Opinion
C/A No. 6:18-02434-MGL-KFM
09-25-2018
Cale Marcus Strickland, Plaintiff, v. Spartanburg County Sheriff's Office, Chuck Wright, and Officer Piggins, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
The plaintiff Cale Marcus Strickland, proceeding pro se, seeks relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(e)(D.S.C.), this magistrate judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters in cases involving pro se litigants, and submit findings and recommendations to the District Court.
On September 10, 2018, the undersigned filed an order informing the plaintiff that his complaint contained deficiencies which could subject it to summary dismissal (doc. 9). The plaintiff was directed to file an amended complaint curing the deficiencies for review for possible service of process (Id.). The plaintiff failed to file an amended complaint. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends summary dismissal of the complaint for the reasons listed below and for failing to comply with an order of the court.
BACKGROUND AND ALLEGATIONS
The plaintiff is a non-prisoner. In the complaint, he names the Spartanburg County Sheriff's Office (SCSO), Sheriff Chuck Wright (Sheriff Wright), and Officer Piggins of the SCSO as defendants. He appears to assert a malicious prosecution/ illegal seizure claim against Officer Piggins and a conditions of confinement claim against the SCSO and Sheriff Wright. As to Officer Piggins, he alleges that on March 2, 2018, he was arrested for having no vehicle insurance, operating an unregistered vehicle, and for improper use of a temporary tag, for which he was incarcerated in the Spartanburg County Detention Center (SCDC) for 34 days (doc. 1 at 7). He alleges the traffic tickets were "not true" and that Officer Piggins violated his Fourth Amendment rights as well as 18 U.S.C. § 241 when he arrested him and took him to jail (doc. 1 at 4). As to Sheriff Wright and the SCSO, the plaintiff alleges that they violated his Fourth and Eighth Amendment rights as well as 18 U.S.C. § 242 and various state statutes as he was required to stay in his cell and denied hygiene, though he also alleges that he was forced to take showers 12 times (doc. 1 at 4,5,7).
The plaintiff states that he pleaded guilty and was released because he was not allowed to use the phone and could not bond out (Id. at 7). The plaintiff contends that he sustained psychological injuries from not knowing when he was going to be released and injuries to his teeth from being unable to brush them (Id. at 9). The plaintiff sues the defendants in their official capacities and seeks monetary damages.
DISCUSSION
The plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma pauperis statute. This statute authorizes the district court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action "fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted," is "frivolous or malicious," or "seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). As a pro se litigant, the plaintiff's pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007) (per curiam). However, even under this less stringent standard, the pro se pleading remains subject to summary dismissal. The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).
This complaint is filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which "'is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides 'a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'" Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 "creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of 'rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States." Rehberg v. Paulk, 132 S.Ct. 1497, 1501(2012). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
Spartanburg County Sheriff's Office
The SCSO cannot be sued under § 1983 because it is not a person. It is well settled that only "persons" may act under color of state law, so a defendant in a § 1983 action must qualify as a "person." However, sheriff's departments and similar groups of people or offices are not persons subject to suit under § 1983. See Harden v. Green, 27 Fed. App'x. 173, 178 (4th Cir. 2001) (finding that the medical department of a prison is not a person pursuant to § 1983); Nelson v. Lexington Cnty. Det. Ctr., C/A No. 8:10-2988-JMC, 2011 WL 2066551, at *1 (D.S.C. May 26, 2011) (finding that a detention center, as a building, is not amenable to suit under § 1983 and that Food Service Supervisors was a group of people not subject to suit); see also Post v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 750 F. Supp. 1131, 1133 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (dismissing city police department as improper defendant in § 1983 action because not "person" under the statute); Green v. Murdaugh, C/A No. 5:12-1086-RMG-KDW, 2012 WL 1987764, *2 (D.S.C. May 07, 2012), adopted by 2012 WL 1987259 (D.S.C. June 04, 2012) (dismissing because police department was not subject to suit under § 1983). Therefore, the SCSO is not subject to suit under § 1983.
Eleventh Amendment Immunity
With respect to the plaintiff's allegations against Sheriff Wright and Officer Piggins in their official capacities, they are entitled to immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. The Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts from entertaining an action against a state. See, e.g., Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978) (per curiam) (citations omitted). Further, Eleventh Amendment immunity "extends to 'arm[s] of the State,' including state agencies and state officers acting in their official capacity," Cromer v. Brown, 88 F.3d 1315, 1332 (4th Cir. 1996) (alteration in original) (internal citations omitted), because "a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official's office . . . [and] is no different from a suit against the State itself," Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (internal citation omitted). Therefore, Eleventh Amendment immunity protects state agencies and state officials sued in their official capacity from liability for monetary damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. "[U]nder South Carolina law, the sheriff and sheriff's deputies are State, not county employees." Edwards v. Lexington Cty. Sheriff's Dep't, 386 S.C. 285, n. 1 (2010). As a result, the plaintiff's claim for monetary damages against Sheriff Wright and Officer Piggins in their official capacities under § 1983, is subject to summary dismissal because they are both entitled to immunity pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment.
Sheriff Wright and Officer Piggins - Individual Capacity
Even if the plaintiff intended to make claims against Sheriff Wright and Officer Piggins in their individual capacities, his allegations are insufficient. To the extent the plaintiff is alleging a malicious prosecution/improper seizure claim against Officer Piggins for arresting and jailing him, such claim is barred because the plaintiff pleaded guilty. In Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), the Supreme Court held that:
[W]hen a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.In so holding, the Heck court found that § 1983 actions for unlawful conviction or confinement necessarily require a finding that the plaintiff's underlying criminal proceeding terminated in his favor. Id. at 484-86. Here, the plaintiff stated he pleaded guilty. Because the plaintiff has not shown that he received a favorable termination of the March 3rd charges, the plaintiff fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted with respect to a Fourth Amendment claim.
512 U.S. at 487.
As for the allegations against Sheriff Wright, the plaintiff appears to name him solely as the official in charge of the SCSO; he makes no allegations that Sheriff Wright personally denied him hygiene or other privileges. To successfully allege a conditions of confinement claim against Sheriff Wright, the plaintiff must show that the Sheriff himself was aware of the plaintiff's purported mistreatment and was deliberately indifferent thereto, causing the plaintiff's injuries. No such allegations are presented here.
Federal and State Statutes
The plaintiff alleges that the defendants violated Title 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242. However, while these are federal statutes dealing with civil rights violations, they are part of the criminal code of the United States, and cannot be used as a vehicle for civil prosecution. As for the alleged violations of S.C. Code of Laws Sections 24-5-80 and 24-9- 30, the court should abstain from considering these state law claims. The plaintiff's state law claims could be considered by this Court through the exercise of "supplemental jurisdiction," which allows federal courts to hear and decide state law claims along with federal claims. Wisconsin Dep't of Corrections v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 387, 118 S.Ct. 2047, 141 L.Ed.2d 364 (1998); 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Federal courts are permitted to decline supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) if "the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction." Here, the Complaint fails to state a claim for a constitutional violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Thus, this Court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiff's state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). See Lovern v. Edwards, 190 F.3d 648, 655 (4th Cir.1999) ("[T]he Constitution does not contemplate the federal judiciary deciding issues of state law among non-diverse litigants.").
RECOMMENDATION
By order dated September 10, 2018, the undersigned gave the plaintiff an opportunity to correct the defects identified in his complaint and further warned the plaintiff that if he failed to file an amended complaint or failed to cure the deficiencies, the undersigned would recommend to the district court that the action be dismissed with prejudice and without leave for further amendment (doc. 9). The plaintiff failed to file an amended complaint within the time provided. Accordingly, in addition to the reasons discussed herein, this action should be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) for failure to comply with a court order. Therefore, the undersigned recommends that the district court dismiss this action with prejudice and without service of process. See Workman v. Morrison Healthcare, No. 17-7621, 2018 WL 2472069, at *1 (4th Cir. June 4, 2018) (stating that district court should, "in its discretion, either afford [the plaintiff] another opportunity to file an amended complaint or dismiss the complaint with prejudice, thereby rendering the dismissal order a final, appealable order") (citing Goode v. Cent. Va. Legal Aid Soc'y, Inc., 807 F.3d 619, 630 (4th Cir. 2015)).
s/Kevin F. McDonald
United States Magistrate Judge September 25, 2018
Greenville, South Carolina
The plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must 'only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'" Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a),(d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
300 East Washington Street, Room 239
Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).