Opinion
Civil Action No. 03-4625.
October 12, 2004
MEMORANDUM
Defendant Ridley School District ("School District") moves for summary judgment on Plaintiff Bonnie Strang's ("Ms. Strang") claims under the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 PA. CONS. STAT. § 950 et seq. ("PHRA"), and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. ("ADEA"). In its Motion, the School District contends: 1) that the PHRA claim related to the School District's refusal to renew Ms. Strang's contract as Middle School Band Director is time-barred; 2) that there is insufficient evidence to show the transfer of Ms. Strang from a position as middle school music teacher to music teacher for three elementary schools in the district was an adverse employment action; and 3) that Ms. Strang has failed to produce evidence demonstrating that the legitimate reasons asserted by the School District for the refusal to renew Ms. Strang's Band Directorship contract and the transfer were pretextual.
In her Complaint, Ms. Strang also asserted a gender discrimination claim, but she has since voluntarily withdrawn that cause of action. Therefore, that portion of the Motion for Summary Judgment as addressed the gender discrimination claim is denied as moot, and Count Three of the Complaint is voluntarily dismissed.
As discussed below in greater detail, because Ms. Strang failed to file her administrative charge within 180 days of the date on which the School District unequivocally informed her that her Band Director contract would not be renewed, her PHRA claim related to that decision is time-barred, and the Court grants the School District's motion as to the PHRA claim related to her removal from the Band Director position. See 43 PA. CONS. STAT. § 959(h) (requiring a plaintiff file an administrative charge within 180 days of the alleged act of discrimination).
Because Ms. Strang has not presented the Court with any evidence demonstrating that her transfer from middle school to the position as music teacher of three elementary schools in the district was an adverse employment action, the Court grants the Motion for Summary Judgment as to both the PHRA and ADEA claims related to the transfer.
Finally, because Ms. Strang was able to show that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the School District's alleged reason for its refusal to renew her contract or rehire her for the Band Director position was pretextual, the Court denies the motion as to that portion of the ADEA claim.
I. BACKGROUND
Ms. Bonnie Strang, who was 55 years old at the time of the events at issue in this matter, began working for the Ridley School District as the Middle School Band Director and a teacher of instrumental music in 1966. On June 12, 1998, the School District informed Ms. Strang that it would not renew her annual $3,000 contract as the Band Director for the Ridley Middle School. Although Ms. Strang reapplied for the Band Director position, she was not rehired. In August, 1998, the School District reassigned Ms. Strang to teach music at Eddystone, Woodlyn, and Leedom Elementary Schools in the district. The School District hired Mr. Rowlyk as Middle School Band Director and to be the music teacher at Ridley Middle School. Mr. Rowlyk was 28 years old at the time.
The parties disagree about the success of Ms. Strang in her various positions, and, not surprisingly, they disagree about the reasons for the personnel changes and decisions. Ms. Strang asserts that under her guidance the Middle School band was highly acclaimed, including one year being selected the best junior high school band in Pennsylvania; receiving first place superior ratings in most competitions it entered; being invited to perform for King Gustav of Sweden and other special events; and serving as substitute band for the high school marching band. Ms. Strang further opines that she neither violated any of the performance guidelines that had been instituted in 1997 nor was warned by the School District or its agents that if she had violated the guidelines she risked losing her Band Directorship contract.
The School District does not deny her successes as a band director, but suggests that the relationship struck a certain discord when several problems arose during the years 1996-1998 related to Ms. Strang's reported rigidity when dealing with students, parents, fellow teachers, and the administration. Specifically, the School District notes numerous complaints by parents about Ms. Strang's treatment of their children, including the lowering of one child's grade because of a missed practice and her refusal to allow students to be part of the stage band if they did not attend a Maynard Ferguson concert. Furthermore, the School District avers that Ms. Strang proved difficult in the course of heated discussions with School District officials about scheduling conflicts with other programs. The School District asserts that the school administration met with Ms. Strang some fifteen times to discuss problems with her band directorship.
On September 4, 1997, Ms. Strang met with the School District administrators to establish a "Ridley Middle School Band Philosophy." On September 7, 1997, Dr. Goldey, the middle school assistant principal, sent a memo to Ms. Strang and other members of the school administration discussing the agenda of the meeting and attaching a revised copy of the Band Philosophy. In the memo, Dr. Goldey wrote "in the event that you are unable to institute the modifications listed, let it be understood that your extra-curricular Band Directorship contract would no longer be offered to you." The Philosophy memo ends on an upbeat note: "your enthusiastic support of this idea was well received by all. We look forward to supporting you in this endeavor."
In a June 12, 1998 meeting at the end of the school year, the school administration informed Ms. Strang that her contract for Band Director would not be renewed, and that a new director would be hired. The school administrators told Ms. Strang at this meeting that the reason for their decision was her failure to abide by the guidelines outlined in the Ridley Middle School Band Philosophy. Later, when the School District publicized the opening for Band Director, Ms. Strang re-applied for the position, but the School District did not consider her application. Instead, the School District hired Mr. Rowlyk, the only other applicant. Mr. Rowlyk had taught elementary level music for fewer than five years before his appointment to the Band Director position.
In anticipation of the new school year, at an August 27, 1998 meeting, the school administration informed Ms. Strang that she was being transferred to her current position as the music teacher for three elementary schools. She filed an internal grievance and appealed the School District's decision. Her appeal was denied. Ms. Strang's base salary for her position in the elementary schools was and is the same as her salary for the position she had held in the middle school. Without the Band Director contract, Ms. Strang no longer received the annual stipend of approximately $3,000 accompanying that extra position.
Ms. Strang asserts, and the School District does not deny, that prior to the events recounted above, other teachers, including Mr. Rowlyk, made comments about her age and told her that it was "time for her to retire." Ms. Strang further alleges that Mr. Rowlyk told her during the 1997-1998 school year that he would replace her. Ms. Strang does not contend that any member of the school administration, or anyone who was a decisionmaker with respect to the events at issue here, made derogatory (or any) statements about her age or affirmed Mr. Rowlyk's comments.
Ms. Strang filed a complaint with the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission ("PHRC") on December 24, 1998 alleging the School District discriminated against her based on her age and her gender. On May 29, 2002, her claim was rejected because the PHRC concluded that Ms. Strang failed to rebut the non-discriminatory reason for the actions taken by the School District and because she failed to file her complaint within 180 days of the alleged act of discrimination, namely the June 12, 1998 communication by which Ms. Strang was informed she would no longer hold the Band Director position. Ms. Strang filed her federal court complaint on August 8, 2003. The parties have completed their discovery efforts. The School District has moved for summary judgment.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate when the record discloses "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). Reviewing the record, the Court is obliged to "resolve all reasonable inferences in [the non-moving party's] favor." Jones v. School District of Philadelphia, 198 F.3d 403, 409 (3d Cir. 1999). The moving party, here the School District, bears the burden of showing that the record reveals no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). Once the moving party has met its burden, the non-moving party, here Ms. Strang, must go beyond the pleadings to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.Id. An issue is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986). In the case at bar, the parties agree that the facts recounted above are not in dispute (except where specifically noted by the Court), leaving the Court to consider which, if any, of the three claims now presented by Ms. Strang could lead a reasonable jury to return a verdict in her favor.
III. DISCUSSION A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Because the claim is substantially based on the ADEA, the Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The Court has supplemental jurisdiction over the PHRA claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367, since that claim is so related to the ADEA claim that it forms part of the same case or controversy.
B. Timeliness of PHRA Claim
A PHRA complaint must be filed "within one hundred eighty days after the alleged act of discrimination." 43 PA. CONS . STAT. § 959(h). Thus, the initial inquiry is to determine the meaning of the phrase "act of discrimination," in the context of timely filing of complaints for such conduct. In Chardon v. Fernandez, 454 U.S. 6 (1981), the Supreme Court found the proper focus for a timeliness inquiry is on the "time of the discriminatory act, not the point at which the consequences of the act become painful." 454 U.S. at 8 (emphasis in original). The Supreme Court held in Chardon that "respondents were notified, when they received their letters, that a final decision had been made to terminate their appointments. The fact that they were afforded reasonable notice cannot extend the period within which suit must be filed." Id. Here, Ms. Strang admits that she filed her administrative charge on December 24, 1998, some 195 days after June 12, 1998, the date on which she was notified and knew that her contract as Band Director would not be renewed by the School District. However, Ms. Strang argues that her claim was in fact timely filed, because she was not replaced until August, 1998. Understandably, Ms. Strang urges the Court to see the August 1998 events as triggering the running of the 180-day filing period.
After completing its investigation, the PHRC concluded that Ms. Strang's complaint was time-barred. According to the PHRC, the "alleged act of discrimination" pertaining to the School District's decision not to renew Ms. Strang's Band Director contract occurred on June 12, 1998, when Ms. Strang was informed her contract for the Band Director job would not be renewed. InKoprowski v. Wistar Institute, 1993 WL 106466 (E.D. Pa. April 6, 1993), the Court held that "courts should give considerable weight and deference to the decisions and interpretations made by the agency empowered to enforce the statute because of the agency's experience and expertise in the area." Id. at *8. I concur that considerable weight properly should be attributed to the decision by the PHRC, and find the conclusion of the PHRC that the "alleged act of discrimination" occurred on June 12, 1998 is consistent with Chardon, supra.
The PHRA is to be "interpreted as identical to federal anti-discrimination laws except where there is something specifically different in its language requiring that it be treated differently." Fogleman v. Mercy Hospital, Inc., 283 F.3d 561, 567 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing Dici v. Commonwealth, 91 F.3d 542, 552 (3d Cir. 1996)). Thus, the timeliness of Ms. Strang's filing under the PHRA may also be evaluated by reference to the ADEA where time periods run from the occurrence of an "unlawful practice."
The ADEA requires the filing be done within the required time "after the alleged unlawful practice occurred." 29 U.S.C. § 626(d). This same language is used in the Civil Rights Act, which was the language at issue in Chardon. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); Chardon, 454 U.S. at 8. However, in the present case, the Court is asked to rule on the applicability of the PHRA statute, which states that the required filing time is 180 days after the "alleged act of discrimination." Both parties agree, and the Court finds, that the minor language differences between the state and federal statutes under examination here do not rise to the level of "language requiring that [the state statute] be treated differently." Thus, the Court considers the Chardon case to be controlling in this analysis.
The issue for this Court is to identify the discreet "time of the discriminatory act." In the context of this case on this issue, the operative event was the notification to Ms. Strang that her Band Directorship contract would not be renewed, not when she learned who was replacing her. Her claim is that the School District discriminated against her based on her age by not renewing her contact as Band Director. The date she learned of her replacement is not the "time of the discriminatory act," because, according to Ms. Strang, the School District must have nonrenewed her contract all the while intending to replace her with someone younger. Therefore, the Court holds that the alleged "act of discrimination" in this case occurred on June 12, 1998. Because Ms. Strang did not file her administrative complaint within the requisite 180 days, the School District's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted as to Ms. Strang's PHRA claim arising from the non-renewal of the Band Director position.
C. ADEA Claim
Ms. Strang also asserts that the School District violated the ADEA by transferring Ms. Strang from her position at the Ridley Middle School to her position at the Eddystone, Woodlyn, and Leedom Elementary Schools based on the School District's alleged desire to have a younger person teach music at the Ridley Middle School. The School District denies Ms. Strang's contention, and argues that the redeployment was unrelated to her age, but was based on concern about her performance at the Middle School position.
The burden-shifting analysis established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), is the appropriate analysis for summary judgment motions in cases alleging age discrimination where there is no direct evidence of discrimination. Torre v. Casio, Inc. 42 F.3d 825, 829 (3d Cir. 1994). In order to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination, a plaintiff must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she: (1) is at least 40 years of age; (2) was qualified for the position; (c) suffered an adverse employment action; and (d) was replaced by a sufficiently younger person to permit an inference of age discrimination. Ryder v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 128 F.3d 128, 136 (3d Cir. 1997). These elements are not to be construed too strictly, but depend on the facts of the particular case. Jones, 198 F.3d at 411.
If Ms. Strang has established a prima facie case, the School District must "articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action at issue." Id. at 412 (citing Keller v. Orix Credit Alliance, Inc., 130 F.3d 1101, 1108 (3d Cir. 1997)). Ms. Strang then must point "to some evidence, direct or circumstantial, from which a factfinder would reasonably either (1) disbelieve the employer's articulated legitimate reasons or (2) believe that an invidious discriminatory reason was more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of the employer's action." Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 764 (3d Cir. 1994).
1. Adverse employment action
The School District argues that Ms. Strang does not demonstrate that she suffered from an "adverse employment action." Adverse employment action is defined as one that "alters the employee's compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, deprives her of employment opportunities, or adversely affects her status as an employee." Robinson v. Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 1299 (3d Cir. 1997). In this case, Ms. Strang claims that her reassignment from the middle school to the elementary school level is the adverse employment action.
A transfer or change in the nature of the employment can amount to an adverse employment action. See Jones v. School District of Philadelphia, 198 F.3d 403, 412 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding a school teacher's two transfers, first, out of his physics teaching position to a less-desirable science position and, second, to a school with a bad reputation, was an adverse employment action); Torre v. Casio, Inc., 42 F.3d 825, 834-35 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding that there was a genuine issue of fact as to whether the company had transferred the plaintiff to a position that was destined to be eliminated). However, here Ms. Strang essentially admits that she has presented no evidence that her new school assignment was objectively a worse place to work, that the new position was going to be eliminated, or that she was placed in a "doomed to failure" situation. Indeed, Ms. Strang acknowledges that her compensation, benefits, vacation, prognosis for longevity and/or success, contract terms, and privileges of employment remained the same. Ms. Strang solely relies on her personal assertion that the work is less prestigious, suggesting that her argument on this point is basically that she simply does not like teaching in elementary school in the position to which she has been transferred. There is no objective reason offered, and no evidence presented, why her current music position in the School District's elementary schools is not equivalent to her former position for purposes of evaluating her claims. Indeed, given the value of the elementary school experience, the Court was not surprised by the total absence of any evidence suggesting that elementary schools are any less important that the divisions for older age groups.
In Hussein v. Genuardi's Family Markets, 2002 WL 56248 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 15, 2002), the Court rejected the argument that a lateral move from one store to another store was an "adverse employment action." Id. at *6. Other cases also hold that a lateral move with no pay change is neither an adverse employment action nor a demotion. See, e.g., Sznaider v. Livengrin Foundation, Inc., 2001 WL 34368919, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 21, 2001) (holding that the plaintiff's unhappiness with her change in job status, but without any evidence of diminution of pay or job duties, fails to meet the requirement of an adverse employment action). See also, Appeal of Santee, 156 A.2d 830, 832 (Pa. 1959) (holding that a reassignment from secondary to elementary school is not a demotion).
Apropos of this case, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court has held that reassignment of teachers is necessary for the proper administration of the school system. Franson v. Bald Eagle School District, 668 A.2d 633, 635 (Pa.Commw.Ct. 1995); Olson v. Board of School Directors Methacton School District, 478 A.2d 954, 955 (Pa.Commw.Ct. 1984). These reassignments are neither demotions nor do they represent the school administration relegating certain teachers to "bad" positions. As recognized by the Commonwealth Court, redeployment of teachers is an essential part of utilizing a limited workforce and resources to educate children in the public schools.
Therefore, the Court grants summary judgment as to the job transfer claim. However, the claim for failure of the School District to renew Ms. Strang's position as middle school Band Director was clearly an adverse action, a conclusion which the School District does not refute. Thus, the failure-to-renew claim is not defeated for failure to satisfy this element of an age discrimination claim.
This claim is dismissed both under the ADEA and PHRA, because, as previously noted in this Memorandum, it is a general rule that the PHRA is to be "interpreted as identical to federal anti-discrimination laws except where there is something specifically different in its language requiring that it be treated differently." Fogleman v. Mercy Hospital, Inc., 283 F.3d 561, 567 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing Dici v. Commonwealth, 91 F.3d 542, 552 (3d Cir. 1996)). There is no language to differentiate the prima facie requirements of the ADEA from the PHRA, so the prior discussion applies equally to the PHRA as to the ADEA.
2. Pretextual Reason for the Adverse Employment Action for the ADEA Claim Arising from the Non-Renewal of Ms. Strang's Contract
Once a defendant has articulated a non-discriminatory reason for an allegedly adverse employment action, which neither party disputes the School District did articulate here, the plaintiff must discredit this articulated reason by pointing to evidence that shows the employer's articulated legitimate reason is unbelievable or is unworthy of credence. Ryder v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 128 F.3d 128, 136 (3d Cir. 1997).
The relevant issue is not whether any pretextual argument can be made, but whether the plaintiff can first marshal any evidence that the defendant's actual motivation was discriminatory.Billet v. CIGNA Corp., 940 F.2d 812, 825 (3d Cir. 1991). The School District asserts that, since there is "nothing suspect, implausible, unreasonable or unusual about [its] decision[s]," Ms. Strang has failed to demonstrate that the School District had a discriminatory motive. The School District also emphasizes that the only record reference to any discriminatory language directed against Ms. Strang came from her peer group, namely, other teachers, not decisionmakers in the school administration or at the district level itself. Such remarks by nondecisionmakers solely cannot support a claim of discrimination, particularly when the remarks are remote in time to the actual act, as here where the comments to which Ms. Strang points were made more than a year prior to the School District's non-renewal of Ms. Strang as Band Director. Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509, 545 (3d Cir. 1992).
However, when someone allegedly hires a significantly less experienced candidate over a more experienced candidate, a reasonable inference can be made that there is a discriminatory motive for the hiring. McCullough v. Real Foods, Inc., 140 F.3d 1123, 1129 (8th Cir. 1998). Ms. Strang contends that she was indeed more qualified than her replacement. She also argues that there is no documentary evidence that shows the School District had reprimanded her in the past, or even that the reason for her not being renewed was related to concern over her job performance. Ms. Strang notes that the School District relies almost exclusively on the depositions of the various school administrators to prove their articulated reasons, whereas her own deposition frequently contradicts the assertions of the administrators on this issue. Ms. Strang argues, and the Court agrees, that these competing depositions present an undeniable question of the credibility of various witnesses to be resolved by the factfinder at trial.
Therefore, a "genuine issues of material fact" certainly remains, and the School District's Motion for Summary Judgment is denied as to Ms. Strang's ADEA claim related to the School District's decision not to renew Ms. Strang's contract as Band Director.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants in part and denies in part the School District's Motion for Summary Judgment as outlined above. An appropriate Order consistent with this Memorandum follows.