestablish a local school district, it has been determined that the local district failed to meet the standards established by the General Assembly in R.C. 3311.29 and repeatedly stated that the Bratenahl Local School District was regularly dissolved.
The determinative issue before this court is whether the judgment that the Bratenahl Local School District has been dissolved is res judicata as to the appellant as a taxpayer.
While it may be said that the issue here is moot because the judgment has been executed, the Bratenahl School District dissolved and the property transferred, the approval of that course of action exists in the prior adjudications of this court. A moot question is one that need not be decided. Where an issue has been resolved, res judicata is the appropriate principle to be applied.
Further, based upon our disposition of this issue herein, infra, this court does not reach the issue of the constitutionality of R.C. 3311.29.
This court has uniformly adhered to the doctrine of res judicata to prevent repeated attacks upon a final judgment. The doctrine applies not only to what was determined but also to every question which might properly have been litigated. State, ex rel. Ohio Water Service Co., v. Mahoning Valley Sanitary Dist. (1959), 169 Ohio St. 31, paragraph one of the syllabus; Quinn v. State, ex rel. Leroy (1928), 118 Ohio St. 48, paragraph one of the syllabus; Burton, Inc., v. Durkee (1954), 162 Ohio St. 433, paragraph two of the syllabus; Pollock v. Cohen (1877), 32 Ohio St. 514, paragraph four of the syllabus. The constitutional issues involved in the case at bar could have been litigated in the board's initial action.
Appellant essentially argues that as a taxpayer he has a private right, independent of the Bratenahl board of education, to relitigate the same public issue determined against the board. This may be true where causes of action are not the same or where the taxpayer has a different private right not shared in common with the public; however, a judgment for or against a governmental body is binding and conclusive as res judicata on all residents, citizens and taxpayers with respect to matters adjudicated which are of general and public interest. Cincinnati, ex rel. Crotty, v. Cincinnati (1977), 50 Ohio St.2d 27, 28.
Accordingly the judgment of the Court of Appeals dismissing the complaint herein is affirmed.
Judgment accordingly.
CELEBREZZE, C.J., W. BROWN, MCBRIDE, SWEENEY, LOCHER, HOLMES and DOWD, JJ., concur.
MCBRIDE, J., of the Second Appellate District, sitting for P. BROWN, J.