Opinion
No. 1-804 / 01-0233.
Filed February 6, 2002.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Fayette County, JAMES L. BEEGHLY, Judge.
The plaintiff appeals the denial of his motion for new trial after the jury failed to award damages in his personal injury action. REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Jay P. Roberts of Roberts, Stevens Lekar, P.L.C., Waterloo, for appellant.
Robert L. Ford of Swisher Cohrt, P.L.C., Waterloo, for appellee.
Considered by SACKETT, C.J., and MAHAN and HECHT, JJ.
The plaintiff appeals the denial of his motion for new trial after a jury failed to award damages in his personal injury action. We reverse and remand for a new trial.
I. Factual Background and Proceedings.
On June 26, 1996, John Beane rear-ended another vehicle with his truck at the intersection of Highway 18 and Ironwood Road, Fayette County, Iowa. Bernard Stroh was a passenger in the vehicle hit by Beane. The impact caused substantial damage to the rear of the vehicle in which Stroh was riding. In addition, Stroh's passenger seat broke, his hands impacted the windshield frame, and his knees were thrown against the dashboard.
The following day Stroh sought treatment for injuries at a hospital emergency room where he informed medical professionals of pain in his neck, upper back, and right upper extremity. The examining physician noted visible edema on his right hand, significant pain and tenderness throughout his hand, arm, and shoulder, as well as diminished mobility. X-rays of Stroh's neck, upper back, and right hand were taken. Medical records received in evidence establish that Stroh was sent home with instructions to rest, take analgesics as needed, and apply ice to painful muscles. From July 2 through July 8, 1996, Stroh underwent a course of physical therapy which focused on pain in his neck, upper back, and right hand. Medical bills in evidence establish the cost of the emergency room services and physical therapy was $1,009.70.
Soon after the 1996 wreck, Stroh's pre-existing heart condition deteriorated and within a month he was in the Mayo Clinic on transplant watch status. While there, he noticed pain first in his right knee, and later also in his left knee. On December 17, 1997, he underwent heart transplant surgery. Stroh claimed he experienced low back and leg pain which impeded his recuperation from the transplant procedure during his hospitalization at Mayo. He also claimed to have received multiple injections for the symptoms at Mayo, but produced no records or bills specifically confirming such treatment.
Stroh filed suit against Beane on June 16, 1998, seeking recovery for injuries sustained in the wreck. Although Beane admitted his negligence caused the crash, he denied his negligence caused the injuries and damages claimed by Stroh. Stroh presented expert medical testimony of Dr. Delbridge, an orthopedic surgeon. The doctor testified that he first examined Stroh on July 10, 1998 for low back pain, and conducted a second examination on October 21, 1999 when Stroh sought treatment for left knee pain. Dr. Delbridge testified the June 26, 1996 wreck caused (1) a back injury which would produce future pain and require future medical treatment; and (2) aggravation of a degenerative condition in Stroh's left knee accelerating the need for arthroscopic surgery and possible future prosthetic replacement.
Beane called no expert witnesses at trial. In furtherance of his contention that Stroh's claimed injuries were not causally related to the 1996 wreck, Beane elicited evidence tending to prove Stroh (1) had polio in his early childhood; (2) injured his left shoulder and upper back in a motor vehicle accident in 1986; (3) had pre-existing degenerative arthritis in his thoracic spine; (4) was on a waiting list for a heart transplant before the June 1996 wreck; (5) made no complaint of knee problems to medical providers until 1998; and (6) suffered knee abrasions when he tripped and fell on an icy sidewalk in February of 1997.
There is no evidence in the record that this injury resulted in medical treatment of any kind.
Beane admitted negligence and the district court therefore submitted to the jury only the question of damages. The jury returned a verdict of zero damages. In his motion for new trial, Stroh contended in relevant part that the verdict was (1) contrary to the evidence and (2) inconsistent with Beane's admission that some of the claimed damages were caused by the 1996 wreck. The court denied Stroh's motion for new trial.
II. Standard of Review.
We review the denial of a motion for new trial for correction of errors at law. Iowa R. App. P. 4; Ladeburg v. Ray, 508 N.W.2d 694, 697 (Iowa 1993). However, if the motion is based on a discretionary ground, we review for abuse of discretion. Ladeburg, 508 N.W.2d at 697. A ruling on a motion for new trial, as it pertains to the adequacy of a jury verdict, is a matter for the trial court's discretion. Bredberg v. Pepsico, Inc., 551 N.W.2d 321, 326 (Iowa 1996); Shepherd Components, Inc. v. Brice Petrides-Donohue Assocs., Inc., 473 N.W.2d 612, 618 (Iowa 1991).
III. Discussion.
A motion for new trial is the proper method for challenging the adequacy of damages. Iowa R. Civ. P. 244(d); Gorden v. Carey, 603 N.W.2d 588, 589-90 (Iowa 1999). In ruling on motions for new trial, the district court has broad, but not unlimited, discretion to determine whether the verdict effectuates substantial justice between the parties. Iowa R. App. P. 14(f)(3); Gorden, 603 N.W.2d at 590. We are slower to interfere with the grant of a new trial than with its denial. Iowa R. App. P. 14(f)(4); Cowan v. Flannery, 461 N.W.2d 155, 157 (Iowa 1990); Rinikerz v. Wilson, 623 N.W.2d 220, 229-30 (Iowa Ct. App. 2000).
A new trial may be ordered if a jury verdict is not supported by sufficient evidence and the verdict fails to effectuate substantial justice. Johnson v. Knoxville Cmty. School Dist., 570 N.W.2d 633, 641 (Iowa 1997) (citing Bredberg, 551 N.W.2d at 326; Thompson v. Rozeboom, 272 N.W.2d 444, 446 (Iowa 1978)). "Substantial justice is inextricably linked to the adequacy of a jury verdict." Id. An inadequate damage award merits a new trial as much as an excessive one. Iowa R. Civ. P. 244(d).
"Whether damages in a given case are adequate depends on the particular facts of the case." Foggia v. Des Moines Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 543 N.W.2d 889, 891 (Iowa 1996) (citing Matthess v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 521 N.W.2d 699, 702 (Iowa 1994)). The test is
"whether the verdict fairly and reasonably compensates the injury the party sustained." Although evidence presented at trial may justify a higher damage award, this alone does not control. The key question is whether after examining the record, "giving the jury its right to accept or reject whatever portion of the conflicting evidence it chose, the verdict effects substantial justice between the parties."Id. (citations omitted).
Stroh contends the district court abused its discretion in failing to grant a new trial because a reasonable fact finder could not find no damages were sustained by Stroh as a result of Beane's negligence. In his brief filed with this court, Stroh claims Beane admitted his negligence caused some injuries "which caused medical bills and physical therapy bills . . . through the first month or so after the accident." Beane denies he made such an admission. We note the district court's "statement of the case" within the jury instructions informed the jury that Beane "denies that he was the cause of all of the damages to the Plaintiff."
Opening statements and closing arguments were not reported, so we are unable to determine whether Beane conceded during unreported portions of the trial that he caused some, but not all, damages claimed by Stroh; or whether he denied causation of all claimed damages. The district court's statement of the case is ambiguous on this point.
We conclude a reasonable juror could not find Stroh sustained no damages as a result of the crash. The rear-end impact caused substantial property damage to the vehicle in which Stroh was riding. Stroh was examined at a hospital within twenty-four hours of the wreck and was found to have bruising and swelling on his right hand. He incurred medical expenses for the hospital examination and physical therapy related to the hand injury. We find no evidence in the record tending to prove Stroh had bruising, swelling, pain, or impairment in his right upper extremity at any time before the wreck of June 26, 1996. The jury's verdict clearly did not effectuate substantial justice because the record requires, at a minimum, some amount of compensation for the medical expenses related to the hand injury. The trial court abused its discretion in failing to grant a new trial under the circumstances of this case.
Stroh claims the wreck also caused injuries to his neck, back, and knees. We believe a jury question existed as to whether those injuries and resulting damages were proximately caused by Beane's negligence. Accordingly, the jury's verdict awarding no damages for those claimed injuries was supported by the record.
IV. Conclusion.
The inadequacy of the verdict necessitates that we remand this case for a new trial on the issue of damages proximately caused by Beane's negligence. Beane's liability has been established and shall not be retried. See Thompson v. Allen, 503 N.W.2d 400, 401 (Iowa 1993); Vorthman v. Keith E. Myers Enters., 296 N.W.2d 772, 778 (Iowa 1980).
REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR NEW TRIAL.